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
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THE FUTURE OF THE
SOUTHERN SLAVS

THE FUTURE *of* THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

BY

A. H. E. TAYLOR



LONDON

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PREFACE

IN the summer of 1915 it was suggested to me that an article contributed by me to the *British Review* on the Renascence of Serbia might be expanded into a volume on the subject. When eventually I acted on this suggestion, instead of expanding the article in question I thought it better altogether to enlarge the scope of what I had written into a volume on the future of the Southern Slavs rather than to confine myself to the more limited design and to the past. Some paragraphs of Chapter I, and a portion of Chapter III section II, appeared in the *British Review* for April 1915, and the greater part of the second section of Chapter VI dealing with the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 appeared in the same Review for September 1915; the latter article in its original form was also reprinted by request in Mr. Crawford Price's book *Light on the Balkan Darkness*. With these slight exceptions the matter of this volume is entirely new.

It has frequently been said in connection with proposed reconstructions of the map of Europe that you should not divide the bear's skin until you have killed the bear, and in some quarters all such proposals are consequently deprecated. In spite of the finality with which some people regard a proverb as being invested there are very good reasons why, so far as South-Eastern Europe is concerned, the supposed application of this particular proverb should be disregarded. It is, for instance, advisable if you are out hunting to know what sort of animal you are after; if it is a bear that you are hunting it is not wise to arm yourself with a shot-gun. In this case, moreover,

part of the bear's skin has been promised already by those in authority, so that the question has been opened up. More especially is such discussion not only advisable but even necessary in regard to the Balkans. Hitherto the attitude of the general public towards Balkan problems has been one of indifference tempered with annoyance at certain small nations whose affairs are continually threatening to set other people by the ears, while the attitude of our Foreign Office, if not actuated always by indifference, though indifference has largely been present, has constantly been based upon a misapprehension of the problems at issue. Our Balkan policy, if it deserves the name at all, has been carried on from hand to mouth and has usually at any given moment sought the line of least resistance regardless of the ultimate results. Even if popular opinion is to have less say on the subject of the terms of peace than is sometimes claimed for it, and if those terms are to be framed by those whose conduct of the Eastern Question has been so remiss, yet it is probable that the public will have much more influence than it has possessed in similar circumstances in the past. All classes of the community have suffered grievous losses in the war, and it is natural that they should demand that the settlement should be thorough and as permanent as possible. Unfortunately the mass even of educated people is but ill-informed of the real issues in the Balkans; the problem has not been studied in the past, and consequently, so far as the general public is concerned, there is no clear idea of the aims to be pursued in the future settlement. Particularly is this true of the Southern Slav question whose solution for many is contained in the phrase "compensations for Serbia". To the general indifference there has been one exception which is furnished by Bulgaria. Bulgaria has been regarded as almost the sole important factor in the Balkans, her well-advertised claims are known, and the ceaseless reiteration of them has in many people wrought the conviction that they must be well founded. While this result has been largely due to

the skilful Bulgarian propaganda, it has also its origin in the circumstances under which Bulgaria gained her independence with the upshot that she, the Balkan Prussia, has taken a place in the hearts of some Englishmen which is really quite unique, and which furnishes a not inapt commentary on the concluding phrase, at any rate, of Bishop Creighton's remark when told that something would go straight to the heart of the English people: "A very nasty place to go to, the last resting-place I should like to be found in—a sloppy sort of place, I take it".

My object, then, has been to attempt to set forth the main features of the Southern Slav problem as they exist to-day, and the solution at which we should aim. Of necessity, in discussing territorial questions I have assumed such a complete victory for the Allies as will result in the dismemberment of Austria. However unlikely such a victory may seem in view of the past mishandling of our resources, the want of grip and energy of our rulers, and the bungling ineptitude which seemed intended to prove the truth of the saying that a democracy can neither keep peace nor make war, it is the only possible basis for such a study as this. If the Central Powers win outright the peace will be dictated by them on their own terms, while, if the victory of either side be less complete, as the extent of such victory cannot be foreseen, so no discussion is possible of the resultant terms of peace, which will vary with the nature of the victory. The hypothesis adopted enables us at any rate to examine what is the ideal settlement which should be aimed at in proportion to the success which may attend our arms and our consequent ability to enforce our views. Since the close of the Napoleonic wars there has been no such opportunity for a national readjustment of European relations, and if the opportunity be lost now it may never recur, and in any case can only recur at the same hideous cost. A partial settlement will leave a chronic state of unrest in the Balkans, and this fact must be realized by the British public if its influence is to be

used aright. No war weariness should induce us to relax our striving for an out-and-out victory, *coûte-que-coûte*, and not the least of the benefits to be attained will be found in the settlement of the Southern Slav question for, as I have endeavoured to indicate, it is in a real sense our affair also.

The difficulty of writing such a book under present conditions has been greater than will be realized by those who have not essayed a similar task. Some topics have perforce been avoided altogether, others barely indicated, and this quite irrespective of their importance.

I wish to offer my thanks to those to whom I am in various ways indebted. The publication of this book has been delayed for various reasons, and while the foreign matter has been brought up to date, the references to the English Government are to the administrations of Mr. Asquith. The circumstances attending the formation of Mr. Lloyd George's administration, the arguments adduced for the change, and, I think, the results already attained, afford an amply sufficient justification for the strictures on its immediate predecessors which may be found in these pages.

I have used the Serbo-Croat names of the Dalmatian towns and islands, as the use of Italian names has proved a fertile cause of misapprehension as to the real nationality of their inhabitants. Moreover, this usage is in accordance with the growing practice of making use of the correct native names of places save where long familiarity and custom have resulted in a genuine English form which it would be pedantic to disregard. Serbo-Croat names have been spelt in accordance with the "Croatian orthography". The Orthodox Serbs use the Cyrillic alphabet which is phonetic, the Croats use the Latin alphabet modified in order to render the sounds of the language and to represent the more numerous letters of the Cyrillic. Thus *c* (which in pronunciation is either *k* or *s*) is rejected and made use of as an arbitrary symbol, while the sound of other letters is modified by various diacritic marks. It is a pity that the

Croatian orthography is not more extensively used, as its adoption would avoid a great deal of unnecessary confusion. The name of General Živković, for example, I have seen spelt in at least six different ways (Jivkovitch, Givkovich, Zhivkovics, etc.), and similar cases sometimes leave one in doubt as to who or what is intended. The Croatian script is not an artificial "system" of transliteration, but the script in use for the common language by that part of the race which employs the Latin alphabet. Moreover, like the modern Cyrillic alphabet, it is the result of a scientific reform, the work of Serbo-Croat philologists of the early nineteenth century. There is consequently no need to supersede it by any "system" or attempt to render words phonetically, the latter in any case impossible, as the English letter-signs vary in value. I append a Table of the necessary letters.

c = ts in sound

ć = ch

č = tch

š = sh

ž = French j

j = y .

lj = liquid gl

nj = liquid gn

r has a vowel sound, e.g., Srb.

Lj is sometimes written (presumably in order that one Cyrillic symbol may be represented by one Latin symbol) Í; nj, ņ; and dj or gj, đ: dž corresponds to a single Cyrillic character.

The following list of Serbo-Croat place-names with their equivalents may be of use:—

Bar, Antivari

Brač, Brazza

Cres, Cherso

Dubrovnik, Ragusa

Gruž, Gravosa

Hvar, Lesina

Korčula, Curzola

Kotor, Cattaro

Kranjska, Carniola

Krk, Veglia

Lastovo, Lagosta

Ljubljana, Laibach

Lopud, Mezzo

Lošinj, Lussin

Mljet or Mlet, Meleda

Rijeka or Rieka, Fiume

Šibenik, Sebenico

Sipan, Giuppana

Spljet or Splet or Split, Spalato

Sušac, Cazza

Trogir, Traù

Vis, Lissa

Zadar, Zara

Zagreb, Agram

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The Future of the Southern Slavs

CHAPTER I

A PLEA FOR SERBIA

IT might seem at first sight unnecessary to commence a volume dealing with our Balkan ally and the Southern Slavs with a plea for Serbia, whose enormous sacrifices in the common cause and indomitable valour entitle her to the fullest possible measure of gratitude from her allies. Unfortunately, however, such a plea is by no means superfluous, but forms a very necessary prelude to the study of the pressing problems that attend the future of the Southern Slavs, in view of the influences which are still working in England to their prejudice, and, looking upon them as mere pawns in the game, do not hesitate to urge that they should be sacrificed to the desires of their enemies, though it is true that the qualities of the Serb race, its progress, especially in military matters, and its prospects for the future, have won a recognition that in the past has been wanting, recognition even better founded in the history of Serbia during the last few years than is yet generally known. It is twenty years ago since the author first offered a plea for Serbia,¹ and in those days and for long afterwards that plea stood almost alone, for a few quotations will show that anti-Serb feeling has its roots in days long before the assassination of Alexander and

¹ *A Plea for Serbia*, "the Piedmont of the Balkans". *Westminster Review*, July 1897. This article is disfigured by the anti-Russian prejudice common at the time which, with fuller knowledge, I abjured soon after.

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Draga. In that article I wrote, "Of all the recently emancipated communities in the Balkans the most interesting, both from its past history and its probable future, is probably Serbia. It is undoubtedly that which, to all appearance, and if it plays its cards well, has the most brilliant future before it; for it will benefit not only by the break-up of the Turkish Empire in Europe, but also by the disappearance, in its present form, of another State—the Austrian". In that same year appeared *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, by that able and impartial authority Mr. William Miller, and it is interesting to note how widely different was his opinion. He gave it as his idea that the "dream of a great Serb Empire" was "unpractical".¹ Speaking of the Prince of Montenegro's play, *The Empress of the Balkans*, he remarked: "Into this drama the Prince has put those grand ideas which every Serb imbibes with his mother's milk and cherishes dearly, however unpractical he may admit them to be in his calmer moments. The restoration of the old Servian Empire, which rose with Dušan and fell, I believe, for ever, on the fatal field of Kosovo five centuries ago, is one of the Prince's daydreams".² Of the occupation of Bosnia by Austria he said: "The monarchy possesses resources, alike in men and money, which no independent Balkan State, no fantastic Servian Empire, could produce".³ "The notion of a great Servian Empire, of which Bosnia and the Hercegovina would form a part, or parts, is one of those fantastic daydreams which are repugnant alike to the teachings of Balkan history and the dictates of common sense".⁴ The use of the word "Empire" introduces a certain ambiguity into these judgments, but the general sense of the context and of what is generally meant by a Serb "empire" seems to include in his condemnation not only the idea of an empire, but of a greater Serbia confined to the Serb race, yet time has shown that these daydreams are, on the supposition of a victory for the Allies, on the eve of fulfilment.

¹ *Op. cit.* p. 33. ² *Ibid.* p. 47. ³ *Ibid.* p. 119. ⁴ *Ibid.* p. 128.

Mr. Miller, however, wrote with gravity and a real sympathy, and his conclusions were reluctant; far otherwise was it with the generality of writers. "Milan's miserable nation of pig-drivers" was the expression of a weekly illustrated paper which affected, and affects, an interest in foreign politics. The same paper accused the Serbs in 1885 of having as little stomach for the fighting as they had in 1876—the accusation of cowardice against this warlike and brave people has been a common one. On this latter point a leading Conservative paper in the mid nineties remarked that, having "little prestige to lose", there existed in Serbia an "absence of the stimulus of pride in past prowess". The same paper advocated about the same time the partition of Serbia between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. When the reform scheme for Macedonia was promulgated about eleven years ago, Old Serbia¹ was expressly excluded from its scope, the Serbs there being left to the mercy of Albanians. Mr. Brailsford, in his book *Macedonia*, remarked: "Servia is not exactly a credit to civilization, and one cannot say that her political extinction would be a serious loss to Europe",² a strange dictum from a Liberal and an adherent, in some cases a vehement adherent, of the principle of nationality. During the annexation crisis of 1908-9 the *Saturday Review* described the Serbs as "this rascal nation"; while at the time when, during the Balkan War, the question of a Serb outlet to the Adriatic was under discussion, Mr. Nevinson, another Liberal and nationalist, wrote contemptuously in the *Daily Chronicle* that doubtless a railway could be built to Porto Medua good enough to carry pigs. Mr. de Windt renewed the charge of cowardice: "As General B—— remarked, 'Every Servian is a soldier and

¹ The term "Old Serbia" (Stara Srbija) is used throughout in its historic sense as denoting the territory roughly corresponding to the former Turkish vilayet of Kosovo with the Sanjak of Novipazar. Since the Balkan War, it is sometimes applied to the kingdom as existing from 1878 to 1912, the recent gains being designated "New Serbia". This practice is needlessly confusing.

² *Macedonia*, p. 319.

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every soldier a chauvinist', and this is probably true—until war is declared. Then, as events have proved (at any rate during the past thirty years), the warlike ardour of the Servian perceptibly diminishes in proportion to the gradual approach of his foe"! Two days before war was declared the *Manchester Guardian* remarked: "If it were physically possible for Serbia to be towed out to sea and sunk there, the air of Europe would at once seem cleaner", a statement which provoked the comment that evidently that paper's version of Mr. Lloyd George's famous apostrophe, put in the mouth of Russia, would have been, "You dare to lay hands on that little fellow! Then I will take him out to sea and drown him".

To recall these dicta would be a task both thankless and harmful were it not that in many quarters the old prejudice remains and finds frequent expression, not always direct, with results that may prove extremely harmful to Serbia when the day of settlement arrives, as it has already done more to poison the relations between England and Serbia than the general public, which can judge only by official expressions of opinion, has any idea of. The lack of sympathy with which Serbia has been treated throughout the war by our Government, and by a large section of our publicists, is brought out in the history of the negotiations which were carried on in the summer of 1915 with Bulgaria, and in the articles which appeared at the time in the daily and periodical Press. The recital of the course of these negotiations will show the scant regard in which the interests of Serbia were held and the altogether exaggerated tenderness paid to the exacting demands, themselves not put forward *bona fide*, of her eastern neighbour. No doubt the part which diplomacy had to play was extremely difficult and its motives were innocuous, but neither the difficulty of the case nor the purity of motive offers adequate excuse for the manner in which our ally was treated and her interests made subservient to the behests of Bulgaria. Although the story is an old one, a brief recapitulation will serve to

¹ *Through Savage Europe*, pp. 194, 195. Popular Edition.

indicate the errors of our past dealings with Serbia, and the nature of the course which we should avoid steering in the future. I mention only such affairs as were known at the time.

From the commencement of the war Bulgaria adopted an attitude of dubious neutrality which indicated clearly the ultimate trend of Bulgarian policy, and when in November 1914 it seemed likely that the Austrian invasion would prove successful the mask was thrown off and so-called "bands" cut the vital artery of the Salonica railway at the very moment when the much-needed munitions were being forwarded to the army, and for some days Serbia in consequence stood in deadly peril. There followed in January 1915 the conclusion of a loan with Germany, or rather the payment by Germany of an instalment of a loan concluded before the commencement of the war. It was explained that the matter had no political significance and entailed no political obligations. It was obvious that Germany had no money to lend to neutrals without a *quid pro quo*, and above all that she was unlikely to export any gold in view of the efforts being made at home to gather the metal into the coffers of the Reichsbank; yet the explanation was accepted.

In the spring of 1915 took place the negotiations with Turkey with reference to the strip of territory on the right bank of the Marica through which runs the railway from Bulgaria to Dedeagač. In the negotiations with Turkey in 1913 Bulgaria had stood out for the whole of the line but had been forced to give way, a result which constituted a legitimate grievance. The final upshot of the negotiations of last year was that Turkey conceded the necessary area, some thousand square miles in extent. Again the explanation was given out from Sofia that the matter was purely commercial and of no political importance, and that it did not bind her future action in any way. Nothing could be more unlikely than that such a cession of territory should have been made without political obligation; the cession obviously was

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the outcome of a pledge for the future, otherwise all motive on the part of Turkey would be lacking. It would be difficult in any case to exceed the cynicism of the Bulgarian explanation even if the latter were taken at its face value. Possibly this very cynicism lent it credence, as being *prima facie* characteristic, at any rate Bulgaria's friends asked us to accept it as being correct, and apparently believed in it themselves. Finally came the mobilization of the Bulgarian Army on September 19, which followed the offer on September 1 of great concessions by Serbia. This mobilization could have only one meaning. There was a wide advertisement of a forthcoming Austro-German attack on Serbia, and an ominous significance attached to the fact that the final offer of concessions had been followed by silence on the part of King Ferdinand's government on that point while the possibility of a war with Serbia was more and more openly canvassed. A last exhibition of duplicity was given when Professor Stephanov came to England and gave what he called a message from M. Radoslavov to the English people,¹ breathing nothing but goodwill and expressions of devotion. This, we were assured by her friends, represented the real sentiment of Bulgaria, and all would yet be well. Their eyes were shut to the evidence of double dealing, and they continued to urge upon the country the policy of sacrificing our friends to our foes.

Beyond this the extreme Bulgarophiles in England proceeded at every turn to dot the i's and cross the t's of our diplomacy in their own sense and in a manner that was most injurious to our interests. The result was a general impression of feebleness on our part. We seemed to be going cap in hand to Bulgaria, as though success or failure in the war were dependent upon the line which she might choose to adopt, we were told continually that Bulgaria held the key to the Balkan position and that she must be made the pivot of our Balkan policy. Our natural

¹ *Vide* interview in the *Morning Post*, September 28, 1915.

friends became more and more bewildered and uneasy, and less and less inclined to throw in their lot with a side which seemed to care less for the interests of its friends than of its enemies, till at length we reaped the results which usually attend the conduct that sacrifices friends in order to placate enemies. In England a vigorous Press campaign was waged, and it was even seriously suggested that Russia should "coerce" Serbia, while the other Powers should threaten Greece with blockade, with a view to landing troops in Salonica to occupy Macedonia *for Bulgaria!*

The whole treatment of our ally savoured of inequality. National rights which in Dalmatia had been disregarded to the detriment of the Southern Slavs became a *sine quâ non* when it was alleged that they favoured Bulgaria; the strategic claims which elsewhere had weighed down the balance against Serbia became a feather-weight when urged on her behalf, and while the Entente set itself to realize Bulgarian unity it would not, and in view of its previous engagements to Italy could not, guarantee the unity of the Serbo-Croats. The concessions agreed to by Serbia went to the utmost limit of what it was reasonable to ask, and beyond: she abandoned the Salonica railway, placed another customs barrier between herself and the Ægean, surrendered Bitolj (Monastir), the terminus of another line to Salonica, while the reservation of Ochrida maintained contact with Greece in a purely formal manner, for a line to Salonica thence would perforce pass through Bitolj, though in the future a very roundabout way might be made through Korica and Castoria. With the exception of Ochrida and Prilip it was a return to 1912, in spite of all that had passed since then—the treacherous attack of her former ally, the blood shed in the second Balkan war, and the attitude of her foe during the present war. She gave far more than had seemed at all likely. I well remember the answer of a Serb publicist to a query of mine with reference to a possible surrender of the Monastir region: "Yes—after another Kosovo". Even so Bulgaria was not satisfied—nor were her friends in England.

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The unwillingness to face facts, the blind adherence to the Bulgarian legend, were maintained to the very end. It was not unnatural that Sir Edwin Pears, with his close and honourable connection with the very rebirth of the Bulgarian people should be willing, so late as October 8, apparently to accept assurances given to him from Bulgaria that no ministry could last a week, which proposed war with Russia or opposition to England, and that nothing would ever induce the Bulgarians to fight on the side of Turkey, and to plead that Bulgaria should be given another chance,¹ but others had not the same excuse. Even after the Russian ultimatum the *Daily News* on October 6 remarked, "We should like to think that the offer of the Entente Powers was still valid." Speaking two days later, Mr. C. R. Buxton said that he was not convinced that Bulgaria was going to war, and that he failed to find certain evidence, although to any one not wilfully self-blinded then at least the matter was clear to probation. Mr. H. M. Wallis, in a letter to *The Times* written on October 5, thought that the Bulgarian nation stood "in a light calling for our deep commiseration and forbearance". He added that in a popular song which he had received from Sofia, it was "the Greek and the Serb who are held up to execration. And with some reason". Two days before the news arrived of the Bulgarian attack, on October 9, the *Nation* still thought that there was a possibility that the German officers in Bulgaria were only on their way to Turkey, or existed only in the heated imagination of a hostile Balkan witness. It urged even greater concessions; "the offer might very easily be improved. It is worth while making a good offer, a high bid not merely for active support, but for a benevolent neutrality".² Yet, as has been seen, the offer was already as high as could be expected—Bulgaria's legitimate

¹ Letter to the *Nation* of October 9.

² It is only fair to state that the *Nation* gave an admirable example of impartiality by admitting to its columns lengthy letters whose contents would certainly not have received editorial endorsement, and this at a time when it was not easy to obtain a hearing for Serbia's case elsewhere.

claims had been more than met. Even the outbreak of war was followed by a final appeal from Messrs. C. R. and N. Buxton, which caused renewed hesitations in neutral Balkan quarters. The net result was to create the impression, as indeed it showed the reality, of excessive weakness on the part of our Foreign Office, and an inability to grasp the essential facts of the situation.

The warnings which we had received from Serbia fell on deaf ears and met with no response. As early as April our Foreign Office was informed that Bulgaria had come to an understanding with the Central Powers, but nothing was done to avert the danger that thus presented itself. On July 7 the Minister of Serbia in London suggested the sending of British troops to Serbia, but the military authorities replied that we had no troops to send, being then engaged in a further extension of the disastrous Dardanelles expedition, which could only be carried on at all so long as Serbia remained unsubdued. It was in truth one of the most crucial points of the war, and the neglect of Serb advice and interest has entailed vast responsibilities and difficulties on the Allies. Following on the Bulgarian mobilization of September 19 Sir Edward Grey "was pressed" on September 27 for his opinion on the Serb proposal to strike at Bulgaria while that Power was in the midst of mobilization—a contingency which forms the nightmare of every general staff—and gave a reply which could only be construed as a refusal. It was Serbia's last chance, hazardous indeed, but the only course which in the absence of allied aid¹ promised any prospect of success, but it was denied to her and she was left alone to bear the double attack made upon her when her adversaries had completed all their preparations methodically and without let or hindrance.

To the very end our Government had yielded itself to the Bulgar obsession which has marked our dealings with

¹ On September 24 an offer was made to *Greece* to send troops to Salonica in order to aid her in the fulfilment of her treaty obligations. They began to land on October 5.

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the Balkans ever since 1878, an obsession which nothing that Bulgaria could do or leave undone was able to shake. Everything was looked upon from the standpoint of Bulgaria, her claims were always just, her opponents always in the wrong, nor was any penalty ever to be exacted from her however often she might bite the hand that had fed her. For thirty years she has been the spoilt child of Europe immune from the criticism and the exigencies which are the lot of other States. The excuse made for our diplomacy in the spring and summer of 1915 that its aim was to restore the Balkan League, means in effect that our Foreign Office had set itself to a task which was foredoomed to failure and which it was unable to recognize as based upon an utter ignorance of realities; it was the hegemony of the Balkans which Bulgaria desired and not an accord based on mutual rights. M. Rizov has stated¹ that a governing motive was to prevent Serbo-Croat union and the formation of a Southern Slav State which would be more powerful than Bulgaria. People and ruler were at one, the Bulgarians have always docilely followed the lead of King Ferdinand, and in the absence of any serious movement of dissent must be held to have endorsed his policy. When the last two Obrenović sovereigns of Serbia pursued an anti-national policy Serbia was in a continual ferment, as all the world was made aware, and when finally no other way of escape from ruin offered itself the issue was the tragedy of 1903. No such exhibitions of opposition to the policy of King Ferdinand have ever manifested themselves among the Bulgarians, and the attempt to dissociate the people from their ruler fails.

It is difficult to sum up this political desertion in any other terms but as the betrayal of Serbia, and whatever may be the outcome a terrible responsibility lies upon our Government for all the misery that has ensued to that unhappy country, the devastation of her towns and

¹ *Vide* report of an interview given by M. Rizov, Minister in Berlin, to a German paper, in *Westminster Gazette* of November 17.

villages, the losses of her Army, the hideous sufferings of her people, the death of thousands of women and children, the exile of her aged and heroic King. For the blood of these martyred women and children whose bodies littered the *via dolorosa* to the Adriatic our Government stands largely answerable at the bar of history and to the Serb race. Even the promise of aid given by our Foreign Minister in the House of Commons on September 28 was subsequently explained away as being a promise to Greece to help her to keep her treaty obligations!

In more senses than one we owe an immense debt to the valiant and sorely tried Serbs, and a plea on their behalf is not out of place as a prelude to the study of Serbia's future. That country has suffered much from the nature of the news diligently disseminated throughout Europe by Austro-Hungarian agencies. No tale was too disgraceful nor too unlikely for use as a means of prejudicing western European opinion. Rumours of plots that had no existence, of unspeakable infamies concocted by the ingenious brains of the Ballplatz, of unrest and disorder, were spread abroad in the justified anticipation that if enough mud were thrown some would be sure to stick. The result has been that perhaps no people in the world has been more misrepresented and misunderstood than the Serbs. Its strong spirit of national feeling became mere turbulence, its justifiable hopes lawless ambitions against the consecrated *status quo*, its impatience of misrule a sign of its anarchical proclivities. No English journalist was resident in Serbia, and all news came through tainted sources. One example will suffice here. When King Alexander was killed all the world was told that his body had been hacked about and thrown out of the window into the garden beneath, where it was left to lie all night, yet I have been informed that there is no word of truth in these details. My informant was the son of one of King Alexander's Prime Ministers, and his own authority was the personal testimony given to him by the king's physician. "It was all an Austrian lie" was the sense if not the actual words of my informant's summing up. Not long ago a

cultured gentleman of my acquaintance remarked that it would be well if the Balkans were put under the sea for twenty-four hours, and that he regarded the Serbs as little better than their own swine. The prejudice showed itself even in details—not until three or four years ago would writers acknowledge that after all perhaps the Serbs knew their own language best and that Dušan did not mean “the strangler”. English ignorance of the Serbs was profound.¹ On the occasion of an address by Father Nicholas Velimirović a lady came up to him after he had concluded and asked him, in the writer’s presence, in what language he would have spoken if he had spoken in his native tongue! He replied with politeness and gravity that he would have spoken in Serb, which was a Slav language with a general affinity to Russian for example. The question interested others, for almost immediately a gentleman approached to say that he and his friends had been interested in his ability to speak English and would like to know what was his native tongue; had the Serbs a “language of their own”? A second polite explanation was followed not long after by the approach of a third enquirer who had evidently a little dangerous knowledge of the ethnological perplexities of the Danubian regions. He asked whether the native language of the Serbs were not Čech!

Prejudice and ignorance form a powerful combination, and it is evident that, to a great extent, neither has been dispelled even yet. Unless, however, we are to make, or allow our rulers to make, great and lamentable mistakes at

¹ So well-known a publicist and eminent colonial governor as Sir Harry Johnston has suggested the cession of the Hercegovina to Serbia as the solution of the Southern Slav question! Such an idea from such a source gives the measure of the profound ignorance of the very elements of the Southern Slav problem which exists in the most “well-informed” quarters. “Reasonable compensation to Serbia and Montenegro would take the form of the cession to Serbia of Herzegovina, to Montenegro of Cattaro, and to Serbia and Montenegro of the right to deal as they pleased with all Albania with the exception of the circumscription of Valona and Epirus”.—*Germany, Africa, and the Terms of Peace. Nineteenth Century Review*, April 1915, p. 765. Serbia and the Hercegovina are not coterminous!

the end of the war it is essential not only that prejudice should be dissipated but ignorance dispelled. It is likely enough, and in view of the sorry record of our diplomatists reasonable enough, that the general body of public opinion will demand a much larger voice in the settling of the terms of peace than has been the case in the past, and if that public opinion is not itself to be misled and misleading it is necessary that the English people should possess not only a working knowledge of the historical past of the Serbs, but a clear appreciation of the nature and extent of the problems with which they are faced in the present. A boggled and patched-up peace in the Near East, born of sheer weariness and distaste will be the sure precursor of fresh wars, and will even afford our present enemies opportunities of which none know better how to avail themselves.

CHAPTER II

A SKETCH OF SERB HISTORY

I

THE RISE OF SERBIA

A SHORT sketch of the history of the Serbs will serve the purpose, which is all that is attempted here, of setting out recent events and their outcome in something of their historical setting, the aim being rather to illustrate the forces at work than to give a full account of events which in so short a compass would be impossible, and if attempted useless. We are accustomed to speak of the Balkan peoples as young nations, and the phrase is, of course, abundantly justified if we regard the present scale of their culture and the stage which they have attained in political growth. It has to be remembered at the same time that in another sense they are by no means young nations. They had reached and passed their early zenith before Prussia had come into existence, and in the Middle Ages they were the legitimate heirs of, and sharers in, the culture of Byzantium. It has been their tragedy that just when they seemed on the point of entering on the course of development which marked the fifteenth century—and this applies in a very real degree to the Serbs—they came under the curse of the Turkish blight. It was not so much that the current of their development was changed, or even forced to take a subordinate position, but that all they were, or possessed, in the way of political development, cultural achievement, architectural and artistic

aspiration, was stamped flat under the Turkish hoof, and simply ceased to exist. For four hundred years only their heroic ballads served to keep alive among the Serbs the memory of past greatness, and to lift, in even the slightest degree, the life of the people above the level of an arduous struggle for mere physical existence. When in the nineteenth century these people attained again to a national independence it is not surprising, not only that they retained many of the marks of long generations of servitude, but that they took up the threads of national life where they had been snapped short by the Turkish conquest. It is this that without doubt largely accounts for the "historical" bias which has marked their renewed consciousness. If we could imagine English history a blank from the reign of Richard II to our own days, how much more real and present a character would seem Edward III, and with what different eyes should we look upon the battles of Crécy and Poitiers, the question of Calais and Guienne. It is not altogether their fault if they are apt to exasperate the twentieth century with detailed claims derived from the fourteenth. All this has to be remembered if we would understand and sympathize with, in the proper sense of the word, their present aspirations and outlook.

The original home of the Southern Slavs, which term is usually confined in practice to the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, but in this connection includes the primitive Slav element in the Bulgarian people, is supposed to have been to the north of the Carpathians between the Vistula and the Dnieper. They entered the Balkan Peninsula towards the end of the sixth century, and in 620 are said to have been invited to migrate into his dominions by the Emperor Heraclius, though a steady infiltration had been going over a long time. The general appellation of these tribes was Slovene, and it was not till the ninth century that specific designations for their main divisions emerge. The term Slovene is used also in the same general sense as its English derivative Slav, e.g. in such expressions as

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Slovenski Jug—Slavonic South—Macedo-Slovenes, and so forth. It is apparently an accident of history that the term has become also the specific appellation of one of the three branches of the Southern Slavs, possibly because that small branch retained the original general name while its more numerous neighbours acquired particular designations of their own. The terms Croat and Serb emerge in the ninth century, but it is significant of the fundamental identity of these two kindreds that to the early Byzantine historians the terms are interchangeable.¹ The origin of these names is unknown, but it is interesting to note that the name Serb is applied to themselves by the nearly extinct Slavs of northern Saxony and the adjacent part of Brandenburg who are usually known to us as Sorbs or Wends. When the Serbs and Croats eventually differentiated themselves the former are found to be occupying roughly the kingdom of Serbia, as existing from 1878 to 1912, Old Serbia (the country round Prizren, Priština, etc.), the late sanjak of Novipazar, Montenegro, southern Dalmatia, the Hercegovina, Bosnia and Srem or Syrmia, the Timok being their immemorial boundary on the east while in Dalmatia the Cetina divided them from the Croats who occupied northern Dalmatia, Croatia, and Slavonia, the Triune Kingdom as it came later to be called. In addition to these regions the early Slav invaders overran the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. The modern Bulgaria and Macedonia were occupied by them, while the population of Albania and northern Greece has a large Slav element in its composition which in the former case is specifically Serb.² The easterly and southern invaders seem to have been largely lacking in the sense of a specific national consciousness, as has been the case to the present day in the case of the Macedonians,³ possibly

¹ *Cit.* Nevill Forbes. *The Southern Slavs*, p. 16.

² "Perhaps the majority of place-names of central and northern Albania are Slavonic". H. M. Brailsford, *Macedonia*, p. 231. Professor Eliot Smith holds that the Albanians are part of the original Slav population. British Association Meeting, 1915.

³ See also Chapter VI.

because the original population of these regions was more numerous than in the north-west, and so the invaders became more mixed in blood.

In 679 the Bulgarians under Isperich conquered Lower Moesia, inhabited by these Slav invaders, and founded their first Balkan Bulgarian Kingdom. The new-comers were of Tartar origin, and though they were to a certain extent absorbed by the conquered, the nation has always been marked by many of the characteristics of its non-Slav ancestors. Though the new immigrants learned the Slav tongue—to this day Serb and Bulgar can understand one another, “when they choose”, as Sir Charles Eliot says—their manners and polity remained sharply distinguished from those of their Serb neighbours. They owned the sway of an autocratic Khan who lived in Oriental seclusion, and throughout its history the people has been marked by the passivity with which it has submitted to its rulers. The absence of any really serious revolt against Turkish domination cannot be ascribed entirely to the geographical features and position of the country, less difficult than Serbia or Greece, less remote than Roumania. The acquiescence in the absolute rule of the powerful Stambulov, and latterly with disastrous results in that of King Ferdinand, seems to be of a piece with what is known of their ancient history. In early days indeed this trait in their character allowed of a rapid development of the power of the Bulgarians, lending itself to the designs of their Khans and Tsars, and in consequence they were centuries before the Serbs in the consolidation of a serious political power. With the advent of the Bulgarians the era of considerable invasions of the Balkan Peninsula came to an end till the coming of the Turks. At this period, then, we find the north-western area in the hands of the Serbs, with the Bulgars to the east of them. In Albania the original stock had been pushed back into the utmost recesses of the country—the Mirdites are said never to have come under the effective sway of any foreign Power—while in the rest of the

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land there was a considerable infiltration of Serb blood. Macedonia had been largely occupied by a Slav stock which must have been akin to the Serbs, but here their blood was largely diluted with elements derived from the provincial population of the later Empire. To this day the still dwindling element of that stock—much more numerous in the Middle Ages—perched on the mountain-tops of the Pindus and its offshoots overlooking the land that once was theirs preserves alike in its language and its name—Aromuni—the boast of descent from the lords of the ancient world, though these Vlachs (Kutzo-Vlachs, lame Vlachs) as they are generally known, can have had but comparatively little genuine Roman blood. Still, Romanized Thracians as they were, they have preserved to us the “provincial” of the Empire. The metropolitan province of Constantinople was Greek, though, as has been seen, in its native land Greek blood was now largely intermingled with Slav.

In organization the Serbs were poles asunder from the Bulgarians. They owned to no fixed central authority, but were a congeries of tribes acknowledging the rule of their tribal chiefs known as župans but knowing nothing, save at rare intervals, of a national ruler. Indeed, to the end of the Middle Ages not only were Croats and Serbs separate, but the Serbs of Bosnia under their Bans occupied a position of precarious and delicately balanced independence between the rival claims to suzerainty of the Kings of Hungary and the Kings and Tsars of Serbia. From time to time one župan more powerful than his contemporaries would succeed in uniting a large part of the nation under his sway as Grand Župan. The fissiparous tendencies of Serb political life have been the bane of the nation, a truth that at long last has been bitten deep into the consciousness of the Southern Slavs. It has, however, to be remembered that this very impatience of restraint and fierce love of independence has been of untold value to the people in times of adversity, keeping alive through centuries of oppression the hope of eventual

national restoration and a burning desire to achieve it. Time and again they rose against the Turks till the very name of Serb stank in Turkish nostrils, and they never sank as others into a sluggish and oriental acquiescence in their servile political lot. The character of their country also, mountainous and split up into a number of comparatively small valleys, and mountain-surrounded basins—the poljes of Balkan geography—as it forbade any easy road to national unity so it fostered a sturdy love of independence and a vigorous local life.

Of the early centuries of Serb history but little is known, and in a brief sketch such as this that little need not detain us long. It is not till 830 that we find definite mention of the name of a Grand Župan in Voislav, while shortly after in the rule of one Radoslav occurred the most momentous event of early Serb history, and one of the most momentous in the whole history of the race, the conversion of the people to Christianity according to the Orthodox Eastern rite by the Southern Slav apostles, SS. Cyril and Methodius, who in the reign of Boris of Bulgaria converted the people of that country also. The Croats received their religion from western Roman sources, and for centuries the difference in religion has been perhaps the most weighty of the causes which have kept the two branches of the race apart. One of the causes of this difference is to be found not only in the more westerly position of the Croats, and the greater accessibility of their land to Western influences, but in the fact that, roughly speaking, the dividing line between Croat and Serb had been the old dividing line of the Eastern and Western Empires as it became that of Eastern and Western Christianity. From S. Cyril is derived the name of the “Orthodox” alphabet in use among the Serbs which has undergone various modifications since its introduction, perhaps in the form of what is known as the Glagolica alphabet; the Croats on the contrary use the Latin alphabet with various diacritic marks in order to represent the sounds of the language, the Cyrillic alphabet being

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phonetic. The reign of the Grand Župan Vlastimir was marked by a three-year attack by the Bulgarians under Presjam, the predecessor of Boris, which was beaten back. This is perhaps the earliest occasion on which the two peoples came into conflict since their institutions had crystallized into something like a definite polity, and marks the beginning of the secular struggle between them. The almost constant state of warfare between Serbs and Bulgars may be likened in its insistence, if not in its scale, to the agelong conflict between France and "the Empire", and both alike have been renewed in our own days with an intensity of feeling which has certainly not lessened with the passage of the centuries. This is sometimes forgotten by those who, ignorant apparently that the mutual animosity has its roots deep down in the history and historical consciousness of Serb and Bulgar, not only preach, as well they may, a gospel of peace to them, but allow their desires to outrun the realities of the situation, and either take their hopes for facts or grow impatient if those hopes are deceived. That nothing in the Balkan Peninsula is so desirable as the laying aside of the feud which has worked such incalculable mischief is as true as that the same applies to Frenchman and German, or Englishman and German, in the west, and the two feuds are likely to have their end about the same time. At any rate it is not for western Europe to take up a superior attitude of pained surprise or lofty disdain towards the blindness to their real interests of the two peoples who might well respond with *Quis tulerit Gracchos?* This hatred between the two kindred peoples is a fact which is as saddening in the thought for the future as in the record of the past, but it is a fact to ignore which is simply a mark of incompetence. The two nations are antipathetic, which may be due to the fact that after all the Bulgars are at least as Mongol, or at any rate non-Slav, as Slav. Boris renewed the attack against the sons of Vlastimir but was unsuccessful, and Muntimir, the eldest of them, succeeded his father as Grand Župan, an office which was tending to become hereditary.

What Boris had been unable to accomplish was effected by his son the great Tsar Simeon, founder of the first Bulgarian Empire. Under him the territory ruled by the Bulgarians touched the three seas which are the goal of Ferdinand in our own time, and included the eastern part of Serbia with Niš and Belgrade. In 917 Simeon made Paul Branković Grand Župan after Peter his predecessor had been decoyed into the Bulgarian camp and treacherously murdered. Frequent Serb revolts were put down with ruthless severity and the country ravaged to desolation. After the death of Simeon Serbia became independent under Česlav, who succeeded in driving out the Bulgars, but after his death Serb history becomes again almost a blank illumined by the emergence of one or two names. We hear of a John Vladimir who was defeated by Samuel the successor of Šišman, who had founded the "western Bulgarian Empire", and subsequently murdered by John Vladislav the last of the early Bulgar tsars. As nearly always, the fortunes of the two nations were inversely connected, and the fall of the Bulgars and their subjection to the Eastern Empire for a century and a half saw the dawn of a better day for the Serbs, and in 1040 Stephen Voislav ruled as an independent sovereign over Zahumlja, Zeta, and Raška, while Michael his son was even recognized as king by Gregory VII, though he was wise enough to maintain his peace with the Emperor. Both Serb and Bulgar rulers engaged in an occasional flirtation with the Papacy when they required aid against Constantinople.

It was with the accession of the Nemanja dynasty in the middle of the twelfth century that the heroic epoch of Serb history began. It must be remembered that the kingdom of Serbia as it existed from 1878 to 1912 is by no means the cradle of the original Serb State, and cannot be spoken of in any historical sense as Serbia "proper" as is sometimes loosely done. The designation "Serbia" has been a political term for that portion of the Serb lands which has been independent, and Danubian

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Serbia in no sense corresponds to East and West Prussia as "Prussia proper". At this time the Serb tribes had coalesced in certain fairly constant State formations both in the Primorija or coast region along the Adriatic, and Zagorija or transmontane region of the interior. Bosnia, as the name implies, had its centre in the basin of the river Bosna. To the south lay Zahumlja, or the land of Hum or Primorija, corresponding roughly to the modern Hercegovina. Zeta, another subdivision of the territory, was the representative of the present Crnagora, or Montenegro. The main Serb State was Raška, which comprehended the late sanjak of Novipazar, Old Serbia to the Šar mountains, and western Serbia (as we know it) as its permanent elements, the eastern part of Serbia was at times in dispute with the Bulgars, as Belgrade and the Mačva were with the Hungarians, for in those days as in our own time the configuration of the latter region made it hard to defend. Vidin in Bulgaria was also a subject of dispute.

Stephen Nemanja, whose accession to power is variously dated as 1143 or 1160, succeeded after conflict with his brothers in uniting Zahumlja, Zeta, and Raška under his sway as Grand Župan, and henceforth to Raška in its varying extent may be applied the name of Serbia. He was born at Dioclea in Zeta in which town, now ruined, some have seen the origin of the name of Diocletian. For a time he succeeded in uniting Bosnia also to his dominions. His attempts, however, to throw off the suzerainty of Constantinople ended in failure, and he was obliged to make a humiliating submission to the Emperor Manuel Comnenus. After the death of Manuel in 1180 Nemanja was able to gather strength, and he added Niš to his territories, and five years later he assumed the title of king though he was never crowned. In 1195 he abdicated the throne in favour of his son, became a monk under the name of Simeon and retired to the famous monastery of Hilindar which he had founded on Mount Athos, where he died four years later. From his time the sovereigns of Serbia

almost without exception bore the name of Stephen, probably from its signification—a crown. The titles of these sovereigns are variously given: I have followed the simplest nomenclature, giving the other designations by which they are sometimes known in brackets. Nemanja's son Stephen II (sometimes called Stephen Uroš) had to contest his right with one of his brothers stirred up by Andrew II of Hungary, jealous of the rising power of Serbia, but the quarrel after some fighting was allayed by the king's youngest brother who had taken orders and is known in Serb history as S. Sava. The latter indeed might almost in some respects be considered the veritable founder of the new State, composing quarrels, organizing the Church, and pressing on the work of civilization.¹ Stephen II at one time coquetted with the Pope and was even crowned by a Papal legate; but this act, though undertaken for political reasons, aroused the Orthodox resentment of his subjects. He was acknowledged by Baldwin the first Latin Emperor of Constantinople as independent King of Serbia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia. S. Sava, who became Archbishop of Užice, crowned his brother again and henceforth the latter was known as Prvovenčani, "the first crowned". The organization of the State was completed by the recognition accorded by the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Serb Church as an autonomous body in 1219. War with Hungary followed the acquisition of Bosnia with results favourable to the Serbs. The reigns of Stephen III (Rodoslav) and his brother Vladislav were contemporaneous with the growth of the second Bulgarian Empire under John Asen II. The former of these sovereigns obtained Syrmia, a province which throughout the Middle Ages had a close connection with Serbia and stood somewhat apart from the kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia, from Hungary and Vidin from Bulgaria, but the latter acquisition was lost by his brother.

¹ "If the father endowed the Serbian State with a body, the son gave it a soul". Father Nicholas Velimirović, *Religion and Nationality in Serbia*, p. 7.

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The country made notable progress during the reign of a third brother, Stephen IV the Great (Stephen Uroš I), who ascended the throne of Serbia in 1242. He married Helena, a niece of Baldwin of Constantinople, of whom her husband's subjects were lavish in praise for the manner in which she seconded the king's efforts for the advancement of his people. A curious memorial of her is to be found in the ruined church of Gradac, in the former sanjak of Novipazar, which in a strange land bears the impress of the French Gothic of her own people. The reign was one of peace on the whole, though Serbia had to undergo a terrible invasion of the Mongols, who were not defeated till they had ravaged the country to the shores of the Adriatic. Among other measures taken for the development of the country was the opening up of the mining industry, for which experts were sought, it is interesting to note, from Germany. His son Dragutin was married to a daughter of Bela IV of Hungary, and the close of the old king's reign was marked by one of the domestic tragedies which form so great a blot on the medieval history of Serbia. Assisted by the Hungarians, his son rebelled, and Stephen the Great was forced to abdicate in 1276. Stephen Dragutin did not long enjoy the fruits of his unfilial conduct, for, stung by remorse, he abdicated in favour of his younger brother, reserving for himself the Mačva and Syrmia, which for many years he ruled with success.

Under Stephen VI Milutin (Uroš II Milutin), Serbia entered upon a vigorous policy which aimed at aggrandizement at the expense of the Eastern Empire, which since the decline of the Bulgarian realm, under the successors of John Asen II, had been in possession of Macedonia. Milutin's first campaign was completely successful, and the Serb armies penetrated to Seres, to the Aegean, and the lakes of Ochrida and Prespa. Not all these conquests were retained, however, but northern and a part of central Macedonia remained in his hands. Equally successful against the Bulgarians, he took Vidin in 1291, and on a renewal

of the struggle against the Greeks made himself master of Durazzo and northern Albania, gains which were partly offset by the loss of the Mačva to Hungary on the death of his brother, the Hungarian king claiming that province equally with Syrmia as a fief of his crown. A new foe was encountered by the Serbs for the first time in the reign of Milutin. The rapid advance of the Turks in Asia Minor might well give pause to the Balkan sovereigns who were wasting their manhood in perpetual warfare among themselves. Possibly it was an appreciation of this danger that caused Milutin during the latter half of his reign to pursue a policy of peace and alliance with Constantinople. This alliance was sealed by the marriage of Milutin, a widower, with Simonis, daughter of Andronicus II. In 1303 the Serbs, in alliance with the Greeks, crossed into Asia Minor and took part in the victory of Angora, in which the Turks were defeated. Twelve years later Serbia again came to the help of Constantinople, in dire straits owing to an invasion of Thrace itself by the Turks. Again the Serbs were successful, and the Turks were swept into the Sea of Marmora. Progress was marked in the development of civilization in the kingdom, and Milutin has been called the "roi bâtisseur" of his dynasty. The monastery of Hilindar was rebuilt on a larger scale by him, and religious or charitable foundations, the results of his munificence, were found in cities so widely dispersed as Salonica, Skoplje, Seres, Constantinople, and even Jerusalem, while the church of Banjska, near Mitrovica, also owned him as founder. In his reign the archiepiscopal see of Serbia was removed from Užice to Peć, in Old Serbia, which since 1913 has been included in Montenegro. His later domestic relations were unhappy, for his wife Simonis intrigued against the succession of his eldest son in favour of her own child. The former was exiled to Constantinople, and his stepmother is said to have given orders for him to be blinded; but the executioner only pretended to do his horrid work, and after seven years the prince returned to his country with eyesight unimpaired, and in 1321 ascended the throne as

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Stephen VII, Dečanski (Uroš III). Milutin was buried at Sofia.¹

The new monarch's surname was derived from the most magnificent monument of medieval Serb art in existence, the Monastery of Dečani, near to Peć, and, like that town, now included in Montenegro. Built of red and white marble by an architect from Kotor (Cattaro), one of the Serb seaports, it has impressed itself with a species of superstitious veneration upon the minds of even the wild Albanians in its vicinity, and retains to this day the contemporary frescoes of early Serb monarchs. During the retreat of the Serb army in 1915 the Albanians are said to have made an attempt to destroy that which they have respected through the centuries, so contaminating are the methods of war as practised by the apostles of kultur.² Stephen Dečanski's short reign was marked by almost continuous warfare. The king of Hungary attacked the Wallachs, who were allies of Stephen, and the latter crossed the Danube and inflicted a crushing defeat upon his enemies. In 1325 he lost Zahumlja to Kutromanić, Ban of Bosnia, in a war which had been caused by a revolt of the Serb king's half-brother. At the end of his reign he had to face a combination of Bulgaria and the Eastern Empire. His action was prompt and brilliantly successful. Interposing himself between the forces of the two allies he crushed the former State in the battle of Velbužd, not far from Kustendil, in which the Bulgarian Tsar, who had repudiated his wife, Stephen's sister, was killed. Stephen placed his sister on the Bulgarian throne as regent, and henceforth, almost till the final destruction of Bulgaria by the Turks, that State remained the vassal of her western neighbour. The Greek forces retreated without awaiting

¹ The "Church of the Holy King" in which he was buried has lately been renamed by the Bulgars, who glory in the desecration of Milutin's remains.

² The report apparently has done an injustice to the Albanians. That which the wild caterans respected was left to the Austro-Bulgars to spoil. The treasures of Dečani have been carried away and a sordid dispute has been carried on by the robbers as to their respective shares.

an attack. Yet again domestic differences marked the close of a Serb king's reign. Unmindful of all that he had suffered, Dečanski took a Greek princess for his second wife, with the usual result that she intrigued against her stepson Stephen—the rôle of royal women in Balkan politics has indeed been miserable. Stephen took up arms against his father and dethroned him. Shortly after, in 1331, the old king was strangled, it is said against the new king's wish and at the instigation of the nobles.

With the reign of the new king Stephen VIII, Dušan, medieval Serbia reached its zenith. For years the surname of this monarch was derived by English historians from a Serb word, *dušiti*, to strangle, and was translated as "the strangler", or "throttler". It is now agreed that the Serbs were right in deriving it from *duša*, "the soul", and that it means the soul or darling, i.e. of the people. A Serb has informed me that the former derivation was absolutely impossible on grammatical grounds. He resumed the war against the Byzantines, and his earlier campaigns were completely successful, Andronicus III himself being forced to suffer a siege in Salonica, and to agree to terms of peace. As a result of the treaty of 1340 Dušan was left in possession of Albania, with the exception of Durazzo, Epirus, Acarnania, Thessaly, and Macedonia to Seres, except for the town of Salonica, while Bulgaria was a vassal State, so that he was master of the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula. Soon after he intervened in the civil war waged between the Empress Anne and John Cantacuzene, taking at first the side of the latter, but reversing his action when Cantacuzene called in the aid of the Turks. Here we can perceive the prescience of Dušan, and perhaps the first germs of the project on which he was occupied at the time of his death. So great was his power and so extensive his dominions that the title of king no longer sufficed for him, and he assumed the title of Emperor or Tsar. A corresponding increase of dignity was conferred upon the Archbishop of Peć, who was elevated to the title of patriarch, and so commenced the long and glorious history of

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the Patriarchs of Peć, who were in sadder circumstances to uphold the standard of Serb nationalism when all temporal authorities had been forced to bow the neck to the Turkish yoke. The Patriarch of Constantinople protested, and it was not till some thirty years after that he consented to recognize the new dignity of the Serb metropolitan. One of the first acts of the new Patriarch was to crown his sovereign in company with the Archbishop of Ochrida, the occupant of which ancient and historic see was titular metropolitan of Bulgaria and Justiniana Prima. At Skoplje on Easter Day, 1346, Stephen Dušan was crowned and proclaimed "Emperor of the Serbs and Romans". The title was in itself a challenge to Byzantium, and seems a clear indication that the Tsar had by this time definitely decided on his grand design, though it was another nine years before he put it into execution. Henceforth the Tsar assumed imperial state and titles, while he founded an order of chivalry, the Order of S. Stephen.

Nor was Dušan a conqueror only; he resembled the great sovereigns of history in being a lawgiver also. He caused a code to be drawn up based upon a recension of Byzantine law to which some two hundred articles were added, said to have been largely derived from the laws of the Adriatic seaport Budva, and in 1349 was promulgated his famous *Zakonik*, or law code. So far as I know this code has never been translated into English, and the most complete analysis of some of its main provisions is to be found in Prince Lazarović-Hrebeljanović's book *The Servian People*. What is there set forth is sufficient to arouse the interest of any one who has passed through the Oxford History School and possesses a working knowledge of medieval English law and the social conditions on which early law throws so illuminating a light. It is to be hoped that, when peace restores our scholars to their accustomed studies, one of them, his interest aroused in our Balkan ally, will give himself to the work of bringing out an annotated edition of this code, even though the actual translation should be the

work of another hand. It shows us a state of society and a law procedure which can fitly be compared with their countertypes in the West, while to the interest of the resemblances is added the force of contrast provided by those elements which were due either to native Serb conditions or to the influence of Byzantine elements. The Tsar was also a patron of learning, and built many schools and churches.

The following year saw the conclusion of a fresh peace, this time between Dušan and Cantacuzene who had made himself master of the Greek Empire and with Turkish aid had won back some of Dušan's most easterly conquests. What the latter, however, lost in the east he more than recovered in the west. Louis the Great of Hungary, jealous of the Tsar's power, invaded the latter's dominions only to experience the fortune that had attended the Hungarian adventure against Stephen Dečanski. Defeated by Dušan he was compelled to give up Belgrade, while Bosnia, together with Zahumlja (the Hercegovina), which latter province had belonged to Bosnia since 1325, passed under Dušan's hand. Kotor, Budva, Bar (Antivari), on the Adriatic were likewise part of the Serb realm, that particular portion of the Adriatic being known as the Serb Sea, while friendly relations were entertained with the independent Serb republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa). Thus was formed at length the medieval Great Serbia, the union of the Serb stock in one realm. Even before this year—ten years earlier if the date be correct—Dušan had claimed the lordship of Bosnia. Sir Arthur Evans has told how in the Franciscan monastery of Fonjica in Bosnia he saw "The Book of Arms of the Nobility of Bosnia or Illyria, and Serbia, together set forth by Stanislaus Rubčić, priest, to the glory of Stephen Nemanja, Tsar of the Serbs and Bosnians. In the year 1340"; the book, however, being a late medieval copy of the original. The present aspirations of the Southern Slavs are here prefigured, for among the quarterings of the various Serb provinces surrounding the white double

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eagle are to be found the three bearded kings of Dalmatia, the hounds of Slavonia, and the red and silver chequer of Croatia.

In 1355 Dušan took up in earnest his great design. The Greek Empire was growing feebler and feebler. Apart from a short stretch of the coast of Asia Minor all that remained to the successors of the Roman Emperors was the metropolitan province of Constantinople and Thrace; the Turks were passing from conquest to conquest, and already the Serbs had met them in battle in Europe; evidently Constantinople was doomed to pass into alien hands, and Dušan determined that those hands should be his own. He formed the magnificent project, altogether justified by circumstances, of seizing Constantinople and refounding the Eastern Empire under himself. Had the scheme succeeded, and had Dušan lived out his life to a normal span, the whole current of European history might have been changed. As it was the strength of the imperial city enabled it to hold out for another hundred years, and if it had been held by a young and vigorous race, reawakening to life the dry bones of the Empire, rejuvenating its population and institutions with fresh impulses and a new awakening, it might well have been that the Turks would have thundered at its gates in vain, and south-eastern Europe have been spared five hundred years of misery, bloodshed, and decay. Not less than 80,000 men were gathered beneath the Tsar's standard, he had sympathizers in the city, and there was no adequate military force to oppose him. Adrianople and Thrace fell into his hands, and he had approached within forty miles of the capital when he was suddenly taken ill and died in December 1355, the circumstances raising the suspicion that he had been poisoned by the Greeks. He was not yet fifty years of age. His forces immediately turned back, and bore the body of the great Tsar to be buried in the monastery which he had founded in Prizren the Tsarigrad. In that tomb was laid also the future of Serbia.

In estimating the civilization of the medieval Serbs we

are faced not merely with scanty documentary evidence but with the almost complete obliteration of those enduring monuments which in happier lands speak so eloquently across the ages. Yet sufficient remains to indicate that they were not the savages or mere copyists that they have been represented to be. Their civilization has two sources; the more immediate was Byzantium with its great traditions and continuous life from Roman times, on the other hand, especially through Dubrovnik, that lamp of the eastern Adriatic, Serbia lay open to the influences of Italy and the West: the historic rôle of Serbia imposed upon her by her geographical position is to be at once the keeper of the gate between East and West and interpreter of the one to the other—a rôle which it is to be hoped she will shortly resume. But little description has appeared of the relics of Serb architecture, even from those who have seen them. It is necessary to go back to Denton's *Servia and the Servians*, published so far back as 1862, for anything like a reasoned account of some of its features.¹ Throughout, Serb architecture seems to have exhibited a *mélange* of western and eastern forms, which in some respects becomes more marked towards the close of the period. Some of the most beautiful churches, though by no means large judged by western standards, date from the last years of Serb independence and are the work of "Tsar" Lazar, his wife, and son. Such is the extremely beautiful little church at Kruševac, and the fine fortified monastery of Manassija,

¹ A short account is given in *Servia by the Servians*, edited by A. Stead. This section of the book, however, suffers from bad translation, the translator having apparently but little acquaintance with architectural terms. The term "Roman" for example is applied not only to Romanesque art, but, as the context shows, to Gothic. "Tambour" is untranslated, though its literal rendering, a "drum," is also correct technically. The climax is reached when, by a slip, the fourteenth-century churches are stated to be marked by the occurrence of a "polygamous tambour," a feature surely more suited to Mohammedan than Christian art! Still, read with care, the section is interesting and instructive.

whose towered enceinte still remains. It has been said that Serbia was on the point of developing a new style "First Pointed Byzantine," that is to say a style which combines many of the features of "First Pointed Gothic" with those of Byzantine architecture.

From the latter this later Serb architecture is distinguished by several features. Byzantine churches though they show a transept in elevation, do not generally show one in plan (in York Cathedral the great transept projects beyond the line of the aisles and therefore shows in plan, the smaller eastern transept shows in elevation, but as it is practically flush with the aisle walls does not show in plan); the Serb churches, however, which we are considering, possess slightly projecting transepts the projection taking the form of polygonal transverse apses. The place of a dome is taken by a low octagonal tower not unlike those to be found in some "Early English" churches as at Uffington, and these towers were covered by a pyramidal cap originally, though in some cases these have been mistakenly "restored" with bulbous domes of Russian type. Rose windows are a very prominent feature, and the likeness to Gothic is sometimes enhanced by the occurrence of "lancet" windows grouped in pairs, with a circle in the head but not under a containing arch. It is much to be hoped that in the future Serb architects, instead of copying the present academic art of the west, will set themselves to follow up the trend of their own traditions: to possess a national style of architecture which has not been "worked out" is indeed a boon, the greatness of which they do not seem hitherto to have appreciated as they ought. Owing to their history, moreover, it has never been superseded by any other tradition, only a few important buildings having been erected in recent times.

Of the social conditions which prevailed in medieval Serbia we can get information from Tsar Dušan's *Zakonik*.¹

¹ I rely in the following paragraphs on the analysis given in Prince Lazarović-Hrebeljanović's book already cited, vol. i, chap. vi. Some of his comments and comparisons are by no means free from partiality,

At the head of the great officers of State stood the Chancellor (Logothet) and by his side were found a High Steward (Veliki Čelnik) and Treasurer (Rizničknj Čelnik). For administrative purposes the country was divided into districts under administrators with the title of Knez. The Crown possessed large estates whose revenues, as was the case with the "ancient demesne" of England, were applicable alike to the personal expenses of the ruler and to the needs of State, while other receipts were derived from the hearth tax, from the mines, from judicial fines, customs dues, and the fixed contribution paid by Dubrovnik (Ragusa) in lieu of individual trade licences. Local administration was exercised through the Župa and the village (selo) each of which possessed its local assembly, the centre of the former being the grad, whose attributes and origin seem to be closely analogous to the Saxon burh.

The nobles (vlastela) were divided into two grades, great and small, both of which had places in the Sabor, or national council, to the exclusion of the commoners, though originally these latter had possessed rights of representation. The landed property of the nobles fell under two classifications, baština and pronja. The former of these was freehold, it could be disposed of after the consent had been obtained of the family, or zadruga, and confirmation by the Crown. The holder was bound to give military service and to pay the hearth tax. The second form of noble tenure was the pronja (πρόνοια). This was not a freehold but a life tenure, it could not be disposed of by sale or gift, and on the death of the holder it returned to Crown. Article 57 declared the pronja to be forfeit in the event of oppression of the tenants. The pronja represented an usufruct granted as stipend to State officials and dignitaries.

Below the nobles came the commoner (sebar). The first order of these, called Slobodnji Ljudi, or independent people, possessed baština, or freehold property, and was liable

but I see no reason to doubt the correctness of the translations given by him or statements made as of fact. The allusions to medieval English conditions are my own.

to military service. His position in other respects seems to have been in general not dissimilar in its social relationships to that of the English freeholder or tenant in socage, account being had of the fact that in Serbia the feudal system had but little hold in its organized western form. The second order of *sebri* was composed of the *merops* or *kmets*. This latter class composed the great mass of the population. Their property might consist either of *baština*, which however was encumbered with servitudes towards a noble's demesne, or of land rented from such a demesne. The *baština* could be aliened (Article 174) provided that there should be a work-hand to perform labour (*robot*) due to the lord's demesne. The duties are defined in Article 68 which forbade any exaction beyond the *robot* prescribed by law, and in the event of such exaction the *kmet* could cite the lord before the royal court, an improvement on the rights of the villein in the English court customary. Each *merop* house had to give the labour of one man for two days in the week, each tenant was further bound to give one day's work (all the tenants working together) at haymaking, and another in the vineyard; the hearth tax and military service were also due, as well as labour on public works, fortresses, and the like, the latter taking the place of the contributions in the form of taxes levied for a similar purpose on the nobles. Lodging and hospitality had also to be given to certain State officials on circuit. The position of the *merop* was so far superior to that of the English villein in that he was capable of possessing freehold property (*baština*) which the villein could not; on the other hand he owed labour service for his freehold, so that he was in respect of the latter somewhat in the position of the class in England which held their land in what has sometimes been called villein socage, the smallest class of manorial freeholders. In other respects, and if none of his land were freehold, he occupied very much the same place in rural and social economy as the villein. Article 22 enacted: "Merops who have

abandoned their land to go and settle on Church lands shall return to their original domain", and Article 201: "If a merop abandons his tenure, the overlord of his [*sic* ?the] domain, upon finding him, can have him punished, and exact a bond for good behaviour, but he cannot seize any of that merop's property". The application would seem to be to a merop not owning baština of his own, but holding of the lord.

The lowest class of all was formed by the otroks. These were strictly *ascripti glebae* but could not be transferred apart from the estate. Civil cases between otroks were decided before their lord, for criminal offences they were answerable to the royal courts. They may be compared to the lowest class of English villeins, the bordars and cottars of early documents. Legal slavery there was none. Article 21 enacted: "Whoever sells a Christian shall lose his hand and have his nose slit".

The administration of justice was in the hands of the royal courts, the country being divided into circuits (Article 179), while local justice was administered in the "grads" (head seat of a župa) by the court of the grad presided over by the Tjephalia (Greek kephalia), the captain or governor of the grad, in the villages by village courts composed of judges locally elected styled "good men" (*dobri ljudi*) presided over by the village elder: the suitors were the judges. In addition there were the ecclesiastical and commercial courts. Article 171 expressly enacted the subjection of the Sovereign to the laws; "In case My Imperial Majesty should give to any person a 'writing' . . . which is contrary to the law . . . the judge shall pay no heed to that writing, and shall judge regularly and according to law and shall see to it that his judgment is executed". Articles 184 and 185 forbade imprisonment without a writ of judgment or order of a judge—an anticipation by three hundred years of our Habeas Corpus. The pristavs, or sheriffs, were forbidden to act save in accordance with legal provisions. Article 152 ordained that both in civil and criminal cases a man could be

judged only by his peers "as in the time of my grandfather, the holy King Milutin".

The two blots on the code were the inequality of punishment for the same offence and the draconian severity of some of these punishments. Personal injury inflicted by a great vlastelin upon a lesser vlastelin was punished with a fine of one hundred perpers (one perper was equal to half a Venetian ducat or Serb zlatnik whose value was about nine shillings), in the contrary case the punishment was a fine of one hundred perpers and corporal punishment, but this differentiation did not extend to crimes against public order or the State. Article 145 ordered that villages where was found a robber or a thief should be dispersed, the robber hanged, the thief blinded. Parricides were burnt at the stake. Some examples exhibit both defects. Manslaughter committed by a noble against a sebar was punished by a fine of one thousand perpers, in the contrary event by a fine of three hundred perpers and loss of a hand. If a nobleman violated a gentlewoman both his hands were to be chopped off and his nose slit, for a like offence the sebar was hanged, but if, in the latter case, the sebar's offence was against one of his own order the punishment was loss of both hands and the nose to be slit, as in the case of a noble offending against his own order. Such draconian severity does not, however, ever seem to have been exercised in cases where the offence was obviously disproportionate; the cruelty, if such it be called, was reserved for crimes which rightly excited detestation and was not exercised in wantonness.


Merchants were protected and a brisk commerce was done with Dubrovnik (Ragusa). The produce of the mines enabled the sovereigns to hire mercenaries, heavy cavalry, from France, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. On the whole the picture presented is by no means unattractive. The *Zakonik* itself, in view of its date, deserves a very high place in legal records, and indicates a high degree of social and legal organization—Tsar Dušan

was no semi-barbarous monarch ruling his dominions with oriental caprice and despotism. The general position of the mass of the people was certainly superior to that occupied by the similar classes in central and western Europe with the exception, perhaps, of our own. There was no feudal oppression, nor feudal justice, or rather injustice, such as ground down the countryside where feudalism reigned supreme in its full development, as it never did in England, and the French peasant of the eighteenth century would probably have very willingly changed places with his Serb brother of the fourteenth. Speaking generally Dušan's code was superior to the contemporary systems prevailing in western Europe even in the more advanced States, and surprising though this may seem at first sight it is not so much to be wondered at when we remember that he had at his immediate disposal the code of Justinian and those legal principles which have so profoundly influenced modern western legal systems. Doubtless administration of this code would vary at different times. In a state of almost constant warfare the organs of government would frequently be functioning very badly, as they did in our country under the weak Lancastrian administration which led to the demand for "more abundant governance," yet it remains that the great Tsar endued his country with a good legal system in advance of those generally prevailing.

II

THE FALL OF SERBIA

The Serb Empire as distinct from the Kingdom of Serbia had been the work of Dušan and fell with his death. He had had no time in which to assimilate its new acquisitions or to set up therein a tradition of organized government under Serb auspices. Even in the Serb provinces the old fissiparous tendencies manifested themselves anew. The problem of all medieval States of any size was the difficulty



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of maintaining the central authority in their outlying provinces, the governors of which continually strove to establish for themselves an independent position; the Roman Empire alone with its close central authority and organized hierarchical services had achieved a solution the merits of which alone enabled its eastern member to endure till the fifteenth century. Added to this in Serbia the nature of the country itself, divided into separate river basins with difficult intercommunication, as it had facilitated in the early migrations the setting up of small clan States, so now made for the dissolution of the Empire into its component elements. Immediately the strong hand of Dušan was removed from the governors these began to agitate their independence. His successor was the young Tsar Uroš (Uroš V), a youth of nineteen and devoid of the vigour and decision of character which had marked out his father even at that age. Thessaly became independent, the Albanians regained their usual condition of independence or anarchy, Bulgaria ceased to be the vassal of the Tsar, Belgrade was lost to the Hungarians, and Bosnia under Stephen Tvrtko fell away from the Empire, which became now not even a pan-Serb Kingdom.

Within the Kingdom itself the same process proceeded apace, and is intimately connected with the name of Vukašin Mrnjavčević. It is a proof that the Serbs themselves were keenly conscious of the cause of their ruin that their popular legends hold up to detestation the names of the great rebels, and indeed impute to them crimes of which they were innocent, guilty as was their general conduct. Vukašin, who was governor of Macedonia, proclaimed his independence of the Tsar and even assumed the title of King of Serbia in 1366. According to legend he attacked Uroš and contrived his death some time in 1367; as a matter of fact, however, the Tsar survived his rebellious vassal.¹ In the meantime the Turks had occupied Adrianople, in 1360, and made it the capital of

¹ Lavissee and Rambaud, *Histoire Generale*, Tome iii, chap xviii, p. 915. This chapter is by the late Stojan Novaković and A. Malet.

their Empire, and began, under Murad I, to press upon the small Serb States which had been formed beyond the Struma. In 1371 King Vukašin, at the head of a combined army of Slavs, Greeks, Hungarians, and Wallachs marched against Adrianople, and suffered on the banks of the Marica a disastrous defeat at a spot thereafter known as Srb Sindin—"The Serb Rout". Vukašin himself is said to have been drowned in the river, or, as other accounts have it, was murdered after the battle for the sake of the gold ornaments he wore. In what remained to Tsar Uroš the Balčić of the Zeta (Montenegro), and the Altomanović of the land soon to be the Hercegovina had broken away before the death of the Tsar two months after the battle of Adrianople in December 1371.

Uroš had left no direct heirs and his dominions were disputed among the Serb princes. Of these Lazar Hrebeljanović, a connection of the Royal House whose name has become the very symbol of the tragedy of Serbia, was recognized as the ruler of Serbia north of the Šar mountains, with the exception of the territories mentioned above. Although he is always called in the legends Tsar Lazar, and is commonly considered the last of the Tsars, he never assumed the title, which indeed would hardly have consorted with his actual power, but entitled himself merely Knez or Prince. Another relative of the Nemanjas Tvrtko of Bosnia entertained designs on the higher dignity, and in 1376 proclaimed himself King of Serbia and Bosnia, but no warfare ensued between the two princes. Macedonia had fallen under the suzerainty of the Turks which was acknowledged by its ruler, the son of Vukašin, the far-famed Marko Kraljević (Marko the King's son) the great hero of a cycle of ballads which deal with his marvellous exploits and those of his magic horse Šarac. His seat was at Prilip, where he was to sleep till the hour of national resurrection was to strike, and when, in the first Balkan War of 1912, the Serbs avenged Kosovo, many of the soldiers ascribed their success to the presence, which they

affirmed, of Marko on Šarac who led them to the assault. In sober history he was a vassal of the Turk, and it is a mystery of popular legend how and why his figure assumed in the imagination of the whole of the Southern Slav race the place which it occupies. Lazar's strength was diminished by the necessity of beating back the attacks of the Hungarians, and in 1386 the Turks captured Niš and forced the prince to pay tribute and provide mercenaries for the Turkish armies.

Three years later occurred the great disaster which has burnt itself into the memory and historical consciousness of the Serb race ever since. Lazar had fixed the capital of Serbia, which at various times had been located at Raška (Novipazar), Priština, Prizren, and Skoplje, at Kruševac not far from the junction of the two main streams of the Morava, where he built the beautiful church which still exists, and the "White Tower", now in ruins, from which he set out on his last fateful campaign. An alliance was formed between Serbia, the Zeta, and Bosnia for a great attempt to drive back the tide of Turkish invasion. The two armies met on June 15, 1389, on the field of Kosovo (the "Field of Blackbirds"), and then was settled for five hundred years the fate of the Balkan Peninsula. The battle was long and stubbornly contested and the result was only decided, according to the legend, by the treachery of Vuk Branković,¹ a Serb noble who was in command of one wing of the Christian host and, while the issue was still in suspense, rode off the field at the head of 12,000 men in accordance with a previous agreement with Murad, who had promised him the throne of Serbia.² The Serbs,

¹ The legends have dealt hardly with his name. There seems to be no proof in fact of his alleged treachery, and his family became the leaders of the Serbs in their subsequent resistance.

² "The story is often repeated in Bosnia that at the time of the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878 an old Serb Moslem Bey named Branković was taunted by a Hungarian officer of Hussars who said, 'It was one of your name who ran away at Kosovo, and gave the country to the Turks'. 'Yes, yes, we know that, alas!' said the Bey, 'but remember, Major, the men under him were a contingent of Hungarian mercenaries'". Prince Lazarović-Hrebeljanović, *The Serbian People*, vol. i, p. 290 note.

overwhelmed by weight of numbers, gave way: the Turkish victory was complete. Both sovereigns lost their lives, for Murad, riding over the scene of the battle when all was over, was killed by a Serb knight, Miloš Obilić or Kobilić. The catastrophe impressed itself deeply on the minds of the Southern Slavs and has become the centre of the "Kosovo cycle" of Serb popular poetry and legend.

In these poems, where fact is mingled with fiction, all the incidents preceding and attending the battle are dealt with; the departure of Lazar the "Golden Crown of Serbia" from the White Tower of Kruševac; his attendance by his father-in-law Jug Bogdan and his brothers-in-law the nine Jugović; the choice offered him by the Virgin of a heavenly or an earthly crown and his acceptance of the former; the taunt levelled by Branković against the courage of Miloš; the proof offered to the latter who stole to the Turkish camp before the battle and slew the Sultan—this is the popular version—the fall of Lazar in the thick of the press (for the ballads will not admit that he was taken prisoner and executed); the news of the death of her husband and brothers brought to the Tsarica Milica at Kruševac by two ravens; and the curse of the Serbs on the head of Vuk Branković who on the field of battle had betrayed the all-glorious Tsar. Ever since, June 15th has been a day of mourning, while the red and black cap of the Montenegrins is said to typify the blood that was shed at Kosovo and mourning for the event. These legends served to keep alive the national consciousness of the defeated, and at Kumanovo it was to shouts of "Kosovo, Kosovo!" that the Serb infantry charged the Turkish line when the long-delayed day of vengeance was come and they were to enter again the great Dušan's capital.

With the battle of Kosovo ended the existence of Serbia as a sovereign State, but for some years it maintained its internal autonomy under Turkish suzerainty. Bajazet, the successor of Murad, was in no condition to push matters to extremes, and Stephen Lazarević was permitted by the conqueror to retain his father's dominions as "Despot" on

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payment of an annual tribute and the furnishing of a Serb contingent to the Ottoman forces; his sister, also, married the Sultan—a fact which gave the latter's successors a claim to the throne. The new ruler set himself to the organization of his State, procured Belgrade from the Hungarians and made it his capital, a change significant of the altered position of the country. Like his father, and indeed all the Nemanjići, he was a benefactor of the Church, and founded the great monastery of Manassija. After proving himself a loyal tributary to the Sultans—and it must be said in extenuation that he may well have considered that resistance would bring him worse evils in its train, while the Hungarians who had attacked Uroš V and Lazar on several occasions and had done nothing previously to give assistance against the Turks could not complain if now they had to fight without Serb aid—the Despot died in 1427.

The remainder of this period of Serb history need not detain us long in so cursory a survey. As he had no heirs Stephen Lazarević nominated as his successor George Branković, son of that Vuk who had betrayed, according to legend, his country at Kosovo. His title was disputed by Murad II the great-grandson of Tsar Lazar, but he succeeded in maintaining it against Turkish intervention. The reign of the new ruler was one long-continued struggle with the Turks, waged now with, now without, the aid of the Hungarians under the famous John Hunyad, for it was inevitable that Serbia, less fortunate in some ways in its geographical position than the Roumanian principalities, should be bowed down completely under the Turkish yoke. The Turks were now pressing on into Hungary, and Serbia, which holds the gate of the East and therefore of the West, lay directly in their path, and suffered the fate of every State which holds an important strategical position with inadequate forces, just as at the present time she has been subjected to the reverse pressure of the German *Drang nach Osten*—only when there is a strong Southern Slav Kingdom will there be a tolerable guarantee of peace in the Balkans, and all efforts by whatever motive induced, to weaken the

Serbo-Croats will be direct causes of further struggles. After a long life replete with even more than the usual vicissitudes of Balkan sovereigns, George Branković died in 1457 at a great age. To him is due the great castle of Smederevo (Semendria) with its defiant cross worked into the structure of its walls now in ruins, and still further damaged, according to report, by the Austro-German bombardment. His death was followed by fresh dissensions, and in 1459 the Turks, their hands freed by the capture of Constantinople, put a definite end to all semblance of independence, and what remained of Serbia became the Turkish pashalik of Belgrade.

The fate of the sister Serb State was not long delayed. Stephen Tvrtko I of Bosnia, as has been seen, had proclaimed himself king in 1376, and a year later had occupied the land of Hum, Zahumlja or Primorja later the Hercegovina, a province whose medieval history, though popularly it is now generally looked upon as a part of Bosnia, had been generally linked with that of Serbia, and whose inhabitants differ in some traits of character from the Bosnians. Bosnia, however, was distracted by religious strife between the Catholic sovereigns on the one side and the majority of the population on the other. The latter were largely Orthodox, and perhaps still more largely Bogomil. The Bogomils, of the origin of whose name more than one account is given—the meaning is perhaps “dear to God”—had embraced a form of Manichæism, and were in fact the forerunners of the Albigenses, though to term them the forefathers of the Reformation is to strain analogy and to ignore decisive differences. Their religion seems to have been free from those darker elements of devil-worship which accompanied pure Manichæism, and which, it has been suggested,¹ formed the real gravamen against the Knights Templars and led to their suppression throughout Europe, while the Hospitallers were left unmolested. Their religion was of a simple Puritan cast, but it brought

¹ By Mr. Hilaire Belloc in a magazine article written some seven years ago, whose title I forget.

down upon them the thunders of Rome whose obedient servants the Bosnian kings were. Add to these internal discords, oppressions, and risings, the struggle with the Hungarians on the one side and the Turks on the other, and it is easy to see how depressing is the tale of the last years of Bosnian freedom without even the relief—and the inspiration—of a heroic tragedy such as Kosovo. The integrity of the new kingdom was not long maintained, for the separate traditions of Primorija found expression in 1448 when Stephen Vukčić became Duke of Primorija.¹ For his title he adopted the German “Herzog” Serbized into Hercega, hence his realm became known as the Hercegovina “the Duchy”, the name which it has always since borne. In 1463 Bosnia fell before the Turks, who were actually welcomed by the Bogomils as liberators from Catholic oppression. A few years later, about 1482, the Hercegovina fell likewise. In these provinces the nobility largely apostatized to Islam in order to retain their possessions led also, as were many of the peasantry, by their Bogomilism to see in Mohammedanism a religion with elements akin to their own, so that ultimately we may see in the religious oppression of the Roman Curia one of the causes of that strange anomaly a large European Moslem element in the north-western Balkans. Such names as those of the Kulenović and Kapitanović among the present Bosnian Beks who are, many of them, the descendants of the old nobility take us back to the earliest days of Bosnian history.

One State alone maintained through the centuries in its rugged mountains the standard of Serb independence, the ever-unconquered Crnagora, or Montenegro, whose inhabitants, recruited by those Serb nobles who had not been killed by the Turks, for they disdained apostasy, have never come under Turkish rule.

¹ This is suggested as the proper title by Sir Arthur Evans. The Dukes were popularly known as the Dukes of S. Sava, a piecing together of their first title with another “Keeper of the Sepulchre of S. Sava.” *Vide* Evans, *Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina*, p. xlvii note.

With the final conquest of the Balkan Peninsula by the Turks Serb history divides itself into two main streams, that of the Serbs who remained in their old homes, and that of those of the nation who migrated into southern Hungary. The record of the former is one of almost unceasing struggle against the conquerors linked from time to time with the story of the efforts made by the House of Habsburg to drive back the tide of Ottoman invasion. The Turkish Serbs were not altogether without an element of national unity, for the Turks, not so much from policy as from their theocratic conception of the State, allowed the Orthodox Church a great deal of autonomy not only in religious but in secular affairs also, the ecclesiastical functionaries acting as the go-between through whom the Sultan acted. The settlement of the Spahis as a territorial aristocracy was attended by great exactions of a financial order, while the inequality of Christian and Moslem before the law denied a remedy in these as in other matters. Yet the most grievous exaction of all was the "devchurme", or blood tax. Every seven years the children of the conquered were examined, and the strongest and brightest were carried off to Constantinople to be trained in the Moslem faith and ultimately to be enrolled in the corps of Janissaries who spread the terror of the Turkish name wherever they went. Thus the nation was deprived of the promise of its soundest elements, while the Ottoman State, like some monstrous vampire, throve on the blood which it sucked from its victims and turned the vital forces of the conquered to their own destruction.

To one, however, of those who had been thus seized the Serbs owed a great debt. One of the greatest of all the Grand Viziers was Mehemet Sokolović, the minister of Suleyman the Magnificent, who in childhood had been seized under the devchurme. The fall of the Serb kingdom had entailed the fall of the Serb patriarchate of Peć and the Church was included in the Archiepiscopal See of Ochrida which had been in Greek hands since the fall of the second Bulgarian Empire. For some years all

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the efforts of the Serbs for their religious autonomy were unavailing, but in 1557 Mehemet Sokolović, after an interview with his brother the monk Macarius restored the patriarchate of Peć with an extensive jurisdiction over the Serb lands, a few central Macedonian sees alone being reserved to the See of Ochrida as suffragans, as that chair could not be destroyed and from its historical associations had been respected by Dušan himself. Macarius was made patriarch and became the recognized head of the Turkish Serbs, affording them a certain measure of protection and supplying a focus of national unity. This restored patriarchate which formed part of the great scheme of reorganization carried out by Sokolović, who divided the Empire into beglerbegliks and sanjaks, endured till 1767 when, together with the See of Ochrida, it was sacrificed to the jealousy of the Greeks and the fears of the Turks. Sokolović was by no means the only high official—apart from those recruited from the Phanar—of non-Turkish birth. Six other Grand Viziers were the product of the blood tax, and so numerous were the Serbs in the Imperial service that it is stated^{*} that till the eighteenth century a large proportion of the administrative documents in Constantinople were drawn up in Serb. "It has been rightly said that if during the period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Servian people had been willing to abjure their Christian faith, the Ottoman State would be to-day a Servian Empire of Mohammedan faith". That may be an exaggeration: the Serbs, however, remained in the great mass true to their religion in spite of all temptation, while the national spirit was kept alive by the recital of the heroic ballads of their past glories, the memory of which treasured in popular song and story contributed largely to the keen historical consciousness of the race, and imbued it with the vital and enduring conviction that a people with such a past could look forward with ultimate confidence to a future.

Not all State forms perished, for while the bulk of the

^{*} Lazarović-Hrebeltanović. *Op. cit.* vol i, p. 322.

nation remained in its old homes thousands fled before the Turks, and establishing themselves in southern Hungary linked their fortunes with those of the House of Habsburg which not long after acquired the crown of S. Stephen. Here, for two centuries, they enjoyed a certain measure of self-government under their Despots of the family of Branković, the object of the Emperors being to utilize them as a defence against the Turks. All that is here necessary is to indicate briefly the relations between the Habsburgs and their Serb subjects. The latter took part in all the wars waged between the Imperialists and the Turks in the sixteenth century, and when, in 1529, Suleyman besieged Vienna it was the action of the Serbs under their leader Paul Bakić which made it possible for the Austrians to raise the siege. The Hungarian Istvanfi says: "It was the Serb Bakich who saved Vienna".¹ After more than a century of desultory warfare Serb forces shared in the campaign of the Duke of Lorraine, 1685 to 1687, and also in that of 1689, their Despot at the time being George Branković III. A great deal of the Austrian success in this last campaign was due to the whole-hearted support of the Serbs both of Hungary and Serbia, and General Piccolomini acting under the Margrave of Baden, the commander-in-chief, was able to carry his arms into the heart of Old Serbia. Kruševac and other towns of historic memory fell into his hands, and the national hopes of the Serbs ran high. The spirit thus manifested, however, alarmed the Emperor Leopold at the possible growth of an independent Serb State. Acting under his orders the Margrave of Baden invited the Despot to confer with him on matters concerning the campaign. On his arrival at the camp, October 26, 1689, Branković was seized and imprisoned at Eger, in Bohemia, where he remained until his death in 1711. When questioned by Russia as to the cause of the Despot's incarceration the Austrian Government returned the cynical reply, "Nihil mali fecit, sed sic ratio status

¹ Page 163 of his History of Hungary. *Cit. Lazarović-Hrebeljanović, ut supra*, vol. ii, p. 562.

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exposit", an answer which was typical of the perfidy which has throughout actuated the House of Habsburg in its dealings with the Serbs. The next year occurred the great migration which has left its mark on Old Serbia to the present day.

On the death of Piccolomini the Austrian campaign collapsed, and the Emperor sent a rescript to the Serb Patriarch of Peć, Arsen III, inviting him to head an immigration into Austrian territory. He promised complete liberty of conscience, and full rights of self-government. The Patriarch accepted the offer and fled into Hungary at the head of some 37,000 families. In reference to this migration a subsequent Austrian Minister, Baron Bartenstein, reported to Joseph II after a commission of inquiry: "It was not a case of offering refuge to fugitives—allowing them to go on to waste lands—but one of inducing persons to leave established and well-provided homes where they had been undisturbed in the exercise of their religious faith, and to pass at the peril of their lives and estate from Turkish domination to ours".¹ The Serbs, therefore, had well-defined covenanted rights, one of the articles of agreement being that they might elect a Vojvode (duke) as their head, while the Patriarch was established at Karlovci (Karlowitz). The title of Patriarch, after being discontinued, was revived in 1848 and still continues. The first Vojvode was John Monasterlija. The aim of the Emperor was of course to keep in his power both the civil and religious heads of the Serb people. The Ottoman Government, however, filled the vacancy in the See of Peć, and, as stated above, the line of the Patriarchs of Peć continued till 1767. Under Monasterlija the Serbs took part in Prince Eugene's campaign of 1697, and so well did they acquit themselves that, after the battle of Zenta, the famous general described them as "ses meilleurs éclaireurs, sa cavalerie la plus légère, les défenseurs les plus sûrs des places conquises". The Treaty of Karlowitz which ended

¹ Baron Bartenstein, *Report on the Illyrian Nation*. Cit. Lazarović-Hrebeljanović, *ut supra*, vol. ii, p. 595.

this war restored Transylvania and southern Hungary to the Habsburgs. They served also in Eugene's victorious campaigns of 1716 and 1718, resulting in the acquisition of Belgrade and the district of the lower Morava which were held till 1739. After the death of Monasterlija the Vojvodship was not continued, and he was succeeded as head of the Hungarian Serbs by the Metropolitan of Karlovci, the name "Serb Vojvodina" alone remaining as a token of the past. One by one the privileges of the Serbs were taken from them as the Turkish menace grew less insistent and the Habsburgs had less need of their services in war, and so intolerable did they find their position that in the years 1751 to 1753 an emigration said to have composed 100,000 individuals left Hungary for Russia where they settled on the Dnieper. The Government of Maria Theresa in alarm established an Illyrian Aulic Council to supervise Serb affairs. The new Council came into frequent collision with the Hungarian Court Chancellery, the Hungarians being bitterly jealous of the privileged position of the Serbs whose greatest and most implacable foes they remain to this day. On the other hand the Viennese Hofskriegsrath, for military reasons, was in general favourable to the Serbs, so that the different points of view of Budapest and the Vienna "Greater Austria" party were already in evidence a century and a half ago. In 1777 the Illyrian Aulic Council was abolished, following on fresh disputes, and a Declaratorium Illyricum was published dealing with religious and educational matters. Thirteen years later Leopold II reestablished an Illyrian Aulic Chancellery only to abolish it again on Magyar instance in 1792. Thus the Serbs suffered under the seesaw of the more statesmanlike views of Vienna and the inflated chauvinism of Hungary, Austria's *âme damnée*. The same course of playing fast and loose with the Habsburg Serbs (and Croats) according to the necessities of the moment was continued throughout the nineteenth century till to-day neither Vienna nor

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Budapest possesses hardly a friend among the Southern Slavs.¹

III

THE RESURGENCE OF SERBIA

During the eighteenth century more than one Austro-Russian project had been mooted for the partition of the Balkans, but with the advent of the great Revolutionary wars all such designs were of necessity laid aside, and the preoccupations of the Great Powers proved the opportunity of the Serbs. Yet when the revolt came it took the form of a "loyal" revolt of Serbs who wished to enforce the Sultan's will. At this time Serbia lay under the heel of the Janissaries and their leaders, the Dahi, whose truculence and exactions were such that Haji Mustapha the Pasha of Belgrade, a mild and benevolent ruler whose name is still revered in Serbia,² prevailed upon the reforming Sultan Selim III to order their removal from the country. They were not long afterwards permitted to return, whereupon they took vengeance upon Mustapha, whom they put to death, and resorted to their old practices, murdering the most prominent Serbs who were likely to prove dangerous to their authority. The result was the

¹ A full account of the Southern Slavs in Austria during the nineteenth century is given in *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy* by R. W. Seton-Watson. At the time of writing this work—the recognized authority on the subject—Dr. Seton-Watson was, as he has acknowledged, somewhat prejudiced against the Serbs of the Kingdom, whom he regarded rather from the "black-yellow" point of view as an adherent of the "Greater Austria" idea. This does not in any way affect his treatment of his main subject, and indeed only appears in one or two references to the Kingdom of Serbia. His services to the cause of Southern Slav union are known to all. See also H. W. Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*.

² A descendant of his was Turkish Delegate at the Conference of London at the end of 1912 when the first attempt was made to make peace between the Balkan Allies and Turkey, and a graceful allusion to his ancestor was made by the first Serb Delegate.

great rising of 1804 which at first was a movement to restore the legitimate authority of the Sultan and to punish the Janissaries who had set themselves to oppose his will.

The leader of the revolt was the great hero of modern Serbia, George Petrović, known from his swarthy complexion as Kara George (Black George—Kara is Turkish : in Serb Crni Gjorgje) the grandfather of the present King Peter Karagjorgjević.¹ A man of great force of character, daring in fight, ruthless against traitors to the cause, and of fierce temperament, he had at first refused the post of leader, alleging his violent character. The people with surer insight insisted, realizing that a successful revolt against Turkish power was not likely to be effected save by a man of determination and violence. To the last in his personal habits he preserved the simplicity of the peasant stock from which he was sprung. The first campaign was successful, the Sultan even ordering the Pasha of Bosnia to aid the Serbs, with the result that the Janissaries were defeated and the four Dahi beheaded. The scope of the rising was now extended and the Serbs aimed at internal autonomy under the Sultan's suzerainty. Thus brought into direct conflict with the Ottoman State the Serbs continued their career of success, and by 1807 had made themselves masters of the territory subsequently comprised in the principality of Serbia as it existed till 1878. A Senate of twelve members was appointed to assist the Supreme Chief, schools were opened, and the work of internal reorganization set in hand, while the Assembly, or Skupština, represented the germ of Parliamentary institutions. The next five years were marked by internal dissensions due to the jealousy of the vojvodes at the power of Kara George, and by participation in the war of Russia against Turkey. The Peace of Bucharest, however, concluded by Russia under the influence of the French

¹ So spelt in the Croatian orthography. Karageorgević is more familiar, but is really indefensible as being partly in Croatian orthography and partly English. Kara George is too familiar to be altered without risk of pedantry.

menace, left Serbia to the mercy of the Turks though Article 8 stipulated for their internal autonomy. The country was invaded from all sides, and in 1813 Kara George suddenly lost heart and fled into Austria, and the country fell under Turkish rule. The sudden loss of nerve on the part of Kara George must always remain one of the psychological puzzles of history, so unexpected was it, and so utterly out of harmony with the whole character of the man as evinced in his whole career.

Most of the vojvodes followed Kara George into Austrian territory, but one among the most influential remained—Miloš Obrenović. Like his former chief of peasant stock, though well-to-do in a modest way, he had taken a prominent part in the insurrection, and the flight of his companions left him the most influential man in Serbia. Whether from deep policy, or from more interested motives, he bowed to the storm, made his peace with the new Pasha, and even helped to suppress an incipient rising. On Palm Sunday 1815, however, he raised anew the standard of revolt under the oak-tree of Takovo, and so immediate were the successes of the Serbs, coupled with the diplomatic aid of Russia whose hands were now free, that in October the Turks came to terms and granted the people their internal autonomy, with a Council representing the twelve districts of the principality, and a Skupština which was to raise the amount of the tribute. A Turkish pasha continued to occupy Belgrade. Two years later Kara George returned, to the discomfiture of Miloš who thought there was no room for two kings in Brentford. The two men had never been on friendly terms, being indeed in some ways of too similar a character. There followed a crime which must always deeply sully the character of Miloš and was the precursor of numberless woes to come. Miloš betrayed the arrival of Kara George to the Pasha and was bidden to procure his murder. Kara George was then murdered in his sleep and his head forwarded to the Pasha. Thus perished by a foul assassination the hero of modern Serbia, her first leader in the national revolt, the man who had shown the way to the

resurrection of the nation. This was the origin of the feud between the Obrenović and the Karagjorgjević families, which ended only with the murder of Alexander in 1903 and the extinction of the Obrenovići.

The same year Miloš was proclaimed Prince, though the title was not formally recognized by the Porte till 1830, when a final settlement was arrived at between the principality and its suzerain. Two years later six districts which had formed part of the Serbia of Kara George, 1807-1813, but which had not taken part in the last rising, were definitely added to the little State which then attained the boundaries which it possessed till 1878. A Turkish garrison was still maintained in the fortress of Belgrade which, by a strained interpretation, was made to include the town as well as the citadel.

No full account of the events of the last century can be given in this brief outline of Serb history, and it is only possible to illustrate the main tendencies of its politics, external and internal. One immediate result of the independence of Serbia was the change of methods rather than aims which was the necessary consequence in Austrian policy. The main idea of the Habsburgs had been to make use of the Serbs as an advance guard against the Turks, to humour them when their services were required, but vigorously to suppress any movement which might lead to the restoration of an independent Serb State, and to push southwards over, yet by means of, the Serb race. The successful risings of the Serbs, however, entirely altered the terms of the problem, for the centre of the political and national aspirations of the Serbs was now transferred to its old home beyond the Danube. As long as the Serb movement had its source in the Hungarian Serbs it could be controlled by the Habsburgs, and was in fact confounded in the southern advance of the dynasty, but the establishment of the Principality meant the rise of the very political formation which Habsburg policy had consistently opposed, seeing the danger to itself involved in the establishment of an independent centre of Serb nationality.

Between the Habsburgs and the young State there could be no real friendship, though it was not at once that the fact was grasped by all Serb politicians. Hitherto the hopes of the Serbs had been centred in the Imperial House, in which alone they could see either a refuge from the past or a hope for the future, and trusting as they did, in spite of repeated disillusionment, to the Imperial professions—for it is curious how that faithless and perfidious House has for so long been able to inspire a passionate loyalty in the breasts of the servants towards whom it has never for its own part evinced the slightest loyalty or shown the least gratitude: its falsity has been beyond measure—they were unable at first in their simplicity to see that under the altered circumstances Austria was in the nature of things their most formidable foe. The Austrian *Drang nach Osten* which is not a tendency that dates from 1866, though the events of that year accentuated it, could from now on only be accomplished at the expense of the Serbs and in opposition to them. Serbia lay in Austria's way and must be assimilated or crushed; the policy of the eighteenth century must be followed, but its methods and formal professions must be cast in a new mould.

At once, therefore, the court of the little State became a hotbed of intrigue in which England, France, and Austria allied themselves against the influence of Russia. It is noteworthy that the latter was looked upon as desiring to wield an omnipotent influence over the destinies of the principality, while England and France professed their desire—as against alleged Russian pretensions *bien entendu*, not against Turkey—for its real independence, a profession in which Austria for motives of policy acquiesced. The absurd dread of Pan-Slavism it will be observed, is also not a thing that dates either from the Crimean War or from 1876. Miloš himself worked in concert with the British representative, Colonel Hodges, against Russian influence.¹ These intrigues of high policy

¹ "Vi basti sapere che per ordine del Principe lavoro col colonello Hodges per sottrarre questo paese alla dispotica influenza russa per

aggravated the internal troubles incidental to the manner in which the new State had been formed. As will have been seen the Serbs were the first of the Balkan peoples to establish their practical independence, leading the way in this regard for the better known Greek war of independence. Moreover, unlike the Greeks, who owed their independence to the intervention of the Great Powers, and the Bulgarians who, without striking a blow in their own cause, emerged fully equipped from the will of the Russian Tsar, as Athene from the head of Zeus, they had gained their freedom by their own unaided efforts and indomitable perseverance. Thus they never experienced the fostering care which has made their eastern neighbours the spoilt darlings of Europe. From this cause sprang further consequences. All their national institutions have been evolved on their own soil and by their own efforts, their administration in all its branches has been "home made" as has been their administrative and military class. They never had the services of foreign organizers and administrators placed at their disposal to set their feet in the way of progress and to obviate the dangers attending their first steps in national life. This must always be remembered when the progress of Serbia is compared with that of the other Balkan States. Mistakes were bound to be made, and progress under such conditions has necessarily been slow. On the other hand there have been compensating advantages of no mean order. The national spirit and self-reliance have been greatly fostered, no bureaucracy of alien habits of thought has been foisted on the people, the dynasty is national and of the spirit of the race, and the whole life of the nation is instinct with native vitality and national consciousness drawing its strength from its own inner resources. Others have paid dearly for a more rapid progress having its roots in alien elements.

metterlo, come la Grecia, sotto la protezione delle grandi Potenze europee". Extract from a letter of Dr. B. S. Cuniberti, the physician of Miloš. F. Cuniberti, *La Serbia e la dinastia degli Obrènovitch*, p. 109.

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The government of Miloš was a despotism made more harsh to his subjects by the manner in which he secured to himself valuable commercial monopolies, the latter grievance weighing with them even more than the former, for the people were not ripe for a parliamentary *régime*. Russia espoused the cause of the malcontents and in 1838, following an abortive Constitution of nominally "advanced" character in 1835, Miloš was forced to grant a Constitution, the chief feature of which was a State Council of seventeen members, irremovable, to whom the four Ministers (appointed by the Prince) had to make their reports. It was in fact the substitution of an oligarchy of "Revolution families" for a personal despotism, and proved even less to the taste of the democratic Serbs than the former *régime*; an autocrat may rule over a people fundamentally democratic (not in the political sense of the word), or even socialistic, in feeling and sentiment as can be seen in the example of Russia, but not so an oligarchy without any historic and traditional basis of aristocratic service in the past but drawn from the ranks of the people. As was to be expected friction increased and in 1839 Miloš was forced to abdicate by his oligarchic opponents to whom in turn the peasants were in opposition.

The Prince's eldest son Milan succeeded but died a month later, being followed by Michael his younger brother. Two men, Petronjević and Vučić, who had been regents for his brother, were imposed on him by the Porte as Councillors. Dissatisfaction in the country increased and demands were made for the removal of the Councillors and a change of the seat of Government to Kruševac. The regents fell, and Prince Michael gained a free hand, the people preferring to fill one ditch with money rather than seventeen. Michael rushed headlong into the course of Western progress accompanied by the taxation which such progress entails in Eastern lands. The people objected to a good deal of the progress, and even more strongly to the taxation. Petronjević and Vučić returned from exile, and in 1842 Michael followed his father into exile. As his

successor the country chose Alexander Karagjorgjević son of the great liberator. The new prince, though personally popular and a good administrator, lacked the dynamic force of Kara George, and concentrated his attention on the interior development of his country, a highly necessary work as in itself the only real foundation for a "spirited foreign policy", and various public works were undertaken. In 1848, while not abandoning its neutrality, Serbia lent its unofficial aid to the Serbs and Croats of the Habsburg Monarchy then fighting under the great Ban Jelačić against the tyrannical Magyars, who had skilfully hoodwinked European opinion, as they have largely done to this day, into thinking that they were struggling for liberty and a constitutional *régime*. The Crimean War added to the Prince's difficulties as Russia not unnaturally expected his aid. The pressure of Austria and the Western Powers was, however, too strong, and he remained neutral. The mass of the people was angered at what was considered his dependence upon Austria, for their instinct did not deceive them as to who was the most dangerous enemy of Serbia; the oligarchs exploited this resentment and in December 1858 Alexander was forced to go the way of Miloš and Michael. The former was immediately recalled, to the dismay of the oligarchs, and reigned till his death in September 1860.

The second reign of his son Michael was marked by enormous progress both in the internal economic and political development of Serbia and in its international position. The State Council was reformed and made amenable to the law courts, while the Skupština was regularly summoned every third year. The army was also reorganized and a French officer installed as Minister of War. All this time the Turks had remained in the frontier fortresses, but in 1862 they gave the Prince an opportunity of which he quickly availed himself. Following upon an insignificant encounter in Belgrade between the Serbs and the Turks the Pasha bombarded the city from the fortress. The government immediately made representations to the

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Powers demanding the evacuation of the fortresses. These representations met with little response, and Prince Michael was attacked by the English Press, which was obsessed by "the superstitions of an antiquated diplomacy", as Mr. Balfour once described the Turcophil policy of the past fifty years. The affair dragged on, but in 1867, in the then condition of Europe, the Porte thought it advisable to give way, saving its face by the formula that the fortresses should be confided to the care of the Prince.

In the domain of foreign policy the reign was one of great activity based upon the idea of a Balkan *bloc*. With Montenegro an agreement was reached in 1866 that if the frontiers of the two States should ever become coterminous the smaller would enter into a formal union with the larger. In Macedonia Serb propaganda was pushed forward and many schools were established which endured till they were dissolved by the Turks after the Russo-Turkish War. Close relationships were entertained with Roumania and in 1867 an alliance was concluded with Greece and an agreement arrived at with the Bulgarian Committee in Bucharest. At this time the Bulgarians hardly entertained separate nationalist aspirations, and it was agreed that, when a Bulgarian State should be formed, it should be united with Serbia, full equality being given to both languages. It was in the same train of ideas that the Serb government lent its vigorous aid at Constantinople to the project of a Bulgarian Exarchate; in fact the Bulgars were regarded rather as a local division of the Southern Slavs proper whose future was bound up in that of the Serbs. The object of all this activity was intervention in Bosnia and Macedonia and an anticipation of the war of 1912. Never before or since has Serbia occupied so commanding a diplomatic position in the Balkans. All these plans, however, were cut short by the murder of the Prince. A conspiracy was set on foot, as has been alleged, in the interests of the Karagjorgjević, though there is reason to doubt it, and on June 10, 1868, the Prince was assassinated in the park of Topčider near Belgrade, the bitter fruit of

the murder of Kara George by his father. It was a bad day for Serbia.

The political ends of the plot miscarried, and in default of direct heirs his cousin Milan, the grandson of Miloš's younger brother Ephrem, was proclaimed Prince under a regency, the new ruler being only fourteen years old. A new Constitution was drawn up on more modern lines than the existing one and promulgated in 1869. The executive power was placed in the hands of the ruler, while a Skupština which was to meet every year was given the legislative power but without the faculty of initiation. One-third of its members were nominated by the Prince, and as in our "unlearned Parliament" of 1404 no official or lawyer was eligible for election—a provision of some utility not unworthy of being copied, perhaps in a modified form, by other more historical legislative assemblies. Prince Milan proved to be as worthless a ruler as he was despicable in private life. Showy in his gifts, of undoubted ability, considerable oratorical power, and handsome presence, he was utterly lacking in moral stability and steadfastness of character, and sacrificed the interests of his country to his private pleasures and caprices. His reign like that of his son was one long scandal. In 1876, the year following the Bosnian rising of 1875, Serbia with Montenegro declared war against the Turks, but Milan's armies met with no success and only the intervention of the Powers saved the country. The following year, after the fall of Plevna, Serbia joined in the Russo-Turkish War and gained considerable successes, but the Treaty of San Stefano proved a great disappointment to the nation. Russia favoured only Bulgarian aims and stipulated for a great Bulgaria which should include not only all Macedonia but districts such as Vranja which were incontestably Serb, while the territorial gains of Serbia were to be few; in fact the Treaty of Berlin, which superseded that of San Stefano, was more favourable to Serb aspirations in some respects in spite of the occupation of Bosnia and the Hercegovina by Austria, provinces which the San Stefano treaty left

to Turkey though by the secret convention of Reichstadt Russia had agreed to an Austrian occupation. Thereafter Milan threw himself into the arms of Austria and became practically an Austrian satrap, to the great indignation of the Serbs and the Radical party, which was supported by the great majority of the people. The proclamation of Serbia as a kingdom in 1882 failed to mend matters, while a further shock to King Milan's position resulted from the unsuccessful war against Bulgaria in 1885 which followed the Eastern Roumelian revolution and the union of that province with the principality of Bulgaria. The scandals of Milan's married life brought him into general contempt while his opposition to the Radicals resulted in a conflict with his people which finally made his position untenable, so that in 1889, after granting a more liberal Constitution, he abdicated in favour of his son Alexander, a minor, who succeeded to a State which in 1878 had been extended by the acquisition of the districts of Pirot, Niš, and Vranja. Milan and his Queen Natalie both agreed to live outside Serbia in the interests of their son and dynasty.

The *régime* of the Regents brought no alleviation in the internal situation for M. Ristić, the head of the regency, was bitterly opposed to the Radicals and their leader M. Pašić, the "Grand Old Man" of Serbia. The *dénouement* was startling, for on April 13, 1893, the young king, not quite seventeen years of age, arrested the regents at a dinner in the palace and proclaimed himself of age. No good results followed this *coup d'état* for King Alexander was not a strong man as was hoped, but merely self-willed and obstinate, and his reign brought Serbia to the lowest depths of her fortunes and made her a byword in Europe. Finding himself unable to control the situation, at midnight, January 22, 1894, he installed a Cabinet under M. Simić, recently Minister at Vienna, and prepared the way for the return of King Milan; at midnight on April 2 of the same year M. Simić was replaced by M. Nikolajević; and at midnight on May 21 he abolished by royal ukase the Constitution of 1888, replacing it by that of 1869, after which he

recalled the Cabinet which had prudently resigned in view of the penalties involved. The return of King Milan did not effect any improvement, for it was hardly likely that Milan, who had failed to conduct his own government, should be able to conduct that of his son. In view of the growing peril to the dynasty Milan and Natalie became reconciled, but nothing could stay the downward course of events. Alexander claimed to instal in power neutral cabinets of his own choice in order to allay the strife of political parties, and give stability to the administration. The old worship of Parliamentaryism has largely decayed of late years; it is no longer generally thought that the unique and complete cure for human ills is the transplantation of the existing form of the English Constitution; we have seen a good deal of its inefficiency, and talk of political liberty is not so alluring now that we have machine-made politics and politicians. The boon of the franchise in the absence of proportional representation means frequently a Hobson's choice between Tweedledum and Tweedledee—*Arcades ambo*. There is a great deal to be said, especially in countries less developed politically, for a "non-Parliamentary" executive with a strong monarchical basis, which shall be above political partizanship, and the tyranny of the party caucus, of political "bosses" great and small, of the machine which crushes out individuals who do not conform in everything to the party ticket, preferring to exercise an independent judgment, as Mr. Harold Cox and Lord Hugh Cecil were elbowed out of our own House of Commons. If a leader of a party in power is wellnigh absolute the leader of an Opposition is often only allowed to lead so long as he follows his followers, so that an Opposition has resembled a sportive puppy chasing its own tail. We have moved far from the ideas of Bagehot and his admiration of the House of Commons which to-day sounds so "remote". Where, moreover, there are several parties and they are divided upon personal questions rather than by differences of political programme the idea of a non-Parliamentary

executive acquires the greater force. All systems are liable to abuse, and if the action of King Constantine be objected to it may well be asked what was the result of the undiluted Parliamentaryism of King George of Greece. The complaint is justly made that King Constantine has reduced Greece to the condition in which it found itself before the advent of M. Venizelos. Nor can it be said that a non-Parliamentary executive is inconsistent with the sovereignty of Parliament;¹ the United States executive is non-Parliamentary, and so in practice is the Swiss. In the case of King Alexander, however, no attempt was made to play the part of a patriot king. With him neutrality was a catchword to cloke his obstinate and foolish refusal to accept M. Pašić and the Radicals; so far was he from seeking to forward the national will that he placed himself continuously in opposition, alike in foreign and domestic politics, to the clearly expressed wishes of his people; so far was he from giving stability to the administration that his capricious changes of ministry resulted in an ever-increasing instability; he was no single-eyed administrator raised above party and pushing forward a work of national regeneration in accordance with the national will despite self-seeking politicians, on the contrary he was always himself deep in political intrigue.

At home the country was in a state of chronic discontent, political persecution was rampant, and the

¹ *Vide* Professor A. V. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, p. 413, Appendix, Note III, for a discussion of the subject. In what I have said above there is no advocacy implied of a "crown-policy", nor is there implied a necessary antagonism between Crown and people, or Parliament, any more than there is a necessary antagonism between the Executive and Congress in the United States. A wise king would choose the man who commanded the greatest confidence, and if King Alexander had been truly patriotic he would have put M. Pašić in power and kept him there. As we have reason to know neither a Parliamentary executive nor Parliament itself necessarily reflects the convictions of a nation. [Point has been given to these considerations by the nature of Mr. Lloyd George's government. See Dicey, p. 417, for a forecast of the possible advent of Presidential government.]

elections were "made" shamelessly. The finances were in disorder, no public works were undertaken, the Oriental line remaining Serbia's solitary railway, the army was neglected, eaten up with politics, without rifles or artillery, and only some first tentative steps in the direction of agricultural development could be placed to the credit of the government. Abroad the Bulgarians were having their own way in Macedonia, Serbia was utterly without prestige, and if she succeeded in 1897 in obtaining a Serb appointment to the See of Skoplje, and in 1900 in securing recognition of a Serb *millet* (politico-religious community) in Turkey, that was chiefly due to the Porte's desire to play off one nationality against another. The course of shame continued, and in 1900 the king married Madame Draga Mašin, the widow of a Serb engineer and his former mistress, the event being followed by a final quarrel with King Milan, who died not long afterwards. In 1901 King Alexander, feeling the ground slipping from under him, granted a new and liberal Constitution with two Chambers—the latter feature an innovation. Still he pursued his headlong course. On April 7, 1903, he suspended the Constitution, repealed by royal ukase several laws, abolished the Council of State, abrogated the freedom of the Press and the ballot, and dismissed the judges who belonged to the Radical party, then after a lapse of twenty-four hours declared the Constitution as modified to be again in force. At this time it was reported that he intended to settle the succession to the throne upon his wife's brother, a Lieutenant Lunjevica. The crisis hastened to its conclusion. It was evident that the country could not continue under a *régime* of misgovernment by midnight *coup d'état*, and on June 10, 1903, the King and Queen were assassinated as a result of a military conspiracy. The crime was a horrible one, but without undue extenuation it may be said that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that either King Alexander or the nation had to perish. He might have been sent into exile; but a Serb pretender in Austria—. The matter has been well summed up by a

recent French historian: "L'histoire, qui a le devoir de flétrir les assassins, réserve cependant ses condamnations suprêmes pour les princes qui avaient réduit le pays à un tel degré d'indigence morale qu'il n'apercevait de salut que dans le crime",¹ and I fear we must add correctly perceived.

The Grand Skupština (the special body four times as numerous as the ordinary Skupština which deals with constitutional changes) immediately elected as king Prince Peter Karagjorgjević, son of the former Prince Alexander Karagjorgjević, and grandson of the Liberator. The new sovereign had served with distinction as a young man in the Franco-German war, and subsequently, in 1875, in the Hercegovinian rising. He was the widower of a daughter of Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, and had been living in retirement in Geneva.² His first years of rule were difficult, the regicides were in power, and the Obrenović still had a small following though it had no leader, the next heir of that family being Princess Mirko of Montenegro *née* Natalie Konstantinović. Regarded with dislike abroad owing to the manner of his accession to the throne he had many difficulties to face at home. He remained true to his purpose to reign in constitutional manner and to follow a policy of general appeasement, while he has relied chiefly on M. Pašić, the veteran leader of the Radical party, universally regarded as his country's foremost statesman and always called in of late years in times of difficulty for the confidence he inspires. The relations of the kingdom with Austria became increasingly difficult as the country gathered strength, and the tariff war of 1905-1906 was turned to account by the opening of new markets, and a beginning was made in the direction of economic independence, for

¹ E. Denis, *La Grand Serbie*, p. 122.

² The scandalous story given by Mr. De Windt of his childish and undignified behaviour on receiving the news of his succession is negatived by the fact that he was living in Geneva not in Paris, ordered his crown in 1904 not in 1903, and that it was made of metal from a Turkish cannon captured by Kara George and not of gold.

hitherto the country had depended almost entirely upon the Austrian market, and Austria applied the screw mercilessly for political ends. In 1908 Austria annexed Bosnia, the Serbs awoke to a vivid sense of realities, and from that dark hour dates the renascence of Serbia.

CHAPTER III

THE RENASCENCE OF SERBIA

I

BEFORE considering the effects of the annexation of Bosnia in 1908 it is necessary to go back a little. The Triune Kingdom, as it is termed, of Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia had originally owned a separate national sovereignty within varying territorial limits, but in 1102 on the extinction of the native dynasty the king of Hungary, Koloman, was elected as the successor of the last of the old line. The nature of the union was personal, the bond between the two States being the common sovereign, but as was natural the legal constitutional position has formed a permanent source of friction between Croatia and Hungary.¹ In the nineteenth century the fortunes of the Croats became more and more involved in those of their Serb neighbours, and the feeling of Southern Slav solidarity was the gradual result. It was Napoleon, whose real abiding work is so often lost in the contemplation of the means which he adopted to gain his ends, who gave the first great fillip to this sense of solidarity in his short-lived kingdom of Illyria. The greater part of Dalmatia had gradually been acquired by the Venetian Republic in the course of the Middle Ages. Northern Dalmatia was wrested from the grasp of Hungary-Croatia and its possession finally made good against the Turks, though, as will be seen later, the

¹ For the history of Croatia see R. W. Seton-Watson's *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*.

process was very slow. The southernmost portion of the province, Kotor (Cattaro), Budva, Bar (Antivari), was obtained as the result of the fall of the Serb Empire to which it had belonged, being indeed no part of the original Triune Kingdom, which stopped short at the Cetina or Narenta. The region from Sabioncello to Castelnuovo formed the independent republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa) throughout the medieval period, and this republic as a matter of fact outlived Venice, falling before Napoleon in 1808, eleven years after the fall of Venice in 1797.

Among the territorial arrangements which Napoleon was able to make as the result of his victory at Wagram in 1809 was the establishment of the kingdom of Illyria, which comprised a great part of Croatia, Kranjska (Carniola), Carinthia, Gradiška, Gorica, Istria, and Dalmatia. This union in one political formation of the Slovene and Croat branches of the Southern Slavs had a powerfully stimulating effect on the national consciousness of the race, which survived the reincorporation of the kingdom with the Austrian dominions in 1815. So great indeed was the impetus given that the very use of the words Illyria and Illyrian were subsequently forbidden by the Austrian Government. The ideal of Southern Slav unity was greatly aided by, indeed was largely the product of, the literary renaissance which marked the close of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth. Its origin, it is important to notice, is to be sought in Dalmatia, the most highly cultured of the Serbo-Croat lands, with its memories of the literary activity of the Ragusan school of writers of the sixteenth century, and in some ways the centre from the literary and political point of view, from which has radiated the idea of Southern Slav solidarity. In Dalmatia Kačić published a metrical history of the Jugo Slavs in 1756, but the practical work was the product of two Serbs, Obradović and Karadžić and the Croat Gaj. Obradović (1739–1811), who was sprung from southern Hungary, was self-taught, and travelled largely for the purpose of educating himself for the fulfilment of his task

of educating his people. His works were chiefly those of a thinker and moralist whose aim was to raise the intellectual standard of his race and to teach it its essential unity. He wrote in the popular spoken language. Not less important was the work of Vuk Karadžić (1787-1864), which, from the practical point of view, made possible the realization of the hopes of Obradović. He found the language of his countrymen (he was born in Serbia) in a state of chaos. The spoken dialect was looked down upon as a vehicle of literary composition for which was employed a largely artificial medium of Serbo-Russian texture. He set to work to grapple with his gigantic task of raising the spoken idiom to its rightful place. He published the national poems and ballads as examples of the language to be used, and himself employed the spoken tongue in his own work. It was necessary to standardize the language, and for this purpose he compiled a dictionary and a grammar. Finally he made a recension of the Cyrillic alphabet and standardized the spelling on a phonetic principle. In spite of great opposition he achieved his objects, and left the Serbs with a language identical in writing and speaking, apart from the use of "dialect" forms, which are to be found in all languages, based on a logical and reformed alphabet and spelling. The Serbs were thus spared the unhappy results which follow where the men of literature use a language which is not "understood of the people". The results of his work had a repercussion in Croatia. Here Ljudevit Gaj carried out a similar reform in the Croatian spelling and language, and adopted what may be styled the reformed Serb literary language as the standard idiom of the Croats also. As a result, the provincial literature which he found was replaced by a Serbo-Croat literature, and on its literary side the way was now clear for a real Serbo-Croat unity. The eddies of the movement spread even further, and influenced the new Slovene school of writers so that they also became conscious of their fundamental identity with their Serbo-Croat brethren.

Throughout the nineteenth century the quarrel between the Magyars and the subject nationalities of Hungary continued. In 1848 the Magyars rose against the dynasty in what they called a struggle for freedom. Western Europe was blinded by the eloquence of Kossuth and the ability with which the Hungarian case was pleaded, but that case was fundamentally unsound. If the Magyars desired freedom from Vienna they were no less passionately determined upon a policy of racial oppression at home. Hitherto the Hungarian State, though aristocratic in constitution, had been, if the phrase be permissible, only mildly oppressive, and the fact that Latin was the official State language made for linguistic equality among all Hungarians, i.e. citizens of the polyglot Hungarian State, who included besides the Magyars, a minority in the kingdom, the Slovaks of the north-west, the Ruthenes (Red or Little Russians) of the north-east, the Roumanians of the east, and the Serbs and Croats of southern Hungary and Croatia-Slavonia (Dalmatia is an Austrian not Hungarian crown-land). The aim of the Magyars was to make all Hungarians Magyar, and they began to use the two expressions as synonymous terms. All means of repression, political, social, linguistic, and educational, were pressed into service with the result that "the nationalities" were bitterly estranged. When the revolution of 1848, therefore, broke out, the nationalities took up arms against the Magyars and for the House of Habsburg. The great Ban Jelačić, the saviour of the Habsburgs, led his Croats against them, and the Serbs took up arms, convened a national assembly at Karlovci, the seat of the Serb Metropolitan, and demanded the restoration of the Patriarchate and the appointment of a Vojvode in accordance with their old rights. Colonel Šupljikac was named to the latter office and accepted by Vienna, which also restored the Patriarchate. The net result of all this was nil. Colonel Šupljikac dying in a few months was not replaced, and although a Serb Vojvodina was delimited, it was purposely made unworkable by the inclusion of large alien, Magyar

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and German, elements. The House of Habsburg, faithless as ever to its friends, abandoned both Serbs and Croats, and in 1867 crowned its perfidy by the *Ausgleich* with Hungary, which left the Serbs entirely at the mercy of the Magyar, and Croatia in a very unsatisfactory position. The empty title of Grand Vojvode of the Serb Vojvodina was all that remained to remind the Southern Slavs of their betrayed loyalty. After, then, a period of general oppression from 1849 to 1867, the dual system was introduced, the position being that the Germans should do as they liked in the Austrian crown-lands and the Magyars in the Hungarian. This was the reward of the Croats for their loyalty in 1848. The friction between the nationalities and their masters continued, and the resources of modern civilization and banking organization enabled a more efficient pressure to be maintained by the Magyars.

In 1878 Austria-Hungary was empowered by the Treaty of Berlin to "occupy and administer" Bosnia and the Hercegovina, whose luckless inhabitants found that they had merely exchanged one master for another. The right of occupation had originally been assented to by Russia in the Reichstadt convention, secretly arrived at by the two Powers before the Russo-Turkish war as the price of Austrian neutrality, though it found no mention in the Treaty of San Stefano, which left the provinces to Turkey. Austria was torn by conflicting motives in the affair. On the one hand she desired to continue what had long been her settled policy of Balkan expansion with its aim the possession, at least, of Salonica—the *Drang nach Osten*. The exclusion from Germany, and from Italy also, left the Balkans as the only possible field of aggrandizement, and the Emperor, on grounds of personal pride, desired some compensation for his losses in the west. Germany had also a double motive in pushing Austria eastward. The intrusion of Austria into the Balkans would tend to make her forget her lost position in Germany, and it would also serve German ends *vis-à-vis* Russia, for such a policy would inevitably produce an acute rivalry, or rather exacerbate

the existing rivalry, between the two Powers, leaving Germany in the happy position of *duobus litigantibus tertius gaudens*. She would be in a position to play off one against the other, and by threatening closer relations with either to hold them both in leash. Above all it would tend to make Austria absolutely dependent upon Germany, which for her part had no intention in those days of adventuring her newly acquired position for the sake of advancing Austrian Balkan interests at the cost of war with Russia: under Bismarck Germany made her own advice of Pericles to the Athenians—*τα ὑπάρχοντα σωζειν*, preserve what you have. Above all, neither Austria nor Hungary desired the formation of a strong Serb kingdom, which they looked upon as a menace to their Southern Slav possessions. On the other hand, the Magyars desired no accession in the Monarchy to the number of Slavs, which they considered to be already dangerously large.

At first it had been the latter motive that weighed most heavily with Andrassy,¹ but Bismarck endeavoured during the crisis to push him forward, working on the fear of a greater Serbia.² Andrassy himself, at the Congress, apparently desired rather the appearance of having been forced by circumstances to take the fateful step,³ and eventually England, then busily engaged in building up

¹ "In reference to the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, Andrassy had recalled the well-known remark of Prince Ligne, who, when some one said to him that his wife was unfaithful to him, replied, 'Comment, quand on n'y est pas obligé?'" *Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe*, ii, 157 (English edition). Conversation with Von Bülow, under date Berlin, November 3, 1875.

² "Bismarck hopes that Andrassy, finding no other choice left to him, will invade Bosnia and keep it. Andrassy is unwilling to do this, but would prefer it to allowing the establishment of a Kingdom in Serbia". *Ibid.* ii, 182. Under date Varzin September 29, 1876.

³ "She (Austria) did not at all wish that Montenegro should be allowed to receive Antivari, and that the Serbs, with Bosnia and Montenegro, should proclaim an empire under Nikita. But the latter would be the case if Austria did not take measures. Austria wishes, however, to be forced to invade these countries". *Ibid.* ii, 212. Blowitz to Hohenlohe. Under date Berlin, June 19, 1878.

the barriers which are now costing us untold blood and treasure, formally moved the invitation to Austria in the Congress. There is no doubt, however, that by that time Austria had very definitely made up her mind, however much for diplomatic appearances she might feign reluctance. Indeed, unless she were to abandon her Balkan policy, there was no other way, for the union of Bosnia with Serbia would have placed a difficult obstacle in the path of any advance in the future. The Serbs lay in the road of her ambitions, and she was determined to strike at them whenever and wherever she could.

The reactions of the occupation on the internal and external politics of the Monarchy were profound. Up to quite recent years the Southern Slav question was really composed of two questions, distinct enough though closely related—the Serb question, which was mainly external to Austrian politics, and the Croat which was purely internal. As has been seen the two kindreds are divided by differences of religion, and they have also been divided in their historical destinies, the history of the Serbs having been mainly Balkan in its interactions and united to that of the countries of the Balkan and the lower Danube, while that of the Croats has been chiefly involved in the politics of the middle Danube. The Magyars had missed no opportunity of inflaming these differences which all through the nineteenth century rendered abortive all the efforts of the Croats against the Magyars, for the Croats, to the secret joy of the Magyars and their *agents provocateurs*, adopted an intransigent attitude towards the Serbs, who number about a third of the inhabitants of Croatia-Slavonia and are numerous in southern Hungary, with the result that the latter leaned upon the ministry at Budapest which in turn used them to thwart the Croats. Serbo-Croat energy was thus turned to its own destruction. The great Bishop Strossmayer of Djakovo, a Croat in spite of his name, but a just-minded and a great-hearted Southern Slav patriot, preached in season and out of season the gospel of Southern Slav reconciliation and solidarity, yet apparently without

effect in his own day, for he did not live to see the realization of all his strivings. "He being dead yet speaketh", and perhaps even in these days of blood he may "see the travail of his soul and shall be satisfied".

Until the occupation of Bosnia, then, it was possible theoretically, that is apart from Austrian ambitions, to envisage two separate solutions of these problems. There might have been south of the Danube a greater Serbia, purely Serb in character, consisting of the Serbia of to-day together with Bosnia and the Hercegovina and, if Austria had been wishful to make her a friend, of the territory of Dubrovnik. That was a possible settlement of the external Serb problem. The Croat problem would have remained as an internal Austrian question. At this time, so far apart politically were the two divisions of the race that such separate solutions would have seemed natural and desirable to themselves.

By the occupation of Bosnia Austria had gone too far or not far enough. She had not united within herself all the Serbo-Croat stock, and there still remained the kingdom of Serbia (as well as the Serb portions of Turkey) to be an independent centre of Serb nationalism. The act inflamed the anger of the kingdom against her mighty neighbour which had occupied two purely Serb provinces which she had regarded as her own reversion, and the population of which would have in a great majority welcomed Serb rule since the traditions even of the Moslem Serbs of the provinces were purely Serb and told of the glories of the ancient Serb Empire. Henceforth for patriotic Serbs there could be no longer any doubt that if the Turks were the *Erbfeind* the Austrians were the *Erzfeind*. Unless Austria could engage the dynasty in its favour there was no possibility of cordial relations between the two States, and though the Habsburgs succeeded in attaching Milan and Alexander to their chariot-wheels it was at the cost of increased bitterness in the nation which, after keeping the kingdom in a turmoil for a generation ended in the dreadful purge of 1903. So, on

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the other hand, Austria had gone too far for a purely Serb solution of the Serb problem, for she had cut the Serb stock in two, and even the purely Serb problem required the incorporation of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the kingdom. Austria had gone as far as she was able at the time, and pending a further advance her aim was to keep the kingdom as weak as possible. Aided by the organs of the Jewish Press both within and without the Monarchy, for the Jews have for occult reasons been constantly opposed to Serb expansion, she filled Europe with tales of Serb disorders, of Serb corruption and barbarism, and thus strove to prepare the way for acquiescence in a further move forward on her part. In Hungary the Jews were extremely powerful and their attitude may be regarded as an expression of Magyar chauvinism, but the Jews of Salonica and the Levant generally worked hard either for Turkey or Austria. Jewish high finance took a hand in the game, hoping perhaps for opportunities of exploitation in Serbia similar to those which it received in Bosnia.

Equally great was the influence of the occupation on the internal politics of the Monarchy owing to the modification brought about in its Southern Slav question. Up to the present there had been, as has been said above, virtually two problems, Serb and Croat, the one mainly external the other wholly internal. After 1878 Austria found that she had added the Serb question to the Croat, and in the course of years a still more fateful result was gradually manifested at first in various forms but eventually taking the shape of a combined Serbo-Croat problem internal and external. The first effect was apparently to drive still farther the wedge between Serb and Croat. The Croats had throughout the nineteenth century clamoured for the incorporation of Dalmatia in the Triune Kingdom of which it was legally and constitutionally an integral member, and this claim was reinforced by the occupation, for Bosnia formed an important link between the somewhat straggling portions of the kingdom. A glance at the map will show that Croatia, Slavonia, and Dalmatia form two long peninsulas, so to

speak, of territory, one pointing east and the other south-east, and that these two tongues of land are joined by a very narrow neck, whose physical characteristics of the high and barren mountains of the Karst made it almost as much a barrier as a point of union. Bosnia, however, conveniently rounded off this area lying between the two peninsulas and forming with them a solid block of territory, while it opened up easier lines of access from the eastern parts of Croatia to the ports of the middle Adriatic. The Croats now demanded the incorporation of Bosnia also in the kingdom and thus came into violent conflict with the Serbs at home and abroad. For the Croats the demand was a scheme of aggrandizement going beyond their constitutional claims, for the Serbs it was an unprovoked attack upon their own legitimate aspirations delivered by a kindred people. This strife worked for the benefit of the Magyars, who promoted it in every way possible. In Croatia riots between the two elements were of frequent occurrence; the Serb colours would be burnt or trampled on, while on their side the Serbs lent their aid to the Hungarian Bans and derided the Croat claims; even the great Strossmayer was refused entry on one occasion to Belgrade. All this brought grist to the Magyar mill. In truth the position of the Magyars was precarious: a large accession had been made to the Southern Slavs of the Monarchy not because their presence was desired, for it was loathed, but partly in furtherance of the policy of expansion and partly to exorcise the danger from a strong Serb kingdom, but this accession might prove absolutely fatal if once the two Slav elements came to terms. The political forces and cross currents were subtle and intricate; Austria had desired to prevent a greater Serbia, for one reason because of the danger that such a Serbia would attract the Southern Slavs of the Monarchy—a result which, as has been seen, would have been by no means certain if a friendly policy had been pursued by the Magyars to the Croats. The danger, however, of a similar result so far from being exorcised would actually have been created, and within

the Monarchy itself, if Serbs and Croats joined hands. In short, in that event Austrian policy would have given form, substance, and opportunity to the very danger it had sought to avoid, and which, possibly, might have been avoided if conciliation towards the Croats at home had been accompanied by a sympathetic attitude towards the creation of a greater Serbia—a policy which in 1865, in the reign of Prince Michael had been tentatively accepted.¹ There was great danger that Austria would find herself hoist with her own petard. Some years were to pass, nevertheless, before the actual danger-point was reached, for until the first years of the present century the Croats remained loyal to the dynasty.

The demand for a greater Croatia was by no means inspired by feelings of hostility to the Habsburgs, for in spite of all discouragements the Croats had always been quite curiously devoted to the ruling House and "Vienna": their quarrel was with Budapest. To the Magyars the design was one to be resisted at all costs, for its success would have deprived them not only of their position in the Monarchy as a whole, but in the "Hungarian" kingdom as well; it would have reduced them to the position *primi inter pares*, while their inordinate and stubborn pride demanded a position of predominance. The success of the Croats, also, would have been an encouragement and example to the two millions of Slovaks and the four millions of Roumanians. The Southern Slav movement would not be checked—repression no longer had its ancient force, while in Dalmatia, owing to the milder methods of Vienna, it found a strong *point d'appui* whence it could exert its influence in Croatia untrammelled by Magyar police methods. The next step showed how Serbs and Croats were learning the lesson of adversity and the folly of internecine warfare, and in 1905, consequent on the resolutions passed at Rijeka (Fiume) and

¹ It has been frequently stated that in 1865 Austria herself expressed to Serbia her acquiescence in a future Serb occupation of Bosnia as far as the Vrbas.

Zadar (Zara), the Serbo-Croat Coalition was formed, embracing the greater part of the independent political parties in the Croatian and Dalmatian Sabors. This step alarmed the Magyars, for it destroyed at a blow the basis of their power in Croatia and was the hoisting of a danger-signal not to be disregarded. Henceforth there could be no doubt of the reality and strength of the Southern Slav movement.

Not even yet was that movement anti-dynastic; it was still directed only against the overweening pretensions of the Magyars. The leaders still desired an accord with Vienna, and for a moment even hoped for one with Budapest at the moment engaged in one of its periodical struggles against Austria. The situation moreover in Serbia, two years after the accession of King Peter, was not such as to lead any but the Serbs proper to turn their eyes in that direction. There was one man in the Monarchy who, if report speaks true, for he had the gift of silence, grasped the position and saw a way of turning it to the advantage of the ruling House and of the whole State, and that was the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Archduke was supposed to give his adhesion to what was known as the Greater Austria policy, a policy which was not content with the passive and secondary rôle which the Monarchy had been playing on the international stage, but saw that a thorough reconstruction at home was necessary to any real forward movement abroad. One of the ideas attributed to the Archduke was the substitution of Trialism for Dualism—that is to say, the establishment of a third Southern Slav unit comprising Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, and possibly the Slovene country, side by side with Austria and Hungary. This is perhaps doubtful. Another plan imputed to him was more thorough and far-reaching. This was the entire reconstruction of the Monarchy on a federal basis. Under this scheme all the national units would have been reconstituted as constituent elements of the State with a large measure of internal autonomy and with a

representation in a common federal parliament for the whole Monarchy. Either plan would have deprived the Magyars of their predominant position in Transleithania, and would have met with the bitterest opposition from them. Indeed it is doubtful whether either idea could have been carried out without a civil war which might have ended in complete disruption, and it was part of the tragedy of the Archduke's life that the man who saw the only chance of saving the House of Habsburg should have come on the scene when it was already too late for effect to be given to his ideas. There was no longer a *locus pœnitentiæ*. To the Magyars he was openly antagonistic as to the great obstacle in his way, and the feeling was heartily reciprocated. Hardly less hostile was the German element whose position, in the larger scheme, was equally menaced. In one thing he was true to his ancestry—he planned for the House of Habsburg.

Among the causes to which is due the failure of the Habsburgs to make use of the most magnificent opportunities may be assigned two traits of character which have marked the House almost without interval from the days of Maximilian to the present time—lack of toleration, its fervid ultramontanism, and lack of imagination. To the first they have frequently sacrificed their interests, to the second they owe the failure to make use of political openings almost without number. The Archduke was not without imagination—far from it; for the Greater Austria idea based on federal reconstruction showed, if not the highest imagination, at any rate an imagination superior to that either of his immediate ancestors or of his uncle's statesmen. To a certain degree the idea may be said to be obvious—but many "statesmen" lack imagination to grasp the obvious. In his Southern Slav schemes there was one fatal flaw, due to the fact that he was a bigoted ultramontane like all his House. He thought of settling the Southern Slav question on a purely Catholic Croat basis, and more, he is credited with having mingled his

political aims with a mystical dream in which he should be the instrument chosen to bring the Orthodox into the Catholic fold. If this be true—and it is asserted by those who claim some degree of intimate knowledge—it would have been more than sufficient to wreck his plans. Even the attempt to solve the Southern Slav question on a Catholic Croat basis was impracticable. In former years the purely Croat problem might have been so treated, but never the whole Southern Slav question. Even the Catholicism of the Croats is not ultramontane in character so far as the people itself is concerned. The day, however, had gone by for partial and separate solutions. The leaven had been at work, the occupation of Bosnia had quickened its action; the Serbo-Croat Coalition had been formed, and the question could only be solved on a Serbo-Croat, Orthodox and Catholic, basis. The ultramontane prejudices of the Archduke would not allow him, his imagination did not soar sufficiently high, to envisage himself as Orthodox Tsar as well as Catholic King.

He found an able but unscrupulous collaborator in the late Count Aehrenthal, and in pursuance of his ideas in 1908 Bosnia was annexed to the Monarchy, having been hitherto only "occupied and administered". A sharp crisis with Serbia followed, in which the latter was forced to eat humble-pie, the form being that she was forced to swallow the words (that the matter was of European concern and affected her also) which had been placed in her mouth by the British Government. Austrian duplicity overreached itself in what followed. Anxious to get up a case against Serbia, the Ballplatz set abroad rumours of a pan-Serb plot, and in 1909 brought to trial the leaders of the Serbo-Croat Coalition in what is known as the Agram High Treason Trial. The accused were condemned by a scandalous judgment. The following year the same men, having been in the meantime amnestied, brought a libel action against the Austrian historian Dr. Friedjung, who in his polemic against them had asserted the existence of, and had quoted from, certain

incriminating documents. In the course of the trial at Vienna these documents alleging a pan-Serb conspiracy engineered from Belgrade and involving the Serbo-Croat leaders, were proved to be forgeries, and their origin was subsequently traced to Count Forgach, Austrian Minister at Belgrade.^{*} Count Aehrenthal, of course, was the prime mover. The result recoiled on the Austrian Government, since it not only failed to establish its case against Serbia, but also finally estranged the Southern Slavs of the Monarchy. The Archduke's plans had definitely come to grief, and it is extraordinary that he ever permitted a course of action so absolutely fatal. The successes of Serbia in the Balkan wars produced a prodigious effect in the "Slavonic South" (Slovenski Jug); patriotism was inflamed and the people overcome with joy, for they set at rest any lingering doubts as to the ability of Serbia to play the part of a Southern [Slav] Piedmont. The Southern Slavs turned aside from any idea of a Habsburg solution of their problem and based themselves on an independent footing; their redemption was to be by their own kith and kin. So high did feeling rise in Dalmatia that most of the municipalities were dissolved and the towns placed under martial law, and when shortly before his death the Archduke visited Spljet (Spalato) the populace forced the band to repeat the Serb national anthem three times. The Southern Slavs had found themselves, and no longer distrusted their future, the resources of their race, or the leadership of Serbia.

II

The annexation of Bosnia aroused Serbia to a sense of her peril. Any lingering hope that she might still have

^{*} For a detailed account of these two trials see R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question and the Habsburg Monarchy*. Less detailed accounts of them, together with summaries of subsequent treason trials to the present time (February 1917), will be found in *Le Régime Politique d'Autriche-Hongrie en Bosnie-Herzégovine et les Procès de Haute Trahison* and in *Les Persécutions des Yougoslaves*.

cherished of obtaining access to the Adriatic through Bosnia was dispelled, and unless she bestirred herself her future in Old Serbia and Macedonia would also be lost. More than that, she saw herself designated as the next victim, and the loss of her independence to be the next step in Austria's course to Salonica. She knew, moreover, that if Austria had renounced her position in the sanjak of Novipazar, it was because the General Staff had come to the conclusion that the sanjak formed no practical military road to the Ægean, and that the only possible line of advance was the historic road up the Morava valley and down that of the Vardar. She lay directly in Austria's path and her danger was acute. For these eventualities she prepared herself with feverish energy, and the work of consolidation which had marked King Peter's reign was pressed forward with increased resolution, especially in military matters.

The army was reorganized chiefly under the fostering care of General, now Vojvode (Field-Marshal) Putnik, first as Minister of War and then as Chief of the General Staff. The father of this famous officer had come to Serbia from southern Hungary and taken up work as a schoolmaster. The son entered the army and devoted himself entirely to a military career. Unlike many other Balkan soldiers he entirely eschewed politics and was noted for his taciturnity. If Moltke could be silent in seven languages Putnik is silent in five, and he is said to have remarked that only fools become politicians or journalists. The Serb artillery was rearmed with French guns from the famous Schneider-Canet firm of Creusot similar to the 75's of the French Army, magazine rifles were procured, and older rifles were converted at the arsenal of Kragujevac. Some batteries of howitzers were also procured to an extent that made Serbia the best provided of the Balkan States in this regard, though, as recent events have shown, not to the extent necessary in modern war against a Great Power. The artillery proved itself up to the standard of the best armies

and was greatly superior in the Balkan wars to that of foes or allies. The infantry proved dashing in attack and stubborn in defence, and tireless marchers. The Serb cavalry was also noted at the time as being the only cavalry in the Balkans trained in the manner of that of western States though it was small in numbers. The auxiliary services proved equal to the strain of the Balkan wars though in some respects, especially medical, overpowered by the demands of the Great War. During the Obrenović *régime* the army had been scandalously neglected, its cadres were insufficient, its subsidiary services rudimentary, its *moral* shaken by neglect and interference in politics, and in the 'nineties it was notoriously the least prepared for war of any Balkan force. Since then the Serb as a soldier has come to his own again, and no more is heard now of the foolish disparagement that has already been noted; indeed the tendency has rather been to an opposite exaggeration, and more has been expected of the Serb army than either it or perhaps any other army could perform. In the first Balkan war the great victory of Kumanovo, leading to the amusing invention of the Bulgarian victory at Kirk Kilisse, an action which never took place, which shattered the Turkish power in northern Macedonia, followed by the battles of Prilip and Bitolj, showed what the new Serb army was like. In the hard test of the second Balkan war it proved its efficiency on the Bregalnica against the Bulgars and firmly established its position. Of the victories of the Jadar, and the great rally on Mount Rudnik when the Austrians were hurled out of the country with a loss of 40,000 killed and wounded and 60,000 prisoners, it is unnecessary to speak. If in November 1915 it went down before the shock of the combined Austro-German-Bulgar forces it was because it was hopelessly outnumbered by at least three to one in men and ten to one in heavy artillery. The fact that the enemy considered that such a combined move was necessary speaks volumes for their opinion of the Serbs. Even before the great last attack the Serbs had placed

not less than 300,000 Austrians *hors de combat*,¹ a figure equal to its own extreme numbers. Before the *débâcle* of December 1914 Danzer's *Armee Zeitung*, the Austrian military organ, said in reference to Austrian reports of Serb demoralization: "In reality we are fighting an enemy who has scarcely his equal in courage and energy, and who defends every inch of the ground." Well equipped and well led the Serb army has proved itself a formidable fighting machine, even when faced by the troops of a Great Power.

In military matters the wheel has come full circle, and here the national motto, "*Tempus et meum jus*", has been justified. Not only, however, in military affairs has there been a veritable renaissance.² Military progress has been accompanied and made possible by political, economic, and financial advance of no mean order, and it is well to know that Serbia's progress is broad based on solid grounds, giving valid hopes of future stability. She is our ally; we shall, after the war, have economic and commercial dealings with her, and her satisfactory internal position should be duly noted by our men of affairs as well as by politicians.

During the present *régime* there has been great progress in all departments of the national life. Political life has followed normal courses, and the present King has known how to respect the Constitution of his realm, while not hesitating on occasion to avail himself of his royal prerogative in such matters, for example, as the refusal to accept the resignation of a Ministry when he considered such a course in the interests of the country. There has thus

¹ The Austrian losses in the Balkans up to February 1, 1916, are stated by the Budapest correspondent of the *Morning Post* to have amounted to 117,900 killed, 265,900 wounded, and 80,000 prisoners: The calculation is the work of a Hungarian statistician. *Morning Post*, March 17, 1916.

² In this section I deal of course with the progress made up to the recent wars. The latter have altered the economic conditions materially, yet the record of previous recent progress stands as an augury of the future.

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been obtained a very fair measure of stability in administration, and constitutional crises are a thing of the past. This is a very different state of affairs to that obtaining under King Alexander, whose political instability and frequent *coups d'état* made normal progress impossible.

The foundation of all internal reforms and social progress is good finance, and here the advance is most noteworthy. It is only possible to carry the survey up to the period antecedent to the Balkan wars, which, of course, created fresh obligations (and assets) and have prevented the presentation of a normal budget. The following figures show the growth of the budget:—

Year.	Total Receipts.	Total Expenditure.	Surplus or Deficit.
	Frs.	Frs.	Frs.
1895	58,540,700	64,935,295	— 6,394,595
1900	77,179,397	78,710,708	— 1,531,310
1906	91,270,374	87,189,680	+ 4,080,693
1907	94,324,117	86,689,952	+ 8,134,164
1908	95,293,792	95,029,350	+ 264,442
1909	105,130,472	103,831,367	+ 1,299,105
1910	116,581,133	111,633,527	+ 4,947,605
1911	126,078,673	111,990,364	+14,088,309

Late years, it will be seen, have yielded a steady surplus, no deficit being incurred even in 1908, during the annexation crisis. The reorganization of the State accounts has been carried out with the assistance of an expert lent by the French Government. The service of the debt is secured upon the monopolies of tobacco, salt, petroleum, matches, and cigarette paper, the customs, and certain stamp duties and alimentary taxes. These taxes are paid in to the monopolies direction, which is sometimes described as autonomous. It does not, however, imply foreign control of these revenues, as, while the bondholders appoint two members to the administrative council of the monopolies, the government itself appoints the remaining three. The surplus revenues of the administration after meeting the

debt service are handed over to the Treasury. The following figures show the increase in this surplus in spite of the increase of debt:—

Year.		Frs.	Year.		Frs.
1896	...	1,556,143	1908	...	12,078,744
1900	...	7,635,608	1909	...	11,489,225
1904	...	11,742,906	1910	...	10,268,074
1906	...	14,404,340	1911	...	15,482,725
1907	...	14,627,678			

In 1903 was instituted the *gotovina*, or Treasury reserve fund, fed by budget surplus and certain assigned revenues. The object of this fund is to provide a working balance pending the encashment of the revenue, to meet supplementary estimates, and to provide for extraordinary expenditure included in the budget. Thanks to the reserve fund, it is some years since Serbia has issued Treasury Bills, the only recent issue being in 1911, advanced to the National Bank for the purpose of providing extra currency. In 1908, during the annexation crisis, the government was able to draw upon it to the extent of 18,000,000 francs, thus obviating the necessity of issuing Treasury Bills or contracting a loan. It has also enabled the State to pay off the balance of certain loans of no great amount, the presence of which swelled the number of outstanding loans. These, to the amount of 14,644,514 francs, have been paid off, as well as a further sum of 700,000 francs representing the last of the old floating debt. Notwithstanding all these payments, the fund increased in the six years 1906–11 by a total of 11,000,000 francs. This result contrasts favourably with the former chronic deficits, which went to swell the amount of unproductive debt. The debt in 1912 amounted to 659,056,000 francs, representing a decrease, as compared with 1910, of 17,500,000 francs. The increase in Serbia's credit is indicated by the fact that the 1895 4 per cent. converted loan was issued at 69·5 and in 1912 stood at 90, an appreciation of 30 per cent. Coincidentally the burden of the debt service on the revenue has decreased notably. In 1889 the annuities accounted for no less than 50 per cent. of

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the Government receipts, in 1895 33 per cent., in 1910 25 per cent., and in 1912 23·5 per cent.

Serbia is predominantly an agricultural State of small peasant proprietors. Of the total population of the kingdom as it existed prior to the Balkan wars, 84·23 per cent. were engaged in agriculture, 6·68 per cent. in industry, 4·41 per cent. in trade, and 4·68 in the professions or Government employment. The following table of figures, the most recent available though not quite up to date, gives an idea of the even excessive subdivision of property in the former kingdom :—

No. of Properties.	Extent of Each. Hectares (1 Hectare = 2·4 Acres).	Percentage of Properties.
98,253	Up to 3 (acres 7·2)	33·49
62,622	3-5 (7·2-12)	21·16
80,822	5-10 (12-24)	27·55
40,782	10-20 (24-48)	13·87
7,663	20-30 (48-72)	2·60
2,138	30-40 (72-96)	·73
846	40-50 (96-120)	·29
345	50-60 (120-144)	·12
198	60-70 (144-168)	·07
99	70-80 (168-192)	·03
63	80-90 (192-216)	·02
37	90-100 (216-240)	·01
41	100-125 (240-300)	·01
17	125-150 (300-360)	·005
17	150-200 (360-480)	·005
2	200-250 (480-600)	·001
3	250-300 (600-720)	·001
3	Over 300 (over 720)	·001

The need in such an economy for co-operation has not only been felt, but has largely been acted upon. There are in existence several hundred co-operative credit societies on the Raffeisen principle, granting loans to their members for such objects as the planting of vines and fruit trees, the purchase of beasts of burden and of agricultural implements, etc. Each association has also an adults' and children's

savings bank. There are also specific associations for the purchase of agricultural implements to be used in common. In virtue of the common guarantee of the members, funds are advanced by the Central Caisse of the agricultural co-operative societies. The societies possess their sowing machine, reaping and threshing machine, etc. As an illustration of the benefit conferred, it is stated that a small cart which used to cost 72 francs in Belgrade now costs 50 francs; and that a Dutch reaper used to cost about 800 francs, while the Central Caisse can now get it delivered in Belgrade for 550 francs. The Central Caisse finances the local societies and also sells their products; it is itself financed by the State. The various local societies can become members as shareholders, but no shareholder can hold more than 100 shares, and voting is by membership, irrespective of the amount of shares held. It should be mentioned that each society has its own tribunal, composed of two members chosen by the conflicting parties and a third co-opted as president. This tribunal settles petty disputes among the members connected with such matters as rights of way, damage done by beasts to crops, etc. Finally, all the co-operative societies, departmental unions, and the Central Caisse form the General Union of the agricultural co-operative societies, which defends their interests, undertakes the creation of new societies and the direction and control of those already existing. Six years ago there were already more than 500 agricultural co-operative societies and about 250 branches. In addition, there are over 50 public nurseries, ranging from 12 to 57 acres, conducted on "model" lines and comprising orchards, vineyards, poultry farms, etc. There are also official agricultural instructors, advising the peasants in their districts and working under the Ministry of Agriculture.

Such is a *résumé* of the means adopted to raise agriculture and to free the peasants from the operations of the "gombeen man", while there is also a homestead law by which an area of about five acres, with the necessary

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implements and beasts, cannot be sold for the satisfaction of private debts, and the peasants are forbidden to give bills of exchange. The restriction of credit thus brought about is ameliorated by the operation of the Raffeisen societies. The Serbs take kindly to co-operation for two main reasons. The older social economy of the people was centred in the *Zadruga*, or family group, which might even comprise as many as 300 members and include a whole village. The family owned their land in common and worked it in common under the direction of the *starešina*, or elder, by whom the products were apportioned. The members had a common dining-hall in the house of the *starešina*, with their individual cottages, in the case of married sons, grouped round the central homestead. Some family *zadrugas* are still to be found. They have also their *moba* and *sprega*, the former being the name given to mutual co-operation, as in times of harvest, when neighbours join together to help one who stands in need of further manual aid, the latter being the name of similar help given by the loan of draught or plough animals, etc. The co-operative society takes the place and even the name of the former *zadruga*, of which it may be said to be the modern form, it is in fact the new *zadruga*. In Serbia co-operation has no deep-rooted prejudices to overcome, as in our own country, and the habit of co-operation augurs well for the economic future of the country. The vitality and growth of a State depend not merely on valour in the field, which is truly a moral test, but in advance in those material and economic aspects of the national life which are in nations as necessarily united to moral soundness as body and soul in the individual.

The work of railway construction which prior to the present *régime* had been confined to the Oriental lines, no subsequent construction at all having been undertaken, has also been pressed forward in recent years. The Brza Palanka-Niš line of normal gauge was completed just at the time of the Austro-Bulgar invasion, it forms the Serb portion of the future connection with Roumania. Several

narrow-gauge lines have also been built such as the western Morava valley line from Stalać to Užice, a line from Obrenovac on the Danube to Valjevo, another from Mladenovac on the main line to the south of Belgrade to a junction to the last named at Lajkovac, and a line from Paraćin, on the main line, to Zaječar on the Timok valley line.

The results of all this work of reconstruction were seen in the Balkan wars. The renaissance of Serbia had been effected silently and in a manner that belied the common accusation that the Serbs are talkers rather than doers. Even the measures taken to emancipate Serbia from economic servitude to Austria following on the "pig war" of 1905-6 had not attracted the attention that might have been expected; fresh outlets of trade had been created *viâ* Salonica, and slaughter-houses had rendered the country less dependent on the export of live-stock. To those who were not cognizant of the work that had been done, the results of the Balkan wars were astonishing, and people realized that Serbia was not only an important military State, but that its statesmen had proved themselves organizers of no mean ability. The inception of the alliance itself was a tribute to the altered position of the country in the eyes of its neighbours who could no longer regard it as a negligible quantity. For Serbia the Turkish war was a desperate attempt to reach the sea and to forestall Austria's next step; success might bring relief and possibly safety, failure would but anticipate an otherwise inevitable fate. She bore her part valiantly, and at Kumanovo avenged Kosovo; "We gained the country by the sword, and you have regained it by the sword," a Turk of Skoplje is said to have remarked to a Serb officer. At Adrianople the deciding factor was the Serb artillery, though the Bulgars endeavoured to belittle the aid received and showed scant courtesy to the Serb contingent who were not even thanked in general orders.

Austria was disconcerted and alarmed at the results achieved, for she had reckoned on a Turkish victory and

the possibility of her stepping in to "save" the Serbs. She refused Serbia the desired access to the Adriatic and intrigued with Bulgaria to break up the alliance.¹ Disputes arose over the partition of Macedonia, and the second Balkan war broke out—the Balkan *bloc* was broken up. Again the result belied Austrian anticipations, and Serbia emerged victorious and still further aggrandized. In August 1913 Austria planned a war against Serbia,² but the project was put off for the time being. The murder of the Archduke in June 1915 gave her the opportunity she desired and the Great War was the result.

In spite of the ordeal through which Serbia is passing, the work of regeneration outlined above gives good hope for the future in the event of a victory for the Allies. The renascence of Serbia in its essential and spiritual elements is an accomplished fact, the recent material loss is heavy indeed but it will be made good; Serbia will rise again from its ashes.

¹ For a discussion of the Macedonian question and the events leading up to the second Balkan war see below, Chapter VI.

² Revelation of Signor Giolitti, December 5, 1914.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF THE ADRIATIC

I

THE programme of the Southern Slavs for their future is national union. As has been seen in the previous chapter, all three branches of the race are at length at one in the demand that, as the Germans and Italians in the nineteenth century and others before them attained national unity within the limits of a single State, so they also shall be allowed to attain the same end as the result of the present war. That indeed is the supreme aim which animates their courage and buoys up their spirit in adversity. Of the difficult questions which are involved in this demand the most difficult in fact, as it is perhaps the least difficult in abstract speculation, is the Adriatic question, which forms the most outstanding of the problems connected with that political reconstruction of south-eastern Europe which should be one of the solid gains of the war in the event of a complete victory for the Allies, which is the supposition necessarily antecedent to such a discussion as follows.

In its essential elements the problem arises from the configuration of the Adriatic and the contrasting character of its two shores. In itself the Adriatic is a long arm of the Mediterranean thrust north-westwards, separating Italy from the Balkan Peninsula, and opening to its parent sea by the Strait of Otranto which is less than

fifty miles wide, the strait itself being commanded from¹ the fine bay of Valona or Avlona with its entrance guarded by the lofty Acroceraunian peninsula and the islet of Saseno. The ports on the western shore are outlets of Italian trade as the eastern ports should be for that of the Balkans, while Trieste and Rijeka (Fiume) at its extreme north-western and north-eastern limits are the ports of entry for the countries of the middle and upper Danube. The Italian shore of the Adriatic is low and singularly devoid of good natural ports, especially of ports capable of being made into strong naval bases. In the north are the ports of Trieste, Pola, and Rijeka, the last named naturally the least good of the three while Pola forms a splendid naval station. The eastern shore, in marked contrast to the western, affords both to commerce and naval power all those facilities which the latter lacks. Formed by the subsidence of the land where the spurs of the Dinaric Alps run down to the sea the coast line is broken up into innumerable deep indentations running far into the land, occupying the place of former valleys and forming a series of magnificent harbours such as those of Šibenik (Sebenico), Split or Spljet (Spalato), Gruž (Gravosa), and Kotor (Cattaro), which are not only admirably adapted for commerce but form naturally some of the finest naval bases in Europe. The coast is flanked, moreover, by numerous islands which not only frequently possess good ports, notably Vis (Lissa), but also guard a marine covered-way leading along the coast between the sheltering islands and the mainland, which enhances the value of the ports and allows of a fleet making its way from Pola to Kotor free from interference by a hostile force. The water, moreover, is everywhere deep.

During the nineteenth century from 1815 the whole of the eastern shore, with the exception of Albania with the bay of Valona and the inferior roadsteads of Durazzo and Medua, and of the short Montenegrin coast formerly Turkish, has been in the possession of the House of

¹ I say commanded "from" not "by" advisedly, *vide infra* IV.

Austria. The result since the unification of Italy has been a constant and unconcealed rivalry between that Power and her Austrian ally, which of late years has become more acute owing to the growth of Austrian naval power. Powerful units were added to the fleet, subsidiary bases established at Teodo in the Bocche di Cattaro and at Šibenik, and when the war broke out Austria was engaged in the first steps towards the realization of an ambitious programme of construction which was to include several "Dreadnoughts." This naval growth pressed more and more hardly upon Italy, which felt acutely the dearth of natural ports on her eastern coast which, against an equal naval force, was difficult of defence from Venice or Taranto, the latter of which lies outside the Adriatic. During the latter years of the last century a new factor appeared on the scene in the shape of the Southern Slav renaissance. To the conflicting ambitions of Italy and the House of Habsburg the Southern Slavs opposed the claim of their nationality and the demands of geography. When, after 1866, the Habsburgs had no further object in bolstering up the Italian element in their dominions and gave—until recent years—something like a free hand to the Serbo-Croats of Dalmatia the municipalities, despite an electoral law which unduly favoured the Italian element, fell one by one into Slav hands with the exception of Zadar (Zara). Without at first any definite political programme the Slavs were gradually "finding" themselves, and while the Italians lost ground *politically* in Dalmatia to the Serbo-Croats, the Germans found the Slovenes blocking their path to a sea which has always been within the scope of their ambitions. The mutual attitude of Italy and Austria to each other was illustrated by their handling of the problem of Albania. Owing to the position of Valona at the very mouth of the Adriatic, neither would permit the acquisition of that port by the other, since its occupation by Italy would have meant for Austria that her sea gateway would have been commanded by her rival and her maritime pretensions throttled, while for Italy an

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Austrian occupation would have given complete physical command to her enemy and aggravated her own existing position. In Albania, therefore, each fostered its propaganda by every means in its power, education, commerce, and religion all being pressed into the national service, with results that on the whole were hardly proportionate to the energy expended, the Albanians being willing enough to take all that was offered to them but having a shrewd idea of the purpose that lurked behind the gifts. In general the Italians met with more success in the south, where Valona was of vital importance to them, while the Austrians were more successful among the Catholic tribes of the north, where they were able to keep a watch on the Serbs and Montenegrins. Eventually a self-denying ordinance was entered upon by both and served to stave off the day of open conflict, and it was provided that any Balkan acquisition on the part of one should involve compensation to the other and that no forward Balkan move should be undertaken by either without previous consultation with its ally. It was the breach of this last stipulation which formed one of the formal grounds of complaint by Italy against her quondam ally in 1914. The attempted formation of an Albanian State in 1912 was the ultimate form taken by this mutual renunciation, as the open rivalry of the two Powers was one of the reasons that the State was still-born. Schools were founded by the rivals in Scutari and Durazzo and banks in the former town, the Austrians finding a powerful lever in the protectorate which they enjoyed over the Catholics who are strong in the extreme north, while the Italians utilized the services of the Albanian colonists who for centuries have formed part of the population of Calabria. It was evident that neither party to the arrangement considered it as anything but provisional and a mere *modus vivendi* pending the time when the course of events should give to one or other an opportunity of effecting its own purpose.

The flowing tide of the Southern Slav renaissance excited an alarm in Italy out of all proportion to any possible

danger to Italian interests. Instead of looking upon that movement as an invaluable ally against the pretensions of the House of Habsburg, and as being the predestined instrument by means of which, coincidentally with a strengthening of Italy's own position, a new and friendly Power might be installed upon the ruins of Austria's Adriatic dominions to take the place of the latter as Italy's *vis-à-vis*, Italian publicists affected, and apparently felt, a deep fear of the consequences to their country of such a *bouleversement*. In truth Italy, after a long period of recuperation following her Abyssinian disasters, apparently entered upon an imperialist foreign policy, divorced from her liberal and nationalist origin and past, and based upon the spirit of Prussian *realismus*. Determined to obtain for herself a more important position in the Mediterranean, and to strive after predominance in the eastern area of that sea, she seemed now nearer to her allies in the ethic of her international reactions than she had ever been before. In 1911 she annexed Tripoli from the Ottoman Empire and took in pledge ten of the islands of the Dodekanese,¹ together with Kos and Rhodes, pending the fulfilment of all the stipulations of the Treaty of Lausanne, while Italian publicists found good reasons for suggesting the permanent retention of these Greek islands, raking out from the past the historical claims—so varied and abundant in the Near East, and mostly worthless—of the House of Savoy to Rhodes. The results of the Balkan war of 1912 found Italy in close agreement with Austria as to the means to be adopted in face of the new situation. In particular she showed the greatest jealousy of the approach of the Serbs to the Adriatic, as she did also of the increased strength of Greece's maritime position. With Austria she took a strong line in denying to Serbia any outlet on the Adriatic, however exiguous, while she vetoed the extension of Greek rule

¹ The Dodekanese (Twelve Islands) consist of Ikaria, Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos, Astypalaia, Nisyros, Telos, Syme, Chalkeia, Karpathos, Kassos, and Kastellorizzo. The Italians hold all but the first and last, together with Rhodes and Kos.

to northern Epirus. As has been said, a common formula was found in the cry of Albania for the Albanians, the Nationalist argument proving useful for the nonce, and she strove to make the boundaries of the new State as extensive as possible. The history of 1913 negatives the plea that Italy was conforming reluctantly to an Austrian initiative; both her Press and her Ministers were eager for a large Albania and a small Serbia. It is difficult to assign any intelligible reason for the erection of the Serb bogey, the strengthening of Serbia being on any rational view of the situation essentially favourable to Italian interests. In the second Balkan war, which followed as the sequel to Serbia's exclusion from the Adriatic,¹ Italian sympathies were manifested for Bulgaria; in fact, the Marquis di San Giuliano followed in the track of Austria's Balkan policy in the hope of reducing Serbia's power and prestige, though at the same time he was in no mood to allow Austria to step into Serbia's place, as he showed when in August 1913 Austria proposed to attack her Southern Slav neighbour. It was a complicated and subtle line of policy designed upon the maintenance of as much as possible of the *status quo* pending an opportunity for Italy to alter it according to her own purposes.

With the outbreak of the Great War that opportunity arrived, and brought with it a plenitude of possible advantages beyond anything that could reasonably have been hoped for. The probable break up of Austria offered Italy not only the acquisition of Italia Irredenta but the possibility of establishing herself on the eastern Adriatic if only Southern Slav aspirations could be baulked, but as Serbia was in fact an ally of the Entente, though never treated as such, the latter possibility was not devoid of difficulty. In the meantime the sorry farce of the Albanian State as hitherto displayed was played out, and Italy was not long in occupying Valona,² with the Islet of Saseno, which in

¹ See below, Chapter VI.

² A "sanitary mission" was landed at Valona on October 25, 1914, Saseno was occupied on October 30, and Valona by a military force on December 25.

1913 had been detached from Greece (who possessed it as one of the Ionian Islands) as belonging naturally to Albania. Greece coincidentally occupied northern Epirus. In October 1914 a strong Press campaign was opened against the pretensions of Serbia (as the representative of Southern Slav unity) to Dalmatia, which was claimed for Italy on several grounds—a campaign which was renewed in the spring of 1915 coincidentally with Italy's negotiations with Austria. In those negotiations Italy demanded, in addition to the Trentino and a line to the east of the Isonzo, the establishment of Trieste as an independent State, and the southern Dalmatian islands of Vis (Lissa), Hvar (Lesina), Korčula (Curzola), Sušac (Cazza), Mljet (Meleda), and Lastovo (Lagosta), the last two of which had formerly belonged to the independent republic of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and not to Venice.¹ In the course of these conversations Italy, with a policy not without skill, put forward the demand for a Serb outlet. The cleverness with which she took upon herself to speak, unsought, in the name of Serbia was equalled by the address with which she posed the question as purely commercial in character, thus by implication denying that any question of nationality was involved. Concurrent negotiations had been carried on with the Entente culminating in the agreement of April 27² and the entry of Italy into the war.

The outbreak of the war was followed, as the opportunity served, by a remarkable growth in the extent of Italian claims in the Adriatic. The chance of asserting and enforcing these claims was not likely to recur, especially if the end of the war were to see a strong Southern Slav State established on the opposite coast; it was a chance not merely for the assertion of the rights which Italy has always maintained, but for the acquisition of advantages for which she had long ceased to hope. Hitherto her demands had been confined to the reclamation of Italia Irredenta properly so

¹ These and other demands were formulated by Baron Sonnino on April 8, 1915.

² *Vide infra* VI.

called, i.e. the Trentino and the line of the Isonzo; even Trieste, despite its predominantly Italian character, lay outside the scope of those ambitions which Italian statesmen regarded as practicable, while as to Dalmatia the feeling was hardly more than one of sentimental regret at the impossibility of recreating the old Venetian dominion. Thus in 1907 Dr. Seton-Watson could write: "Thus even the wildest Irredentists have come to recognize the hopelessness of reclaiming provinces where the Italian is in a minority of one in seven [he is speaking not only of Dalmatia, but of the whole coast from Trieste downwards], and confine their aspirations to Trieste and its Littoral, and to the Trentino".¹ The growth of Italian claims after the commencement of the war, as also the attitude taken up towards Serbia and the Southern Slavs, can best be seen by the contents of the Italian Press, and it is better moreover, in view of international relationships, that the tale should be told by the writers themselves as far as possible rather than in the form of a foreign commentary. The trend of opinion was not satisfied with the probable disappearance of Austria from the Adriatic; it desired that the Southern Slavs should not be permitted to step into Austria's shoes even in the lands which are incontestably Slav by nationality, the most efficacious method of preventing which was to claim the regions concerned for Italy. In particular Italian claims were extended to Dalmatia, the figures of the Austrian census were questioned, and Signor Gayda, an extremist, claimed 60,000 Italians in the province, though even this figure amounts to less than 10 per cent. of the whole, while the society *Pro Dalmazia* was founded with the object of arousing public opinion on the subject. The result was a violent polemic in the autumn of 1914 between the Italian and the Serb and Russian Press. Thus the semi-official Serb paper, *Samouprava*, reprinted from the Serb *Politika* an article headed "Let us save Dalmatia": "Serbia", it said, "will not consent that this Slav country should pass from Austrian domination to another domina-

¹ R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Future of Austria-Hungary*, p. 31.

tion, that of Italy". Serbia "will have the courage, with the co-operation of the Dalmatians themselves, to defend it to the last against any attempt made in Italy to transform its liberation into a new servitude". The Italians (as represented by the Press and politicians) were willing that Serbia should have a commercial outlet on the Adriatic but no more, and they disclaimed any feeling save that of self-interest. A political leader remarked *more Prussico*: "Serbia and Montenegro, Russia's *protégés*, have ambitions for a wider outlet on the Adriatic; but Italy with her 40,000,000 of people can hardly be considered in the same light as Serbia with her 3,000,000, or Montenegro". While Signor Bissolati, the well-known Interventionist Socialist, and a member of the present Cabinet, maintained that Italy should appear as the sincere champion of the principle of nationality, which she could not be so long as she laid claims to the Dalmatian coast which was overwhelmingly Slav, Professor Fiorese had been previously constrained to admit in the *Giornale d'Italia* of October 1, 1914, that "our collective opinion . . . does not yet think broadly of the possibility of making friends with the Serbs". When, on October 18, Signor Salandra took over the Foreign Office *pro tem.*, he said to the departmental chiefs, in a phrase that has become historic, "What is needed is . . . a freedom from all preconceptions and prejudices, and from every sentiment except that of sacred egoism for Italy". So on December 3, 1914, in his statement on foreign policy, he remarked: "Italy has vital interests to safeguard, just aspirations to affirm, and support of her position as a Great Power to maintain, not only intact, but such that it shall not be diminished by the possible aggrandizement of other States".¹ Two days later, when in the debate Signor Altobelli said that his sympathies were with the Entente, the Premier replied that Italians had only one feeling, that for Italy. The controversy dragged on along the same lines into

¹ *Cit. the Morning Post*, December 4, 1914.

the spring of 1915. The paramount claims of nationality were denied: "There are political and military considerations which are above any question of nationality whatever," said the *Giornale d'Italia* on April 4, and it added, "Let the Serbs have an ample outlet to the Adriatic, but do not let them aspire to conquer a predominance in that sea",¹ a sentence which well exemplifies what seems to non-Italians the almost grotesque fear felt for a State which can never be a first-class Power, for as M. Supilo, the well-known Croat leader, remarked in Petrograd shortly afterwards, Italy has nothing to fear from a Southern Slav State only a third of her size. He added the grave warning that his countrymen would prefer Austrian to Italian rule.

The more recent speeches made by the late Italian Ministers can hardly be described as being other than masterpieces of balanced ambiguity. Signor Orlando, for example, at Palermo on November 21, 1915, alluding to a sentimental and political reason acting strongly on Italian minds, said: "In the first we affirm all our admiration and all our solidarity towards the heroic Serb people; in the second we affirm all the inestimable importance to Italy of the position of the Balkan peoples".² There is posed here an antithesis, or at any rate a contrast, between the solidarity towards the Serb people which is a sentimental reason, and the inestimable importance to Italy of the "position of the Balkan peoples" (in the plural) which is a political reason. This contrast is capable of more than one interpretation discussion of which is profitless, though those who have been at all behind the scenes will hardly be at a loss for an explanation. Baron Sonnino on December 1 alluded to Serbia in cordial terms while laying it down that it was a vital necessity to bring about a state of things in the Adriatic that would compensate Italy for the unfavourable configuration of the Adriatic coast, a proposition which is altogether legitimate. Signor Salandra, however, on December 11

¹ *Cit. The Times, die seq.*

² *Cit. the Morning Post, die seq.*

was more oracular: "The unfortunate conditions which put us topographically at a disadvantage can only be altered by a victorious war, bringing us in the Adriatic not only the security of our country, but also the civil hegemony which (without excluding the peoples who have a right to border on the Adriatic) belongs to us by virtue of the superiority of our country, our territory, our population, and our civilization, which is the highest and oldest".¹ "Civil hegemony" is ambiguous, and superiority of country and kultur is a familiar phrase, of which the rest of the world is weary: the wording was not happy. Signor Barzilai at Ancona on January 19, 1916, seemed to hint that the Serb *débâcle* was in the nature of a Providential chastisement: "I was not talking at random, as you begin to see, when I hinted the other day about the responsibility of the Balkan States for the fate which has overtaken them. If heroic Serbia, whose expansion towards the Adriatic we have never tried to thwart, is to-day healing all its strayings from the vision of its own interests and pledges with the sacrifice wherefrom will assuredly germinate the resurrection of its future . . .".² Signor Martini at Florence on January 20 spoke of the day of peace, "the day when Italy, safe in her seas, will have the frontiers which Dante traced for her, when the Serb people will be re-established in the fulness of its independence", but it is to be feared that the Colonial Minister had forgotten for the moment what were the frontiers which Dante traced for Italy.³

The declarations of the present Italian ministry have been marked by a like ambiguity. Signor Bissolati continues to speak with sympathy of the Southern Slav cause and to plead for good relations between the two peoples. Thus in an interview with a French paper⁴ he remarked:

¹ *Cit. the Morning Post, die seq.*

² *Cit. the Daily Chronicle, January 21, 1916.*

³ Dante's Italy ended at Pola.

⁴ *Le Matin*, October 1, 1916.

“The Italian race has suffered too much from oppression to exercise oppression. We will not allow an irredentism to be created against us.” The *Secolo* of the same date remarked: “She [Italy] detests the idea of creating on the other side of the Adriatic a counter-irredentism.” The Premier, Signor Boselli, on the other hand, at Milan spoke of his salutation of the flag of Dalmatia. The Nationalist Press of Italy has lately adopted a line which cannot but gravely prejudice the cause of good relations between the two neighbours. In the first place must be put allegations more or less specific against the Southern Slav Committee. On October 7, 1916, the *Stampa* published a telegram stating that Yugoslav circles in Geneva had pronounced in favour of a Jugoslavia under Habsburg auspices. Three days later the *Idea Nazionale*, republishing the telegram, stated that the Yugoslav Committee at Geneva had expressed itself: “The present war has shown that small States cannot live independently without exposing their national existence to a grave danger. That is why the Jugoslavs, in view of the impossibility of creating an independent Serb kingdom which would have included all the Yugoslav regions, would wish to see the union of the Yugoslav countries realized under the form of Trialism . . .”. This elicited a reply from certain members of the Committee stating that there is no Yugoslav Committee of Geneva, although certain members of that Committee happen to live there; that with the exception of the signatories no member of the Committee had been living at Geneva since the beginning of the year; and that they had neither collectively nor individually made the declaration attributed to them, nor any declaration like it. In its leading article the *Idea Nazionale* represented the Committee as being an instrument of Austrian policy. An exactly similar procedure had been adopted by the same paper in respect of the Čechs, for on September 23 it had published an interview with “a member of the Čech National Council, who declared that his people dissociated themselves completely from the Jugoslav movement. To this the Council replied: “No member

of the National Council of the Čech Lands was in Italy during the month of September 1916, and therefore none could have spoken in its name."

Other organs of the Italian Press adopted the same line. The *Popolo d'Italia* a little later stated that the conviction was general that the Yugoslav propaganda was supported financially from sources outside its own territories, and precisely in Austria, in order to injure Italy; and Signor Caburi, in the *Giornale d'Italia* of July 10, had previously declared that the Yugoslav programme was a programme of conquest elaborated by the clerical Croats in the service of Vienna and Budapest, and that the Serbs ought not to support it. In any case Italy would never consent to its realization. The *Perseveranza* of October 19 accused Professor Lazar Marković, editor of the Serb paper *La Serbie*, published in Geneva, of having espoused the Trialist cause, while the *Giornale* of Turin, going further, stated in terms that he was an "Austrian agent, a traitor to his country," statements which drew from the calumniated editor an indignant response.¹ In December Signor Boselli, in the course of an ambiguous statement in the Italian Chamber in which he said that victory "will assure us the mastery of the Adriatic, which, for Italy, signifies a legitimate and necessary defence, and which, without forgetting the just needs of the neighbouring Slav nationalities and the necessities of their economic development, will assure equally its imprescriptible rights on the opposite coast to the Italian nationality," spoke also of "the active propaganda of which it is necessary to seek the origins in the comprehensible manœuvres of the enemy." He thus gave the sanction of his high position to the insinuations referred to.

To these accusations, the methods of whose authors bear an unpleasant resemblance to those generally associated with the names of Counts Aehrenthal and Forgách, the Yugoslav Committee gave an indignant denial through its president, Dr. Trumbić,² in the course of which it was

¹ *La Serbie*, November 5, 1916.

² *Vide The Southern Slav Bulletin* No. 25; *La Serbie*, December 3, 1916, for the full text.

pointed out that Committee derived its funds largely from American Jugoslavs (some of the South American Jugoslavs are enormously rich men, ten of them are said to control, each, a capital of over £4,000,000), and that the members of the Committee had been proceeded against in Austria, had suffered confiscation of property, had been struck off the professional rolls, and in some cases sentenced to death. The Committee, however, "has never been able to find for its defence the hospitality of the Italian Press, because our censorship tolerates no discussion on this subject favourable to the accused." ¹

It is necessary to complete this survey by giving a few more examples *à titre d'information*. The facts of this unhappy controversy are known to all who have access, direct or indirect, to the foreign Press, and it is useless, and indeed harmful, to ignore them, for if a correct appreciation is to be made of matters which will have to come up for settlement knowledge is certainly a desideratum. They will be given without comment. The *Corriere della Sera* for October 7, 1916, gave its adhesion to the programme of the Committee *Pro Dalmazia*, and said that it was necessary to remember that one part of the Jugoslavs was fighting for Austria, and the other part trying to create distrust of Italian rights. The *Giornale d'Italia*, important because of its ownership, spoke of the Croats as "the most furious enemies of our race." It added that the Croats could have their economic outlets on the Croatian coast, and the Serbs theirs in southern Dalmatia, thus treating the two portions of the race as separate entities and postulating the question as one of commercial access. Signor Caburi, in the same paper for November 16, 17, 19, qualified the Croats as "Austrian Cossacks", and the Southern Slavs as the "Prætorians of the Habsburgs"! Other Italian writers, such as Signor Bianco, have insisted on dissociating Croats and Serbs, and persist in speaking of them as of different peoples; they even urge that it is not to Serbia's interest to

¹ Statement of the republican deputy, S. Pirolini, in the Italian Chamber. *Cit. La Serbie*, December 24, 1916.

achieve Southern Slav unity, as the simple, brave Serbs would be exploited by a Croat and Slovene oligarchy. The underlying motive was plainly stated in an article in the *Secolo* as far back as May 8, 1915, in which it wrote: "If the Serbs were to succeed in including the Croats in their frontiers they will then become too powerful, and we must envisage all the possibilities. It is better for us to raise up two other nations (the Croats and the Albanians) and thus to divide the imperialist Serb *bloc*, reducing it to its just proportions, for it is better to have for neighbours two small States than a single State which includes them. With an Albania anti-Slav *par excellence* on one side and a Croatia anti-Serb and Catholic on the other, we should establish in the eastern Adriatic an advantageous equilibrium, dividing the Slav forces which have too great a tendency to increase but little to coalesce."¹ I do not understand this superstitious fear of Serbia and the Southern Slavs; evidently we have travelled far from Mazzini.

Not all Italian writers take up this line; on the contrary there are notable exceptions. Signor Mondaini, for example, in the *Azione Socialista* of August 12, 1916, published an article² against Adriatic Imperialism; so also in the *Secolo* of November 28, Signor Ghisleri, writing on the proper mission of Italy, enters a plea for the Southern Slavs and for an Italo-Slav accord; while Professor Salvemini has continued to express himself in the same sense as in his pamphlet *Guerra o Neutralità?*

Such has been the position as expressed in general terms; but it is advisable to examine in detail the specific claims advanced, more especially in respect of Dalmatia and its islands, which form the crux of the question as between Southern Slavs and Italians, leaving the regions at the head of the Adriatic for later treatment. It will be well to consider the conflicting arguments on their merits, and without reference to the "Dalmatian Agreement," whose effect will be considered in the last section of this chapter. The argu-

¹ *Cit. La Serbie*, October 8, 1916.

² Reprinted in the *New Europe* of October 26.

ment centres round three topics—historical, ethnographic, and strategic.

II

Before passing to the more substantial arguments adduced in support of Italian claims on the eastern shore of the Adriatic it is necessary to refer to a strange contention which has been seriously advanced by the more extreme partizans of Italian expansion, namely that Dalmatia forms a geographical part of Italy. Professor Cippico¹ has said: "Dalmatia and Istria have never neither in geography nor in history belonged to the Balkans".² Signor Gayda has remarked that the great bastion of the Dinaric Alps divides Dalmatia from the Serb country, that commercial relationships are impossible between them, and that communications are lacking. Another writer has ascribed the last fact to the difficulties of the mountains dividing Dalmatia from its backlands. That the Dinaric Alps do in a sense cut off and differentiate Dalmatia from Bosnia is of course true, but neither in the degree nor with the consequences asserted. All through the Middle Ages there was active intercourse with the interior both from the republic of Dubrovnik, which owed part of its wealth to its trade with medieval Serbia, and also from Spljet. In no sense are the Dinaric Alps a barrier in the same degree as the Great Alps, and for Italians, with the example of the great Alpine tunnels ever before them, to speak as though the Dinaric Alps were incapable of being pierced, or of affording means of communication, is absurd, apart altogether from the great breach opened in them by the Narenta valley. Alike from Knim to the valley of the Una and from Sinj *viâ* the

¹ "Il rispetto del Cippico per i dati di fatti non è soverchio." G. Prezzolini, *La Dalmazia*, p. 34 note.

² A Cippico, *Italy and the Adriatic*. *Fortnightly Review*, August 1915, p. 300. "Non dicò nulla di Cippico o di Dudan, scusabili per la loro incompetenza come per la passione che fa loro veder bianco il nero in questo argomento" is Prezzolini's comment on the attitude of which the quotation in the text is a manifestation. *Ibid.* p. 56.

Aržano pass to Livno, there are practicable railway routes, infinitely easier than the great trans-Alpine lines, while Dubrovnik is already connected with the interior by a narrow-gauge railway running up the Narenta valley, while a short spur runs more directly inland to Trebinje. If these ways of communication have never been developed, that has been due to Magyar hostility directed against future rivals of Rijeka (Fiume) and to dislike of a development which would have made closer than hitherto the moral and material ties binding together the different elements of the Southern Slavs. That, with Austrian apathy, has been the sole reason why these lines of railway are still wanting despite repeated demands from the Dalmatian Diet.

The writers who claim as part of Italy all that lies within the Alps and their continuations have not the courage of their convictions, for the line of the Dinaric Alps is continued by the southern spurs of the Šar Dagħ to the Pindus and thence to the Gulf of Corinth, while the Maritime Alps also include all the French Riviera. On the theory above stated not only Dalmatia, but Albania, Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia are "geographically" a part of Italy. It is not necessary to consider further an idea which is not only repugnant to common sense but is contradicted by Italian geographers themselves. The idea has been subjected to an unintentional *reductio ad absurdum* by a cartographer mentioned by Prezzolini, who has headed a map showing Dalmatia down to the Narenta as part of Italy with the inscription, "The *new natural* boundaries of Italy". *Solvuntur tabulae risu*.

The historical claims based upon the facts of the former Venetian dominion in the Adriatic require more serious treatment, both as earnestly put forward by Italian patriots and as carrying weight with foreign observers. Many "well-informed" Englishmen cognizant of the bare fact of this dominion have seen in it a proof of a veritable colonization in the English sense, and the impression has been heightened by the accident that the towns of the Dalmatian seaboard are usually known to us by their Italian names.

It is needless to cite the numerous instances of this confusion which are to be found in our daily and periodical Press. It suffices to point out that the actual form of the nomenclature carries no argument with it, just as we are not entitled to deduce that Köln, Mainz, Trier, and Aachen are French cities because usually known to us as Cologne, Mayence, Trèves, and Aix-la-Chapelle. It is a mere matter of the source through which our general acquaintance with the places has been originally derived.

It is generally unknown how scanty was the foothold of Venice on the mainland of Dalmatia until a comparatively recent epoch of the history of the republic. Till the end of the seventeenth century Venetian territory was confined to a narrow strip a few miles wide along the sea coast, and it was not till the Treaty of Karlowitz, concluded in 1699, that the republic was confirmed in the possession of such inland places as Knim, Klissa, or Sinj, by the "Mocenigo line." Only by the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1719 did Venice extend her boundary to the line of the Dinaric Alps. As the republic fell in 1797, a period of one hundred years therefore covers the total duration of Venetian rule over the inland parts of Dalmatia, itself as a whole but a maritime province. In short, historically speaking, the Venetian dominion was restricted until the last years of her independent existence to a bare foothold on the actual coast, the coast towns and the connecting shore. Moreover, it has to be remembered that in Dalmatia, as the term is used now, there existed from early times an independent republic which was never a possession of Venice but on the contrary was her vigorous rival. Within the southern limits of Dalmatia, stretching from a little south of the Narenta to the Bocche di Cattaro and including the islands of Lastovo, Mljet, Sipan, Lapud, and Calamotta, was the territory of the republic of Dubrovnik, Serb in race and popular speech though Italian in culture. Her merchant ships by transposition of the initial letters of her Italian name are said to have given us the word Argosy originally Ragosie; her vessels were to be found in the Spanish Armada; and

she was the home of the early Serb literary renaissance of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, producing works instinct with the national consciousness of the race, while in the eighteenth she produced the mathematician Bošković. Reduced in wealth by earthquakes and the changing current of commerce she yet maintained her independence and even survived her mightier rival till she too had to yield her liberties to Napoleon in 1808.

The character of the Venetian rule over Dalmatia was not such that its supersession by that of the Habsburgs brought anything of loss to the country, though it was regretted by the Italian element of the towns. That rule exhibited the worst features of the "mercantile system" without the redeeming element of the opening up of new territories which operated in our own colonial empire of the eighteenth century. Throughout her dealings with her subjects Venice was actuated by her own selfish interests, and those conceived in the narrowest spirit. Her dominion to her was not a trust, nor an instrument of civilization, but merely a means of enriching the city of the lagoons, and what money she spent in Dalmatia was spent for the sake of its defence, in short, on behalf of those "strategical necessities" which are taking Italy to its shores in our own day. Her first aim was to secure the monopoly of commerce and the carrying trade, an object which could most completely be achieved by the conquest of the Dalmatian ports and the regulations which she could thereupon enforce. The constant wars in which Venice was engaged with Hungary and its sister kingdom of Croatia were due entirely to the aggression practised against those kingdoms by Venice. They could not acquiesce in the foreign domination of their seaport towns, and the consequent strangling of their trade, its diversion to other channels, and its exploitation for the benefit of the "mistress of the Adriatic", and as surely as like causes produce like effects so a repetition of Venetian policy by Italy will lead to a repetition of the old struggle to be carried on with the future Southern Slav kingdom; the new position will be

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an exact counterpart of the old and will lead to the same sense of rankling injustice and determination for redress. The history of the past should be studied for the lessons it brings for the present and the future, and though diplomacy never learns yet the peoples concerned should insist that old mistakes, the cost of which will fall upon them, should not be committed again. The lesson of Venice's ceaseless wars against the possessors of the eastern Adriatic backland constitutes a grave warning for those who will have the handling of the Near Eastern settlement.

The policy of monopoly postulated the economic weakness of the colonies, and possible competition was eliminated by the most ruthless economic methods. To prevent the rise of a silk industry in Dalmatia Venice did not hesitate to take the drastic step of cutting down all the mulberry-trees, and it has been stated that after the change of masters the number of Dalmatian fishing and trading vessels was doubled in a single year. The last fact is easily accounted for when we remember that all commerce had to be carried in Venetian bottoms and by way of Venice. The contrast between the condition of the towns under Venetian rule and the free republic of Dubrovnik, which conducted its own commerce freely and by means of its own ships, pointed the moral and assigned the cause of the poverty of the former. While the one was prosperous, happy, and orderly, even in the days when its former glory had departed, the others were poor, torn by factions between the townsmen and peasants, and sunk in feebleness, a condition which was reflected in the state of agriculture. The monopolist policy of Venice required and effected this state of affairs, and a recent Italian writer has said that the prosperity of Venice depended on the poverty of Dalmatia and that historically the Venetian dominion was a long suffocation of the country.¹

¹ "La fortuna di Venezia dipendeva dalla sfortuna della Dalmazia e storicamente il dominio veneto non poteva rappresentare nè altro rappresentò che una lunga soffocazione del paese". G. Prezzolini, *La Dalmazia*, p. 8. This invaluable brochure should be in the hands of

Apart from the stifling of competition, what Venice sought in Dalmatia was wood for shipbuilding and sailors for the fleet. It was the enormous demands of timber for the former purpose that was responsible for the destruction of the ancient forests for which the country was famous in classical times. This destruction has resulted in the denudation of the soil and the turning of large areas of it into practical desert. For this last result Venice cannot be held morally responsible, for it is only in our days that the need of reafforesting forest areas as they are felled has been recognized, and our neglect of forestry in own country and of reafforestation in many of our colonies is proof of how slowly the need, even when recognized, is acted upon in practice. Its Venetian rulers did not desire that the Dalmatians should be other than what they had been in times past, poor, hardy, simple, and a defence against the Turks. The absence of road-making, of instruction, and of economic development, has been defended on the strange ground of preserving a frontier territory whose condition would not attract the cupidity of its neighbours and the rude condition of whose inhabitants preserved the fitness of the latter as a semi-barbarous race of caterans useful for the defence of the marches. Any other government, say the apologists for the system, would have done the same, and perhaps have been less successful! Even Tommaseo, while defending the moral character of Venetian rule, is reduced to pointing out that to leave unremedied a defect in man or nation is a different thing to introducing it.¹ The damning fact remains that Venice, in not desiring the educational development of the country, so far from spreading Italian culture actually, by the measures it adopted, prevented, though of course not with that purpose, the introduction of learning. It is not too much to say that if northern Dalmatia is to-day a Slav and not an Italian land it is due

every student of the question. It disposes of the case for annexation, and gives numerous quotations from documents not accessible to students in England.

¹ *Cit. Prezzolini, ut supra*, pp. 16-18 note.

to the restrictive policy of her former Italian mistress. No printing press was to be found in Dalmatia till about three hundred years after the setting up of the first press in Montenegro, for no books were published in the country of a date prior to 1774, nor was there any public school. A humorous illustration of the regard felt for her subjects from overseas is to be found in her authorization to the University of Padua of the conferring of the doctorate on such subjects on presentation of a certificate of proficiency given by two doctors of medicine or jurisconsults, the condition attached being that they should only practise in Dalmatia!

There is nothing therefore in the past of Dalmatia that can justify any historical claim on the part of Italy to its possession. Neither the duration of Venetian dominion over the interior, nor the character of that dominion, is of a nature to confer historical rights upon the heir of Venice. The ports of Dalmatia were regarded as convenient trading stations as were other cities in the Levant, while the possession of them stifled any possible competition. No right can be alleged in Dalmatia that could not equally be alleged in the case of Crete for example, though it is not to be forgotten that history has been invoked in the case of Rhodes, and Corfu also has been claimed as an Italian island. Dubrovnik and its territories at any rate were never Venetian, Kotor (Cattaro) was Serb till it fell into the hands of the Hungarians in 1371, Bar (Antivari) was recognized by the Serb monarchs as a sort of republic and allowed to coin its own money, Budva was also a Serb port and is noteworthy from the fact that its law is said to have been the source of Dušan's *Zakonik*. These two towns finally fell to Venice in 1442 and 1444. The kingdom of Croatia possesses prior historical rights over northern Dalmatia. In fine, the Southern Slavs were in the country before the Venetians—and are there now.

These "historical claims" are the sport of propagandists all over the Near East, and the history of these regions is such that almost any and every Power can advance some

sort of "historical" right to anything which it covets. Some are valid enough, others are comparable to our "rights" to Calais or Bordeaux. The continual insistence on these "historical" claims is one of the worst evils which have afflicted and still afflict the problems of the Balkans. There is no other quarter of the world where contending parties hark back to "rights" derived from so long distant a past, which not infrequently represent a possession quite ephemeral in its character. However keen may be the regret of patriotic Frenchmen for the loss of the splendid colonial empire which they possessed in the eighteenth century, no Frenchman urges the historical rights of France to Canada proper, perhaps the most outstanding feat of colonization in history in its character if regard be had to the manner in which, as in the ancient Greek colonies, the very civilization, culture, and atmosphere of the metropolis has been transplanted to a new land, though doubtless in the case cited a good deal of this resignation must be set down to the liberal policy pursued by England which has kept the French Canadians as British subjects without requiring them to abandon their national outlook or religion. In the Near East, however, we have a veritable riot of conflicting historical claims of a nature which if applied elsewhere would, as Professor Cvijić has observed, require a remodelling of the map of Europe which, if *per impossibile* it were effected, would result in a state of affairs infinitely worse than that which prevails. The Magyars insist on the claims of that fetish of their chauvinism, the sacred crown of S. Stephen, whose worship requires that everything that ever fell under its sway or suzerainty should return again to its allegiance in defiance of the principles of nationality and historical growth and in repugnance to the dictates of the most ordinary common sense. Italy achieved her unity in despite of historical claims. The kingdom of the Two Sicilies was an ancient political organism with its roots deep in the history of the peninsula, and the Italian Bourbons and the House of Este have undeniable "historical" claims to their former territories. These claims

are rejected on the ground that they run counter to the principle of nationality and the right of every people to determine its political life. It is fortunate for Italy that neither English nor French, especially the latter, set any store on ancient historical claims. Do Italians accept the historical claims of the Pope to the Papal States? Macedonia again has been the prey of claims dating from the Middle Ages, and in some cases a particular town or district has acquired a sentimental importance quite incommensurate with real values. One reason for this has already been given—the stamping flat of the Balkans by the Turkish conquest, with the result that the independent life of its peoples has been resumed from the late medieval standpoint—and it is a reason which must be allowed for and is in fact natural enough. The only real resolvent of these problems is the fact of nationality, and the real political frontiers are to be found in those geographical lines of demarcation which correspond most closely to the ethnographical.

III

Dalmatia is a Southern Slav country from the point of view of nationality. The Austrian census gives the population of the province as follows: Serbo-Croats 610,669 or 96 per cent.; Italians 18,028 or slightly under 3 per cent.; Germans 3,081, the total population being 634,855. In 1900 out of a total population of 584,823 the Italians numbered 15,279. Of the Serbo-Croats the Catholic Croats muster 80 per cent. of the total population and the Orthodox Serbs 105,335, or 16 per cent. Some 20,000 of the Orthodox are to be found in the extreme south in the district of Kotor, the remainder in the extreme north and in Šibenik. Of the Italians no fewer than 8,000 are to be found in the single town of Zadar (Zara). Signor Gayda has combated the correctness of these figures and prefers a calculation of his own. He alleges that 6,000 votes were cast for Italian candidates for the Reichsrath, that it is usual in

Austria to reckon one elector for every ten citizens, and that consequently the number of Italians should be 60,000. The immediate answer to this is obvious. In the first place the Italians, such as they number, are to be found in the towns which always give a higher percentage of votes cast than rural constituencies, and in the second place he gratuitously assumes that no Italian candidate received any but Italian votes. The contrary is known to be the case at Zadar, where Croat votes have been cast for Italian candidates. Moreover, his own calculation gives the Italian population at less than 10 per cent. of the total. He further alleges that as the result of governmental pressure many Italians are terrorized into concealing their nationality, and that owing to the same cause many Italians have become denationalized. As to government pressure, it has been pointed out by Dr. Seton-Watson that the municipality of Zadar, which is in the hands of Italians, is the only municipality in Dalmatia which has not been dissolved; it has therefore received preferential treatment as compared with the Serbo-Croat councils. The arguments alleged require, however, more detailed treatment, and it will be necessary to see how far the latest figures are supported by previous estimates, and what is the historical testimony as to the ethnographic character of the country in the past. The inquiry will show what ground there is for saying that Dalmatia in the past was more Italian, and that the waning of Italianità is a modern process induced by illicit pressure. Here also, thanks to Professor Prezzolini, it will be possible to rely almost entirely on Italian evidence.

In 1873 Maschek gives the population as containing 440,282 Serbo-Croats as against 27,305 Italians.¹ In 1868 Tommaseo accepted the round figures of 400,000 Slavs and 20,000 Italians.² Sir Gardner Wilkinson, in his book *Dalmatia and Montenegro* published in 1848, gives the

¹ L. Maschek, *Manuale del regno di Dalmazia per l'anno 1873. Cit.* G. Prezzolini, *ut supra*, p. 43.

² *Cit.* Prezzolini, *ibid.*

population of 1833 as embracing 360,000 Serbo-Croats and 16,000 Italians. So far then as the statistical estimates of the past century are concerned there is nothing to invalidate the correctness of the figures of the last census. The proportions vary, but not to any striking extent. In view of the growing national consciousness of the Serbo-Croats, we should expect a slightly larger percentage of them in the later figures, as many of the bilingual population who in former times would return themselves as Italians, as constituting the richer and more aristocratic element of the population, would latterly return themselves as Slavs. The Austrian census, it must be remembered, is by language, and a man speaking Serb at home but knowing Italian and using it for business purposes could return himself at will as being by language Serbo-Croat or Italian.

The historical testimony of the past is quite conclusive in its results. Writing in 1500 Lucio states that the original Dalmatian population which spoke a corrupt Latin dialect had greatly decreased as the result of war, pestilence, and other causes, and that gradually the Slavs had penetrated not only the mainland and the islands but into the cities, so that the "Dalmatians" were constrained to learn Slav and became bilingual, and owing to the prevalence of the Slav language were counted as Slavs by foreigners. That language, he says, was called Croat or Serb.¹ These Romance-speaking people were not of course Italians but the descendants of the old Latin-speaking provincials of the Roman Empire. Nor was the process of infiltration a new one in Lucio's day. The Southern Slavs had early penetrated to the coast, and the earliest Croatian kingdom had its nucleus in northern Dalmatia, Šibenik for example having been the capital of King Krešimir, and Spljet of Zvonimir, but it is very probable that in the towns the

¹ Prezzolini, *ut supra*, p. 27, *cit.* Lucio, *De regno Dalmatiae et Croatiae*, vi, p. 219: "Dalmatae tamen, ipsique contermini Slavi, linguam Slavam non dicunt, sed Heruatam vel Serblam, prout cuiusque dialectus est".

provincials were numerous, and that a further process of diminution, as Lucio says, was the result of frequent wars and the great pestilences of the fourteenth century. Even in 1177 the towns had been invaded, for we are told that when Pope Alexander III paid a visit to Zara he was conducted in procession by the inhabitants, who recited praises and songs "in loro lingua schiava".

In 1553 a Venetian noble, Giustinian, who visited Dalmatia with a mission from the Government gave an account of his travels. At Zadar he found an Italianate gentry, but the populace, though speaking the *lingua franca* were Slav in their customs. At Šibenik he observes: "The costumes of the inhabitants, the speech and the customs of these Sebenicans are all Slav in their character (all'usanza schiava)". Nearly all had the *lingua franca* and a few of the gentry dressed in Italian fashion. "The ladies", he adds, "all dress in Slav fashion and hardly any speak the *lingua franca*", an observation which is very significant of the real nationality of the people. At Trogir (Traù) he finds the same state of affairs, "nelle case loro parlano lingua schiava per rispetto delle donne, perchè poche d'esse intendono lingua italiana, et si ben qualcuna l'intende, non vuol parlare, se non la lingua materna", so that here also Italian or the *lingua franca* was only the language of business for the greater part of the inhabitants. He speaks in almost identical language of the neighbouring Spalatines, whose tongue he says is the Tuscan of Slav. The islands are more Italian in character.¹ A similar account is given by another traveller of the independent republic of Dubrovnik. Here even the men only spoke Italian "here and there". "La lingua loro nativa è schiava, con la quale parlano gli altri Dalmatini". Their Italian is corrupt.

The *Diario* of 1571 gives similar testimony of a Slav-speaking population at Spljet (Spalato), men and women in the piazza using that language.

¹ *Monumenta spectantia historiam slavorum meridionalium*, viii, pp. 197, etc. *Cit.* Prezzolini, *ut supra*, pp 28, 29.

In 1574 the *Relazioni de' rettori* is full of the same evidence. The Spalatines complain "in their language". The Venetian procurators include in their advice to know what the Spalatines say if they speak Slav. A significant incident is related at Trogir. An old soldier receives a solatium from the republic, he takes it, salutes, and goes off "singing in Slav of King Marko, and all the people and the bystanders sang it with him, as with one accord. For they all know this ballad (canzone)".¹ Here then we have a people which knows and spontaneously takes up some ballad of the famous Serb hero Marko Kraljević.

One consideration emerges plainly, and that is that even in the sixteenth century not only the country districts but the towns themselves were predominantly Slav. The people speak Serbo-Croat in their own homes, they commonly dress in Slav costume, their habits are Slav, their popular songs are Slav. The townsmen however are generally bilingual, knowing also Italian, the *lingua franca* of commerce. It is this circumstance which may have created the impression of greater Italianità in the towns than really existed, since foreigners knowing Italian but no Serb could get a response in the towns while they were unable to obtain an answer in the country, thus acquiring the impression of an Italian town population as contrasted with a Serbo-Croat peasantry. The real line of demarcation seems to have been one of wealth—the wealthy classes were often genuine Italians while the Slav population comprised the poorer section of the community. Hence the great bitterness of the class feeling, breaking out in 1797 into an open Jacquerie, of which there is abundant evidence in the authorities referred to. Fortis, who wrote his *Viaggio in Dalmazia* in 1794, says that the Slavs spoke indifferently of "fede di cane e fede d'italiano", a dog's word, or an Italian's word.² When in 1797 the Austrian

¹ V. Solitro, *Documenti storici sull' Istria e sulla Dalmazia*, 1841: *il Diario*, pp. 131-172, *Lettere di Rettori*, pp. 173-250. *Cit.* Prezzolini, *ut supra*, pp. 29-30.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 50. Prezzolini, p. 21.

general Rukavina, a Croat, entered Dalmatia, he and his soldiers were well received on account of their nationality. He addressed the people in Serbo-Croat, and at Trogir, when two companies of Croatian infantry were disembarked, the populace remarked on the fact that the soldiers spoke their own language, and that many had the same surnames as themselves.

It is not altogether surprising, in view of the evidence of which part has been adduced above, to find that the most patriotic Italian writers and thinkers, the real makers of modern Italy in the moral and spiritual elements which marked the *risorgimento*, have no doubt that Dalmatia is a Slav and not an Italian land. Tommaseo, who was himself by birth a Dalmatian, wrote in 1861: "I do not think that Dalmatia can ever form an appendage of Italy . . . because, if it has always been difficult to rule men speaking another language, for the Italians now it would be impossible if they wish to institute, I do not say material equality, but civil equity . . . her future destiny intends her to be the friend of Italy not her subject".¹ He thought that Dalmatia should be joined to Serbia and the Serb provinces then under Turkish dominion i.e. Bosnia, etc. Croatia he regarded as being morally less free than these provinces. At that time, of course, the Croats were still under the glamour of the House of Habsburg, and their political ideas were vague and halting, and the same thought was expressed by Sir Arthur Evans in his *Illyrian Letters*. Time and circumstances have changed that attitude and, while geographically Dalmatia forms the complement of the Serb lands of Bosnia and the Hercegovina, such particularist ideas are now swallowed up in the greater ideal of a Southern Slav unity in which they have no place.

Mazzini definitely assigned Dalmatia to the Slavs, whom he regarded—and rightly—as natural allies of Italy. "Procure the election", he said, "of men to represent in one

¹ N. Tommaseo, *Lettera ai Dalmati*, p. 6. *Cit.* Prezzolini, *ut supra*, pp. 35, 36.

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national assembly Carinthia, Kranjska (Carniola), Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia . . .". In 1866 he said: "For ethnographic, political, commercial reasons Istria is ours: as necessary to Italy as the ports of Dalmatia are necessary to the Southern Slavs".¹ After 1866 he considered the retention of the island of Lissa to be necessary, influenced doubtless by the Italian naval defeat.

Valussi in 1871 distinguished between the Friulian-Istrian littoral and the "Hungarian-Dalmatian", the first of which is within the natural boundaries of Cisalpine Italy, whereas in the second "the Italians are a colony on the maritime coast which belongs to another nationality whose territory extends to its shores". He remarks again of Dalmatia that it is "destined henceforth to become the maritime coast and harbours of the future, and now, not far distant, Jugoslavia".²

Cattaneo sees the natural boundary of Italy in the mountainous backbone of Istria: "Di là Slavia, là Fiume: di quà l'Italia, di quà Trieste" (Beyond is Slavia and Fiume, on this side Italy and Trieste). Prezzolini³ quotes also from a speech delivered in 1896 by a Signor Ziliotto, a champion of Italianità, in the Diet at Zara. "We, separated from Italy by the whole Adriatic, a few thousands scattered without territorial continuity among a people, not of hundreds of thousands, but of millions of Slavs, how could we ever think of union with Italy?"

The result of this inquiry, pursued in Italian sources, is quite conclusive. We have continuous testimony to the Slav character of Dalmatia, not only in the country districts, but, so far as the general populace is concerned, in the towns also. This was remarked upon by Venetian travellers quite early in the history of the Venetian occu-

¹ G. Mazzini, *Opere*, vol. xiv, *passim*. *Cit.* Prezzolini, p. 37.

² "Essendo ormai la Dalmazia destinata a diventare la costa marittima portuosa della futura, ed ormai non molto più lontana Jugoslavia". P. Valosi, *L'Adriatico in relazione agli interessi nazionali dell'Italia*, pp. 29-30, 107-108. *Cit.* Prezzolini, p. 38.

³ *Ut supra*, p. 44.

pation, itself until the end of the century confined to a narrow strip of coast line. Venice made no effort to Italianize the people, from motives partly of commercial jealousy and partly of military expediency. The great patriotic thinkers of the *risorgimento* regard Dalmatia as Slav, destined to form part of a united Southern Slav kingdom the friend of Italy. There is no trace of a decreasing proportion of true Italians during the past century, though the growing national consciousness of the Slavs led to the overthrow of the political Italianità which till 1866 and even longer had, in point of fact, been bolstered up by the Austrian government both by the official use of Italian and by that manipulation of the franchise which still subsists for the local Diet. There is no reason for supposing any material inaccuracy in the census figures. Ethnographically Dalmatia is a Serbo-Croat land.

Not only is Dalmatia Serbo-Croat, but it is the very home of the movement for unity between the two branches of the race; it has given birth to a vigorous national literature, the great sculptor Meštrović is a Dalmatian from the neighbourhood of Šibenik, its politicians have been the foremost advocates of political reunion and have carried their principles into practice, a united Southern Slav kingdom without Dalmatia would be deprived of some of its most vigorous political elements, of the spiritual home of some of its foremost champions.¹ So strongly rooted is Slav conservatism, even among the Roman Catholics, that in many parishes of the islands and the mainland the old Glagolitic rite is still in use, despite former discouragement by the Vatican. Slav philologists resort to some of the islands of the Quarnero where the dialect represents the earliest known

¹ These points will be found fully treated by Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson in his brochure *The Balkans, Italy, and the Adriatic*, to which the reader is referred for information upon them. Goracuchi, in his work *Attraites de Trieste*, written in 1883, speaks with enthusiastic fervour of the great names contributed by the Southern Slavs of Dalmatia to the history of art, literature, and science. Himself an Italian, he acknowledges the Slav nationality of those of whom he speaks. *Vide* a passage cited in *La Serbie*, October 15, 1916.

form of the Slav tongue. As has been seen in the previous chapter, the Serbo-Croat Coalition in Croatia was largely the work of Dalmatian politicians. We have seen also the joy with which the Serb successes in the Balkan wars were received, and the consequent dissolution by Imperial authority of several of the Dalmatian municipalities—Signor Gayda himself has given a most vivid account of the demonstrations of joy, of the spiritual exaltation, and of the excited hopes of the Dalmatian populace.

IV

If the historical and ethnographic claims of Italy to Dalmatia are without substantial basis, and come into conflict with the principle of nationality, the demands advanced on the ground of strategic necessity are entitled to a respectful hearing in so far as they are concerned only with the legitimate needs of self-defence, and are neither extended to cover ideas of aggression nor pushed to a length where the wrong done to others by their gratification would be out of proportion to their benefit to Italy. The origin of these strategic claims has already been stated as due to the configuration of the Adriatic, the paucity of harbours on the Italian side, and the abundance of them on the eastern shore, which could become a menace to Italy if held by a strong naval Power. So far as the demands have a legitimate foundation they call for such a territorial settlement in the region of the Adriatic as may give reasonable security to Italy.

"It was and is the possession of the eastern shore which gives command of the sea".¹ In this sentence we have the root claim of Italy to territorial possession of the opposite coast expressed in its baldest and also its most far-reaching sense. If the dictum were true, then indeed there would hardly be a "problem" of the Adriatic; *cadit quæstio*, and the only point to be determined would be whether Italy or

¹ J. A. R. Marriott, *The Problem of the Adriatic*. *Nineteenth Century Review*, December 1915, p. 1327.

the Southern Slavs were to be put into this command as thus expressed. "Dalmatia", says an Italian writer in the same train of ideas, "dominates the Adriatic"; it has done so in the past, and the development of naval warfare by means of mines, torpedo, and submarine, will enable it to do so much more in the future; whoever has sought to command the Adriatic has always been compelled to occupy the Dalmatian coasts. But is this true? Underlying these dicta is an assumption without warrant in history, plainly repugnant to the art of naval warfare as conceived by sailors, and akin to those "heresies" which have more than once threatened the supremacy of a naval Power. A coast does not, and cannot, command a sea; it does not, and cannot, in itself command naval power in either sense of the phrase. If it be possession of the eastern coast that gives command of the Adriatic, if Dalmatia dominates the Adriatic, how is it that the Allies from the first day of the war have been in command of that sea, how is it that Italy at this moment dominates it?

If these dicta be true then Austria should be in command of the Adriatic, Austria should be able to navigate its area freely, transport her troops at will, forbid passage to the warships of her enemies and *a fortiori* to transports carrying troops. We find, on the contrary, that the reverse is the case; the appearance of Austrian warships is rare and furtive, no troops have been or could have been transported across the Adriatic, though some perhaps have been moved down the coast under cover of the island barrier. On the other hand the Italian fleet, with some allied aid, has convoyed the transport of 260,000 men across the Adriatic in 250 vessels, and 300,000 cwt of materials in 100 vessels, while sovereigns and princes have crossed six times, and military and political officials more frequently.¹ In short, the Allies have exercised command in spite of the continued and unthreatened occupation of Dalmatia by the Austrians. Evidently, in face of facts which directly negative the validity of the dicta above quoted, there is some fatal flaw

¹ *Vide* Italian Official Note of February 24, 1916.

in them. That flaw is the confusion, which is often found in political discussions on this and kindred topics, between power itself and the means of acquiring power. If good ports constituted maritime power then Norway would be one of the most foremost naval Powers of the world, for its coast is a series of magnificent harbours, deep, well sheltered, and capable of easy defence. Greece, too, in that case would be the leading naval State of the Mediterranean, which it would command by virtue of the same natural advantages as are possessed by Norway. No one, however, would pretend for a moment that the coast of Norway commands the North Sea, and that England cannot dominate that water unless she obtains the opposite coast. It is fleets, and fleets alone, that can command the sea, and, as the course of the war has shown, that command cannot be divided though it may be in suspense—the stronger fleet drives its rival off the open sea.

To say, then, that Dalmatia “dominates” the Adriatic is plainly incorrect. Mr. Marriott’s phrase that possession of the eastern shore “gives” command of that sea marks an approximation to the correct idea, but only an approximation. The truth is that all such phrases are misleading. What is meant by them—or ought to be meant—is that such a harbour, position, or coast is of a nature to confer advantages or opportunities on its possessor greater than those afforded to its possessor by some other point or coast, in such manner that in certain circumstances the possessor of the first named will be clearly in a position to make good by *naval* means his command of the waters in question. Those circumstances consist in *equality of resources* for a naval establishment. The resources necessary in modern days for the maintenance of a great navy are only to be found in a first-class Power, a navy is a most expensive instrument to build up or maintain and it is an instrument that grows yearly more expensive. It requires also, if the fleet is to be built and provided for by its possessor, large industrial and manufacturing resources. These are the reasons for the practical disap-

pearance of secondary fleets as a factor in maritime warfare. In the days of the Napoleonic wars, when a ship-of-the-line could be built for £100,000 and, when built, was good for fifty years, the smaller States such as Denmark could maintain respectable fleets equal in quality of material to the best. Such a State could possess, say, some half-dozen ships-of-the-line besides frigates and smaller craft. The equivalent in modern days would cost £15,000,000 for the battleships alone, and in a dozen years they would be obsolescent and in twenty years obsolete. Harbours and coasts do not command a sea or constitute naval power, they only afford greater or less facilities for the acquisition of such power provided the possessor can also command the necessary resources in men, industry, and, above all, money. If then the possessor of Dalmatia be a Great Power it can command the Adriatic, but even so only if it employ the necessary resources. Austria is a Great Power, but in default of having employed the necessary resources she does not command the Adriatic in spite of her being a first-class State. If the future possessor of Dalmatia do not command the resources of a Great Power, then that possessor can no more command the Adriatic than Norway can command the North Sea; Dalmatia in such an event will largely represent unrealizable potentialities. Dalmatia would of course confer advantages on such a possessor, its coast could easily be defended against attack, which is a defensive advantage, such naval power as might be possessed by the State in question would be more efficacious than if exercised from a poor coast devoid of natural harbours, but the fact remains that in default of the necessary resources such a State could not build or maintain a large fleet, and while, therefore, in a position to annoy her neighbour by minor warfare she could not command the sea. It is not Portsmouth that commands the Channel, but the fleet that we can maintain at Portsmouth; in the Mediterranean it was not Gibraltar nor Malta that dominated the inland sea, but the fleet that

was maintained there. Give Gibraltar, Malta, and Aden to Monaco, yet Monaco will not command the Mediterranean nor maintain for twenty-four hours her hold on the great fortresses. All this is extremely elementary, yet it is constantly overlooked or confused by speakers and writers both in reference to ourselves and others. The future Southern Slav kingdom, as will be seen, cannot be, even if the Southern Slavs attain full national unity, more than one of a new order of secondary States; it will not be in a position to compete with Italy or to maintain a first-class navy, nor will it desire to maintain even a relatively strong fleet unless forced to do so by an openly hostile Italy.

That the point has not been laboured without cause is to be seen in the exaggerated language frequently held, not only by Italians, in this matter. Thus an English writer has said: "Should Europe be persuaded by the folly of the Greek and the greed of the Slav to acquiesce, through sheer weariness, in the eventual partition and destruction of Albania, the inevitable result will be that the eastern shores of the Adriatic will fall into Slav hands to the swamping of the fatuous Greeks and the reduction of Italy to a second or third-rate State. With the opposite coasts of the Adriatic from Trieste to Corfu in the hands of one strong Power, Italy knows that she would be thrust down to the position of a dependency . . .".¹ It says little for the political grasp required by the British consular service that such opinions should find utterance from a consul of twenty years' standing at Skodra. There is no question of Trieste or Valona, of which the latter is already in Italian hands and the former will be in the event of an Allied victory. For the rest it is absurd to say that a State of less than one-third of her population and smaller in area could reduce Italy to a position of dependency by the mere possession of the eastern shores of the Adriatic, or that in such an event Italy would sink to a second- or

¹ Mr. Wadham Peacock, *Italy and Albania*. *Contemporary Review*, February 1915, p. 362.

even third-class Power. Those shores have been for years in the hands of a first-class Power, but Italy has not therefore sunk to the level of a third-class State, and if Austria has maintained a certain ascendancy over Italy it has been due to the possession of a greatly superior army. Apparently, however, the writer considers 12,000,000 Southern Slavs to be worth very considerably more than 40,000,000 Italians, or than the 50,000,000 of Habsburg subjects including the greater number of those Southern Slavs. It is absurd.

Signor Prezzolini has pointed out quite correctly that what has been the decisive factor in the dominion of the Adriatic has been the possession of a more powerful fleet and not the possession of Dalmatia, and he adds the striking comment that as a fact, with the exception of the defeat suffered in 1866 at Lissa by Persano, "and every one knows whose fault it was", the victors in the Adriatic have always been those who sought to acquire Dalmatia and not those who were in possession of it. He cites the case of the Roman victory over the Liburnians, the conquest of Zara by the Venetians, the victories of the Genoese over the Venetians in 1298, 1354, 1379 (they were defeated the following year off Chioggia), and of the English over the French at Lissa in 1811, while in 1859 the Franco-Sardinian fleet captured Lussinpiccolo: a series of historical events which amply bears out the argument which has been put forward above.

It has been seen above (Section I) that in the negotiations with Austria Italy claimed certain of the southern Dalmatian islands. At the same time various projects were ventilated in the Italian Press, but these ideas have ceased to be of interest since the conclusion with the Entente of the Adriatic agreement, which has settled the extent of the territorial demands put forward by Italy. In accordance with the scheme of this chapter the discussion of that agreement is relegated to the last section, being postponed to the discussion of the problem on its merits. By putting forward claims to Dalmatia and its islands Italy is in reality

proclaiming a great distrust of the future Southern Slavdom, for if the result of the war be a complete victory for the Allies of a nature leading to the full satisfaction of their demands, the result will be that there will only be two States left on the Adriatic, Italy and greater Serbia. These territorial guarantees, then, are demanded as against Serbia, they have no other *raison d'être*; they imply either that Italy is hostile to Serbia or suspects the latter of present or future hostility to her. There can unfortunately be no doubt of the feeling of the Italian Press, and it is idle and foolish to shut our eyes to facts, but these feelings are mistaken and have no counterpart among Southern Slav statesmen save in so far—and this is a saving clause which is tending to include an increasing content—as the attitude of Italy provokes an inevitable reaction in their minds. Thus the attitude of Italian publicists is tending more and more to evoke the very danger which they wish to guard against. The Southern Slavs cherish no feeling of hostility to Italy except as the result of Italian claims. The position is paradoxical: the possession of Dalmatia by Italy would tend to make its possession necessary, the abandonment of Italian claims would make its possession useless. That is to say that the effect of an Italian occupation will be the unsleeping hostility of the Southern Slavs, a hostility which will entail upon Italy the necessity of guarding against its effects, while the abandonment of the claim would gain Italy the friendship of her oversea neighbour and render precautions needless.

Italians have claimed not merely a supremacy in the Adriatic but an absolute dominion of the most unconditional character. The *Giornale d'Italia* (whose two chief proprietors are Baron Sonnino and Signor Salandra) remarked on April 19, 1915: "The principal objective of Italy in the Adriatic is the solution once for all of the politico-strategic question of a sea which is commanded in the military sense from the eastern shore, and such a problem can be solved only by one method—by eliminating from the Adriatic every other war fleet. . . . From the military point

of view Italy ought not to make a compromise . . . neither a fort nor a gun nor a submarine that is not Italian ought to be in the Adriatic. Otherwise the present most difficult situation in the Adriatic will be perpetuated, and will inevitably grow worse with time".¹ This demand aims not only at a reasonable security for Italian defensive interests but at an exclusive command of the Adriatic, so that it should become in reality "il mare nostro", an Italian lake, though there is no reason why the possessor of the western shore of that sea should claim it as a national property rather than the possessor of the eastern shore. Neither party has any right to an exclusive possession of what is by nature common to both, neither party can claim more than reasonable security and ordinary maritime rights; the claim is in fact the result of an inflated chauvinism very much akin to the claims of which we are accustomed to hear from Berlin. Indeed the claim of Germany to the mouths of the Rhine is on its merits incomparably stronger than the Italian claim to Dalmatia.

Even moderate Italian opinion which is not in favour of the extreme claims advanced for Italy and is willing to see Dalmatia in the hands of the Southern Slavs shows itself very jealous on the subject of a possible Southern Slav navy. Thus Professor G. Salvemini writes: "Italy will have the right, and—for its future security—it ought, to profit by the transition from the old to the new equilibrium to bind Serbia to itself by a convention not only military (terrestre), but also naval which could at the same time distribute the burdens of land (terrestre) defence and forbid Serbia any beginning of naval hopes.

"We cannot prevent Austria having a fleet since she already possesses one. The Serbia of to-morrow we can prevent in its own interests and ours. And we can profit by this moment, which will never recur in history, to exclude

¹ *Cit. the Times*, April 20 and 26, 1915. M. Charles Vellay quotes the last portion in a slightly different form: "Ni un port [? fort], ni un sous-marin, ni une torpille". *La Question de l'Adriatique*, p. 54. The general sense is the same.

*from the Adriatic Austria which has a fleet, and to substitute for her a new State which has no fleet and which we can prevent creating one".*¹

This is the view not of an intransigent but of a moderate man who views the formation of a united Southern Slav State with sympathy, and in the next paragraph adds with a wisdom rare in his compatriots—those at any rate of them whose views find expression—that even on the worst hypothesis, the foundation of a great Serbia with a fleet and allied to Austria (what would remain of it, that is to say), such a *transitory* alliance would be a less evil than the *permanent* hostility of an aggrandized Austria.

The same line is taken by Signor Prezzolini, whom we have seen as a vigorous opponent of that trend of thought which aims at the incorporation of Dalmatia. Like Professor Salvemini, he is willing to allow complete Southern Slav unity, save for an Italian occupation of Lissa and also of Zara—the latter apparently as a sort of museum,² but on the other hand he postulates the prohibition of a Slav navy or naval ports, and the neutralization of the Serb coast line. The arguments which he advances are not due to any sentiment, but on the other hand lack nothing in "reality" of the most pronounced type. To him a Serbia with Cattaro and a fleet, even though Italy should have northern Dalmatia and the islands, is a greater danger than a completely united Southern Slavdom without a fleet. Here again we note the almost superstitious fear of what this people will be able to achieve on the water with their small resources. He advances his argument with admirable candour.

"To neutralize the Adriatic, or rather to prevent the entrance of any fleet, to prevent the fortification of any island or port of Dalmatia, would be a much better guarantee for us than the possession of two-thirds of Dalmatia from which Cattaro was excluded. The more

¹ G. Salvemini, *Guerra o Neutralità?* p. 17. Italics in the original.

² "Zara è fuori questione . . . Zara resterà all' incirca un museo". G. Prezzolini, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

so because whilst neutralization would mean for Serbia that she would have no fleet, it would mean for us that we should have one in the Mediterranean, *ready, whenever hostilities should bring about a rupture of the treaty to enter the Adriatic* [my italics]; the more so because neutralization would signify the exclusion from the Adriatic of every other fleet, and especially of the Russian, for which, once free ingress into the Mediterranean has been obtained, a Serb Cattaro would become the *point d'appui*.¹

"Nor are we under any illusions as to the eternity of neutralization. All agreements are subject to revision once there is a change in the equilibrium of forces from which they sprung. But we maintain that Serbia would have no interest in violating the neutralization and thus entering into conflict with us, save on the day on which it would be equally to her interest to contest with us the possession of Dalmatia. But, whilst neutralization would mean that we should find ourselves ranged against a Serbia, in possession indeed of Dalmatia, but without a fleet, *and therefore of a useless Dalmatia* [my italics], where it would be easy to disembark, the conquest of Dalmatia [i.e. if Italy had northern Dalmatia and Serbia the southern part] would find us against a Serbia in possession of Cattaro and of a fleet which, with the addition of the Russian or the Greek, would not be despicable. Without being profound strategists, the first hypothesis seems to us preferable to the second".²

¹ The writer here contradicts his own observation made two pages previously that a united Southern Slav State, having no more to get from Russia would pursue an independent policy.

² "Neutralizzare l'Adriatico, ossia impedire l'entrata a qualunque flotta, impedire la fortificazione di qualunque isola o porto della Dalmazia, sarebbe per noi una garanzia, assai migliore del possesso di due terzi della Dalmazia dai quali fosse escluso Cattaro. Tanto più che mentre la neutralizzazione significherebbe per la Serbia non avere flotta, per noi significherebbe averla in Mediterraneo, pronta, qualora le ostilità rompessero il trattato, a penetrare nell' Adriatico; tanto più che la neutralizzazione significherebbe l'esclusione dall'Adriatico di ogni altra flotta, e specialmente di quella russa, per la quale, una volta ottenuto il

The arguments which are here adduced in favour of the prohibition to the future Southern Slav kingdom of the creation of a fleet, whether combined or not with the occupation of northern Dalmatia, are sufficient to bring out the essential unfairness of any such proposal, and it is well therefore to have had them stated by a man of such moderation in his general handling of the problem. The policy of prohibiting a Southern Slav navy is based avowedly on the fact that such a prohibition would leave the Southern Slavs in their maritime activities more at the mercy of the Italians, even though the latter relinquished all claims to Dalmatia, than would the occupation of a large part of the province without any such prohibition. It is pointed out with truth that Italy would still have her fleet in the Mediterranean (there being under ordinary circumstances no occasion for stationing it in the Adriatic), ready to enter the latter sea at a moment's notice, without the Serbs being in a position to take any safeguards whatever. The Serbs would hold a "useless" Dalmatia on which the Italians could land troops at will. In a word, while surrendering physical possession of Dalmatia Italy would in fact hold the destinies of that province in the hollow of her hand, and with it absolute power over any and every form of Serb maritime activity. Serb merchant vessels would navigate at Italy's good pleasure, the fishermen would fish by her permission,

libero ingresso nel Mediterraneo, Cattaro diventerà il punto di appoggio. Nè ci facciamo illusioni sulla perennità della neutralizzazione. Tutti i patti son soggetti a revisione una volta che sia mutato l'equilibrio di forze dal quale nacquero. Ma noi sosteniamo che la Serbia non avrebbe interesse a rompere la neutralizzazione e quindi a entrare in lotta con noi, che quel giorno in cui lo avesse egualmente per contestarci il dominio della Dalmazia. Ma, mentre la neutralizzazione ci farebbe trovare contro una Serbia, sia pure in possesso della Dalmazia, ma senza flotta e dunque di una Dalmazia inutile, dove sarebbe facile sbarcare, la conquista della Dalmazia ci porrebbe contro a una Serbia in possesso di Cattaro e di una flotta che, con l'aggiunta di quella russa o di quella greca, non sarebbe spregevole. Senza essere profondi strateghi, la prima ipotesi ci pare preferibile alla seconda." G. Prezzolini, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 63.

exportation would proceed under her practical surveillance, and the inhabitants of the coast towns would be able to call themselves Serb subjects just so long as it did not please Italy to annex them, for any sort of fortification would be forbidden and not merely the formation of fortified naval bases. I know of no such limitation in modern history of the sovereign rights of an independent State over its own shores: no such requirement that they should lie open to enemy attack. The Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris forbade the presence of war fleets in the Euxine to all alike, and theoretically the configuration of its entrance would have enabled the guaranteeing Powers to prevent the violation of the provisions, save indeed in the case of a surprise movement of a Turkish *Ægean* squadron through the Straits. In any case Turkey lay open to easy coercion in case of violation. In all these points the Black Sea clauses are fundamentally and essentially differentiated from the proposals before us.

Britain is the mistress of the seas, and upon her mastery depends not only her empire but almost her very existence, at any rate her existence as a first-class Power and certainly her existence in times of war. Yet she has never made any such demands as these upon Holland. The importance of the Dutch ports to us is enormous; it is a maxim that whoever touches Holland, and especially whoever touches Rotterdam or Flushing, touches England, and one of the reasons for which we are at war is that Germany has touched Belgium and Antwerp. Yet we have never demanded that Holland should possess no navy, we have never denied the right of the Netherlands to fortify their ports and their coasts. Even in the case of the fortification of Flushing, with its bearing upon the freedom of the Scheldt and our treaty right to succour Antwerp, we made no protest, we allowed full Dutch sovereignty over the mouth of the Scheldt, and drew the conclusion that we could not succour Antwerp by the sea, advantageous as such a course would have been. It is difficult then to see by what moral right Italy could assume the attitude

here proposed for her by some of her publicists; she may be in a position to dictate such a prohibition, but it will only be on the principle that might is right—the very principle against which the other Allies, at any rate, are fighting. Nor would greater Serbia be left only at the mercy of Italy, but equally at the mercy of any other Power which possesses a navy of even the smallest dimensions, for who will care to guarantee international respect for the neutralization of Dalmatia? Any such prohibition would in fact be of the nature of an “unconscionable” agreement which would only lead to endless friction and the reopening of the question on the first convenient opportunity. The history of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris already cited is full of warning. They created in Russia a resolution to put a term to their validity on the earliest possible occasion, and unhappily for one of the authors of them that occasion proved to be the Franco-German war, when Bismarck was enabled to offer to Russia as a bribe for her complaisance the abrogation of them. It would not be altogether far-fetched to see in the present world war a not too remote consequence of that portion of the Treaty of Paris; at any rate, but for their existence the attitude of Russia in 1870 might easily have been different, and in consequence the subsequent history of Europe. Limitations of national sovereignty in the case of a proud and independent people always and inevitably lead to the same result, a vehement desire to be rid of the shackles imposed.

It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said already as to the limited means available to Serbia (I use the word as a short term for the future Southern Slavdom) for the creation of a large war fleet, but the absence of any desire on her part to engage in such a task will bear repetition. If Italy does not antagonize her but shows herself a friend, the Southern Slavs will be eager to reciprocate her attitude, and in such reciprocity will be under no temptation to undertake so expensive, and under the circumstances so useless, a burden. In a word,

Serbia will be unable to create a great navy if she would, and if Italy proves a friend would not if she could. It is the reaction to Italian hostility or suspicion, above all the candid admission that Italy desires for Serbia a "useless" Dalmatia at Italian mercy, that alone will cause Serbia to create such naval forces as will lie within her competence; apart from that attitude on the side of her neighbour her ambitions will be limited to a very modest form of naval defence. Even if it be admitted that submarines and mines will enable small States to play a more important part in naval affairs in the future, as has been seen, that would only mean a reversion to an older state of affairs; so far, moreover, the submarine has failed as an offensive weapon.

Of the idea of neutralization little need be said apart from the naval consequences just discussed. There are still to be found publicists who talk of a possible "neutralized" State of Constantinople, for example. If after the events of the past two years there are those who still believe that the word contains a valid international significance in point of fact, that is a striking testimony to their idealism. For myself I do not consider the "neutralization" of Dalmatia or of anything else to be worth discussing. A hundred years hence international engagements may carry with them some assurance of substantial existence, and neutralizations may be left till then. It will be long before any faith will be placed in the public law of mankind, and no Southern Slav can be expected to place any faith in neutralization—ironically enough Corfu, the training-place of the remnants of the Serb army for future employment, is neutralized.

The legitimate claims of Italy, then, on strategical grounds cannot be held to extend to the incorporation in her dominions of the Serbo-Croat province of Dalmatia. Moreover in no event, whether Italy obtains a portion of Dalmatia or not, is there any justification for the demand that Serbia should not be allowed to possess any fleet. It is not only against Italy that a coast defence fleet might

be required, and as we all know the neutralization of Dalmatia would give no guarantee to the Serbs. Serbia, then, will have the right, like every other State, to build such a fleet as she may deem necessary whether she obtains all Dalmatia or not, and the more friendly Italy shows herself the more insignificant will be any fleet that Serbia may desire to construct.

V

The strategical conditions in the Adriatic constitute, nevertheless, a source of legitimate anxiety for Italy which is abundantly entitled to demand that in any general resettlement she shall be placed in possession of adequate guarantees for the sufficiency of her naval defence, and that her position shall receive due recognition so that she may be able to face the future with confidence. Such guarantees can be given to her without any undue infringement of the principle of nationality, without creating on the side of others a sense of grievance akin to her own, and without inflicting on others injuries out of proportion to the real benefits received by Italy. She is entitled to urge that however friendly may be the Southern Slavs at the present time no government can conduct its policy upon the supposition that future enmity is never to be feared from the friends of to-day; that though the Southern Slavs number less than a third of her population yet their territory is large, some three-fourths of the extent of the Italian peninsula, and being at present comparatively thinly populated as compared with her own territory will be able to support in the future a population much more nearly approaching her own, even when due allowance has been made for the large unproductive Karst region and the absence of any such fertile area of great extent as the valley of the Po and its tributaries, a deficiency in part counterbalanced by a probable considerably higher mineralization; and that consequently she is entitled in the settlement to consider not only the conditions of to-day but those which may be present in a not too distant future.

Italy is already in occupation of Valona and its district, and it is certain that her continued occupation of the "gate of the Adriatic" after the war will not be called in question by any of the Allies. The occupation of this place in itself alters the whole strategical position in that sea. Its importance has been alluded to already, and was so highly valued by both Austria and Italy that neither would permit of its falling into the hands of the other. It is idle for any one to seek to diminish its strategical value at the present time, for any assertions to that effect are belied by the policy of the two Adriatic Powers in the past. They have set the seal of their military and naval judgment upon its position as giving the possibility of the command of the entry into the Adriatic, Italy placed so high a value upon it that its retention formed a demand *sine quâ non* in the course of her negotiations with her rival previous to her entry into the war, and it cannot be pretended now that it is a position not of such value that its possession by Italy may be taken as going a long way towards meeting her legitimate claims. Guarding the forty-mile wide Strait of Otranto with its *vis-à-vis* Brindisi already in Italian hands, and Taranto in its gulf "round the corner" a great naval arsenal, Valona will enable Italy to close or open the Adriatic at her will, and that the more easily owing to the development of the mine and submarine. Its possession will enable Italy to exercise a permanent surveillance over all Southern Slav maritime activity other than merely local, and will give its owner a position of unquestioned mastery; the jealousy of Austria in the past on this question is a proof of the fact.

At the head of the Adriatic—to anticipate some of the conclusions of the next chapter—Italy can claim the great commercial port of Trieste, Monfalcone, and the enormously strong naval base of Pola. Installed thus at Valona, Brindisi, and Taranto at the entrance of the Adriatic, and at Venice, Trieste, and Pola at the head of the sea, Italy will be its veritable mistress, and will turn it into an Italian lake to as large an extent as is compatible with

the just rights of the Southern Slavs as owners of the eastern shore, for after all they, as owners of one side of the Adriatic in virtue of nationality, have certain rights in that sea, the more so as it is their only coast, while Italy has her frontage south and west to the Mediterranean also. It is asserted that the island of Lošinj (Lussin) forms a "back door" to Pola and is in a sense complementary to that naval arsenal. If that be so, and if Italy set store upon its occupation, that demand also may be conceded without any great violation of the principle of nationality, since it possesses a large Italian element in its population, a fact which distinguishes it from the other islands of the Quarnero.

Beyond the above it is difficult to see that Italy can put forward any well-grounded pretensions if her aim be merely the security of her own coasts. Other demands have the appearance of aiming not at securing her own position but of dominating that of her neighbours. These other demands are asserted, it is true, in the name of defence, but if defence be construed in this fashion then nothing will satisfy it but complete physical possession of the Adriatic. It is difficult, or impossible, to set a term to what can be demanded in the name of defence, for the only complete defence is sole possession. Readers of Beaconsfield's speeches in connection with the Treaty of Berlin may remember the indignant communication which he said that he had received from a correspondent in Cape Town. The latter pointed out that Kars was the key of Asia Minor, the latter in turn was the key of Egypt, as Egypt was of the Sudan, and so the chain of keys was lengthened till it ended at Cape Town. The Russian occupation of Kars, to which Beaconsfield had agreed, constituted therefore a menace to Cape Town. We may suspect that this correspondent had no existence outside Beaconsfield's dialectic, but the alleged letter was no exaggerated satire on a certain mode of reasoning which finds favour not only with the amateur strategist. Of such a texture are Italian demands beyond the great and valuable concessions outlined above. In particular it is

difficult to see how any case can be made out for an Italian occupation of Vis (Lissa). It has been called the key of the central Adriatic, and without a doubt it is one of the extremely numerous keys of that well-locked gulf, but this key at any rate might be left to its more natural possessors—no man would care to live in a house of which he possessed not a single key. Some, at any rate, of the importance it assumes in the eyes of Italians is due to the defeat of Persano off its harbour in 1866, an event which has always rankled in their minds, while the value of its position is enhanced by the possession of a fine harbour. It lies, however, close to the eastern shore, and is rather an outlying defence of that coast than of the western. It is in fact a pistol pointed at the heart of Serb Dalmatia, and if it were in the hands of the Italians the latter would be in a position not only to threaten Spljet and Gruž, but to dominate the whole of the Serb Adriatic coast and to exercise a close surveillance over even the coastwise trade of greater Serbia. Lošinj in their hands would enable them already to close the Quarnero, and therefore Rijeka, and Vis would perform the same function for southern Dalmatia. In a word, Valona and the entrance to the Adriatic would be Italy's, as also Trieste, Pola, and Istria at the head of the sea; the western shore is hers already; and finally the Slav eastern coast would be commanded in the north by Lošinj and the centre and south by Vis, so that Rijeka, Spljet, and Gruž would be useful to their owners only so long as Italy wished. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that it is this and not legitimate anxiety for self-defence that forms the real underlying motive of the claim to Vis. As an outpost of the eastern coast without which sovereignty over that coast would be wellnigh nugatory, "useless", to use Prezzolini's phrase, and as being Slav by race, the island should go to the Southern Slavs free of those naval limitations which have been already considered.

It was said by Mr. Paton that Bosnia was a head without a face, and Dalmatia a face without a head, and

it is true that the future of Dalmatia is bound up with its backland. The separation of the two provinces, whenever they have been separated, has always been unnatural, and the possessor of the one has inevitably sought the dominion of the other also. In the Middle Ages till the fall of the Slav States they were not so separated, and their reunion achieved in a limited sense by the Austrian occupation of Bosnia should be extended and consolidated; their permanent severance is unthinkable. The ports of Dalmatia are the natural outlets of the trade of the interior. Šibenik and Spljet by the continuation of the existing railway to form junctions with the interior systems, in the north by the valley of the Una and in the centre *viâ* the Aržano pass and Bugojno will be the natural ports for the greater part of Bosnia, and to the latter leads one of the traces of the proposed Danube-Adriatic line which would find its terminus here rather than farther south. This so-called Danube-Adriatic line is of course merely a portion of a much more extensive and important connection being designed to bring Roumania and Russia into direct contact with that sea by the shortest through route. Dubrovnik to the south though eventually, when the narrow-gauge line is widened and a more direct route with the interior opened up by the extension of the short Trebinje spur, important for the trade of Danubian Serbia and the Hercegovina, is not the natural outlet for the larger part of Bosnia or of eastern Slavonia, as a glance at the map will show. Separated from the interior Dalmatia would languish, it would be bereft of its natural trade, and the connection with Italy would offer no compensation, for mutual trade postulates mutual prosperity, and of the latter Dalmatia, cut off from the resources of the inland and deprived of the transit trade, would have no share: its ports cannot thrive on purely local traffic. In Serb hands they would as a fact benefit Italian trade, for through them would pass manufactures from northern Italy, whose artizans in return would receive the agricultural products, the wheat and the meat, of Serbia.

The settlement of this question on just lines and with a due consideration of the claims of both parties is of interest not merely to the countries immediately concerned. The Southern Slav problem as a whole is a matter of vital concern to Europe and the cause of European peace, and the solution of the Adriatic question as a crucial part of that problem affects in its consequences the other European States which are deeply involved in the future course of Serbo-Italian relations. The past relations between Italy and Austria have been very largely, if not entirely, the result of a settlement partial and incomplete instead of final and conclusive, and a settlement of similar character between Serbia and Italy would inevitably be followed by similar consequences. If the eventual settlement of the Dalmatian question, for this is the kernel of the matter, be just and fair the result will be a permanent peace, as political permanency goes, in the Adriatic and a fruitful friendship between Italy and the Southern Slavs. If, on the other hand, Serbia be left with a festering sore in its territorial and national relationships, then the result after a period of suppression and inflammation will be that it will discharge in renewed bloodshed. The result of the annexation of a large area of Slav territory to Italy would be the creation of a Serbia Irredenta, and the ultimate consequence, not necessarily to-day or to-morrow, would be the outbreak of a fresh war, for to the Southern Slavs this unredeemed land would be what Italia Irredenta has been to Italy. "It is terrible to think", a well-known Croat leader remarked to me, "that, after all this horrible war in which the divided Southern Slavs have suffered so much, we should have to look forward in the future to yet another", and his manner expressed the pain which he felt at the prospect. It is necessary to look facts in the face, we have too long ignored the opinions, rights, and interests of the Southern Slavs, we have suffered grievously as the result, and worse lies before if we do not conduct our relations with them upon a basis of sympathy and knowledge. The mishandling of the whole Balkan affair con-

tains abundant instruction and warning to all who do not wilfully or foolishly blunt their appreciations.

If the war in its deeper aspects is teaching us anything it is the hideous failure of soullessness in diplomacy and national policy. The prime object of statesmanship in the remodelling of Europe should be to settle old questions without creating fresh ones of the same kind, but if the Adriatic settlement should involve the handing over of hundreds of thousands of Southern Slavs to Italian rule the result would be nothing less than a European disaster. For the present Austro-Serb question would be substituted an Italo-Serb problem of the same character and malignity, a problem which would evoke the sullen anger of the Southern Slavs and eat like a canker into the peace of south-eastern Europe. "If you imprison a Slav idea in the deepest dungeon of a fortress it will end by blowing up the whole fortress in its effort to escape", but Slav pertinacity and memory should be devoted to more fruitful aims than the relentless preparation for yet another day of reckoning. "The Balkans will be Austria's grave", said Prince Gorčakov, and he has proved a true prophet; there is warning here for others. On the other hand, a frank and friendly policy on Italy's part would redound to her advantage, free her from diplomatic and strategical preoccupations, and enable her to develop relations, commercial, political, and cultural, that would benefit both her and Serbia.

The reaction of an unsatisfactory settlement may not improbably drive one or other of the two States into the arms of Germany in the future. It must not be forgotten that the Germans have for long looked upon Trieste as their future window on the Adriatic, an aspiration which has brought them into conflict with the Slovenes who block the way—always we return to the fact that the Southern Slavs are the bulwark against the eastward and southward trend of Germanism, the *Drang nach Osten* and the *Stoss südwärts*. So long ago as 1876 Sir Arthur Evans, in his book *Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina*, gave an

instructive quotation from a German traveller who six years previously had been travelling through the Southern Slav lands: "We must not spare ourselves the realization of the bitter truth that the greater part of Styria and Carinthia [thus Sir A. Evans's author, but the "greater" part is incorrect as applied to these two provinces], and the whole of Carniola, Gorizia, Gradisca, and Istria, with the avenue to the Adriatic, are lost to us. Even supposing the whole of Southern Germany to have been fused with Northern, and the German element in Austria either under compulsion or of its free will to have followed the already torn away Bohemia and Moravia [!] even then we should have neither the might nor the right—though it matters less about the right—to break forcibly through Illyria to the Adriatic".¹ It was said to me by a Croatian, "If our cause is deserted by the Entente then by and by we may have to look for friends elsewhere—in Austria or," with a shrug, "in Germany". The bearing of the words, though the topic was not pursued, was sufficiently evident, and, while I should not wish to press unduly anything said under the influence of the chagrin caused by the then recently concluded Dalmatian agreement, the remark is symptomatic of the feelings which might be engendered by a mishandling of the question, and the possible tendency indicated calls not for surprise but for the most serious consideration. On the other hand it might be Italy which would enter upon the path indicated: her ties with Germany are very strong. Neither resultant of the extraordinarily complicated cross-currents involved is desirable for Europe. Italy, with a knowledge of German ambitions for Trieste, may be reckoning on the alliance of the Southern Slavs willy nilly in the event of a future advance in that direction by Germany, since the latter could only reach Trieste conveniently through part of the Slovene country, not only through Gorica and Gradiška but also through the most western part of

¹ Sir A. Evans, *op. cit.*, p. 3, quoting Franz Maurer, *Reise durch Bosnien*, etc., p. 45.

Kranjska (Carniola) where the railway, after reaching Tolmino from Trieste, passes through the north-west corner of Kranjska to Villach, while the retention of Trieste would entail as well the possession of at least a part of Istria. It may be thought, therefore, that a German advance southwards would of necessity bring Germany up against the Southern Slavs, concerned to defend Kranjska against invasion and possible spoliation, and possibly unwilling to sacrifice a portion of that province even for Dalmatia and the islands—a very doubtful proposition. Thus Kranjska, a wedge of Southern Slav territory between Istria and German Austria, would become a bulwark of Italian Trieste, and the Southern Slavs might be compelled on this supposition to side with Italy against a German push to the Adriatic, thus becoming, to the ironic amusement of their allies, the champions of the alien lords of Dalmatia.

On the other hand, the more Slav territory Italy acquires the less convincing does such a line of reasoning become. If Italy obtains all Istria and Gorica-Gradiška as well as a large part of Dalmatia with the islands together with southwestern Kranjska then the interest of the Southern Slavs to come, *pro domo sua*, to Italy's aid becomes sensibly less and a German-Slav accord easier. Kranjska, though desirable for a German possessor of Trieste, is not absolutely essential if that possessor hold all the county of Gorica (apart from any possible acquisition of the line through Udine) and Gorica will already belong to Italy. Thus it would be open to Germany to offer the bribe of Dalmatia and the islands and to engage herself to respect Kranjska while pointing out that it should be a matter of indifference to the Southern Slavs whether Istria and Gorica were in Italian or German hands. It is extremely difficult to understand in what manner Italian politicians envisage the future in these regions. What is evident, however, is that a policy which should estrange the Southern Slavs opens up a vista of extreme peril to Italy, unless indeed she contemplates a reinsurance treaty, and with the Italians the

Southern Slavs might be dragged down also, for the pity of the whole controversy involved in this tangled Adriatic problem lies in the fact that the essential interests of Italians and Southern Slavs are identical, and they should be the closest allies. Italy can hardly oppose front *both* to Germany and the Southern Slavs. It must be remembered that in any case the Germans will remain a strong nation and that the time may come when, if favourable circumstances offer, they may be tempted to renew their attempt to push not only eastwards but southwards. In such an eventuality it would obviously not be a matter of indifference to the other members of the Grand Alliance whether the Adriatic settlement which they would be called upon to defend were intrinsically just or not. Moreover, under those circumstances the Southern Slavs should be the natural and fervent allies of the Italians, and their aid will grow in importance with the years. A settlement which should risk throwing them into the arms of Germany would represent to Italy a double loss.

The alternatives ultimately narrow themselves down to two; on the one hand a hostility between the two peoples which will eventually result in war whenever a favourable opportunity occurs, which admittedly may not be for many a long year though it may occur sooner than is thought; on the other hand a fair settlement resulting not merely in friendly relations but in a definite alliance. Under such circumstances Serbia and Italy left alone on the Adriatic to their mutual satisfaction would have every interest in combining against any Power which should threaten the newly established *status quo*, since any such aggression would be equally to the disadvantage of both. Neither would wish to see Germany installed in Trieste and neither would desire any weakening in the territorial position of the other. Indeed to remove Italian suspicion it might be laid down as a condition for the adoption of the Southern Slav contention that the new State should enter into a treaty of alliance with Italy for a term of years, fourteen or twenty, by which each would be bound to resist in common

any attempt to alter the new *status quo* in the Adriatic or the territories adjoining. The advantage of the aid of Italy to the Southern Slavs is obvious, while the task of the Italian General Staff would be enormously lightened by the knowledge that the forces which a united Southern Slavdom could put in the field would be found arrayed on their side and would not have to be regarded as potential foes.

There are some Italians who already see the advantage of cultivating good relations with the Southern Slavs. "The truth . . . is", says Professor Salvemini, "that the establishment of a great Serbia can in no case, that is to say even on the hypothesis of a very great aggrandizement of Serbia, represent a loss for us".¹ He concludes his remarks on the subject of Italy and Serbia by saying [his Italics]: "*In fine even on the supposition that Serbia should acquire all the Austrian Adriatic provinces and that Italy should remain within its present boundaries, Italy in this conjuncture has nothing to lose and much to gain*".² Signor Bissolati, the Reformist Socialist, is another who has pleaded, and still pleads, the cause of good relations between the two peoples, while the attitude of Signor Prezzolini has been abundantly illustrated above. The last-named perhaps lays his finger on the root of the mistrust when he says that "We are ignorant of Serbia". The Southern Slavs on their side have given frequent expression to their feeling of friendship, a notable example of a plea for good feeling being the speech of M. Pašić in the Skupština on April 28, 1915.

An attitude on the part of Italy which would indicate a policy of Mediterranean imperialism would not be without interest for other States.

In any case it is no mere question of an outlet for Serbia or of "compensations", it is a question of national unity pure and simple.

¹ G. Salvemini, *Guerra o Neutralità?* p. 16.

² *Ibid.* p. 18.

VI

To a certain extent it might seem that some of the foregoing remarks are of somewhat academic interest in view of the conclusion of the "Adriatic" or "Dalmatian" agreement between Italy and the Triple Entente; but not only is it necessary to examine the whole of the questions involved on their merits if an adequate appreciation of that agreement is sought, but the affectation of secrecy maintained on the subject since its conclusion invites this course.

The Treaty was concluded on April 27, 1915, but the secret of it had been so ill kept that it was not long before its existence and the general tenor of its terms were pretty generally known. I myself was made cognizant of it in May,¹ a few days after Sir Arthur Evans, in his letter of May 10 to the *Manchester Guardian*, had given an outline of the Italian demands, of which I also gave a sketch in one of the Reviews in September. The information then received has proved to be substantially accurate, requiring modification chiefly in the matter of the southern islands. Some of the terms of the agreement have been given by Dr. Seton-Watson in the *English Review* for February 1916.² Italy receives by its provisions the Trentino, Gorica, and Trieste, and the whole of Istria and its islands, the continental boundary in this area starting from the neighbourhood of Rijeka (Fiume) and running along the line of the Julian Alps. Italy further receives the whole of northern Dalmatia and its islands to a line drawn between Trogir and Spljet and thence to the Dinaric Alps in the neighbourhood of the Aržano Pass, and also the islands of Vis, Hvar, and Korčula,

¹ In giving a short account of it in the *British Review* for September 1915, I inadvertently gave the month of signature as May instead of April. It was on May 28 that I received information of the agreement.

² R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Failure of Sir Edward Grey*. *English Review*, February 1916, p. 148.

etc. This Treaty was not only concluded without any consultation with the Serb Government, but without that Government being informed that any such project was entertained, its only information being derived from common rumour. The whole manner of its conclusion was in the highest degree injurious to our ally, and in the plainest contradiction of those rights which our statesmen have so often proclaimed. The Dalmatians are of the same nationality of the Serbs, Serbia was an ally who for months had been detaining and defeating large Austrian armies, it was under the cover of the Serb army as a flanking guard that we were engaged on the Gallipoli expedition, and we had proclaimed ourselves the champions of small nations and of the rights of nationalities, yet on practically the first occasion on which our principles were put to the test they were betrayed. Our ally in a matter deeply affecting her interests in the war was ignored and kept in the dark, in fact she was not given the status of an independent ally at all, while the rights of nationalities were bartered away by the Great Powers concerned in Metternichian fashion. It is noteworthy that while Belgium has received^{*} an assurance that she will be called upon to take part in the peace negotiations (i.e. that she will take her place as a sovereign contracting State and not merely be admitted to be heard in the anteroom) no such assurance has ever been given to Serbia, which has throughout been treated as a dependent until the Paris conference in March 1916 to which she was admitted. This attitude was deliberate and evidently due to the knowledge that Serbia would not have given her consent to the concessions made. At the same time the Italian Press indulged in a campaign of falsification, with the obvious desire to throw dust into the eyes of the public at home and abroad, and English correspondents were telegraphing to their newspapers extracts from Italian papers dealing with alleged Serbo-Italian negotiations and a complete agreement between the two States for days

^{*} On February 14, 1916.

after even the present writer was aware on the best authority that no such negotiations were taking place. Evidently there was a feeling that the clandestine method of procedure would not meet with general acceptance. It is perhaps significant that up to the moment of writing the English Press has consistently ignored the treaty, while the majority of our publicists at the most have made an occasional vague allusion to some "alleged agreement", an attitude which is obviously assumed in view of the disclosures made.

On the ethical side, then, the agreement connotes an abandonment *pro tanto* of the moral basis of the war and a return to the ideas of the Congress of Vienna, while on its material side it lies open to the objections which have already been made to proposals of the nature contained in the agreement. It can in no sense be reconciled with the doctrine of nationality, for by its terms nearly one million Southern Slavs will be included in the Italian Kingdom, namely some 450,000 of the population of Dalmatia, and the Slav inhabitants of Trieste, 60,000;¹ Istria, 224,000; Gorica 155,000; and some 100,000 of the population of Kranjska. As regards the latter regions a more detailed examination of the figures and the deductions to be drawn from them will be given in the next chapter. It is sufficient to say here that though in any case an appreciable number of Slavs would have to be included in the new boundaries of Italy the necessity falls considerably short of what is here conceded, for the boundary between Slavs and Italians is in a general way fairly definite and does not depart largely from the natural boundaries indicated by the geographical features of the country. In the case of Dalmatia the violation of the national rights of the Southern Slavs is flagrant and incontestable, and, as has been seen in the section devoted to the strategical aspect of the problem, quite unnecessary from the point of view of the legitimate requirements of Italy. The whole of the

¹ Census figures, in round numbers, of 1910. The figures in detail will be found in the following chapter.

Dalmatian element in the above figures has been sacrificed without any valid necessity. While the incorporation of the province in a Southern Slav State would have affected only 18,000 Italians in a population of 630,000, the annexation of a large area of the Dalmatian mainland and of the islands affects some 450,000 Slavs on a strictly moderate and reasonable estimate.

The occupation of almost all the islands with the exception of a few of the Ragusan group very effectually serves the purpose of rendering as "useless" as possible the coast line which is left to the Slavs, as a glance at the map will show. The islands in the Quarnero will enable the Italians to dominate absolutely all traffic to and from Rijeka, and moreover will cut off that port from the southern Dalmatian coast left to the Serbs. Passing to the southern boundary of the new Italian Dalmatia it will be seen that it passes close to Spljet (Spalato), the opposite side of the bay being in fact in Italian hands, while the islands of Solta and Brač (Brazza) perform for the Italians here the function of the Quarnero islands in the north. It is difficult to see how the Serbs can in the circumstances make any use of Spljet. Indeed it would be an act of supreme folly if they should endeavour to make it the terminus of a line to the interior and the outlet of a great part of their trade. The whole harbour and town can be commanded absolutely by batteries placed on the opposite Italian shore, so that within half an hour of the opening of hostilities every ship in the port could be sunk, the wharves, cranes, and warehouses destroyed, and the port rendered useless, nor could such a consummation be prevented by the fortification of the Slav shore except on the impossible assumption that the latter batteries were so immeasurably superior that the Italians would be almost instantaneously overwhelmed before they could do any damage. Without a doubt under the circumstances the Serbs will have to concentrate their attention on Dubrovnik in spite of the fact that its position makes it unsuited to be the trade outlet of a great deal of Bosnia. The development of Spljet,

if the present arrangements hold good, would be nothing less than a sign of incapacity on the part of the Serbs, and if this language be thought an exaggeration, the map again will prove a corrective. Below the delta of the Narenta the coast-line is broken by the long projection of the peninsula of Pelješac or Sabioncello, off which lies the island of Korčula, and farther off Vis. These islands will be in Italian hands, and as the Quarnero islands isolate Rijeka, so these southern Dalmatian islands, besides giving the command of the Spljet-Narenta coast line to Italy, will cut off that stretch of shore from southernmost Dalmatia. The two strips of coast left to the Slavs will thus be divided into three portions by the islands held by the Italians, who will be in a position to cut them off from communication with each other by sea. Only when we come to the extreme south, to Dubrovnik and Kotor, do we find a coast where the Serbs will be masters in their own house. Even here a certain calculation has been probably made, but destined, as I believe, to be defeated. Imagine the inner as well as the outer Hebrides in the hands of a foreign Power possessed also of a block of the mainland, say of Argyll, and we have an adequate comparison of the situation to be established on the eastern Adriatic. In Article VIII of their reply to President Wilson the Allies spoke of a "reorganization of Europe guaranteed by a stable *régime* and based at once on a respect for nationalities . . . and at the same time upon territorial conventions and international settlements such as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attack". These principles should be applied to the Adriatic, and such guarantees afforded to the future Southern Slav kingdom.

The conclusion of this treaty has created a most painful effect on the Southern Slavs, and has aroused a feeling of keen resentment and profound disillusionment. They feel that for them the European struggle has largely altered its character, and that immense sacrifices have been and are being undergone by them in order that hundreds of thousands of their fellow-countrymen may exchange an

Austrian for an Italian dominion, sacrificed in the cause of "sacred egoism". The result is noticeable enough though undisclosed by a discreet Press. There is no longer the same enthusiasm among the Serbo-Croats of former Habsburg allegiance, the joyous hope of independence and national unity has largely deserted them, while the Serbs of the Kingdom are left in doubt as to whether even now they may not be forced to pay blackmail to Bulgaria. East and west the Southern Slavs see their interests sacrificed or menaced and their national heritage turned into a common fund out of which large bribes are to be given—by their Allies—with which now this State now that may be gained over. The House of Habsburg, quick to see its advantage, has sent large numbers of Southern Slav troops to its Italian frontier, where they are taking a valiant part in the defence.

These results were easily to be foreseen except by those who, unwilling to face realities, prefer to take their fancies for facts, and their hopes for accomplishments, but the expression of this opinion has largely been denied publicity.¹ Unfortunately a "delicate situation" does not cease to be delicate because the difficulties of it are shirked. The situation has to be dealt with at some time, and the sooner all the facts are realized the sooner will people be able to arrive at a correct appreciation of the position. Writing in the early part of 1915 Professor Denis gave utterance to a warning which has fallen upon deaf ears. He said: "*La question de la côte orientale de l'Adriatique n'intéresse pas seulement l'Italie et la Serbie. C'est une question d'ordre universel, et il n'y a aucune exagération à dire que l'avenir du monde peut dans une large mesure en dépendre. Car, enfin, si une puissance se règle uniquement sur ses convenances momentanées, il est absurde d'exiger des autres un renoncement qui, au milieu de l'égoïsme universel, ne serait plus qu'une niaiserie. . . .*"

¹ Letters to the Press forecasting the untoward effects of possible Italian action of the nature indicated were refused publication in November 1914.

Partir en guerre pour supprimer la guerre et préparer de nouveaux conflits ; inscrire sur son drapeau le respect des nationalités et la liberté des peuples, et aboutir à un nouveau congrès de Vienne ; être les héritiers légitimes des humanistes du XVI^e siècle et des nationalistes du XVIII^e pour chausser les bottes de Metternich et de Guillaume II, quelle déchéance et quelle banqueroute !”^{*} That which he posed as supposition is now fact.

Nothing that has here been written has been written in any spirit of hostility to Italy. The writer was brought up to believe, and still believes, that the accomplishment of Italian unity was one of the finest and grandest things that happened in the nineteenth century, nor was the name of any foreigner so familiar to him in childhood, not by contemporary knowledge but in political conversation of the past, as that of Garibaldi, who became to him an almost “legendary” hero. What has made the attitude of Italian politicians so painful to those who remember her past, and the generous enthusiasms which it evoked, is that their attitude in Southern Slav affairs is a flat negation of the whole historical and ethical basis of the Italian Kingdom. They would seem to have turned their backs on the generous ideals of nationality to which Italy owes her existence in the pursuit of an imperialist policy. That Italy, the product of those ideals, the result of the union of a formerly disunited people, compounded of several States, some independent, some enslaved, which had the House of Habsburg for her hereditary enemy, which made her appeal to liberal Europe, should place herself in opposition to the Southern Slavs whose present position is a picture of her own past, as her present position is the goal at which they aim, inspired like her by the teaching of Mazzini, the exploits of Garibaldi, is one of the saddest things possible for those who still retain any hopes of national idealism. Surely the Italian people must be nobler and more generous than those who speak in its name. Let that people hear the words of Signor Tittoni, a

^{*} E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie*, p. 320.

former Foreign Minister and lately Ambassador in Paris, uttered in a speech delivered on December 18, 1906, which as I have them only in a French rendering I will not submit to a further process of translation. His reasoning applies with equal force to the present situation. "Je repousse donc le conseil qui m'est attribué, de proposer à l'Autriche-Hongrie des partages de territoires ou de pousser à des occupations que ne prévoit pas le traité de Berlin, afin d'exiger ensuite pour nous des compensations territoriales. Un semblable procédé serait en contradiction avec les principes sur lesquels est basée l'unité de l'Italie; il ne serait pas compatible avec les principes qui nous ont dirigés jusqu'ici; il nous jetterait dans les périls, parce qu'il serait un précédent qui, à l'avenir, nous serait souvent opposé. En un mot, il obscurerait les buts évidents de notre politique en l'Orient".

CHAPTER V

PROPOSED FRONTIERS

THE actual area of the national territory of the Southern Slavs which can be included in the future State depends naturally upon the extent of the Allied victory and the terms which the Allies can therefore enforce upon the vanquished, and in particular upon the continued existence or disappearance of Austria-Hungary. As the extent of the victory cannot be foretold, and because in any event it is necessary to have in mind an ideal solution of the question which should be aimed at in proportion to our success in the field, it is necessary and in any case best to assume that such an ideal solution will lie within our grasp, and to examine the problem on the basis of that assumption.

The Dalmatian question having been treated of, the next and cognate element that calls for consideration is the future status of the lands at the head of the Adriatic, that is to say, Istria, Trieste, the county of Gorica-Gradiška, Kranjska (Carniola), Carinthia, and the southern portion of Styria. The following table gives the population of these countries according to the last Austrian census of 1910.

	Slavs.	Italians.	Germans.	Total population.
Istria ...	224,400	147,417	12,735	386,463
Trieste ...	59,974	118,959	11,856	190,913
Gorica-Gradiška	155,039	90,119	4,486	249,893
Kranjska ...	492,043	369	27,915	520,327

In Carinthia there are some 120,000 Slavs and 300,000 Germans, and in southern Styria some 400,000 Slavs. Of

the Slav population that of Istria is divided between the Croats, 168,184, and Slovenes, 55,134, the remaining Slavs in these regions are chiefly Slovenes. In Istria the Italians are found in a majority in the western portion of the peninsula, while the central and eastern parts are predominantly Slav. In the county of Gorica the Italians inhabit the country to the west of the lower Isonzo, while they form also the majority in the district of Monfalcone and in the town of Gorica. To the north of that town the ethnographical boundary crosses the existing frontier of Italy, which here already includes in its dominions a Slovene population. From the neighbourhood of the Pontebba Pass the racial line dividing Slovenes from Germans runs roughly to the river Drave above Villach, thence it follows the course of the river to the boundary of Styria. From this point it runs north of the river to the town of Radkersburg or Radbona on the Mur. Immediately to the east of Radkersburg a wedge of Slovene country runs north as far as S. Gotthard on the Raab in Hungary, the boundary returning south to the Mur, and thence the frontier between Slovenes and Croats follows the boundary of Croatia and Kranjska.

In parts of this region the interests of Italy are great and incontestable. Western Istria with Pola are of prime importance to her naval position, and as has been seen are predominantly Italian in population. Venice is no longer, in view of modern requirements and the increased size of shipping, the naval base that it was in past years, and the Italians have not in recent years based, I believe, their eastern squadrons on the aforetime mistress of the Adriatic, preferring for the purpose Taranto, which is outside that sea. With Pola in her hands the position would be fundamentally altered in her favour; she would have in these northern waters the base which she requires, connected by rail with the peninsular railways, well sheltered, and naturally strong. In the previous chapter it has been suggested that Lošinj (Lussin) should also be assigned to Italy if she desires it, thus assuring her the mastery of these waters.

Trieste occupies both historically and commercially a peculiar position. For over five centuries it has been a possession of the House of Habsburg; it is the port of entry and egress for a vast backland inhabited by various races, and, as the Germans have frequently pointed out, is only two hundred miles from the Bavarian frontier. Racially, in spite of the recent growth of the Slovene element, it is predominantly Italian, even if the contention of the Slovenes be true that their element is underestimated in the census by some 20,000 persons. The municipality is in the hands of the Italians, and it seems to be substantiated that the scholastic needs of the Slovenes have been purposely neglected, the Italians, perhaps not unnaturally, having been greatly alarmed at the height reached by the flowing tide of Slavs, so that the town has become one of the focus points of racial strife and propaganda. Despite, however, the contentions of the more extreme propagandists, there can be no hesitation in assigning Trieste to the Italians, who on the ground of nationality have an incontestable claim, while the culture of the town has always been Italian. It is true that Trieste is the port of a great deal of the Slovene backland, but it is the port likewise of the German backland, and it is unwise to advance an argument that elsewhere might be turned against its authors. The commercial position of Trieste undoubtedly complicates matters. If the port were included in the Italian customs area, then part of the Slovene country would be deprived of its natural outlet, as also the whole of German Austria, and beyond that the Bohemian country (Bohemia and Moravia). It is by this trade that Trieste lives, and if it were diverted the result would be commercial ruin for the port and a grievance for the interior. The difficulty is by no means insuperable, and could be overcome by the suggestion of Dr. Seton-Watson that it should be made a free port. Traffic then from the interior would pass through its harbour as at present, without imposition of a customs tariff, only goods destined for consumption in Italy being

subject to the Italian tariff. The duty-free trade could be carried in what may be called "bonded" trains through Italian territory to its destination. Such a proposal is not less in the interests of Italy than of the port and of the interior, and would not in any way derogate from Italian sovereignty over the town and harbour.

In the county of Gorica-Gradiška it is inevitable that a certain Slovene population should pass under Italian rule. The Italians in no case would be now satisfied with the line of the Isonzo, and would require in the south a good connection between their peninsular territory and Istria. The heights to the east of the river would form a natural and defensible frontier, and would give to Italy the positions for which she is now fighting. Monfalcone would be hers, Gradiška, Gorica, the positions of Doberdo, Plava, Podgora (all three Slav names), and more to the northward Tolmino, Plezzo, and the Predil Pass, beyond which (Malborghetto, etc.) the future frontier of Italy does not concern the Southern Slavs. Entrenched on this line, with lateral communication behind along the valley of the Isonzo, Italy could contemplate with assurance the defence of this portion of her frontier against even the strongest assailant. In effect, Italy would thus secure more than half the area of the province, and probably would take under her rule not less than 75,000 Slovenes, as well as all the Italians, so that the suggestion can hardly be described as niggardly, or as characterized by lack of appreciation for her strategical necessities, going as it does far beyond her pre-war aspirations. The frontier, moreover, would be a natural one.

The suggested land frontier then would start at the estuary of the Arsa, and gain the mountain backbone of the Istrian peninsula which traverses the country nearer to the eastern than the western shore, and to the east of the railway which connects Pola with Trieste. It would follow the course of this range northward, and eventually strike the boundary of Kranjska at the point in the latitude of Trieste where the boundaries of Istria, Kranjska,

and the district of Gorica-Gradiška meet. Thence it would coincide with the boundary of Kranjska to the point where the latter turns northward not far from S. Daniel, from which point the line would continue its north-westward course in the direction of the town of Gorica, leaving the inland railway Gorica-Trieste in Italian hands as well as the coast route, until it struck the mountains which border the east bank of the Isonzo, and so along the range which forms its watershed to the north to the Predil Pass and Tarvis. As already stated, this would leave in Italian hands all the strong positions for which they are fighting at the time of writing—the positions round Gorica, Tolmino, the Kern heights, the Cal Pass and Plezzo, the Predil Pass and Tarvis. In addition to some 75,000 Slovenes in Gorica-Gradiška, the territory would include the 60,000 Slavs of Trieste and approximately 100,000 of the Slovenes and Croats of Istria, a total of about 235,000, together with practically the whole Italian population, some 350,000, of these provinces. The suggested frontier would not altogether meet the wishes of the Southern Slavs, but I have reason to believe that if their claim to Dalmatia were met no serious opposition would be manifested towards it.

The secret treaty with Italy gives the latter considerably more than the above territories. The boundary starts a little to the west of Rijeka, and follows approximately the frontier between Croatia and Istria, then entering Kranjska follows the Julian Alps, cutting off the south-western portion of that homogeneous province, the centre of Slovene nationality, till it reaches the boundary of Gorica in the northern part of that county. This trace incidentally severs the direct railway line from Ljubljana (Laibach) to Rijeka, and the former town would thus be reduced for communication with the port to the roundabout route *viâ* Karlovac. All Istria therefore goes to Italy with its 224,000 Slavs, all Gorica with 155,000, Trieste with 60,000, and a slice of Kranjska with about 100,000 Slovenes. The population of the ceded area will therefore

comprise some 539,000 Southern Slavs and 357,000 Italians, as a reference to the table previously given will show.

The whole future of this region is naturally dependent upon the extent of the Allied victory and the demands which can be made upon Austria, for while the Monarchy could lose Galicia, Transylvania, Croatia, and Dalmatia, without ceasing to exist as a considerable State with its own seaboard, the loss of the territories now under consideration would connote the disappearance of the Habsburg realm as a distinct entity. To put it in another form, if the Allies should be in a position to force the House of Habsburg to cede these territories in addition to the others mentioned, they would in the nature of things be equally in a position also to enforce the complete dismemberment of the Monarchy. In an article contributed to the *British Review* for April 1915 I said that the more desirable event would be the formation of a Habsburg federal State, consisting of a Čech-Slovak kingdom, a purely Magyar Hungary, an Austrian German State, and a Slovene State, the latter of which would of necessity include Istria and Trieste. The formation of such a Habsburg Monarchy would incidentally limit Italian accession of territory in the northern Adriatic to the actual line of the Isonzo river, and the future Southern Slav territory would in a similar manner be limited in this direction by the western frontier of Croatia. The argument that weighed with the writer was that the alternative would entail the absorption of the old Austrian German duchies into the German Empire, and the consequent near approach of the latter to the Adriatic. Further consideration, however, and the increased subserviency of Austria-Hungary to Germany, which has marked the progress of the war and will evidently characterize the ensuing peace, have led me to reject the opinion expressed in that article. It is now evident that such a State would become politically, economically, and in military matters, a mere satellite of Germany, for the Čechs and Slovenes would be outnumbered by the Germans and Magyars and forced to

follow in their wake. The effective strength of Germany would consequently be increased by the resources of a monarchy numbering some 35,000,000 inhabitants.

The more the problem is considered the more fundamentally erroneous appears the view to which expression was given in the article mentioned. If Germany has been able to maintain herself in arms against the greater part of Europe, it has been owing to her control of the resources of Austria-Hungary—that is to say, of a State which is predominantly non-German and non-Magyar. Southern Slav, Italian, Roumanian, Čech, Pole, Ruthene, all have provided cannon fodder for the German High Command, and without these supplies Germany would have been lost long ago. Any future Habsburg monarchy will inevitably gravitate within the German orbit and bring its resources to the aid of Prussianism, and hence the absolute necessity of shearing off from the Habsburg dominions all that is not German or Magyar. In practice that would mean the creation of an independent Bohemia, to include all the Čechs and Slovaks, the creation of a purely Magyar Hungary, and almost certainly the incorporation of the Austrian Germans in the German Empire. It is the latter fact that causes hesitation with some people, but evidently with very little cause. The Austrians would bring to Germany an accretion of some 8,000,000 of population, but such an accretion is greatly less than the 30,000,000 to 35,000,000 of a reduced Austria which would equally be at the service of Germany; it would, in short, represent the lesser evil of the two. Such a Germany, deprived of all other means of support, could never make head again in face of the Grand Alliance, or even of Russia and France, supported as these would be by Bohemia and the Southern Slav kingdom. To some it is repugnant to think of the final prostration of the Habsburgs before the Hohenzollerns, but that sentiment rests on no solid basis. The Habsburgs have always been disloyal, intolerant, perfidious, and reactionary; and Gladstone was right in saying that nowhere had Austria (i.e. the House of Habsburg) done good. There

are few things more curious in history than the glamour which this House has managed to cast over all sorts of men in various countries, but now at last it is open to all to see it in its true colours. That some who call themselves Liberals should come forward as the champions of Austria is something truly astonishing, and can only be due to that kink which causes some men always to be apparently, and in good faith, on the side of their country's enemies. Far truer was the teaching of Gladstone and of Professor Freeman, to the latter of whom so deep a debt is due for his clear teaching on this subject. If the writer of this in the article quoted spoke in favour of a reduced Austria, it was not for love of the Habsburgs or of Austria, for the burning words of the great Professor had left their mark years before, but for the reason assigned in the text, a reason now clearly seen to be superficial. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the question of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is the question of whether we want to win the war or lose it, or more correctly of whether, having won the war, we wish to win the peace. It is noteworthy that French opinion, which at the beginning of the war showed some tenderness to Austria, shows signs of hardening in the opposite direction. While M. Bainville considered the destruction of Austria as a European disaster (in which case it is curious that he should have made it an accusation against the Yugoslav Committee that it was, according to him, subsidized by Austria), M. Herbette looked to a grouping of the Austrians proper with the Southern Germans. This latter idea is not incompatible with the destruction of Austria-Hungary as at present existing, but is based upon a misconception of German feeling. Readers of the Hohenlohe Memoirs will remember that the great impulse towards unity came precisely from the South Germans, and that their particularism is directed also against each other. On the other hand M. Chéradame is explicitly for dismemberment. Thus he wrote: "All who have studied on the spot the problem of Central Europe are unanimous in declaring that the liquidation of Austria-Hungary is an absolute neces-

sity".¹ M. Dubosc has stated the reasons with admirable precision and conciseness: "In short, if we are of 'those who speak of demolishing Austria and do not speak of demolishing Germany', it is because (1) the demolition of the one appears to us definitive, while that of the second appears ephemeral; (2) because the demolition of Germany seems to us superfluous on the day when Prussia will be cast down; (3) because the demolition of Austria will be the ruin of the *bloc* of Central Europe, which was hostile to us, and in particular of the mutual aid of German and Hungarian assured by the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867".² The *Temps* and *Matin* in leading articles, and other writers such as M. Gauvain, have adopted the same line of reasoning, and have pointed also to the doctrine of nationality as necessitating a final liquidation of the Danubian Monarchy. The Allies' note to Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Balfour's letter, if words mean anything, have endorsed the policy as being the aim of the Grand Alliance. Henceforth the matter should be *chose jugée*, unless we are to go back upon our word, upon our moral obligations to our Allies, upon the definite treaties with some of them and upon our own interests. *Austria delenda est*.

The complete disruption of the Monarchy would be attended by the cession to the Southern Slavs and to Italy of the territory which has just been considered, and the formation of independent kingdoms of Bohemia, including Moravia, Austrian Silesia, and the Slovak districts of Hungary, and of Magyar Hungary. The German Austrian provinces would then inevitably enter the German Empire, which in their 8,000,000 inhabitants would find some compensation for its losses elsewhere. The accession of strength would nevertheless be considerably less than that which would fall to her lot in the alternative considered above. Even if an independent Hungary gravitated towards Germany, and such a course is perhaps less likely in an independent Hungary than in a Hungary tied to German

¹ *Rappel*, July 10, 1916.

² *Paris-Midi*, July 15, 1916.

Austria,¹ there would be a counterbalance in a Čech-Slovak Bohemia of some 10,000,000 inhabitants, while the Slovene and Italian country would also be lost. If, then, the Allies should be in a position to demand the cession of the Slovene and Italian Adriatic lands, that demand should be maintained, with the consequent disruption of the Monarchy into its constituent elements, the latter event being, as said above, a necessary result of the former in political consequence, as it would *ex hypothesi* lie equally within the power of the Allies to enforce.

The less complete the victory of the Allies, the less, obviously, shall we be in a position to demand, but it must be remembered that these cessions of territory alone will give an adequate and permanent solution to the Southern Slav and Italian questions. It is not a mere question of a province more or less, as in the case of the dynastic wars of the eighteenth century on the Continent, but of utilizing a unique opportunity of recasting the map of Europe on national and rational lines.

As regards the northern boundary of the Southern Slavs in this region it could be drawn along the river Drave, following the ethnographic line of cleavage from the neighbourhood of Villach to the Styrian frontier, thence in a more or less direct line to Radkersburg on the Mur. There is, as stated above, a northerly wedge of Slovene territory running from this point to S. Gotthard on the Raab containing some 100,000 inhabitants, but I do not think that this wedge could be included in the Southern Slav State. It is impossible to make the political boundary follow in every detail the linguistic or ethnographic, as the result of such an attempt would lead to many inconveniences and anomalies. The principle should be the natural or geographical boundary—if such exists—which coincides most nearly with the racial, provided that the application of this principle does not exclude

¹ Such a complete disruption would probably bring in its train a considerable modification in the internal condition of Hungary in the direction of the loss of their power by the Magyar magnates.

large racial areas from their co-national State. In general, also, in estimating what should fall within a racial area regard should be paid to the manner in which the races are juxtaposed. Small racial "islands" in a surrounding sea of another race must be lost to the racial stock. This last consideration does not apply to the Slovenes in question, as the area adjoins the main block of Slovene and Croat territory, still its inclusion would make an awkward boundary. The frontier from Radkersburg should run along the Mur to its junction with the Drave. Croatia would thus receive again the little territory of the Medjumurje of some 735 square kilometres, which lies here between the two rivers. Of its population of 90,357 82,829 are Croats. The territory belonged to Croatia till 1861, when it was filched by Hungary, and its possession has always been claimed by its former owners. It was the seat of the great family of the Zrinjski.

The future of Croatia has been much canvassed and various rumours have at different times been in circulation on the subject, and even now, as has been seen in the previous chapter, some Italian papers are not yet reconciled to the idea of Serbo-Croat unity.¹ The secret treaty with Italy lays it down that the future status of the country shall be declared by the Croats themselves. The result of any *plebiscite* is a foregone conclusion—the Croats will declare for union in some form or another with the Serbs and the formation of a united Southern Slav State. Owing to the presence among the Allies of many Southern Slav refugees drawn from each province inhabited by the race we have had abundant opportunities of learning the sentiments of the people, the more so as these refugees are thoroughly representative of the political and economic life of their people. They include members of the Austrian and Hungarian Parliaments, and of the Dalmatian, Croatian, and Bosnian Sabors (Diets), town

¹ That unity is recognized in the official Austrian census statistics, which speak always of Serbo-Croats. The Austrian census is by language.

councillors, priests, lawyers, bankers, journalists, and men of letters. The testimony they give is unambiguous and decisive. The Serbo-Croats in America at the congress held at Chicago endorsed the national programme of unity, and they also published in a Southern Slav newspaper of New York a violent manifesto in reply to the Austrian consul's request that Austrian Southern Slav emigrants should return to Europe for military duty. The Croatian Committee in Rome has stated: "The official acts of the Croatian Diet at Zagreb testify, in fact, to the will of the Croatian people to consider itself as forming a single nation with the Serb people, to which it is united by the sacred ties of the soil, of blood, and of language". In May 1915 M. Trumbić, a member of the Dalmatian Sabor and a former mayor of Spljet, said to M. Delcassé when presenting his colleagues: "As the Croats, Serbs, and Slovenes form one [la même] Yugoslav [Southern Slav] nation we desire the liberation of all our co-nationals now under the Austro-Hungarian yoke and their union with our Serb brothers of Serbia and Montenegro in a single State. . . . In order that the Yugoslav nation may be able henceforth to accomplish its noble national and civilizing task, it is indispensable that all its members should be joined together in a compact and united State".¹ "The Southern Slav people aspires to unite its territories in a single independent State", says the Yugoslav Committee in its appeal to the British nation and parliament.

In a conversation on this subject which I had with Dr. Hinko Hinković, the well-known advocate of the accused in the Agram High Treason Trial and one of the leaders of the Serbo-Croat Coalition, he said that the old bitter Catholic-Croat anti-Serb feeling was dead in Croatia except among a few politicians and their followers of the older school, the younger generation would have nothing to do with such ideas. Nor was there, in his opinion, he remarked in answer to a specific question, any danger of a

¹ *Cit. C. Vellay, La Question de l'Adriatique, p. 75 note.*

revulsion of sentiment after the war when Magyar oppression would be a thing of the past. The feeling of solidarity was not a mere reaction to alien tyranny, however powerful an agent that had been in awakening national self-consciousness. The Croats, it must be remembered, though Catholic, were by no means ultramontane, following in this the example of the great Strossmayer. This latter point was confirmed from another source, the Serb monk, Father Nicholas Velimirović, to whose reputation in his own country has been added the consideration he has gained for himself in England. Discussing the future relations of Croats and Serbs he bade me remember that the Croats are not particularly fond of "the Vatican". In his pamphlet on *Religion and Nationality in Serbia* he has borne testimony to the great part played in the furtherance of the programme of Southern Slav unity by the Catholic priests, many of whom have suffered, and are suffering, for their racial patriotism. Some, as also Orthodox priests, have given their lives to the cause. The point is of extreme importance when it is remembered how in the Near East religion has proved a solvent of nationality, and in the past hardly anywhere more conspicuously than in the case of the Southern Slavs. "It may be objected that this may be so in the day of trouble, but that all may be different to-morrow, with the return of peace. . . . On this point I venture to say that history will *not* repeat itself; what has been will never be again. . . . All we Jugoslavs are sure that there will be harmony and unanimity between the two priesthoods, the two confessions, and the two Churches in the future Serbian State".¹ This feeling of solidarity has been a long time in coming, and perhaps will be all the more enduring and surely based because the lesson has been learned in the hard school of adversity, of frustrated hopes, of spurned loyalty, and of common suffering, and it has completely altered the terms of the problem as it formerly existed. There can be no doubt

¹ Father Nicholas Velimirović, *Religion and Nationality in Serbia*, pp. 19, 22.

as to the result of a consultation of the Croat people as to its future: they will elect to stand with their Serb brothers.

The position of Rijeka is a close counterpart commercially of that of Trieste in that it serves a large backland of various national elements. The loss of Croatia would cut off Hungary from the sea, and, though there might be some poetic justice in that in view of her action towards Serbia, she would be entitled to a guarantee of the right of free exportation and importation through Rijeka and a fair railway tariff to the port.

Croats and Serbs occupy a considerable area in southern Hungary in the districts of Baranja, Bačka, and the Banat of Temesvar, the two latter corresponding roughly to the former Serb Vojvodina (Duchy), and it is necessary to examine Southern Slav claims in these regions and to arrive at an estimate of what may rightly be included in the future Southern Slav State. Baranja is one of the southerly counties of Hungary, bounded on the south by the Drave and on the east by the Danube, with an area of 5,105 square kilometres. The number of Serbo-Croats in the county according to the census of 1910 is 36,000. The figure is disputed by the representatives of the race, who assert that the returns have been falsified by the Magyar authorities, and the real number of Southern Slavs is 70,000. Apart, however, from the Magyar population the number of German settlers amount to 103,000, so that the Serbo-Croats do not form the most numerous section of the population. Unfortunately the local distribution of the racial elements is thoroughly mixed, and it would be difficult to carve out of the country any considerable area of homogeneous character. While some Serbo-Croat colonies are to be found in the northern portion even to the south and east of Pečuh (Pecs), where the bulk of the Slavs live, they are mingled with large German and Magyar elements. Under the circumstances it seems hardly practicable, and in the interest of the Southern Slavs themselves undesirable, that the future State should here cross the natural boundary of the Drave, even though the

reluctance to leave any portion of the race under Magyar misrule is natural enough in view of all that it has suffered at the hands of Magyar chauvinism.

There are certain considerations affecting the distribution of territory in southern Hungary which should, I think influence the result of any concrete inquiry and proposals, which apply not only to Baranija, but also to the Bačka, and the Banat, which may be stated at this point. It would be a bad thing for the Southern Slav kingdom if it sacrificed its intension for the sake of extension. Serbia has owed a great deal to its homogeneity, and the consequent concentration of its political aims and national feeling; it has been her intension which has given her her relatively great strength, and the same considerations would apply to a wider Southern Slav State. Nor is it at all desirable in the interests of the Southern Slavs themselves that the territorial frontiers of their kingdom should be so extended as to make its borderlands a miniature Austria-Hungary in the variety of its ethnical elements; it would lose, not gain, by having for its frontier provinces a sort of ethnological museum. The guiding principle should, therefore, be to include all the compact masses of the race, but to eschew annexations which would bring with them the complications of an alien population. Such complications cannot altogether be avoided, but they should be reduced within the narrowest possible limits. Especially should Southern Slavdom avoid the needless inclusion of German elements. The Germans, as the war has shown, are extremely indigestible; even in the United States, that great melting-pot of nationality, we have seen—in some ways more markedly than elsewhere—how the German has placed the interests of his country of origin altogether above the interests of his adopted country and his own duties as a citizen. Political, financial, commercial, and journalistic action have not exhausted his activities, but arson, murder—as witness the loss of life in the various dynamiting outrages—and outrage have also been called into service. Doubtless the German inhabitants of southern

Hungary are compacted of milder stuff¹ and are relatively less numerous, still the Southern Slavs would be better without them. As regards some of the German colonies, which necessarily will be included in the new State, I have not hesitated in a later chapter to suggest some drastic steps. Without anticipating what will be suggested later, it may be pointed out here, that not only will the Serbs be well within their rights in repatriating the strategic colonies which have been deliberately planted in certain parts of Bosnia and Srem (Syrmia), but that somewhat similar steps may have to be taken in regard to other Germans. Any rearrangement of frontiers will probably lead of itself to a certain amount of cross migration, and that process will be all to the good even if not unattended by a certain hardship. Such hardship will add but little to the vast sum of human misery caused by the war, while the results of the process will make for peace in the future and a more settled condition of affairs in the various racial frontier regions. So far, however, as any governmental suasion is to be employed, that will only be legitimate if the frontiers are so drawn as to include the minimum of alien elements. If the frontiers are so traced as to include only compact blocks of Serbo-Croat nationality, with no more than islands of foreign elements, then some such measures as suggested may justifiably be employed,—I am speaking only of the Germans. If, however, the frontiers are traced in such a manner as to include all the Serbo-Croats, even where it is they themselves that are islands in an alien sea, then any such measures would be in the highest degree without justification, for the Serbo-Croats could not claim to include solid blocks of aliens and then to treat them as intruders, nor is there the slightest reason to suppose that any such unjust course would suggest itself to them. In fine, a studious moderation in the trace of the frontiers in the

¹ According to Budapest reports, however, they have shown a marked pan-German feeling during the passage of German troops in the campaign against Serbia which has given concern to the Magyars.

manner indicated would carry with it a certain latitude of conduct towards the engulfed Germans, while *e converso* the Serbs would be estopped from such a course by needless territorial extension. Finally, the place of the rejected elements could be taken by immigrants of their own nationality.

For these reasons I do not think that a good case can be made out for the annexation of Baranja or even for any considerable portion of it, and the wiser course would be to rest content with the Drave frontier.

The adjacent region is the Bačka, which is bounded on the east by the Theiss and on the south and west by the Danube, which makes a right-angled turn below its confluence with the Drave; it corresponds to the Hungarian county of Bacs-Bodrog. The population of the county is composed chiefly of Serbo-Croats, Magyars, and Germans, with a few thousand Slovenes and Ruthenes. The statistics of the Hungarian census are disputed, and it is probable that they underrate the number of Serbo-Croats and exaggerate those of the Magyars, for the latter, unlike the government of Vienna, have a direct interest in the manipulation of the nationality returns. Unfortunately, not only is the population mixed, considered as a whole, but the different elements are commingled in an inextricable manner. The eastern part is predominantly Serbo-Croat beyond a line drawn roughly north and south from Novisad (Neusatz) on the Danube to Sentomaš on the Bački canal, which runs in an easterly direction from the Danube to the Theiss. The former of these towns is an old Serb centre, in fact before the resurrection of independent Serbia it, together with its near neighbour Karlovci, was the cultural centre of the Serb stock, and most of the educated Serbs of the early days of the Principality owed their education directly or indirectly to Novisad, many too of the Serbs of this southern region of Hungary, Bačka, and the Banat, emigrated to the Principality when it gained its autonomy, and this applies especially to the educated element.

Obradović, who made spoken Serb the literary language, also was a native of southern Hungary, and in more recent times the father of the Vojvoda (Field-Marshal) Putnik was an immigrant from the same region. Of late years Novisad has been forced to yield its place as the Serb cultural centre to Belgrade, while that of the Croats is at Agram, and the Germans have made considerable progress in the town. Another considerable block of Serb inhabited territory is to be found in the neighbourhood of Subotica (Maria Theresiopol). The intervening areas along the Danube to the west of the line Novisad-Sentomaš, and to the north of the Bački canal are inhabited by a confused medley of Serbo-Croats, Magyars, and Germans, interspersed with each other in a manner which forbids the drawing of a frontier which should correspond closely with the lines of racial demarcation. Thus the Serbo-Croats of the Subotica region, and those also of Sombor, are separated from the fairly homogeneous south-eastern Bačka by these polyglot areas. As the Serbs are probably the most numerous nationality it is natural that the whole of the Bačka should be claimed for the new Southern Slavdom. Here again, however, the considerations to which I have adverted above call for examination. It is doubtful, as already stated, whether it would be in the interest of the Southern Slavs to burden themselves with an area of such diverse ethnic elements. It would add enormously to the tasks of the administration and might easily be a source of trouble and international complications. It has always to be remembered also by the Southern Slav leaders that it is far easier to deal by way of legislation with the foreigner, to circumscribe his commercial activities and exploiting proclivities, to curtail the extent of his banking operations and so forth, than to deal with the man of alien race who is a native-born subject, as these Germans and Magyars would become, unless they were given, and exercised, permission to opt for Hungarian nationality, in which case the confusion would be worse confounded. Hard as it might be to the Southern Slavs to renounce

claims to a region rich in historic memories of national struggle, I think (and those Serbs who know me know that it is the thought of a sincere friend) that it would be wiser, if they have the choice, to exercise a severe moderation. The south-easterly corner within the limits already defined—south of the Bački canal and east of the line Novisad-Sentomaš—might perhaps be claimed for the Southern Slav State, and the claim might include Novisad itself for historical reasons and for the practical reason that to it crosses the railway bridge over the Danube from Petrovaradin, but beyond that in their own larger interests I think that they would do well not to press their claims.¹

The last region of southern Hungary with which we are concerned is the Banat of Temesvar, which includes the greater part of the former Serb Vojvodina and comprises the counties of Torontál, Temes, and Krassó Szörény (Serb, Krašovo-Severin). The southern boundary is the Danube, and it extends east and west from the borders of Roumania and Transylvania to the Theiss, while on the north it reaches to the Maros. The Banat also is a country of mixed nationality, its population comprising Serbs, Roumanians, Magyars, and Germans, while other races are represented, particularly the Slovaks. The western portion, including the major part of the county of Torontál and part of Temes, is predominantly Serb. This portion includes the towns of Velika Kikinda and Veliki Bečkerek, and extends some distance eastward in the southern part to Vršac, Bela Crkva (Weisskirchen, Fehértemplon), and Bazjaš. The population even here is by no means homogeneous, but includes large bodies of Roumanians in the neighbourhood of Alibunar and of Germans and Magyars in that of Pančevo. The eastern portion of the Banat,

¹ If in pursuance with the remarks made above a scheme of cross-migration, directed chiefly with a view to the Germans and possibly to Magyar "islets," be adopted (of which more is said in Chapter IX), then the south-west of the Bačka should be attributed to Serbia as well as the south-east. This would give the whole line of the Bački canal as the northern boundary. In any case tens of thousands of Serbs will be excluded.

comprising the county of Krasso and part of Temes to the east of the line Temesvar-Vršac is predominantly Roumanian. Besides Germans and Magyars this portion includes numerous Serb islands as in the neighbourhood of Temesvar and Párdány. In former days the Serbs occupied a more important position than they do now, as they have lost a lot of ground to the Roumanians in the east. Here many Serb districts remain only as islands in a Roumanian sea, and Serb ecclesiastical foundations, far removed from Serb settlements of the present day, have passed into Roumanian hands. The northern portion of the Banat is very mixed in population, and a wedge of German and Magyar colonies with a Serb and Roumanian admixture is thrust southward to Veliki Bečkerek between the main masses of Serbs and Roumanians.

The detailed study of this region carried out by Dr. Seton-Watson in his book *Roumania and the Great War*,¹ as part of the study of all the Roumanian districts of Hungary, enables one to arrive at a fair conclusion as to the future lines of demarcation. The eastern county of Krassó Szörény is so far Roumanian as to lie outside the purview of legitimate Serb aspirations, which can only be concerned with the counties of Torontál and Temes. In the county of Torontál the districts of Török Kanizsa and Nagy Szent-Miklós in the north-west are Magyar though the former contains a large Serb population, while the district of Perjámos in the north centre is mainly German, the Roumanian being the next most numerous element, the Serbs being in very small minority. Dr. Seton-Watson assigns seven districts to the Serbs: Velika Kikinda, Török-Bečse, Veliki Bečkerek, Zsombolya, Pančevo, and Pančevo Town. The total population of these districts is 298,823,

¹ This book contains an invaluable series of appendices, chiefly of statistical tables showing the population of Transylvania and eastern Hungary in great detail, to which I am deeply indebted throughout this particular section. See especially for my purpose pp. 81, 82, 86, and 87. I do not quite follow portions of his summary on page 89, but this does not affect the matters with which I deal.

and it includes 114,595 Serbs, 32,170 Roumanians, 54,502 Magyars, and 77,855 Germans. The details of the districts disclose the fact that in the district of Zsombolya the Serbs form a very small minority—3,687 Serbs, 4,643 Roumanians, 12,026 Magyars, and 25,552 Germans. For the reasons more than once given, I think that were I a Serb statesman I should willingly renounce any claim to this district. The Roumanians advance considerable claims in the Banat (the necessity of harmonizing Serb and Roumanian pretensions is the reason for the detailed consideration here given to this region), and apparently are not afflicted by any doubts as to the number of aliens who may be included in the Roumanian Kingdom—some Roumanians have gone so far as to claim the line of the Theiss, i.e. all the Banat and much else. This perhaps is due to the fact that the satisfaction of their legitimate claims will necessarily result in the inclusion of the large Saxon and Szekel islands (234,085, and 501,930) which are situated near to the Roumanian frontier, so that a few thousands more or less of Germans and Magyars will not greatly affect them. The Serbs are in a happier position and should take advantage of it. The district of Zsombolya, then, should be renounced by them to the Roumanians, the more so as its cession will not materially break the continuity of Serb territory though making its northern portion rather a narrow tongue of land. If this be done the population of the remaining districts¹ under consideration will work out as follows: Serbs 110,908, Roumanians 27,527, Magyars 42,476, Germans 52,303. It will be observed that the result is greatly to increase the ratio of Serbs to both Magyars and Germans. The process could be carried a step further. A solid block of German and Magyar territory extends right up to Veliki Bečkerek, and if the new boundary were taken close to the east of that town, but so as to leave the Bečkerek-Pančevo railway in Serb hands, the number of Germans and Magyars would be still further reduced.

¹ Of the county of Torontál.

Mixed Serbo-Roumanian districts are Csene, Párdány, Módos, Bánlak, and Alibunar extending roughly in a crescent with horns pointing west with the centre to the south-east of Veliki Bečkerek. Of these the first is mainly German, and should share the lot of Zsombolya, in fact if the latter (and the region last mentioned) be assigned to Roumania, Csene would of necessity from its position go also. In Párdány the Serbs are the most numerous element closely followed by the Germans who in Módos and Banlak take first place while in the latter Magyars and Roumanians are more numerous than the Serbs. In these districts it is possible to work out a redistribution by communes by which the Serb and Roumanian elements will be disentangled, but the result leaves the Serb districts with a large leaven of Magyars and Germans.^{*} Here also the Serbs would be wise to resign to the Roumanians all but a few communes in the west which are mainly Serb and adjoin the main block of Serb territory. The district of Alibunar stands in a different case. It is possible so to disentangle the communes as to give two regions, one predominantly Roumanian and the other predominantly Serb with only small minorities of other nations. The difficulty, however, is that Alibunar projects deeply into Serb country, and unless the boundary is to be extremely in and out the whole district should go to the Serbs. This is the less important because not only does the distribution outlined above give large Serb islands to the Roumanians, but the two races are remarkable among Balkan peoples in that their relations are generally characterized by mutual liking instead of mutual hatred: they are noted for getting on well together.

In the county of Temes the Serbs are in a small minority in most of the districts though their number in these districts amounts to 30,129, but that is out of a total population of 416,998. In Vršac Town they are numerous

^{*} *Vide* R. W. Seton-Watson, *op. cit.* p. 87. In Párdány, after subtracting Roumanian districts, 9,196 Serbs are left in a population of 26,029; in Módos 6,899 out of 23,468; in Banlak 3,658 out of 19,777.

(8,602 out of 27,370, but 13,556 Germans), but the town must follow the fortunes of the district in which the Serbs only number 5,531 out of 36,978 (18,174 Roumanians, 8,605 Germans). Kevevára is Serb, and so is Bela Crkva with the exception of three communes.

The boundary, then, of Serb territory in the Banat might be traced roughly as follows¹: Leaving the river Theiss somewhat to the north of Zenta it would run eastward to a point between Makó on the Maros and Velika Kikinda, then it would run southward slightly to the east of Velika Kikinda and continue its course to a point slightly east of Veliki Bečkerek, leaving, as said, the railway V. Bečkerek-Pančevo in Serb hands. Thence with a slight southward bulge it would run to the river Temes north of Bótos and continue up the river to above Srpska-Boka. It would then run with a northward bend to the Brzava canal between Partos and Kanak and follow the canal southwesterly to the junction with the Theresien canal. From this point it would run south to the neighbourhood of the railway between Számos and Ilánesa, and follow the railway—a little to the east of it—till just east of Alibunar it would cross the railway Alibunar-Vršac. This railway it would follow—slightly to the south of it—to a point between Ulma and Vršac, whence it would take a southeasterly course to Bela Crkva and Bazjaš on the Danube. The island of Moldova on the Danube below Bazjaš would also go to the Serbs. If this trace were followed the result would be represented in the following table:—

	Serbs.	Roumanians.	Magyars.	Germans.	Total.
Torontál (district of V. Kikinda, T. Beče, V. Bečkerek, Antafalva, Pančevo)	110,908	27,257	42,476	52,303	251,949
Alibunar district ...	11,743	14,982	588	755	29,292
Temes, Kevevára district	16,795	5,705	5,355	6,587	35,482
Bela Crkva district ...	20,863	1,160	<i>circa</i> 700	<i>circa</i> 4,600	29,227
	160,309	49,374	49,119	64,225	345,950

¹ Stieler's Atlas will enable the line to be followed easily.

From these figures an appreciable reduction must be made in respect of the Germans and Magyars inhabiting the excluded portion of Veliki Bečkerek and a slight addition to the number of Serbs in respect of the communes alluded to above of Módos, Párdány, and Bánlak districts. If three Roumanian communes of Alibunar were excluded there would remain in that district 9,938 Serbs and only 126 Roumanians, out of a total of 12,193 inhabitants, but these communes could hardly be excluded for geographical reasons. These figures could, and probably would, be modified considerably by cross-migration after a resettlement of frontiers. Some 90,000 Serbs would, upon the above distribution, be left in Roumanian territory, accepting the total figures of the Hungarian census of the counties of Torontál and Temes which exceed by several thousands the sum of the detailed figures of the districts. Many of these would doubtless be willing to emigrate into the new Serb territory to take the place of Roumanians equally desirous of emigrating. Any such movement should be encouraged but not in any way forced, for the employment of pressure would create a grievance which would react on the political relations of two States whose interests are identical and will remain so and whose people are mutually sympathetic. The same remarks apply to the Magyars also, many of whom would be likely to refuse to pass under the government of the despised "nationalities". The case of the Germans is considered in Chapter IX.

If the boundary here suggested be compared with that proposed by Dr. Seton-Watson in his book already cited it will be seen that the chief difference is to be found in the exclusion of Zsombolya from the Serb area. The line here given, roughly speaking, leaves Dr. Seton-Watson's line near Velika Kikinda and rejoins it in the neighbourhood of Vršac. Though it gives to the Serbs slightly less in area yet it has the advantage, which is very considerable, of including far fewer Germans and Magyars while the number of Serbs it excludes is comparatively small. Discussing the question of the

Banat, a well-known Serb geographer and publicist traced roughly for me on a map a line with which he said he had reason to believe the Roumanian Government would be satisfied. That line—I have kept the map—corresponds generally with Dr. Seton-Watson's line, though drawn slightly to the east of it. I gathered that the Serbs also would not be dissatisfied with the line given to me, and I trust, therefore, that the trace which I have suggested would meet with no insuperable objections from them while, by giving a slightly increased area to Roumania, it might be acceptable there also.

The future of Macedonia at the time of writing is still uncertain, though loyalty to an ally and the necessities of plain honesty should have deprived the situation in that region of all ambiguity in the event of victory for the Allies. I assume here for my immediate purpose that King Ferdinand and the Bulgars will *at the end* play the Germans false as they have previously played us false: that an appeal will be made to England, whose infatuation for Bulgaria has already cost us so dear in the Balkans; that an immediate response will be evoked, and that at least a portion of Macedonia will be demanded for our enemies to console them for their non-success against us. I am bound also to assume that even such modified treason to our ally will be repudiated, in spite of powerful pro-Bulgar influences.¹

Without a doubt some sort of union will eventually be achieved between Montenegro and the remainder of Southern Slavdom, though the exact nature of that union and even the hour of its accomplishment is in doubt, and will depend in part on how far the Powers show them-

¹ A discussion of the Macedonian problem and of the nature of the settlement which should be made with Bulgaria will be found in the two following chapters. The district of Strumica should be included in Serbia which, in view of Greece's attitude, should receive also the Florina district which has a Slav population. The latter cession would give her a mountain frontier instead of an arbitrary line across the Pelagonian plain. The chain runs south from Kajmakčalan west of Lake Ostrovo.

selves capable of taking long national views to the exclusion of immediate dynastic and diplomatic matters. Just before the outbreak of war negotiations were in progress with a good hope of success for a union between Serbia and Montenegro in matters of common concern. The proposal was for a single army, a single Foreign Office, and a customs union. In former years King Nicholas was an ardent advocate of Serb union, and even wrote that he would be content to be the sentinel before the King of Serbia's tent, and it has been asserted that in the days of Prince Michael of Serbia there was an actual agreement that in the event of the two States becoming coterminous there should be a sort of federal union between them, Montenegro becoming a principality within the Kingdom. How far there has been an alteration in the old King's personal sentiments it is difficult to know, but the brilliant marriages of his daughters and the union of the Crown Prince to a German princess have greatly increased the dynastic feeling of the family and exalted its notions of its courtly position—from being the household of a tribal chief it has become a recognized Royal family. It was asserted—though I do not know with what truth—that King Nicholas himself was averse to taking the title of King, and that it was urged upon him by his family, and even more significantly by the Austrian Emperor, who wished thus to effect a breach between Serbia and Montenegro since it would be more difficult for a King to concede what would be comparatively easy for a Prince. A great deal of mystery surrounds the alleged surrender of the Montenegrin government to Austria at the time of the loss of Lovćen. It seems perhaps not improbable, though the suggestion is offered with diffidence, that the court camarilla which, as has been said, paid of recent years greater heed to dynastic than Southern Slav national considerations, and which is stated to be headed by the Princess Vera, did induce the King to offer a surrender, but that the latter was met with a refusal by the army (it is important to remember that,

as I was pointedly informed, the Montenegrin General Staff was composed of Serb officers) and that the King thereupon reversed his decision. The position of the dynasty was weakened by the events of the Balkan wars. The Montenegrins were dissatisfied with the conduct of the princes who do not seem to have shared the hardships of the soldiers, while the latter contrasted the results achieved with those obtained by the Serbs. When in the second Balkan war Montenegrins and Serbs fought side by side the contrast in resources was further brought home to the former who saw that Montenegro was too small and too poor even to organize efficiently the resources they possessed. There was consequently a general feeling both among Serbs and Montenegrins that, while no great change might take place in the lifetime of old King Nicholas who has played a great and noble part for his country, after his decease there should be a union of the two States the Montenegrin princes receiving appanages from the civil list. During the lifetime of King Nicholas there should be at any rate a federal union which would have the incidental advantage of placing beyond doubt the consummation of complete union in the future and of eliminating the danger of any intrigue directed against that consummation.

During the war rumour has been busy with the subject of Montenegro and its ruling House, and with intrigues real or alleged in which the little country has figured, and there can be little doubt apart from details that there has been substantial basis for some at least of these rumours. In the spring of 1915 I was told the story of an intrigue which has not hitherto been published whose authenticity was accepted in Southern Slav circles. It is asserted that at that time—April–May 1915—a certain Power had urged Montenegro to stipulate from the Entente for the cession to her of all the Hercegovina to the south of the Narenta, an area which would include Dubrovnik (Ragusa). The result would be twofold. In the first place, such a cession would reduce the future outlet of

Serbia proper on the Adriatic to the very narrowest proportions. The second result would be to make less likely the union of Serbia and Montenegro. The acquisition of such an area including Dubrovnik would further exalt the dynastic pride of the ruling House, while the Montenegrin people also, in view of the increase of its resources, might change its opinion that the country was too small and too poor to stand alone and should join its larger neighbour. The comment on this subtle idea made to me by a Southern Slav was emphatic: "We wish no harm to old King Nicholas who used to be a great patriot, but if he intrigues with — against Southern Slav unity he will have to go."

No one can feel anything but compassion for the old chieftain of the Black Mountain forced in these dark days to leave his home and the little country which he has so dearly loved, and every one must hope that his life may be spared to see the dawn of a happier day not only for Montenegro but for all that Southern Slav race whose union inspired all his policy in former years and formed the theme of his play *Carica Balkanska* (the Empress of the Balkans). There can, however, be not the slightest doubt as to what should be the future of his country. Whatever provisional arrangements may be made for the lifetime of King Nicholas, Montenegro after his death should be completely fused with Serbia. His family does not command the respect and allegiance which belong to the old King, and its attitude of recent years has made it suspect of being lukewarm in the cause of national unity—that unity which more than ever, as stern events point to its absolute necessity if the race is to have a future, is the goal for which every Southern Slav passionately strives, treachery to which is the one sin that has no forgiveness. That union is equally in the interest of the Montenegrins; their country is small and it is poor, even the great forests of the Brda cannot be exploited by its own resources, and fusion with the rest of the race would enable it to enter into a larger life, would dispense with the expense

of a separate administration, and would enable it to share in the resources of the whole country, and to obtain subventions for educational and other purposes which it cannot supply itself. It is to be hoped that such a consummation will not be hindered by the dynastic ties which unite other ruling families to the House of Petrović. The position of the latter would be no worse than that of many German and Italian Houses which had to yield place in the cause of national unity, and the statesmen of the Allies should see the matter from the broad view of international policy and the national desires of the Southern Slavs rather than from that of the editor of the *Almanach de Gotha*, or of those who forget that if there is a King of Italy it is because one king and several lesser potentates, not to mention the Pope, have had to make way for him. It must be remembered that the not too popular heir-apparent is married to a German princess and has no children, and that the next heir is Prince Mirko, whose rôle in recent events has been more than equivocal. He remained behind in the country after the great retreat, and is now in Austria, where rumour has been busy with his name as a possible "tame" sub-king of an Austrian Yugoslavia. There can be but little doubt of the fusion of Montenegro with the rest of the Southern Slavs whatever arrangements may be made at the peace. If they are for a time separated it will only mean a revolution the more, similar to that which chased from their thrones the King of Naples and the Dukes of Tuscany, Parma, etc., and with a similar result, for no Holy Alliance is likely to attempt to stay the progress of events and there are limits to the extent to which any single State can flout public opinion. Political wisdom, however, endeavours to obviate the necessity for revolutions.

There are two or three slight rectifications which should be effected in the Serbo-Albanian frontier, though the amount of territory affected is small. The first of these is that the line of the Bojana should be secured, the present frontier leaving the river just below Gorica and

passing north-west to the lake of Skodra. A small river is not usually a good frontier except on the map, but in this case the character of the two banks is different and the line of the Bojana is in reality the line of the hills which come down to its western bank. In the neighbourhood of Gusinje the present frontier cuts across the upper valley of the Lim part of the valley—both sides—being Montenegrin and part Albanian. The difficulty here is that the upper part of the valley is inhabited by an offshoot of the Klementi tribe from over the mountains, but at any rate the boundary could be so modified as to include in Montenegrin territory the headwaters of the affluent which joins the Lim at Andrijevisa, which would give a continuous mountain frontier in this neighbourhood. The new boundary would follow the hills which divide the headwaters of the Andrijevisa tributary from those of the Lim. The total area involved would not be more than some fifty square miles, but the result would be a natural frontier. A more important rectification is necessary between Djakovica and Prizren. The present frontier leaves the mountains to the south of Djakovica and strikes north-east to the junction of the Erenik with the White Drin and then follows the course of the latter to the west of Prizren. As a consequence, in this portion of its course the valley of the river is divided between Serbia and Albania. As has just been remarked, a small river is not a good frontier, for the reason that the social and economic life of its banks is the same. Moreover, in this case the strip of Albanian land is cut off from the rest of Albania by the mountains which bound the western side of the valley. A modification of the frontier would be expedient by which the new line should follow the mountains just mentioned to the narrow gorges west of Prizren in the neighbourhood of Vranica where it would cross the river where the valley is confined and thence rejoin the present frontier to the south of Prizren. Here also the result would be a practically continuous mountain frontier. To the south of Prizren at the point last

mentioned, the present frontier makes a loop eastward of almost three-quarters of a circle pointing in the direction of Tetovo, and abandoning the main line of the southern extension of the Šar Mountains. The new line should follow the main chain and thus cut the neck of the loop, giving once more a natural frontier. The sum total of these last two losses to Albania would not be above some three or four hundred square miles at the outside. In the event of Albania being re-established in a real independence, i.e. without any right of occupation, administration, protectorate, or tutelage being granted to any *single* Power, she could be amply compensated by the valley of the Radika, at present Serb, and even by the town of Debar itself, which would be worth much more to her than the areas relinquished to Serbia. In the event of any other future being marked out for Albania, then an entirely new set of circumstances would arise which it would be useless to discuss here. The failure of the late experiment in Albania lay in the circumstances in which it was conceived, the agents by whom it was worked, and the jealousies which strove to wreck it. This virile people should not be despaired of. Progress will be slow—the Highlands were not tamed in a day—but there seems no reason why a really honest attempt, made without *arrière pensée*, to found an independent Albania should not succeed. If an administrator of the calibre of, e.g., Lord Milner¹ were to be sent out for ten years, the way would then be clear for a princely government. A “Constitution” would of course be the last work, not the first.

¹ Written before party politicians had re-discovered him. Presumably we shall henceforth use his talents for ourselves.

CHAPTER VI

MACEDONIA: THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY OF 1912

I

It is necessary that some reference should be made in a book dealing with the future of the Southern Slavs to the Macedonian question, however great may be the impatience of many Englishmen at the mention of that, to them, wearisome topic. It might have been thought that the question of the future of Macedonia has been settled by the course of events: Serbia has been our faithful ally, which has repulsed all overtures for the negotiation of a separate peace when such were made to her, while Bulgaria has been to us as well as to Serbia a treacherous enemy, so that to those unacquainted with the methods of modern British diplomacy it might seem that no other course could, or would be, followed save that of restoring the province to our ally in the event of victory. The facts, however, are otherwise, and consequently the main outlines of the problem must be restated in the barest possible form. There are one or two common misconceptions, widely held in England and fostered by the ever-active Bulgarian propagandists, which require at any rate passing notice. Reference has been made more than once to the frequency with which historical claims dating from the Middle Ages are advanced to various Near Eastern lands and provinces, and Macedonia in particular has been the object of such claims based upon the conquests made by the contending

parties in medieval times. Professor Cvijić, the Rector of the University of Belgrade, has pointed out in his monograph on the Nationality of the Macedonian Slavs that if historical arguments were to have full sway, the entire map of Europe would have to be recast with most unsatisfactory results, and it must be remembered that these "historical" claims are frequently in plainest contradiction to arguments, such as the ethnological, to which much greater deference should be paid. The fact, however, that these arguments are frequently advanced and have had undoubtedly so large an influence entails a brief glance at the history of Macedonia subsequent to the irruption of the Slavs.

A very common misconception in England is that during the greater part of the Middle Ages Macedonia was almost continuously a Bulgarian province, which fell into the hands of the Serbs for a short time during the reign of Stephen Dušan,¹ before passing under the rule of the Turks. This is an entire mistake as will be seen, however little bearing the historical question has upon the racial character of the inhabitants or their political desires, if they possess any desires beyond the wish to be allowed to cultivate their lands in peace and quietness. Unimportant in itself, a sketch of Macedonian history becomes necessary when the alleged facts of this history are seriously advanced as a contribution to the present political solution of the problem of Macedonia's destinies. Another common misconception is a confusion between the great importance of the Archiepiscopal see of Ochrida, whose occupant bore the title of Primate of Justiniana Prima and Bulgaria, in the ecclesiastical history of the Orthodox Church and its ephemeral importance as the capital for a few years of a Bulgarian Empire. The two things have been consistently confounded by those whose object was to make political profit out of the confusion. With this latter matter it is not my intention to deal, as the facts can be found elsewhere in

¹ See for example an article on *The Macedonian Problem*, by Mr. Ledward in the *Fortnightly Review*, August 1915.

greater detail than is warranted by the purpose of this volume.¹

The "first Bulgarian Empire" was founded by Simeon, 893-927, who proclaimed himself Tsar, and held Macedonia, Albania, and part of Serbia, including Niš and Belgrade. Subsequently the empire split into two portions, of which the eastern fell before the Greek Emperor Zimisce, in 972. The western empire was founded in 963 by Šišman of Trnovo, who held Macedonia and Albania. His son, Stephen Samuel also held Macedonia, Albania, Niš, and Belgrade. His troops suffered a disastrous defeat at Belašica at the hands of Basil II, the "Bulgar Slayer," in 1014, which he did not long survive. A short period of anarchy and internecine strife was followed by the extinction of the Western Bulgarian Empire in 1018, and the whole territory, though the ecclesiastical organization survived, was incorporated into the Eastern Empire and parcelled out into governorships. It so remained for a period of 160 years, from 1018 to 1186.²

In 1186 a revival of Bulgarian power took place under John Asen, who, it is to be noted, was a Vlach and whose dominion is frequently described as Vlacho-Bulgarian. John Asen II prided himself in a document addressed to the Pope on being a Roman. This revival had its origin in northern Bulgaria, Macedonia at the time being under an independent ruler named Strez, variously described as a Serb and a Bulgar. Tsar Kalojan, son of Asen, 1197-1207, took possession of northern Macedonia, and the revived empire had its greatest extension under John Asen II, 1218-1241, whose dominions touched the Black Sea, the Ægean, and the Adriatic, including Albania up to Durazzo. Macedonia and

¹ *Vide* a sketch of Macedonian history by Professor P. Popović in the *Near East* for September 10, 1915, which has since been republished as a pamphlet, for some interesting information on the subject on the see of Ochrida.

² It is maintained by Professor Popović, *ut supra*, that the "Western Bulgarian Empire" should be regarded as a separate "Macedonian" State of non-Bulgarian character. He cites Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, as now adhering to this view.

Thrace were lost by Koloman, son of John Asen II, the date of the loss being given as 1254–1257, during the last years of his reign,¹ while Constantine Asen, or Tić, a Serb by race, 1258–1277, was the last Tsar who occupied upper Macedonia, and then only for a short time.² The second period of Bulgarian possession, then, lasted only some fifty years, on the most generous estimate, if we compute the time from the occupation of upper Macedonia by Kalojan. The Greeks had immediately to defend it against the Serbs, who, under Stephen Milutin, 1281–1321, penetrated to the Struma and the Lakes, and maintained his hold on northern Macedonia. Under his grandson, Stephen Dušan, all Macedonia and much else fell to the Serbs as a capture, not from the Bulgars but from the Greeks. On his death in 1356 Macedonia fell to one of his nobles Vukašin, and subsequently became the principality of the famous Marko Kraljević. It continued under Serb rulers till the Turkish definite conquest in 1396, having acknowledged Ottoman suzerainty since the battle of the Marica in 1371.

It will be seen, then, that there was nothing like a continuous Bulgarian occupation in the Middle Ages. On the contrary, after the fall of the first Bulgarian Empire, which had held Macedonia for 160 years, including the duration of the "Western Bulgarian Empire," during the 370 years from 1088–1396 the Bulgars only held the province for some fifty years, the Serbs holding it in sovereignty or under suzerainty for about a century at the close of the period, and the Greeks for periods of some 160 years and fifty years. Another point which becomes evident is that no revival of Bulgarian power had its origin in Macedonia, in spite of the difficult nature of the country; the province fell to Bulgaria as a result of later conquest, and at times had its own princes of Bulgar or Serb race. I lay no great stress on this confused medieval

¹ *Cit.* Lavissee and Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, Tome iii, p. 909. Professor Popović gives the date of acquisition as 1230 (this would refer to all Macedonia), and of its loss as 1246.

² *Cit.* William Miller, *Travel and Politics in the Near East*, p. 374.

history, but if it be cited it should be cited correctly, which is rarely the case with the Bulgar propagandists, native or foreign. Historically the Serbs have a good claim, and M. Vesnić, the Minister of Serbia in Paris, has told me that such public works as remain from the medieval period date from the years of Serb supremacy. In our own days Serb influence was paramount during the nineteenth century till 1878, when it waned as the result of various causes—the abortive Treaty of San Stefano, the operations of the Bulgarian Exarchate, Turkish fear of Serb nationalism which led to the suppression of the Serb schools, and the operations of the “Macedonian Committee” which seems to have killed considerably more Macedonians than Turks.

As for the ethnology of the Macedonian Slavs the best opinion is that it is not unlike what we might expect from this previous history. The original Slavs must have been of the same general stock as their Serb neighbours and the original Slav inhabitants of Bulgaria, and that original stock has at different times received an infiltration of Bulgarians. East of the middle Vardar valley they may be described as Bulgarians, and north of the line Štip-Gostivar as Serbs, the remainder living in the Slav portions of the former vilayet of Monastir are neither pure Serb nor pure Bulgar. I may cite two English authorities, the quotations forming part of the discussion of the subject by the authors cited. Sir Charles Eliot says:—

The result of this investigation, then, is that it is not easy to distinguish Servians and Bulgarians beyond the boundaries of their respective countries. We have in reality three categories: pure Slavs, Slavised Bulgarians (the original un-Slavised Bulgarians having long ago disappeared), and pure Slavs who have been influenced by Slavised Bulgarians. . . . Of the remaining Slavs [*i.e.* between the Struma and the Šar Mountains] an impartial observer can only say that they are intermediate between the Serbs and Bulgarians; but I think that traces of Mongolian—that is, Bulgarian—physiognomy can be seen as far west as Ochrida. The practical conclusion is that neither Greeks, Servians, nor Bulgarians have a right to claim central Macedonia.¹

¹ Sir Charles Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, pp. 337, 338.

Mr. Brailsford, whose Bulgarophil sentiments are well known, writes :—

Are the Macedonians Serbs or Bulgars? . . . The lesson of history obviously is that there is no answer at all. They are not Serbs for their blood can hardly be pure Slavonic. . . . On the other hand, they can hardly be Bulgarians, for quite clearly the Servian immigrations and conquests must have left much Servian blood in their veins and the admixture of non-Aryan blood can scarcely be so considerable as it is in Bulgaria. They are probably very much what they were before either a Bulgarian or a Servian Empire existed—a Slav people derived from rather various stocks who invaded the peninsula at different periods. But they had originally no clear consciousness of race, and any strong Slavonic Power was able to impose itself upon them. One may safely say that for historical reasons the people of Kossovo and the North-West are definitely Serb, while the people of Ochrida are clearly Bulgarians. The affinities of the rest are decided on purely political grounds. Language teaches us very little. The differences between literary Servian and Bulgarian are not considerable but they are very definite. The Macedonian dialect is neither one nor the other, but in certain structural features it agrees rather with Bulgarian than with Servian. This, however, means little; for modern Servian is not the language of Dushan, but the dialect of Belgrade. A southern Macedonian finds no difficulty in making himself understood in Dushan's country (Uskub and Prizrend) though he will feel a foreigner in Belgrade. One must also discount the effect of propaganda. A priest or teacher from Sofia or Belgrade who settles in a village, will modify its dialect considerably in the course of a generation. . . . The Servians have a respectable historical and ethnographical claim to be reckoned a Macedonian race.¹

It is true that he claims them very definitely for the Bulgarians and decisively rejects Serb claims, but it is on grounds of political affinity. M. Bérard, in his book on Macedonia, differs with regard to the inhabitants of the Ochrida region: "Les Slaves des Dibres et des Lacs se disaient volontiers Serbes." Professor Cvijić is also of opinion that they are of intermediate type, but considers that the central Macedonians as far east as the Vardar-Struma waterparting have Serb characteristics in their customs, songs, and some of the elements of the language. It is curious that the Bulgars and their backers insist so

¹ H. N. Brailsford, *Macedonia*, pp. 101, 105.

strongly on their alleged ethnographical claims to Macedonia while claiming in Thrace a large area which is Greco-Turkish by race, as well as Kavala, etc., which is undoubtedly Greek. The geographical, commercial, and strategic reasons which they advance in these latter cases are equally operative for the Serbs in Macedonia.

Mr. Brailsford found no native traditions of the old Bulgarian Empire, such traditions as the people possess being rather of the days of Serb rule. Bulgarians themselves have admitted it. It is this indeterminate character of the population that has so embittered the Serbo-Bulgarian struggle for Macedonia. The Macedonian speaks a patois which is identical with the literary language of neither Serb nor Bulgar, but is mutually intelligible with both. When he is educated he learns either the one or the other literary language, and becomes, as the case may be, Serb or Bulgar. If the Bulgars have made great progress in the past, that is due largely to political causes and the methods of the Macedonian Committee, and whichever State could hold Macedonia for a generation would succeed in converting its inhabitants to its own nationality. Neither side could rest secure in the belief that eventually the people would remain in its fold in spite of a passing foreign domination. It is a testimony to the correctness of this view that most ethnologists are agreed that prior to 1878 the population of the country between Niš and Sofia was of the same intermediate character, and it is a fact that villages on what is now the Bulgarian side of the line asked to be included in Serbia. Yet at the present day the political boundary has become a genuinely national one. At one time, if the Bulgars claimed Niš, the Serbs claimed Sofia. All this explains, if it does not excuse, the bitter struggles for the Macedonian heritage. In reply to Bulgarian efforts the Serbs in later years pushed a vigorous propaganda in Macedonia not only in ecclesiastical matters, which, as we shall see, were themselves political, but by the foundation of schools, etc.

A note must be made of the great influence of the

Exarchist Church in promoting Bulgarian influence. Up to 1870 the Orthodox inhabitants of European Turkey were forced to submit to the ministrations of priests who were Greek by race, and a general confusion was made between Greeks (Hellenes) and "Greeks" by religion. The Slavs demanded priests of their own; the Patriarch refused the request. Then in 1870 was formed the Exarchist Church by an act of formal, though not material, schism, rendered necessary by that refusal. The Serbs, it must be remembered, took an active part at Constantinople in forwarding the movement and even brought diplomatic pressure to bear at the Porte in its favour. The original sphere of the operations of this body, which, it must be remembered always, differs in no matter of doctrine, ritual, or religious observance from the Patriarchist Church, was in Bulgaria proper. Its operations were gradually extended to Macedonia, where it became a Bulgarizing agency. The Serbs of the Principality had their own autocephalous Church in communion with the Patriarch, and this body was unable to send a mission into Macedonia without committing an act of schism. The result was that the Exarchist Church had matters all its own way, since the only method by which the Slavs could obtain the services of a Slav clergy was by adhesion to the Exarchist body. It was not till 1897 that the Serbs were able to obtain the appointment of one of their own race as Patriarchist Metropolitan of Skoplje, and only in 1900 that the Serbs of Turkey were recognized as a separate *millet* or politico-religious community. From the Serb point of view, therefore, action against the Exarchist clergy is purely political, since an Exarchist Church in Serb territory can have only, in present circumstances, a political *raison d'être*; namely, to teach the inhabitants of Macedonia that they are Bulgars, and therefore, if they want a Slav clergy, should have Bulgar and not Serb priests.

That in spite of its terrorist methods the Macedonian Committee did not obtain so large a hold over the Slav Macedonian population as is often supposed is shown by

the fiasco of the much-advertised "great rising" of 1903. During that rising, according to Mr. Brailsford, no more than 4,800 insurgents were under arms, a number which is very small if comparison be made with the total population of the districts affected and in great contrast to the great popular insurrections which at different times have had their origin in the Balkans. Even when allowance be made for lack of arms and for the discouraging effects of previous abortive rebellions the number seems inadequate to sustain the contention that it was a genuine popular revolt of the central Macedonian people. Moreover, the very methods to which the Bulgarian Committee had recourse, the frequent assassinations, the raiding of villages for supplies not willingly afforded, the taking of hostages, the terrorism exercised not less upon the villagers than upon the Turkish officials, argue an inherent weakness in the cause it sustained. Not thus was it with the frequent Greek and Serb insurrections of earlier days, when supplies were willingly accorded and there was no need for the insurgents to take measures against those upon whose behalf they were fighting, since these latter recognized their mission and assisted the hajduks or klephts to the best of their ability. The Committee throughout the history of its operations was always compelled to take the severest measures against the peasantry, not only Greek or Vlach but also Slav, which argues that at least a large proportion of the villagers had but little sympathy with their self-styled champions; indeed it was frequently only by force that villages could be induced to enrol themselves in the cause of the Committee. Everything then points to the same conclusion of a peasantry Slav by race, but in the mass largely untouched by nationalist propaganda, probably confining their conscious desires to security for life and freedom from extortion and excessive taxation, and capable of being moulded into Serbs or Bulgars according as their destinies lead them. I am speaking of the people of central Macedonia.

II

Undoubtedly the Serb cause has been prejudiced in England by the view taken of the provisions of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 which preceded the first Balkan war. It has been argued that the Serbs by agreeing to the territorial delimitation contained in that Treaty acknowledged the ethnographical rights of Bulgaria over the region assigned to her, and were therefore morally debarred from demanding any revision in the terms of the treaty so far as the territorial arrangements contained in it were concerned, and could not put forward any claim to central Macedonia without thereby disavowing those rights of nationality upon which is based the whole Southern Slav case. It is contended further that in consequence of the foregoing arguments Serb rights in central Macedonia are based purely upon the successful issue of the second Balkan war, i.e. upon force, and that in any general Balkan settlement a return must be made to the provisions of the 1912 Treaty as representing the considered moral judgment of the two States themselves upon the question at issue. It is urged even further that in pursuit of the aim of a Balkan accord in spite of Bulgaria's treacherous stab in the back these views must find concrete expression in the proposals of the Allies notwithstanding Serbia's position as an ally and Bulgaria's hostility, and although these same Allies have already signed away large areas of territory which are as indisputable in their Southern Slav character as the nationality of the central Macedonians is disputable.

There are here evidently two main points. The first is matter of fact and historical argument, the second, partly dependent upon the first, is largely matter of policy and honest dealing with an ally. The first is concerned with the genesis, the aims, the underlying causes, and the rupture of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912, and the second with the policy which ought, in view of all that has happened, to be pursued by the Allies in the Balkan

settlement. In this section I will endeavour to set forth the truth about the 1912 Treaty.

A commonly received view is that the first real, as apart from formal, breach of the Treaty was made when Serbia demanded a redistribution of the spheres allotted to the two States by the set terms of the Treaty, and this view necessitates the consideration of the motives that underlay that distribution. The Bulgarians, as we have seen, have long laid claim to practically the whole of Macedonia and of what the Serbs call Skoplian Old Serbia, i.e. the districts of Skoplje, Kumanovo, etc. The general history of those claims has already been reviewed. In these pretensions of the Bulgars the Serbs never acquiesced, even though prior to 1878 they concerned themselves more immediately with their prospects in Bosnia and the Hercegovina. They claimed that the inhabitants of central and southern Macedonia were at least as much Serb as Bulgar, and that their own historic claims were as good as those of their rivals. Unless it is recognized that the Serbs never acknowledged Bulgarian claims to Macedonia on ethnological grounds, we shall fail to understand the reasons which led them at a later date to reassert their own claims by the demand for a revision of the 1912 Treaty.

The main object of Serbia in concluding the Treaty was to secure an outlet to the Adriatic under her own control. It is unnecessary to deal with the conditions, economic and political, which pressed heavily on the State and made this desire imperative, as they are sufficiently well known. Under the terms of the Treaty Bulgaria was to furnish 100,000 men for operations in Macedonia and 200,000 against Austria if Serbia were to be attacked by that Power. There was also a territorial delimitation of the future acquisitions to be made in Macedonia, assigning by far the greater part of Macedonia to Bulgaria.

The reason why Serbia made these large concessions was, as has been said above, the need of a port on the

Adriatic, for the possession of which she was willing to pay a high price; and this was perfectly understood by the Bulgarian statesmen with whom the Treaty was concluded. The Macedonian concessions to Bulgaria were made to her in return for her support in the matter of an Adriatic outlet, which for Serbia was the governing motive throughout for entering upon the Treaty at all. "Why, under these circumstances", I asked a well-known Serb in a position to know the facts, "was not the question of a port definitely included in the terms of the Treaty? Your attitude then could not have been liable to misrepresentation". "We made a mistake in not doing so", was the reply, "a great mistake which we bitterly regret. But we did not want to alarm Europe". Forced by the jealousies of the Powers to conceal their plans under the usual guise of a demand for Macedonian reform, the Balkan States desired no disclosure of the fact that in reality they intended a root-and-branch settlement of the Balkan question. "The extent of the concessions", it was added, "was due to the fact that we, like the Bulgarians, did not think that we were so strong as we were". When, therefore, at a later date the Bulgarians argued that there was no mention of Albania, i.e. of the Adriatic outlet, in the Treaty, they were literally accurate, but at the same time they knew that, though not mentioned in terms, the matter was fundamental—was, in fact, virtually a suppressed clause.

It is this that gives real importance to a visit paid in November 1912 to Budapest by M. Danev, an ex-Premier and at the time President of the Bulgarian Sobranje. He went avowedly as the representative of his Government. On November 10 he was received by Count Berchtold (the Delegations were sitting at Budapest at the time), and in Hungarian official quarters he is stated to have intimated that Bulgaria was not bound unconditionally to support Serb claims in controverted territorial questions. Yet on the day following the Bulgarian semi-official *Mir* itself acknowledged that the question of a Serb outlet

was a *sine quâ non*.¹ For Serbia this action of Dr. Danev, the first of an ill-fated series connected with the name of that unhappy statesman, constituted nothing less than a breach of the Treaty. If Austria had attacked Serbia in arms Bulgaria was bound to come to her aid with 200,000 men,² and *a fortiori*, if the attack took a diplomatic form, she was bound to aid her diplomatically. It cannot be argued that, though bound to military aid if required, she was free to withhold her diplomatic assistance. Yet here Bulgaria, far from doing diplomatic service, actually did her Ally a disservice, and so far as the diplomatic field was concerned abandoned her. To Austria the information was important. It must be remembered that at this date—early November 1912—the decision as to the Adriatic outlet had not yet been given definitely against Serbia, though Austria was loudly declaring the impossibility of conceding it. She knew, after Dr. Danev's declarations, that on this point the Allies were divided and that she had nothing to fear from Bulgaria, which would certainly not support her Ally in arms in a question which she had already declared was no affair of hers. It is true that in any event the military situation was such as to preclude any help from Bulgaria reaching Serbia, since the former State had some 50,000 to 70,000 men locked up around Adrianople, while the rest of her army was before the lines of Tchatalja. This, however, really means that the terms of the Treaty had become impossible of fulfilment on the military side as they had already been repudiated on the diplomatic. Doubtless the position of

¹ So also Dr. Danev: "I should explain to you that, during the crisis of 1912, the most important question for the future of Serbia was her outlet on the Adriatic Sea. Austria was opposed to that. If the Allies ever meant to execute the clause of which we speak [Article III of the Military Convention between Serbia and Bulgaria], no better opportunity could have been presented. But no one, much less Serbia herself, thought of it".—Speech in the Sobranje, May 1914. *Cit.* "Balkanicus", *The Aspirations of Bulgaria*, p. 85. Dr. Danev was trying to disprove the obligation of Article III, but the admission remains.

² Article III of the Military Convention.

Bulgaria was a difficult one, but at the same time Serbia was entitled to urge that by default, apart from stress of circumstances, her Ally had failed to give her the *quid pro quo* for the Macedonian partition boundary, and was consequently in no position to demand those concessions the return for which she had failed to render.

The next point that calls for consideration is the position of affairs at the time when the first peace negotiations between the Allies and Turkey were broken off. The question of the Adriatic outlet had been settled against Serbia; the whole of Macedonia and Southern Epirus were in the hands of the Allies; the Bulgarians were before Adrianople and Tchatalja. The negotiations had been broken off on the question of Adrianople at the demand of Bulgaria, though in fact the Great Powers had signified that they would themselves see to it that the town should pass into Bulgarian hands. The other Allies had obtained all that they required, and there was no mention in the Treaty, implicit or explicit, of Adrianople or Thrace,¹ both of which by race are predominantly Greco-Turkish, yet they loyally continued the war. The action of Bulgaria appears to be the more self-willed as she now declares that Thrace is of only secondary interest to her and not worth bothering about. If that attitude represents her real opinion, then her action in 1913 becomes almost incredibly foolish. It has been a matter of dispute as to when Serbia first made known her desire for the modification of the Treaty. So far as Russia was concerned she was informed in December 1912, as appears from a dispatch of M. Sazonov to M. Hartwig, Russian Minister at Belgrade, under date December 16, 1912, in which the former states:—

“Dans la conversation qu’il à eue avec notre ambassadeur à Paris, M. Novakovitch lui a dit qu’en cas d’un refus des grandes puissances de lui laisser en propriété

¹ “Now when in the month of May . . . we have got an enviable part of Thrace which we did not hope to get”.—Speech of Dr. Genadiev May 22, 1914, referring to the position the previous year.

souveraine un port de l'Adriatique, la Serbie sera contrainte de demander des compensations en Macédoine, au delà des frontières fixées dans le traité serbo-bulgare".¹

He added that he could give no support. At Paris also M. Danev learnt that Serbia would ask for a rectification of the Macedonian delimitation. The Bulgarians, unable to make sufficient progress in front of Adrianople, asked Serbia for help. It has been suggested² that Serbia did not at this juncture demand an alteration in the Macedonian terms of the Treaty. I am in a position to set that right. Serbia replied that she was sending forward two divisions, 50,000 men, with practically the whole of her siege artillery, but in view of the altered circumstances must demand compensation. This compensation, of course, could only be had in Macedonia. Bulgaria tacitly accepted the aid, but *made no reply to the note*.

The last point for consideration is the situation that immediately preceded the outbreak of war between the former Allies, and the attendant negotiations. Bulgaria claimed practically the whole of Macedonia in virtue of the Treaty with Serbia; Thrace she claimed in virtue of conquest; Kavala by occupation and as a commercial outlet; and finally Salonica, which was not hers by treaty nor nationality nor conquest, because she wanted it. To the last-named port she had early asserted her claims. On December 15, 1912, M. Isvolski reported from Paris to M. Sazonov, *inter alia*:—

"À une question que je lui posais sur les difficultés à prévoir à ce sujet [division of territory] M. Danev répondit que la Bulgarie en aucun cas et à aucun prix n'abandonnera la ville de Salonique et me pria de porter à votre connaissance que c'était une question de vie ou de mort pour la Bulgarie et que le gouvernement bulgare ne pouvait consentir à la soumettre à l'arbitrage".³

¹ *Vide* Russian Orange Book, *Recueil de documents diplomatiques concernant les événements des Balkans*.

² Mr. Frank Fox, *Bulgaria's Attitude*, *Fortnightly Review*, March 1915, p. 488.

³ *Vide* Russian Orange Book, *ut supra*.

Easily recognizable here is the inflexible temperament and *brusquerie* of the minister who—in so far as he was not the agent of others—has to bear so large a responsibility for the misfortunes of his country. Bulgaria had not conquered Salonica, her troops were only there *en droit d'alliés*, and yet before any negotiations have been entered upon she demands the town, while asserting in advance that she will not submit the matter to arbitration. Later on Bulgaria refused a general arbitration on the matters in dispute with Serbia on the ground that the Treaty provided only for specific arbitration on a particular point, but this predetermined refusal of arbitration on a point not covered by any treaty throws doubt on the *bona fides* of her plea in the other case: evidently she preferred to “hack her way through”. Wherever, then, Bulgaria could advance a plea of treaty or nationality or conquest, that particular plea was advanced, and where such pleas were wanting she fell back upon her desires backed by force. When to this general attitude is added the oft-repeated boast that the Bulgars were the Prussians of the Balkans (a boast not without elements of justification), it is no wonder that Serbia and Greece took alarm, and asked themselves whether they were cast for the parts of Bavaria and Württemberg. Evidently they were face to face with the design of a Bulgarian Balkan Empire. The occupation of the whole of Macedonia by Bulgaria coupled with a return to an Austrophil attitude on her part, as indicated by various symptoms, would mean absolute ruin for Serbia.

Serbia was willing to submit the whole Treaty to the arbitration of the Tsar, not the delimitation clause only.¹

* Article II of the Secret Annexe to the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty contains the “delimitation clause” and provides for the arbitrations of the Tsar within the limits contained therein. Article IV, however, is a general arbitration clause providing for the definite submission to Russia of every dispute which might arise concerning the interpretation or execution of any stipulation of the Treaty, the Secret Annexe, or the Military Convention. It would follow that a dispute solely concerned with the delimitation of territory would be decided

Her plea was that the reciprocal obligations should be examined and the degree in which they had been fulfilled. Thus the non-fulfilment of Bulgarian aid in the Adriatic affair would carry with it a reconsideration of the delimitation agreed upon as consideration. Bulgaria, dominated by Austrian counsels, claimed her price though the consideration had not been forthcoming. Two methods of easing the crisis commended themselves to Russia: a partial demobilization and a meeting of the Balkan Premiers. On May 20, 1913, M. Sazonov proposed a reduction of forces to a third or a quarter—a proposition which a little later, on the initiative of Russia, was adopted by the conference of Ambassadors in London, and on May 31 Petrograd was able to announce that the proposal had been accepted. Bulgaria, however, adopted an equivocal attitude, and on June 7 M. Sazonov instructed M. Nekliudov to put the pointed question to Bulgaria:—

“d’où vient maintenant le retard de la Bulgarie à procéder à cette mesure simultanément avec les alliés. Cette proposition nous a été formulée par la Bulgarie, qui, à ce qu’il paraît, évite maintenant de la remplir, ainsi que

by the arbitration provided for by Article II and within the limits of that Article. If, however, the dispute were concerned with the whole question of the applicability of Article II, with its proposed delimitation of territory and the specific arbitration provided in that regard, to the changed circumstances then such dispute would fall under the general Arbitration clause of Article IV being a matter concerning the stipulations of Article II of the Secret Annexe. Russia would thus have to decide first on this latter dispute. It was for the arbitration under Article IV that the Serbs stipulated, the Bulgars for the specific arbitration of Article II. The text of these conventions with a full discussion will be found in “Balkanicus”, *The Aspirations of Bulgaria*. The Bulgarian case is given by Dr. Gešov in *The Balkan Alliance*. The demand of the Serbs was justified by the text of Article IV, for otherwise the subject-matter of Article II (the delimitation and specific arbitration) would have been expressly excluded from the purview of the general arbitration provided for by Article IV. The matter in dispute was the applicability of Article II *in toto* to the changed circumstances, and that would certainly seem to be fit matter for the general arbitration proposed by Article IV.

de prendre part à l'entrevue des quatre présidents du conseil à Salonique”.

The Bulgarians made conditions of a joint occupation of Macedonia, and the proposal fell through, although again directly advanced by Serbia.

The second measure proposed by Russia was a meeting of the Premiers. It is incorrect to represent Russia as stiffening the attitude of Serbia or as lukewarm in the cause of peace. While Count Tisza was championing the right of the Balkan States to engage in internecine war, Russia strove for peace in every way and was ready to approve of anything that would tend towards securing it. In April M. Nekliudov reported the warlike feeling in Sofia, and added that M. Gešov was evidently powerless to control events. On the 22nd of that month the Russian Foreign Minister proposed a meeting of the Balkan Premiers, but was informed from Sofia that the idea found no sympathy there. Throughout Bulgaria was opposed to a round-table conference, since her object was, after obtaining a settlement of the dispute with Serbia, to be left face to face with Greece. Russia, while advocating a general reliance on the Treaty, was in favour of reasonable concessions by Bulgaria as being likely to contribute to the solidity of the alliance. She naturally had no liking for the invidious task of arbitration which M. Sazonov confessed would be *très pénible* for her, and she therefore welcomed the meeting between the Serb and Bulgar Premiers and counselled a meeting with M. Venizelos also. In the event of these meetings proving fruitless, she would welcome the Premiers to Petrograd. Time pressed, and the idea of a general preliminary meeting was abandoned, and Russia asked for a meeting in her capital, which M. Pašić considered more likely to lead to the desired end. Bulgaria again adopted an equivocal attitude: she was willing to accede to the idea if her point of view were adopted previously, to which the Russian Minister replied that if all the matters in dispute were cleared up beforehand there would

obviously be no need for the meeting itself. On June 17, ten days after the Tsar's telegram, he wrote to M. Nekliudov:—

“Nous insistons donc pour obtenir de M. Danef la réponse la plus prompte: désire-t-il, oui ou non, venir à S. Pétersbourg”?

Finally M. Danev caused M. Sazonov to be informed that the Bulgarian condition that the arbitration should be confined to the specific territorial stipulations of the Treaty was his last word. This was on June 25, and early on June 30 the Bulgarian attack was made.

There has been printed¹ a private letter from the Bulgarian Minister to Russia, M. Bobčev to M. Todorov, the Bulgarian Finance Minister, which throws a vivid light on how the situation was regarded by the former. It is dated June 20, and in it occur the following words:—

“... Le refus de notre premier ministre de se rendre ici à la conférence produira le plus terrible, le pire effet. On le prendra comme une offense à l'Empereur lui-même. Que la guerre doive avoir lieu ou non, j'estime que nous ne pouvons pas nous refuser à prendre part à la conférence. ... L'Empereur et la gouvernement sont décidés à l'arbitrage conformément au traité et dans son cadre. ... Que le premier ministre vienne ici et qu'il dise sa pensée; mais qu'il vienne. ... M. Delcassé ... m'a dit, 'Gardez-vous des conseils secrets qu'on vous donne, car ils ne visent que les intérêts de leurs auteurs ...'”.

It was not for want of good advice that Bulgaria fell; she had been warned by Russia of the Turkish and Roumanian dangers, and the result bore out the words of M. Sazonov that it was clear to him that Bulgaria was acting on the suggestion of others who were holding out hopes which would only lead to bitter disillusionment. The poignant words of the Bulgarian Minister passed unheeded.

The nature of the Bulgarian attack is well known, as

¹ M. Yakchitch, *La seconde guerre Balkanique*, *La Revue Politique Internationale*, April 1914. This article gives extracts from the Russian Orange Book for which I am indebted.

also General Savov's truly extraordinary reasons, that it was necessary to raise the *moral* of the troops and make them consider their ex-allies as enemies, to make the allies more conciliatory as a result of the "violent blows" that would be dealt to them, and to put Russian policy in face of the *danger of a commencement of a war!* The Bulgarians subsequently explained that they did not regard the attack as a beginning of war and were apparently astonished that their violent blows had failed in their conciliatory object.¹

Even Serb forbearance was distorted into a confession of weakness by the Bulgarian command, which paid an unconscious tribute to their enemy's desire for peace. General Kovačev, commanding the Fourth Bulgarian Army, in an order, No. 29, dated June 17, said:—

"Our men must be told that the Greek and Serb soldiers, so courageous against defenceless populations, are only cowards whom our approach alone has terrified. . . . By allowing the various échelons of our army, at the moment of concentration, to pass before the front of the Serb troops without acting against them, our enemies have clearly shown their moral state, and the fear they have of measuring themselves against us. If it were otherwise, they would never have allowed our concentration to be effected without hindrance in conditions altogether unknown hitherto in history".

It is useless and harmful talk to hark back to the Treaty of 1912 as a basis of proposals. The Treaty is as dead as Jacob Marley, it belongs to conditions that are past, was entered upon by Serbia for a consideration not received and for motives no longer operative, and has finally been ruptured by Bulgaria's second declaration of war. It is true that as a result of the war she will obtain an Adriatic coast line, but that will not be thanks to Bulgaria, and the

¹ The documentary evidence produced by "Balkanicus" in *The Aspirations of Bulgaria* proves conclusively that the treacherous Bulgarian attack had been deliberately prepared for by both the civil and military administrations.

former concessions can therefore no longer be in question. Before the war we recognized Germany's rights in the Bagdad railway, and were about to negotiate with her on the basis of recognizing further rights of German commercial exploitation in Asia Minor. Does any one suppose, however, that if successful we shall hand over the Bagdad railway to Germany and Asia Minor also for pacific penetration? Why then should we deal otherwise with the interests of our ally? In both cases the war has fundamentally altered the conditions of the problem. The same holds good of the otherwise well-founded claim of Germany to the possession of a colonial empire : we, I imagine, will not return South-West Africa, or German East Africa. If it be argued that the cases are differentiated on the ground that the principle of nationality is involved, and that Serbia in 1912 recognized the Bulgarian character of central Macedonia, that point has been dealt with above.

CHAPTER VII

THE SETTLEMENT WITH BULGARIA

IN the previous chapter the conflicting claims to Macedonia derived from the past history of the province and from its ethnographical characteristics have been examined, and the result was to establish the fact that in the Middle Ages there was no continuous Bulgarian rule over that country, but that it passed to Bulgar, to Greek, or to Serb, according to which of the three States was able at the moment to exercise supremacy in those regions, and that in fact from 1018 onwards the Bulgarians only held Macedonia for a period of fifty years on a liberal estimate, and assuming the Bulgarian character of the rule of the Asen family. It was seen, also, that the racial character of the people is indeterminate so far as central Macedonia is concerned, the inhabitants belonging to a primitive Slav stock without definite national consciousness and capable of being moulded into Serbs or Bulgars as each may be able to subject them to a generation of rule and schooling. The Treaty of 1912 was also considered in its inception, the motives which underlay the territorial distribution contained in it, and the events which led to the second Balkan war. It was observed that there was no implied recognition of the validity of Bulgarian ethnographical claims, but that the delimitation proposed was set forward as consideration for access to the Adriatic by Serbia, was in fact the price which Serbia was prepared to pay in order that she might make use of the opportunity which offered of securing her economic emancipation. It remains now to be considered what

should be the line of policy to be pursued by the Allies in the present situation, in view of all that has passed, and having regard to the actual attitude of the different parties to the Allies and to the objects and aims pursued by them, account being duly taken of the facts established in the previous chapter.

While, then, in view of the events of the last few months, it would seem that no question as to the future of Macedonia can arise, seeing that Serbia has been for nearly two years a loyal ally in arms, and that she has been treacherously attacked by Bulgaria, who has thus become our enemy as well, yet, on the other hand, it is by no means certain that the disastrous course of sacrificing Serbia to Bulgaria has even yet been abandoned. So far our Balkan policy has had Bulgaria as its pivot, and our relations to Greece seem to have been based on the idea that if we could not win over Bulgaria to our side by any means, then we did not want any other Balkan ally—at any rate Greek aid, when proffered, was refused, and an attempt made to get Greece to cede to Bulgaria the Greek region of Kavala. There are still¹ a number of people in our midst who care more for the interests of our Bulgarian enemy than of our Serb ally, who continually urge a course of policy which should aim at buying Bulgarian support at the expense of Serb territory. More frequently such a course is urged on the specious ground of the necessity of securing a Balkan accord and a permanent settlement with which all the Balkan States will be satisfied. Thus Mr. J. L. Garvin, whom I do not include in the category just mentioned, and whose talents, as I happen to know, are highly appreciated in Southern Slav circles, despite things which have wounded them, wrote as follows in the *Observer* of April 2, 1916: "Again, despite all that has happened, and all the iniquities of King Fox's policy in Bulgaria, the fundamental problem remains just what it was in 1912—

¹ March 1917. In spite of Bulgarian engagements against Russian troops, we are still without a pronouncement on the official attitude of the Entente towards the Macedonian problem.

to establish a system by which bearable relations between neighbouring peoples may be restored and racial hate may cease to be the master-passion of the Balkans. In grasp of this fact still lies the key to the creation of a Greater Serbia, which, with an enlarged Roumania, would rank high indeed, next to the leading Powers amongst the kingdoms of the new Europe." This, perhaps, puts the argument at its best, but it requires little consideration to see how weak is the case made out. It cannot be said that the Balkan problem remains what it was in 1912. Since then Bulgaria has twice stabbed her neighbour in the back, Bulgarian troops have overrun Serbia, and the Bulgarian authorities have systematically looted that unhappy country, while graver charges of massacre have been made on good evidence. To say that after all this the problem remains the same is to ignore facts as completely as if it were asserted that the European problem as a whole is the same now as four years ago. The cessation of racial hate is a thing to be desired in the Balkans as elsewhere, but that is not a political problem, but an unrealizable ideal in present circumstances. I have alluded more than once to the strange obsession which regards racial feeling as something different in the Balkans to what it is elsewhere, which imagines that a little persuasion, a little diplomatic treatment, and some unexceptionable homilies will assuage those deep and dark human instincts which we do not imagine for a moment will be allayed easily in western Europe. Possibly it may be due to our own success in establishing good relations between different peoples in our own Empire, but reflection will show, though the topic cannot be pursued here, that the conditions are altogether different, both as to the peoples concerned, the nature of the problem, and the means to be employed. It is difficult to understand in what sense the key to the accomplishment of Southern Slav unity is to be found in unjust concessions to Bulgaria, unless it be meant that the latter are to be made a condition precedent for the former, a project of disloyal coercion that has unfortunately not been without

its upholders in a certain section of our publicists. While regard for the future will avoid imposing upon Bulgaria terms of peace which might seem a vindictive punishment for her past action, on the other hand, as any idea of Serbo-Bulgarian friendliness for many a long year is absolutely Utopian, we cannot impose upon Serbia conditions which have regard to considerations possessing no correspondence to reality.

A question of honour is undoubtedly involved. Part, at any rate, of the prestige which we have enjoyed abroad in the past has been due to recognition of the fact that we have stood loyally by our allies. The honour of an Englishman and of the English nation, the respect paid to an Englishman's word, the feeling that an Englishman can always be relied upon, that he will never desert a friend in distress—these are a priceless heritage from the past. It has been very largely by means of such considerations that we have been able to build up our Empire at a cost so comparatively small; they have stood us in good stead time and again. This honourable prestige is not a thing lightly to be thrown aside or impaired. Already we have gravely compromised our position in the Balkans by action which has appeared to be actuated by other motives. It cannot be denied that the suspicion with which we were regarded in Greece in October 1915 was largely due, not to the action which we were compelled to take upon Greek soil, but to our treatment of Serbia, for the Greeks felt that even alliance with England would not obviate demands opposed to their interests, just as a year's comradeship in arms did not save Serbia from exigences put forward on behalf of a State whose attitude was well known in the Balkans, and apparently to Sir Edward Grey, though not to Lord Crewe.¹ Such considerations reinforced others of

¹ "We did not originally assume that Bulgaria was, or need be, hostile to us in the first instance".—Lord Crewe in the House of Lords, October 14, 1915. "The German and Austrian sympathies of the King of the Bulgarians have always been known, and reports of Bulgarian negotiations with Turkey, under German influence, came from various Balkan sources as early as April".—Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, November 9, 1915.

a more questionable nature in determining the Greek Government to repudiate its treaty obligations to its ally.

The point of honour thus finds contact with considerations of policy. It is necessary that we should declare ourselves in unambiguous terms. On April 28, 1916, when Mr. R. M'Neill asked in the House of Commons for an assurance that Bulgaria should not be permitted to acquire territory at the expense of any people who had fought or might hereafter fight on the side of the Allies, Lord Robert Cecil stated in reply that such a statement made without discussion with our Allies would be contrary to the declaration of September 5, 1914, by which each of the Allies was precluded from making a separate peace and from demanding conditions of peace without the consent of each of the others, and he did not think that at present any such discussion would be opportune. In plain English, he refused to give any assurance that Bulgaria would not be permitted to acquire any Serb territory until we had discussed the matter with our Allies, and he did not think that any such discussion would be opportune. At that date, therefore, we had not yet determined whether not to betray the interests of Serbia and refused to initiate a discussion of the matter with our Allies. Discussion with our Allies should certainly have been not merely inopportune but unnecessary, on the ground that as a matter of course we should stand by our friends. So long as the attitude disclosed in Lord Robert Cecil's answer represents the policy of the British Government it is childish to expect Balkan neutrals to put any confidence in us. All the time, moreover, we fill the world with our contention that Germany is using her Balkan allies as mere pawns in the game and will be ready to sacrifice their interests to her convenience. We are giving great scope to our enemies to point out that their assertion is true that perfidious Albion is always ready to sacrifice those foolish nations who throw in their lot with her; nor, as will be seen, does our attitude inspire either respect or gratitude in Bulgaria. If we give grounds for the belief that even now we are

prepared to sacrifice Serb interests the effect will be more than unfortunate. In brief, the impression produced would be that to be allied with the Entente would not protect national interests even in the case of success, since they might be sacrificed to a rival and hostile Power, while, on the other hand, openly to join the Central Powers would not preclude the gaining of what is desired at the hands of the Entente itself. In short, to join the latter might bring disappointment in either event, while to side with the former would bring realization. The effect might, of course, be obviated if it were announced that this peculiar privilege is reserved to Bulgaria alone, but even such an announcement might induce undesirable reflection. Our aims should be to encourage our friends by unshakable loyalty, to win the confidence of neutrals by our transparent honesty, and to impress our enemies by the strength of our hostility, rather than to encourage our foes, depress our friends, and give pause to neutrals.¹

It remains to consider how far there is any justification for the arguments which are derived from certain alleged tendencies among the Bulgarian people. It is asserted that we must not identify the nation with the policy of King Ferdinand, that a large section of it and of the political leaders are pro-Ententist and have been the objects of coercion, that they are only claiming their co-nationals according to their interpretation (which has been seen in the previous chapter to be in any case without justification), and that the Bulgarians are not imperialistic. These points can be elucidated with the help of the Bulgarians themselves by means of the notices of articles appearing in the Bulgarian Press, interviews granted by Bulgarian politicians, and signed communications, which in various ways have become known in England.

A common assertion is that the Bulgarians are not united in sentiment, and that large sections both of the people and of the politicians are strongly opposed to the course adopted by King Ferdinand, are animated by friendly

¹ These words were written before the entry of Roumania into the war.

feelings towards the Entente, and are only awaiting the first opportunity both to manifest their sentiments openly and to take action upon them. In this connection frequent allusion is made not only to Dr. Danev, the leader of the former Russophil party, but to M. Gešov, who is described as Bulgaria's "moderate" statesman and as being strongly pro-Ententist. Every scrap of news, every despatch from a neutral journalist, giving evidence of bad economic conditions in the country, is hailed as further proof of the correctness of these opinions and as being a sign that the day is fast approaching when Bulgaria will turn in her tracks, while an immediate response to any such movement is demanded by those who have always held by the Bulgarian legend. Conditions, we are told, are fast becoming unbearable, the Bulgarian army and people are deeply dissatisfied, and the end is not far off. That the economic conditions in Bulgaria have approximated to those of their allies is probably true enough, but that the natural dissatisfaction arising therefrom is a proof of change of purpose is pure hypothesis. Economic conditions in Serbia were long bad, but there was no consequent instability of purpose, and it would be foolish to expect anything different from the Bulgars. That Prussian arrogance is distasteful is also likely enough, but the Bulgarian official classes must have made their people so well acquainted with that particular quality that it is unlikely to produce any real revulsion of feeling, and after all it is only in a comparatively few places that it can be in evidence from the nature of things. There is not the slightest proof of any division of feeling among the Bulgarians; on the contrary, all the evidence points the other way. The Bulgarian papers are full of abuse not only of Russia and the Russian Emperor but of the other two Powers of the Triple Entente as well, and they are equally insistent on the unanimity of Bulgarian feeling.

On January 15, 1916, the Sofia *Dnevnik* gave some messages for the Orthodox New Year from prominent Bulgarian statesmen. Dr. Gešov, the "moderate," the

pro-Ententist, said that they were greeting the New Year with a *Te Deum* to the war and with praises to the Alliance. Dr. Danev, it is true, speaks of striving in ways commensurate with Bulgarian dignity and vital interests to facilitate the conclusion of peace. Dr. Genadiev, who has lately, according to report, been arrested, pleads for one effort more. At a later date Dr. Gešov, in an interview with the German *Vossische Zeitung*, stated that in Bulgarian home politics there was no opposition. Before the war his party had believed in Russia's strength. but as the opinion of Dr. Radoslavov had proved correct Bulgarian politicians could not do otherwise than acquiesce in the present state of affairs. Before the entry of Bulgaria into the war he had declined office not because he was in favour of joining the Entente Powers, but because he wanted a coalition government in order to preserve neutrality. On January 18 the *Mir*, which is M. Gešov's organ, remarked that the English and French still believed that the Balkan peoples were ready to go knife in hand against their rulers. They had been expecting a revolution in Bulgaria in the event of mobilization. Events had proved the fallacy of their opinion, and now they were believing the same thing of the Greeks. The Socialist leader, M. Sakazov, at the New Year remarked that Bulgaria's destiny was inseparably bound up with the destiny of the Central Powers. According to the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of January 3 the Democrat M. Liapčev said that no one would hinder the government, and that what had been undertaken must be successfully finished. The *Dnevnik*, on January 24, alluded to the report which had appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* of dissatisfaction with King Ferdinand, and in the *Daily News* of friction between the Bulgarians and the Austro-Germans, and repudiated their accuracy, its own explanation of their appearance being the alleged dissatisfaction in England over the introduction of compulsory service, an explanation which perhaps serves to point out the need of caution in accepting news of similar character from abroad; probably all

the belligerents are apt to lay too much stress on reports of bad internal conditions in enemy countries. M. Malinov, who, as well as M. Genadiev, is said to have been arrested, in the debate in the Sobranje on February 28 on the speech from the throne is reported in a Sofia message to the *Berliner Tageblatt* to have delivered a speech which was distinctly hostile in its general tenor to the government, but in which he, nevertheless, alluded to the omission in the royal speech of any allusion to Russia, saying that in his opinion Russia in the bombardment of Varna had acted no less disgracefully than England and France in Salonica. It is needless to add that the members of the Bulgarian ministry and the government organs have been equally emphatic in their assertion of Bulgarian unanimity.

The statement frequently made that the Bulgarians are after all merely seeking the satisfaction of legitimate national claims, besides being negatived by the rejection of the offers made by the Entente, which included a large area of territory which the Serbs have always claimed as part of the national heritage, as has been seen above, and to which any claim of definite Bulgarian nationality is not borne out by independent testimony, is further shown to be baseless by the extravagant claims on the score of nationality now put forward by the Bulgarians. Thus on December 27 the *Mir*, the organ of the moderate Dr. Gešov, remarked that the Bulgarians had not joined in the war to conquer foreign territories but to unite their sons of one blood and one faith. At *Zaječar* and *Pirot*, at *Niš* and *Leskovac*, at Skoplje, Kumanovo, Veles, Prilip, Monastir, Ochrida, Debar, and Kičevo beat the Bulgarian heart and lived the sons of the Bulgarian people. It is no longer then a question of a Bulgarian Macedonia, but apparently of a Bulgarian Serbia as well! It is not surprising therefore to find the *Narodni Prava*, Dr. Radoslavov's organ, taking up the same line of thought in an article published on February 4, and dealing with a debate in the Sobranje on the government bill establishing

Bulgarian schools in the occupied territories. Some members, to their honour, had spoken in deprecation of a policy of denationalization. The paper remarked that even if Bulgaria were anxious to denationalize anybody it had no scope for such a propensity. Whom was the State to denationalize in Macedonia or the *Morava Valley*? The Bulgars perhaps? If any Serbs were living in Piroć, Vranja, or Zaječar they would not be denationalized by Bulgaria, but only so far as by living in the midst of a compact Bulgarian population they would forget their Serbomania. On the two following days the same paper published letters from a "soldier-schoolmaster", a certain Dr. D., alluding to the manner in which the inhabitants of Niš quickly pick up their old mother-tongue [the two languages are mutually intelligible and a large part of the vocabulary is practically identical], and advocating the establishment of schools as the best agency for the propagation of the Bulgarian tongue among a population which still believed in the return of the Serb government. When, however, a train was fired on near Sveta Petka, to the north-west of Niš, the paper quickly discovered the presence of Serbs, and alluded to the incident on January 22 as a manifestation of the impotent malevolence of Serb chauvinism *in extremis*, and it advocated severe measures against the Serb population—which on other occasions does not exist, being replaced by a people with a Bulgarian heart. It demanded less tolerance and more severity! Decidedly the Bulgarian appetite grows with satisfaction when all eastern Serbia, including the *Morava Valley*, is claimed as a genuine Bulgarian land. The claim is of interest, however, for other reasons to be alluded to below.

In curious contradiction to some of these claims is an article by Dr. Boris Vazov, a member of Dr. Gešov's party, in the *Mir* of January 16, in which he paid a tribute to the work of the Serb government and scientific and literary societies in the publication of excellent periodicals and of a scientific popular library. The Bulgarians had neglected their language. In Bulgaria not a single serious literary

publication could last, there was not a Bulgarian grammar [presumably a scientific grammar of the language], nor an adequate dictionary. All this implies a contradiction of the extreme national claims of his countrymen. In spite of all, therefore, a policy of Bulgarization is needed, and Dr. Vazov calls for it. He avowed frankly that the struggle was one between the two languages, and victory for Bulgaria would only be complete when Bulgarian should predominate in the Balkans. In the occupied territories he said that soldiers and officials were struggling to speak Serb with the population [the sons of the Bulgarian people with the Bulgarian heart], which was a great mistake. In the same style on January 26, Dr. Gešov's paper, the *Mir*, said in a leading article that the school was the only means of uniting the population of the new territory to that of the old, and the Ministry of Instruction was deserving of praise for its bill for the establishment of schools in the conquered territory.

All this sheds a valuable light on Bulgarian claims in Macedonia. We find the Bulgars, in the first place, not less insistent in claiming all eastern Serbia as a true Bulgarian land than they have been in the past in making a similar claim to the former province, a claim which by ceaseless repetition had come largely to be accepted abroad. The worthlessness of the claim in the one case, to say the least casts doubts upon its value in the other quite apart from other considerations, and it ought now to be clear to every one that a Bulgarian claim is not to be regarded as justified merely because Bulgarian chauvinists repeat it *ad nauseam*. It has been remarked above that originally the population of the Niš district of Serbia and of the Sofia district in Bulgaria was of the same indeterminate character as the present population of Macedonia, though now the political boundary has become a genuinely national one. In the pretensions which the Bulgarians are now putting forward we have an undesigned corroboration of the truth of this. It may be agreed that it has been Serb rule and Serb schools which have made the

Niš-Pirot region definitely Serb, but the Bulgarians forget that it has been equally Bulgarian rule and Bulgarian schools which have determined the final character of the Sofia basin. The corollary of the renewal of the Bulgarian claim to Niš would be a revived Serb claim to Sofia and the one is no more absurd and unwarranted than the other. Here at any rate, and this is the second point which emerges from this riotous chauvinism, we have an acknowledgment that the schools have influenced, and definitely crystallized, the national consciousness of the population, though it may well be doubted whether, once definitely roused and formulated, that consciousness could ever be induced to flow into another channel. If the Bulgarians grudgingly acknowledge that the Serb schools have had this influence on a population which they seek to claim as Bulgar (without any justification whatever, for it was never Bulgar but only amorphous), and if they even go so far as to imagine that it could be Bulgarized by the establishment of Bulgarian schools, what then becomes of the contention that the population of central Macedonia, which practically every impartial authority regards as being of an intermediate type, is so definitely Bulgarian that it should be assigned to Bulgaria and that it is incapable of being permanently acted upon by Serb influences? If the Bulgarian contentions be taken at their face value, if they really believe, as they affect to believe, that Niš can be Bulgarized, as according to them it has been previously Serbized, then *a fortiori* central Macedonia even if, as they also assert, of Bulgarian character is capable of yielding to Serb assimilation. In short, Bulgarian chauvinists in their frenzied eagerness to claim everything for their country have, *accepting their own position*, knocked the bottom out of Bulgaria's Macedonian claims. The real truth is that whatever may have been the case in the past, Niš is now finally Serb as Sofia is finally Bulgarian, and that the central Macedonians are of an intermediate type which a generation of Serb rule will make as permanently Serb as a generation of Bulgarian rule would make them Bul-

garian. Finally, we have in the above manifestations of Bulgarian policy abundant evidence of a definite desire and plan to attempt the forcible Bulgarization of a large part of Serbia, which forms an illuminating commentary on the assertion that the Bulgarians value the principle of nationality and are themselves struggling for it. They stand self-confessed as striving for their own racial predominance at the expense of an ancient nationality with a history greater than their own and much more fertile in cultural advancement.

Not only do the Bulgarians desire to Bulgarize part of Serbia, but they seek the final and entire destruction of that State. The *Berliner Tageblatt* of January 30 gives an interview which its Sofia correspondent had had with Dr. Radoslavov, in the course of which he said that Serbia had played out its rôle for ever and that Austria-Hungary would of course retain what it needed in order to obviate the dangers by which she had been threatened. In the same way on January 7 the *Vossische Zeitung* reprinted part of a conversation between Dr. Momčilov, the Vice-President of the Sobranje, and the representative of the Hungarian paper *Az-Est*, in which the former remarked: "Ceterum censeo Serbiam esse delendam". The Bulgarians who have filled the world with their clamour for the accomplishment of their national unity, as they interpret it, are determined so far as they can to prevent the consummation of the unity of the Southern Slavs, and in striving against it they cynically admit their jealousy and anger at the idea that there should be a Balkan State larger, more populous, and more powerful than Bulgaria. In the *Westminster Gazette* of November 17, 1915, will be found a lengthy extract from an interview granted to a German paper by M. Rizov, the Bulgarian Minister in Berlin, in which he asserts that a governing motive for the Bulgarians was to prevent Serbo-Croat unity, since if the Southern Slavs were united they would be more powerful than the Bulgarians. It is thus not national rights that the latter desire but their own pre-

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dominance,¹ and as they are not numerous enough to achieve that predominance if others are given the liberty of full development, they must be thwarted, divided, left weak, and have their territory partitioned in order that Bulgaria may realize her ambition of being the mistress of the Balkans; it is the Prussian spirit exactly reproduced in this people which its admirers are always telling us is a peaceful, non-imperialist, peasant democracy. The idea has been expressed with characteristic coarseness and brutality by the *Narodni Prava*, the government organ, on October 17, 1915, within a week of the declaration of war. In the course of an article on Bulgarian aims it underlined a passage in which it was asserted that the Serbs had taken the lives of the Austrian heir and heiress in order to realize their impracticable chauvinist designs. The foolish Serb government, said the article, expected to unite to Serbia fifteen millions of Slavs, and the Bulgarians did not admit the idea that Serbia should be united to those Serbs, therefore the Southern Slav slaves must be joined by the Serbs from the free kingdom of Serbia in the Austro-Hungarian cage. On May 19, 1916, the same paper published a leading article under the title "Generosity at the Conclusion of Peace", in which it says:—

"Very soon the Bulgarian diplomats will have to speak at the general peace conference, which will bring about the liquidation of the present war. They will have to demonstrate and theoretically prove the Bulgarian claims which have already been fully established by the force of our arms. The question of Serbia's future and our relations with the neighbouring States, etc., will all have to be discussed and definitely formulated. In these matters, especially in regarded to the question of the future of our real enemy—

¹ Bulgarian publicists have never made any secret of the fact that the aim of Bulgaria is to establish a Bulgarian hegemony in the Balkans. The other main motive avowed during the last two years is opposition to the establishment of Russia in Constantinople. The two motives are of course correlative.

Serbia—our diplomats will have to be circumspect, and most important of all they will have to be strictly inexorable. In this question our diplomats will have to lay aside all sentiment, all humane consideration and feeling. The continued existence of Serbia, no matter in what form, means the subversion of all peace in the Balkans, constant quarrels, and conflicts between Bulgaria and other nations, and a permanent obstacle to the prosperity and peaceful development of Europe. That State, which since the beginning of its independent existence has been a breeding-place of dissension and strife, must be wiped from off the face of the earth, in order to establish an understanding for peaceable cultural work in other nations of Europe and the Balkans. This is neither malice nor barbarity on our part. It is one of the main necessities for the future of humanity, and principally for ourselves and our neighbours. To this question it is most suitable to apply the words of the German political genius, Bismarck, spoken by him on the night from the 1st to the 2nd of September, when the conditions for the surrender at Sedan and the rounding-up of the French army there were being discussed. Only the brutality of the Iron Chancellor in face of the entreaties of the French secured peace and prosperity to Germany for forty-three years. The relations between Germany and her western neighbour are similar to those between Bulgaria and Serbia. That is why it is the bounden duty of our diplomats to take to heart Bismarck's motto: 'No generosity at the conclusion of peace'. This is the people for whom there are still to be found intriguers in our midst, a people which has never as a nation evinced gratitude for the benefits it has received, and is now actuated by a deadly malice against its neighbour.

It is no wonder that the campaign has been waged by the Bulgarians with such ferocity, if such be the ideas by which they are animated. We find here an explanation of the systematic looting of the Serb libraries, of the carrying off to Bulgaria all the movable property

which is desired by the government for utilization in its own country, of the theft of agricultural machinery supplied to the Serb peasantry in the manner described in a previous chapter, of, worse than all, the massacres, of which there can be little doubt that they have been guilty. I well remember how in October 1915 a young Serb diplomatist, in conversation with me, with difficulty restrained his emotion as he said, "What we fear is that the Bulgarians will exterminate the population in the districts they enter". On the evidence of German witnesses, officers, pastors, and women, backed by documents and photographs, Professor Schiemann had branded Bulgaria's methods of war in 1912-13 as "a disgrace to humanity", and it is hardly likely with Germany's example before them, and against the Serbs, that the methods of the Bulgarians have become more humane even though they might now obtain a more lenient judgment from the Germans.

The Bulgarians do not evince that gratitude towards those in England who have upheld their cause which might have been expected. Sir Edward Grey's efforts on their behalf, and the manner in which during 1915 our Foreign Office subordinated the interests of Serbia to the exigences of Bulgaria and her demand for blackmail, should have earned for him at any rate a measure of appreciation. Those, however, who sacrifice their friends to their enemies while they shake the confidence of the former rarely earn the gratitude, still less the respect, of the latter, who are apt to despise those whom they dupe and of whom they make use. On December 5, 1915, for example, the *Narodni Prava* published a derisive article, "The bargainings of the bankrupts," directed against the British Premier and Foreign Secretary. England is represented as partitioning the territories of others in order to bring in the neutrals, as increasing her offers when they prove unsuccessful, and when even the increased offers prove to be of no avail, as reducing them to a minimum again. It can hardly be denied that there is a certain painful accuracy

in this summing up of one aspect of our Balkan policy, and it is exemplified in our dealings with Bulgaria and Greece. The article deals with special severity with the famous promise of aid given, as all the world believed at the time, to Serbia, but afterwards explained away as a promise to Greece if she fulfilled her treaty, and with the Foreign Secretary's explanation that his words "without reserve and without qualification" were a "political" promise, and meant merely that Serbia and Greece would not be required to yield territory to Bulgaria—if the latter attacked them! The *Narodni Prava* represents the Ministers as losing their heads, as making declarations only to deny them, of declaring to-day that they will help Serbia and to-morrow hastening to explain that it was only a "political" promise; they have become, it says,

'The pertinent passages are as follows: "Not only is there no hostility in this country to Bulgaria, but there is traditionally a warm feeling of sympathy for the Bulgarian people. . . . If, on the other hand, the Bulgarian mobilization were to result in Bulgaria assuming an aggressive attitude on the side of our enemies we are prepared to give our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies without reserve and without qualification".—Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, September 28, 1915. This promise seemed as explicit and categorical as it well could be, but it was subsequently evacuated of all intelligible meaning. "On September 24, when I first informed the Serbian government, in answer to an appeal for help, of the despatch of troops, I did so in the words that 'we were offering to Greece to send forces to Salonica to help her to fulfil her obligations towards Serbia', I said nothing as to what we could, or could not, do in the contingency of Greece refusing to help Serbia. . . . As regards the last part of the question, I do not understand how the words 'without qualification and without reserve' could have any other construction than the political one I have placed on them, viz. that promises and concessions previously suggested to Bulgaria were at an end, and that our troops would be used solely to help our friends and fight our and their enemies".—Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, November 9, 1915, in answer to Mr. Ronald M'Neill. It surely hardly needed a formal undertaking for people to understand that our troops would only help our friends and fight our enemies! Even so the British ministry endeavoured to get out of its undertaking, and the troops at first were forbidden to cross the Serb frontier.

a mock with their theories on political and non-political promises. From Bulgaria that is indeed black ingratitude, however appropriate such words might seem in the mouth of an Englishman, not to say a Serb. It is, after all, only another exemplification of the old truth that to stand firm by your friends is the only way by which to gain the respect even of enemies.

That Bulgaria in certain eventualities would be willing to cut her losses by abandoning her present allies is highly probable. Her past policy shows that she would not be deterred by any scruples of honour or plain dealing, and it is fairly evident that the possibility of another act of betrayal has by no means been lost sight of by her rulers. Just as the Hungarians have endeavoured to make use of the English Press,¹ so from Bulgaria there has been in the past the pretence of an existence of a pro-Entente party, so that if ever a change become advisable the plea might be put forward that the Bulgarian nation was not behind King Ferdinand's betrayal of the Slav cause and should not be punished for his mistakes. As has been seen above, that is no more than a pretence in view of the expressed opinions of the so-called pro-Entente leaders. It is very noteworthy that in the discussions which were alleged to have taken place between the Bulgarian and German authorities the former were stated to have pointed out that they have gained their end in the war, and that if further efforts were required further rewards must be promised. What is the assumption underlying this

¹ Letters from Hungary, if genuine, pass the Hungarian censor in spite of the fact that they are full of diatribes against Count Tisza. *Cui bono?* To whose advantage was it that the combined attack upon Serbia was described as bluff up to the last moment? To whose advantage that the old fallacy of regarding all "Hungarians" as Magyars should still be maintained? To whose advantage that it should be set forth week by week that the heart of the Magyars is not in the war? It has been the frenzied chauvinism of the Magyars and their gross misgovernment that has been largely responsible for years for some of the most sinister aspects of the Near Eastern problem. The only reasonable explanation is that the Hungarian government wishes not to be without sympathizers in the Entente camp.

attitude? *Primâ facie* it would seem that Bulgaria's Macedonian ends cannot be considered as attained until the final victory of the Central Powers, and that Bulgaria must go on on pain of losing what she has so far won. The underlying assumption is obviously this, that it is open to Bulgaria at any time to make her peace with the Entente on terms that she should be allowed to retain Macedonia, for only on that assumption could Bulgaria maintain that her ends have been secured and that fresh efforts cannot be required of her. This idea has been fostered in England by those who always stand by Bulgaria. In certain sections of our Press it was frequently pointed out last winter that Bulgaria had won what she was fighting for, and would probably be henceforth lukewarm in the Germanic cause. Again, the assumption is a bargain by which Bulgaria should be allowed to keep at any rate her Macedonian conquests, a bargain which would be dishonouring in the last degree to any statesman of the Entente who should entertain the idea of entering into it—more dishonouring to him than to the Bulgarian statesman who after betraying one side (by dishonest negotiation) should afterwards betray the other. It is inconceivable after all that has happened—or it should be inconceivable—that such a bargain should be struck. Encouragement was unfortunately given to such ideas in the mind of the Bulgarians by a passage in the interview accorded by M. Sazanov to M. Naudeau, the special correspondent of the *Paris Journal*, which was telegraphed to England on October 5, 1915: “That people, the Bulgarian people, Russia created it and cared for it in its trouble. Further, however great may be its errors, maternal Russia will never cast off its child; she will always be ready to open her arms to it.” These words were a direct encouragement to the Bulgarians to hold fast by the idea that whatever they may do, however grievously they may sin against their benefactors, however great their treachery, they have only in the event of the failure of their plans to cry *peccavimus* to be received again into the arms of Russia and to escape

the consequences of their deeds, or even to receive as a reward for their penitence what they had sought by their wrong-doing. It is fairly certain that they are reckoning on the sentimentality of the Allies. There is a story, the authenticity of which is guaranteed by those from whom it emanates, that a Sofia solicitor, one Ivan Dimitrov, had been staying for some time till the early part of last year in Geneva, and represented himself as an ex-secretary in the Sofia Ministry of the Interior and a personal friend of King Ferdinand. A Belgrade merchant, also staying in Geneva, reproached him for the fact that Bulgaria had attacked Serbia at the moment when Serbia had yielded to her demands. After saying that Bulgaria was bound to join the Central Powers in order to prevent Russia coming to the Dardanelles and to prevent Serbia from becoming larger, which two things the Bulgars must imperatively hinder, he replied to a question as to what the Bulgars would do in the event of the Allies winning the war, "We will cut off the heads of Ferdinand and Radoslavov, and afterwards we will go to Petrograd, and fall on our knees in front of the Tsar asking his mercy. Russia will be moved with compassion, and nothing will happen to us".¹ Without demanding that anything special should "happen to" the Bulgars, at the very least we should see to it that they should not be allowed to retain their spoils of war.²

We have to remember what would be the position of Serbia if the statement made by the Allies just previous to

¹ The new Russian Foreign Minister, M. Miljukov, was at one time a professor in Sofia, and is a very strong Bulgarophil. His expression of Bulgarophil feelings in the French Press during his visit to France and Switzerland last autumn gave rise to some feeling in Southern Slav circles.—*Vide La Serbie*, September 17, 1916. It is to be hoped that this obsession will find no place in his official policy: we have suffered more than sufficient losses owing to our persistent Bulgarophilism.

² The manner in which the Bulgars have fought against the Russians ought surely to have destroyed the last illusions on the subject of this people, which demonstratively denies its Slav character, and claims, with justice, to be of Turanian stock and congeners of the Turks and Magyars.

the Bulgarian attack that the offers previously made to Bulgaria had lapsed were to be treated as a scrap of paper and if those offers were to be renewed. The result of the Dalmatian agreement is that Salonica remains for Serbia of practically undiminished importance as giving her a commercial backdoor free of Italian domination, a point the importance of which has been brought out by the analysis given above of the effect of that agreement upon Serbia's future maritime position. The line of the Vardar, which connects her with Salonica, will assume an even greater importance if certain canalization schemes mature. English engineers are already studying the project of making the Vardar and Morava rivers navigable and connecting them by a canal through the relatively easy waterparting which divides their head-streams. Such a canal system would unite Salonica by water-carriage with the Danube and the central European canals connected with it. The great importance of such a project is obvious. If central Macedonia be given to Bulgaria, then the latter will march with the frontier of Albania, which is apparently destined to become an Italian protectorate, and in any case will be in close contact with the district of Valona. As has been seen, on the Adriatic a small stretch of coast from Dubrovnik downwards will be in Serb possession, but above that the coast will be commanded by the Italian islands till at Trogir commences Italian Dalmatia. Northward, again, the Croatian coasts will be commanded by the Italian islands in the Quarnero, which link Italian Dalmatia to Istria. It is obvious, therefore, that Serbia would be entirely cut off from Greece, and could be held tight in an Italo-Bulgarian vice which would render her independence precarious unless she relied upon some stronger Power. The Powers of the Triple Entente would be even more badly circumstanced from the point of view of rendering aid than they are at present, for the lines from Salonica to Skoplje and to Monastir would pass through Bulgarian territory; in fact, they could render no direct assistance of any description. North of the Drave, again, would be

Hungary, which for some time, at any rate, would be sore at the losses sustained in an unfavourable issue of the war, and only by two narrow necks of land, north-eastward through Roumania and north-westward through German Austria, could Serbia communicate with the rest of Europe. It would, in fact, be difficult to devise any means more calculated to throw Serbia into the arms of Germany, as the only Power which could render direct assistance to her if assailed by a hostile coalition, than the surrender of central Macedonia to Bulgaria, apart altogether from the sentimental and psychological reaction of such a loss. The position of the Southern Slavs will in any case be difficult, as they will be almost surrounded by States which have either lost territory as the result of Southern Slav unification, or are jealous at the prospect of the rise of an important Yugoslav State, and if they are to be altogether cut off from the outside world save through Roumania and Germany, the effect may be such as largely to nullify some of the gains to Europe of a successful result of the war. It is not a mere question of pique or of cutting off the nose to spite the face, but a question of the political results which may follow from the hard facts of political geography. To go to war in order, *inter alia*, that the Germanic Powers should not completely absorb the Southern Slavs, and to impose terms of peace which might force the latter into the arms of Germany, would indeed be an act of supreme folly.

At the moment of writing it is of immediate importance that an unequivocal assurance should be given to the Serbs. Is it really seriously proposed that the Serbs should be asked in conjunction with the Allies to conquer Macedonia, already twice acquired by them at the cost of great bloodshed, only in order that when conquered again it should be handed over to Bulgaria? Doubtless these questions have been asked at the recent conferences by the statesmen of Serbia, who would hardly receive with equanimity any suggestion that they should act as a catspaw to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Bulgaria.

The various phases of the problem of Macedonia and the settlement with Bulgaria have now been passed in review, and the conclusions to be drawn from this study are obvious enough. There is no evidence that the Bulgarians are not in substantial accord on the policy that has been pursued by their government; it has been seen that the so-called pro-Ententist M. Gešov has himself proclaimed this accord and acclaimed the alliance with the Central Powers. So far are the Bulgarians from fighting merely for the claims of nationality that we find them extending these claims to a large area of the old territory of the modern kingdom of Serbia, and again it has been seen that M. Gešov endorses these claims. We find that the Bulgars are pursuing a policy of aggressive imperialism, and are entering upon a campaign of forcible Bulgarization directed against undubitable Serbs. We find the open avowal that they will not permit the union of the Southern Slavs if they can help it, that they are aiming at the complete and permanent destruction of Serbia, that they assert the necessity of Bulgarian predominance in the Balkans, and that it is in fact for the hegemony of the peninsula for which they are struggling. No plea can, therefore, be made out for a special treatment of Bulgaria on any of the grounds which have been brought forward by their special friends in this country, or for sharply differentiating their case from that of our other enemies.

On every ground alike of honour and policy we are bound to stand by Serbia, our Balkan ally. Though the Balkan crisis was the occasion and not the cause of the war, yet the advance of the Germanic Powers in the Balkans was one of the prime gains which those Powers sought to harvest as the result of the war. Indeed, supposing it to be conceivable that a peace should be patched up by which the Central Empires should be forced to relinquish their gains in the east and west, and to retain their present position in the Near East, their statesmen would probably consider that the war had been well worth while. The

cause of Serbia, therefore, forms an integral part of the general cause of the Allies, and interest no less than military and political honour demands that that cause should enjoy our full support. No State, not even Belgium, has suffered more in the general struggle, and it is known now, though not at the commencement of hostilities, that the aggression upon Serbia was as deliberate and unprovoked as the attack upon Belgium: this has been determined definitely apart from all arguments drawn from political study by the revelation of Signor Giolitti. That war has been loyally waged by Serbia, which has refused to accept a separate peace even at the time when she was being left to face alone the great attack which was to break down her resistance in the field. It cannot candidly be said that she has during the war received that support and recognition, or even at times sympathy, which as a faithful ally she had a right to expect, apart from the fact that her cause, as will be seen later, is in every sense the cause of England as of France and Russia. It is now coming to be recognized, though even yet only slowly, that a well-nigh fatal mistake was made when she was left to face the double attack alone.

It was the Serb army which was acting as a flank guard to our Gallipoli enterprise, and which was, in effect, shielding Egypt. This became apparent when that army was forced to yield its ground and to evacuate its territory; the Gallipoli expedition had to be withdrawn, the Turks in Mesopotamia, with renewed supplies, were able to make head against our army,¹ and Egypt was so far in a position to be threatened that large forces were concentrated there for its defence—in short, the whole aspect of the eastern campaign was altered. The debt which we owe the Serbs and our own interests cannot allow us now to play them false and to make a corrupt bargain with their

¹ The fall of Kut was a logical result of the fall of Belgrade and Niš, for without German supplies and German officers it is doubtful how far the Turks could successfully have withstood the advance of the relieving force.

implacable enemies at their expense. I cannot imagine that, in any other circumstances, or with any other protagonists, any such course would be advocated for a moment, but some malign influence seems for years to have manifested itself in our Balkan policy, probably the influences of ignorance, in part, and the sheer indifference to which a British diplomatist alluded some years ago when he said that "England does not care a damn about the Balkans." Added to this has been the curious infatuation which has caused the greater part of our Press and of our publicists to regard Bulgaria as the only Balkan State whose wishes were ever to be considered. It is time to be done with such ignorance and folly. Any sacrifice of Serbia's interests to Bulgarian perfidy now would finally seal our Balkan policy as untrustworthy to those who fight with us, and as plainly lacking in the old British staunchness and sense of honourable obligation. The effect of such a betrayal upon Roumania might be disastrous.

There is no need to be vindictive in the terms of peace to be imposed upon Bulgaria, not because she has done anything to deserve leniency of treatment, but in the future interests of the Balkans. One thing is certain, that Ferdinand should have to go as the condition precedent to the granting of any terms of accommodation. Throughout his long reign he has lived in an atmosphere of deceit, low cunning, and chicanery, and he has exaggerated rather than modified favourably precisely those servile vices to which his recently emancipated politicians were already too prone. He has tricked and duped all with whom he has had any dealings, and his retention of power would in itself constitute an absolutely unconditional condemnation of the schemes to which reference has been made. There can be no question of any concessions to Bulgaria, in any event in central Macedonia, for the reasons already given. Nor, indeed, if Bulgaria is to be treated like any other enemy can there be any question of territorial gains at all at the expense of Serbia. It cannot be too often repeated that

neither before 1912 did Serbia recognize the justice of Bulgaria's Macedonian claims, nor did the delimitation clauses of the 1912 Treaty constitute any such recognition, nor still less did the concessions acquiesced in by Serbia on September 1, 1915, which latter were nothing more than blackmail extorted from her by the military necessities of the moment and the importunity of her allies. Neither in honour nor in policy can there be any reopening of negotiations with Bulgaria. Such negotiations have already cost us dear. It is true that Greece was bound by the terms of her treaty with Serbia to come to the aid of the latter, but it must not be forgotten that, when from the necessities of Serbia her allies wrung such great concessions for her enemy, we at the same time destroyed the *raison d'être* of the treaty from the point of view of Greece. The treaty was designed to prevent such an aggrandizement of Bulgaria as might lead to the establishment of a Bulgarian hegemony, and to secure a common Serbo-Greek frontier—objects which were frustrated largely or completely by the concessions in question. The concessions, it is true, were withdrawn, but it is not altogether surprising if the Greeks were unable to keep pace with those sudden and pitiably undignified reversals of policy so trenchantly satirized by the Bulgarian official organ already quoted.¹ What would be the effect produced if that withdrawal were itself withdrawn? What little credit for statesmanship, for stability of purpose, for understanding of the Balkan position which still remains to us would be entirely lost, and we should be left with a reputation for naked perfidy. As Bulgaria has elected to throw in her lot with the Central Empires, she must abide the result. As for any genuine movement of Bulgarian opinion in a direction hostile to King Ferdinand and favourable to the Allies, it has already been seen that there is no ground whatever for such an assumption. That when an advance is made by

¹ It is true that the later policy of Greece has been moulded by the personal will of the King, but it is undeniable that the position of M. Venizelos was badly shaken by the course of the Allied diplomacy.

the Allies, and the plotters of Sofia see that the game is up, there will be the pretence of such a movement is more than likely, as also that it will meet with a response in certain quarters of England; but if we would be true to ourselves and to our friends, such a feigned repentance should not modify the Macedonian settlement.

When Bulgaria declared war one or two writers, not hitherto conspicuous for their support of Serbia's cause, in the first flush of anger, characterized by a passage from one extreme to the other, spoke wildly of a possible disappearance of Bulgaria, and one of them concluded a paragraph with the words "*finis Bulgariae*". There can be no end of a nation short of extermination; and while the Bulgarians have no claim on our regard, it would be foolish and detrimental to the interests of all concerned to partition the territory of Old Bulgaria,¹ it would be a mere copying of the action which has brought Bulgaria into disrepute. That Ferdinand should be dethroned and that Bulgaria should be confined roughly to the limits of the Treaty of Bucharest, together with the loss of all hopes of Balkan hegemony will be punishment sufficient. Placed under the rule of a Slav prince with a thorough purge of those political elements which have dragged her down there is still a chance that Bulgaria may settle down to a peaceful and orderly development undisturbed by the mirage of a Balkan empire. She would still retain all the lands (excepting indeed the southern Dobrudža) which are indubitably Bulgarian, and would therefore lack the incentive to an adventurous policy which would be furnished by the grievance of a partition of the genuinely national territory; and while, as I have said, the idea of an approximate Serbo-Bulgarian friendship is Utopian, and any policy based upon such an idea foolish, yet no

¹ Minor rectifications apart. In Macedonia the Serbs should be given Strumica as a safeguard for the Salonica railway, which at this point the present frontier closely approaches. The Bulgars in December 1914 utilized this salient to cut the railway at a critical juncture when Serbia was short of munitions.

unnecessary hindrance should be placed in the way of an eventual *rapprochement* between the two States. We stand pledged, moreover, to the principle of nationality, and our sincerity should be proved in the case of Bulgaria, perfidious enemy though she has been.

Upon a review, then, of all the factors in the problem, the past history of Macedonia, its ethnographic characteristics, the Treaty of 1912, Bulgaria's two attacks upon Serbia, our obligations in honour to a sorely tried ally, the fact that Bulgaria is fighting for predominance and the complete extinction of her hated rival, the unanimity in this course which characterizes Bulgarian statesmen and the Sobranje, and their support of King Ferdinand, such should be the nature of the settlement with Bulgaria—restriction to the boundaries of the Treaty of Bucharest. We must have an end of the pro-Bulgar sentimentalism which, exhibited in the greater part of the Press and by almost all our publicists, has tended to obscure counsel, and to dismay our friends and allies by a display of weakness without excuse; we must have done with the folly which to all that has gone before would add this last, that Serbia should even now be sacrificed and Bulgaria should gain by her stab in the back what she sought. We have one good and loyal friend in the Balkans, and that is the Serb people, and it is the Serbs and their interests which must form the pivot of our Balkan policy.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE

I

It cannot be said that the proposals set forth in the foregoing chapters are conceived in a spirit of blind adherence to the most extreme Southern Slav opinion, for in several directions, as has been said, they fall considerably short, for the reasons given, of what has been claimed by some, at any rate, of their spokesmen. On the other hand, stress has been laid on those claims which are indubitably justified, though in some directions they have been notably infringed by the diplomacy of the Entente, a circumstance which has vastly enhanced the difficulty of making moderate proposals in other directions and of avoiding the appearance of consistently loading the dice against the Southern Slavs. A brief conspectus of the elements of the new Southern Slavdom as above outlined may be of use.

The State would be, considered as a whole, remarkably homogeneous, since only in the north-east and south-west would there be any appreciable admixture of alien elements. The vast bulk of the population would be composed of Southern Slavs. Of these the Slovenes inhabit the area to the west of the present Croatian frontier with a large majority of Croats in eastern Istria. It has already been pointed out that though they have been for centuries under the Habsburg sway, and were formerly noted for their loyalty—they are said to have given as their reason

for not rising in 1848 that they had not been ordered to do so by the Emperor—they have now become fully possessed of the consciousness of their race brotherhood with their Serbo-Croat neighbours, with whom they proclaim their essential solidarity and unity. The total number of the Slovenes is about 1,400,000.

Next to them come the Serbo-Croats, the term used as a common designation for these two branches of the race. The Serbs and Croats are ethnologically one people, speaking one language, with but slight tribal differences. By race the inhabitants of Croatia, a great part of Slavonia with the exception of Syrmia or Srem, and northern Dalmatia are Croat, while the inhabitants of Syrmia, the Serb Vojvodina of Hungary, southern Dalmatia, Bosnia, the Hercegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia belong to the Serb stock. Politically, however, the real division is by religion, Orthodox Croats considering themselves Serbs, and Catholic Serbs considering themselves Croats, and in that sense the terms will be used in this section. It is, however, to be noted that there is a certain misuse of terms in speaking of the Hercegovinian Catholics—among the purest Serbs—as Croats, and on the other hand that the Dalmatians in recent years have become among the warmest partizans of a greater Serbia. The Serbs, including Orthodox Croats, use the national phonetic alphabet known as the Cyrillic, akin to the Russian, and ultimately derived from the Greek. It has discarded useless letters such as *c* (which is either *k* or *s*) and has added others, its phonetic quality greatly aiding the work of education. The Croats use the Latin alphabet, but with various diacritic marks in order to render the sounds of the language: this is the only “correct” way of spelling Serb words in our alphabet, and it is a pity that it is not generally followed. In the Austrian crown-lands the Croats number some 700,000, of whom 168,184 are to be found in Istria, and the remainder in Dalmatia, where the river Cetina marks the old boundary between Croat and Serb. In the Hungarian crown-lands, the kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia has a population of over

2,621,954, of whom 1,638,354 are Croats, and 644,955 Serbs. There are some 300,000 Croats and Slovenes in the south-west of Hungary between the Mur and the Drave and in the adjacent region.

Next in geographical order come the Serbs. "In Bosnia there are three religions but only one nationality—the Serb". So wrote Baron von Kallay in that history of the Serbs which, as he used to relate, was the first book he put on the Index when, after the occupation of Bosnia, he became governor. Using the two terms "Serb" and "Croat", however, in their political sense, we find in Bosnia some 856,158 Serbs, 451,686 Croats, and 626,649 Serb Moslems. The last-named include the old nobility of Bosnia, who became renegade on the conquest in order to preserve their position. The "Croats" here are entirely Serb by race, as can be seen by their geographical distribution in the following table, where it will be noticed that the Orthodox are strongest in north-west Bosnia, nearest Croatia, while the Catholics are strongest in the centre and south-east. The figures are those of the census of 1895, as I have not been able to find the figures of any later census given in the same manner. They serve to indicate, however, the distribution of creeds in Bosnia and the Hercegovina.

	Orthodox.	Mohammedan.	Catholic.
Bosnia—			
Sarajevo ...	72,904	111,984	38,096
Banjaluka ...	195,039	73,016	59,493
Bihač ...	101,152	81,777	8,726
Dolnja Tuzla ...	150,814	155,780	49,080
Travnik ...	78,448	69,940	90,559
Hercegovina—			
Mostar... ..	74,889	56,135	88,188
	673,246 43 per cent.	548,632 35 per cent.	334,142 21 per cent.

The areas are those of the six "circles" into which the country was divided by the Austrians. The Krajina

AREA AND POPULATION OF THE SOUTHERN SLAV STATE

	Area in Square Miles.	Serbs.	Croats.	Moslem Serbs.	Slovenes.	Italians.	Magyars.	Germans.	Rou- manians.	Total.
Kranjska ...	3,845	—	205	—	490,978	969	2	27,915	—	520,327
Carinthia (part) ...	600	—	—	—	80,000	—	—	?	—	80,000
Styria (part) ...	3,000	—	—	—	400,000	—	—	?	—	400,000
Gorica-Gradiška (part)	500	—	—	—	80,000	—	—	?	—	80,000
Istria (part) ...	900	—	100,000	—	25,000	—	—	2,000	—	150,000
Croatia ...	16,421	644,955	1,638,354	—	—	—	105,948	134,078	—	2,621,954
Medjumunje ...	300	—	82,829	—	—	—	7,000	—	—	90,000
Rijeka ...	—	—	13,000	—	—	25,000	—	—	—	49,000
Bačka (part) ...	350	80,000	—	—	—	—	?	?	—	80,000
Banat (part) ...	2,000	160,309	—	—	—	—	49,119	64,225	49,374	345,950
Dalmatia ...	4,956	105,335	505,334	—	542	18,028	4	3,081	—	634,855
Bosnia ...	19,768	856,158	451,686	626,649	3,108	2,462	6,443	22,968	608	1,962,411
Serbia ...	18,650	2,778,706	—	—	—	[Albanians]	1,956	7,494	122,429	2,911,701
	15,241	1,100,000	—	—	—	250,000	—	—	—	1,636,291

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or "Turkish Croatia", as it is sometimes called in our maps, is the most predominantly Orthodox portion of Bosnia.

In the kingdom of Serbia, in its extent before the Balkan wars, there were 2,778,706 Serbs and about 200,000 of other races, the most numerous being Roumanians and Čechs. Of the population of its newly acquired territories there are no good statistics, and the most that is possible is an intelligent guess which should disregard the extreme claims of partizans. Probably 550,000 would be a fair estimate of the Serbs in Old Serbia, the Serb share of the sanjak of Novipazar, and in what the Serbs call Skopljan Old Serbia, i.e. the districts of Kumanovo, Skoplje (Uskub), and Tetovo. In its new territories Serbia probably embraces some 250,000 Albanians, of whom a large number live in the Debar and Ochrida districts of Macedonia, while there may be in central Macedonia some 550,000 Macedonian Slavs. In these regions all estimates are hopelessly at variance and irreconcilable, and the majority are not even plausible, but the estimate is somewhere near the mark. The Serb population of Montenegro is estimated at about 500,000. In southern Hungary, formerly known as the Serb Vojvodina, there is a numerous Serb population, of whom some 250,000 would fall to the new State.

A conspectus of the whole therefore yields the following results. In the triangle of territory between the Drave and Danube on the north, as far as Negotin, and the Adriatic from Istria to Bar (Antivari) on the south-west, there is a population of nearly 11,000,000 of Southern Slav stock, who occupy that area to the practical exclusion of any other people, the majority of whom could be, and ought to be, included in the "Greater Serbia" of the future. The area is compact, geographically well defined, and homogeneous. The chart on pages 252 and 253 gives in tabular form the area and population of the Southern Slav State on the basis of the proposals made above.

If the treaty with Italy be carried out as signed, then

a reduction must be made in respect of Dalmatia of some 370,000 Croats, 80,000 Serbs, and 13,000 Italians, the figures for Istria and Gorica-Gradiška disappear, and some 100,000 Slovenes, besides some Germans, must be deducted from the population of Kranjska. The totals would read roughly as follows, the percentages moving slightly against the Southern Slavs as a whole, but slightly in favour of the Serbs by themselves :—

Area in Square Miles.	Serbs.	Croats.	Moslem Serbs.	Slovenes.	Italians. [Albanians]	Magyars.	Germans.	Roumanians.	Total.
86,604	6,095,463	2,321,408	626,649	874,628	32,859	170,472	260,000	199,982	10,879,702
	9,918,148				[300,000]				

II

There remains the important question of the form to be taken by the future Southern Slav State, the relations which will subsist between the different provinces as we know them. This is a subject on which it is impossible for a foreigner to dogmatize; it is pre-eminently a matter for internal solution. It is of good augury that no cut-and-dried plans exist in this regard. Serbia will leave the form to be taken by these relations to the people of the new territories, it will not endeavour to force a predetermined solution—"In Belgrade", said Professor Cvijić to the writer, "we have no policy in this matter, only ideas". At the same time it is highly important that the matter should be fully considered in an informal manner betimes, since when the time comes for a definite decision the leaders of the nation should be in a position to give some clear guidance to the people; nor is a discussion of the matter by a foreigner altogether out of place, if only on the assumption that onlookers see most of the game and that freedom from local influences leads

to an impartial judgment. There are obviously three forms which may be taken by the new State: it may be a federation of the existing provinces, it may be a dual Serbo-Croat monarchy, or it may be a unitary kingdom.

There has been a good deal of somewhat vague talk of a future Southern Slav federation, so that it may be well to commence with a consideration of that solution of the problem. With some "federation" like "Mesopotamia" is a word of blessed import. Federation has been suggested for all manner of States as a cure for all manner of ills, taking rank as a panacea only after the grant of a constitution after the latest British model. In part this fondness for the idea may be the result of the example of the United States, in part due to the insistence of our own Imperial problem, which so far as it admits of formal solution can be solved only on the basis of a federal or rather confederate system, in part to the formation of the German Empire. This has led to the theoretical consideration of the applicability of the idea to States which like the United States cover a vast area, and to those States which number within their confines a variety of races, the latter application being directly suggested by the success of the Swiss Confederation. There has been, however, a tendency to apply the idea somewhat indiscriminately to those States whose conditions hardly call for a formal federal system, and to others which lack the internal cohesiveness which in Switzerland is largely the result of pressure from without, of its situation between the Great Powers. In particular have theorists been prone to press its application to the Balkan Peninsula as a whole.

In the formation of a federal State a strong common interest is essential, as otherwise there is no basis on which to build. On the other hand, if the interest be very close and the political, social, and economic conditions not too markedly dissimilar, there will be a desire not for a federal but for a unitary government. There is all the difference again between federalism as a means of uniting

under one supreme government elements which would otherwise stand apart, and its employment for splitting up an already united people, while the instance of a people unwillingly united in a unitary State forms a third case. If the interest be not close then there is no possibility of federation, and consequently talk of a Balkan federation lacks political "reality". It is very well to say that the Balkan Peninsula forms a geographical unit, that it seems marked out by nature to be the home of a single strong Power, and that the highest interests of its peoples would be best served by a cordial co-operation in a federal State, but if the peoples themselves do not desire this union, if on the contrary some of them have been secular enemies all such arguments are beside the mark. It would be well for Europe if French and Germans, and English and Germans, could heartily co-operate with mutual respect, esteem, and liking, but we have to take the world as it is and human nature as we find it. In the Balkans the secular struggle between France and "the Empire" has its counterpart, as remarked before, on a smaller scale in the secular enmity of Serb and Bulgar, and Greek and Bulgar. It is absolutely mischievous to talk, as some have talked and talk, of imposing some such solution on the Balkans as a whole; it cannot be done in the first place, and in the second place, if the idea leads to the proposal of measures to be adopted with an eye to an ultimate solution which is impracticable, the result will be neither the ideal solution nor the next best but a series of measures adopted in one plane of ideas which will be worked out in another. Professor Freeman considered the Balkans as offering ideal ground for the establishment of a monarchical federation, but since he wrote the old feuds have broken out anew and have been exacerbated by recent events to an extent which puts off indefinitely, I fear, the day when Balkan lambs will willingly lie down with Balkan lions.

It is very necessary, not merely in the case now being

considered but, in all discussion of the idea of federation, to keep clearly in mind the distinction between the two main types of a federal system, between the *Staatenbund* or confederation of States otherwise sovereign and the *Bundesstaat* or federal State. In the former type the central executive, except in the matter of the assigned functions, can only act on the citizens, if at all, through the medium of the State governments. In this form each State of the confederation is a sovereign State and retains all the attributes and powers of a sovereign State except in respect of those functions and powers which are expressly assigned to the federal authorities, i.e. to the central executive and the federal Parliament, and also to the federal judiciary, which in this type is apt to become of necessity a co-ordinate authority under the federal Constitution. Sovereign powers belong to the States, and these States delegate certain powers to the federal authorities. In the second type, the *Bundesstaat* or federal State, the conditions are reversed; the central government can act upon the citizens directly; sovereign powers belong to the Union and the separate States enjoy only such powers as are delegated to them by the central government. In the first case, sovereign States combine in a confederacy and delegate certain definite powers to the common government; in the second case, a sovereign State delegates certain powers to local authorities; and the distinction still remains vital even if in the second case the powers possessed by the component parts be as extensive as the reserved sovereign rights of the different States in the former, for the central government, if sovereign, can vary the powers of the local governments, while if the latter be sovereign no such variation is possible without an alteration of the Constitution which inevitably is a difficult and complicated business.

In spite of the fact that in the American Civil War it was the party known as the Federals who were victorious over the Confederates, the United States are an example of a *Staatenbund* or confederation of States and not of

the more unitary type. Each of the States of the American Union is a sovereign State, and the Federal Government only enjoys delegated powers, a point which has many times proved of great practical importance, and which accounts for the elaborate measures necessary for any change in the Constitution, which represents in effect a treaty between the different States composing the Union. Of the second type, the *Bundesstaat* or federal State, Canada is an example, and this sharply differentiates its case from that of the United States. It is true that Professor Dicey¹ has insisted strongly, in spite of some Canadian criticism, on the fundamental identity of the two Constitutions, and to disagree with such an authority on his own ground may seem presumptuous, but the distinction noticed above seems to be fundamental in the literal sense of the word and does in effect modify very considerably the working of the two governments in the internal affairs of the two countries. It is difficult to see an essential identity, however close may be the likeness of their outward form and even of a great deal of their everyday working, between two Constitutions in one of which the sovereignty lies with the central government while the local legislatures possess only delegated power, while in the other the local governments are sovereign while the central government enjoys only delegated power. The difference in the assigned powers respectively, and therefore in the practical working of the two Constitutions, is brought out in the analysis of the attributes of the central and local governments in the two countries given by the Professor himself.² The fact strongly insisted on by him that the constitution of the Dominion under the terms of the British North America Act can only be altered, except within narrow limits, by the sovereign power of the British Parliament, does not seem to be essential to the form of government in Canada, whose federal Parliament might have been given full

¹ A. V. Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, pp. 157 *sq.* Fifth edition.

² *Vide* A. V. Dicey, *op. cit.* Appendix, Note II, pp. 410 *sq.*

rights of amending the Constitution, and though the limitation provides a certain resemblance to the difficulty of amending the United States Constitution, it does not invalidate the distinction drawn above. Indeed, so great is the contrast that the Dominion Government has even the power of disallowing a Provincial Act which falls within the powers assigned to the Provincial Legislatures by the Constitution.¹

The distinction is by no means of theoretical value only. Hamilton in 1789 thought that the individual States were too independent, and in practice to-day we find such flagrant evils as the diversity of marriage laws in different States, while the Federal supervision of inter-State traffic, for example, has presented great difficulties and internal State traffic lies outside the scope of Federal authority. In some cases legal fictions have come to the aid of the Federal Executive. When Australia was federalized various circumstances, such as the fact that Western Australia was cut off by land from the other colonies, the jealousy between New South Wales and Victoria, and the strongly developed local independence of all the colonies, led to the adoption of a confederation, *Staatenbund*, and the results have in many ways hardly confirmed the wisdom of the choice. Conflicts of authority have been numerous, and a large section of the electorate is in favour of an increase in the power of the federal authorities. Possibly it was with this example before its eyes that South Africa in forming its Union, mindful also of the grave danger of the old jealousies breaking out in a fresh form, framed its Constitution on the Canadian model.

This apparent digression will, perhaps, have served the purpose of enabling a consideration of a possible Southern Slav federation to be approached with a clear idea of what may be involved. It will be apparent that the looser form of confederation is not called for in their case by the

¹ Dicey, *ut supra*, p. 412, *cit. British North America Act, 1867*, s. 90, and Bourinot, *Parliamentary Practice and Procedure*, pp. 76-81.

necessities which may make that form the best attainable. The territory of the Southern Slavs is not so extensive as to require the subdivision of its area for purposes of administrative convenience and efficiency, neither is it inhabited by diverse races, nor by populations which have long possessed a complete internal autonomy which they might be unwilling to relinquish. Nor does there seem any necessity for the closer form of federation on the Canadian model for the reasons just recited. The great argument for a federal system arises when it serves to unite those who for national or physical reasons cannot combine willingly or conveniently in a unitary State. One of the advantages of federal government is the combination of national unity with a strong local patriotism, while the exercise of an extensive local government gives a higher political education to a large number of the citizens. On the other hand, the central power tends to be weak at the extremities, especially in the case of a *Staatenbund*. An instance of the danger to be faced in this respect was afforded by the dispute between the United States and Japan over the anti-Japanese legislation of California. Complaints addressed to the federal government elicited the reply that the matter lay within the competence of the State sovereignty of California, and that the central executive possessed no coercive jurisdiction in the affair, a response which gave rise to the light-hearted jest that the United States should rather be called the Disunited States. The problem assumed the most serious proportions. If the central authority had no sympathy with the legislation in question against whom did a remedy lie? If the Japanese had recourse to the *ultimata ratio* against California could the federal authorities stand aside? If not the wheel of diplomatic argument came full circle again. Even the closer organization of Canada has not relieved the Dominion government of problems similar though less serious. A federal system for the Southern Slavs might tend to perpetuate the local particularism of the different provinces, and the race has suffered so much in the past from its

internal divisions that any Southern Slav statesman should be careful in the extreme before advocating a system which might perpetuate or exalt similar divisions in the future, and they should be on their guard against the surface attractions of federalism. The bitter misfortunes which have made the history of the race an age-long tragedy, and its present parcelling out among different jurisdictions, have led to an overpowering desire for a real and unequivocal unity. It must be remembered also that the Skupština would not be burdened with the concerns of an extensive empire, while the vice of over-centralization does not postulate for its avoidance a fully developed federal system. "Federal government means weak government. . . . A federation, therefore, will always be at a disadvantage in a contest with unitarian states of equal resources".¹ The Southern Slavs are not so circumstanced that they can afford to neglect any element of strength; after the war they will be faced by jealous neighbours, at whose expense their unity will have been achieved, and the stronger they are the more likely are they not only to maintain their own position, but to preserve peace in their part of the world. Attention has been directed to the different level of culture attained by the various territorial divisions of the Southern Slavs, but that consideration argues rather for a unitary government, since under a federal system the different provinces might be governed under varying standards of administrative efficiency, unless the actual administrative personnel in the more backward provinces were supplemented from the more developed. In that event, however, the argument for federation would seem *pro tanto* to fail, and there would still remain a varying level of legislative competence. The resources of the whole should rather be applied to the development of the whole. On the other hand, a federal system accompanied by the counter-checks which are present in the American constitution makes for a certain stability and continuity of policy.² It is doubtful,

¹ A. V. Dicey, *op. cit.*, pp. 162, 163.

² *Vide* Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, vol. i. pp. 53 *sq.*

however, how far this system of counter-checks could be transplanted. On the whole, then, the balance of argument is decisively against a federal system for the Southern Slavs, as unnecessary, not being required by the extent of area of their country, diversity of racial elements, or past political freedom in the provinces; as being fraught with the danger of particularism; as likely to be accompanied by a varying standard of legislative and administrative efficiency which would be a great weakness for the State as a whole; as not providing for the best possible utilization of the strength of the nation in its cultural elements; as dissipating instead of strengthening the concentration of the national energy; as being more expensive and less efficient; and as tending to weaken the nation's international position.

The second form which might be taken by Southern Slav union is that of a dual State. If Serbia, Bosnia, southern Dalmatia, Montenegro, Syrmia, and the Serb portions of southern Hungary were united into a single State the result would be a kingdom whose population would be overwhelmingly Orthodox Serb with a Catholic Croat minority of about ten per cent. of the Serb numbers, as a glance at the table in the preceding section will show. If the remainder of the Southern Slav lands were formed into another State, Croatia, northern Dalmatia, eastern Istria, and the Slovene country, or such portions of them as may be left to their natural possessors after the appetites of others have been gratified, the resulting kingdom would be overwhelmingly Catholic Croat and Slovene. These two States could be united in a Southern Slav dual monarchy upon a close basis—closer than that of the present Habsburg monarchy. The idea at first sight is not without its attractions. Some such scheme seems to have been at the basis of Russian proposals in 1915, and it was advocated by the present writer in an article written at that time, but further reflection has considerably modified the opinion then advocated. The very points which at first blush indicate such a solution as desirable tell to a large degree against it. The two elements of the State

would certainly be very homogeneous, but in that homogeneity would be a danger for the future unity of the whole. The fact that one-half of the monarchy would be Orthodox Serb and the other Catholic Croat would tend to give a sharp, and more disruptive, note to any disputes between the two, and disagreements might even harden into a certain antagonism, or at any rate jealousy; it would in some ways make it harder for either to give way to the other. The old distinction between those Southern Slavs whose past history has been linked with the fortunes of the house of Habsburg, and those whose fortunes have been specifically Balkan, would be renewed and stereotyped, and the ultimate result might be fraught with danger to the hardly won unity of the race. Such a solution would not, of course, preclude a future fusion in a unitary State, and would for the time being preserve the intensive strength of each of the kingdoms. It was this last argument, that the Serbs should preserve the solidarity which has been their great strength, and should avoid the sacrifice of intension to extension that formerly weighed with the writer. The war, however, has forged still more strongly the links of national solidarity, has indicated still more vividly the danger of disunion and the advantages of full fusion, and it is doubtful whether the argument now carries the weight that might formerly have been attached to it. More and more it has become evident that the different branches of the Southern Slavs are resolved on a real union even though the exact form be not settled.

Experience has shown the extreme difficulties which attend the working of a dualistic system of government. Neither the personal union (with a common Foreign Office but separate armies, etc.) of Sweden and Norway, nor the closer union of Austria and Hungary, has given good political results. This seems to lie in the nature of the case. In a federal system the majority opinion will be composed from time to time of varying combinations of States, but in a dualistic system whenever there is disagreement it is of necessity always between the same two parties.

If one of them usually succeeds in getting its way a sense of soreness and of inferiority will be engendered in the other. If, on the other hand, there is in general unanimity on most important matters, or at any rate an even see-saw, then to that extent a dualistic system seems uncalled for unless it be demanded by local considerations and conditions in the two halves of the State.¹ The difficulty of course is the greater when it is a genuine dualism between two equal partners, and not a mere matter of granting an extended measure of local self-government to a certain area in an otherwise unitary State, for it is the very equality which is apt to make the citizens watch with jealous regard that the equality be not infringed. At the same time, there is in theory no reason why two States each managing its own internal affairs should not find themselves fundamentally at one on the great matters common to both—the army, foreign affairs, trade policy, banking and commercial legislation—nor why such divisions as may exist on these matters should not be cross-divisions affecting the citizens and legislators of each State equally—divisions horizontal rather than vertical. The arguments, perhaps, are somewhat nicely balanced, save for the warning that history seems to give, though even here it must be remembered that historical analogy is at once the most facile and most dangerous of arguments, depending upon an identity of causes which seldom exists for the validity of the deduction sought to be made.

There can be no doubt that the complete fusion of the Southern Slavs in a single unitary State would be, if it can be effected and if it be the desire of the race, the ideal solution of the problem of their national union. A unitary government is the strongest form of government, and a unitary State can act with a decision and promptness which cannot in general be achieved by any other. The

¹ I mean that theoretically the two halves might have a common opinion in common matters, but different opinions relative to internal matters. This divergence, however, could only arise by reason of great differences of local conditions.

case of the German Empire is no real exception to this rule, for its constitution is anomalous. While the relations between Prussia and Bavaria partake of the character of a *Staatenbund*, the relations of Prussia with the minor States are those of a strict *Bundesstaat*, and it was for that reason that Bismarck, as readers of his reminiscences and of Prince Hohenlohe's memoirs will remember, was by no means anxious to force the pace of internal union between 1866 and 1870, since he was anxious that the southern States should find themselves forced eventually to come in on Prussia's terms, and the concessions made to Bavaria were always regarded rather as a matter of necessity than as being desirable in themselves. In spite of these concessions, the constitution of the German Empire gives an almost complete predominance in all matters of common concern to Prussia, a predominance which is enhanced by the constitutional position of the Emperor and the absolutism in the ministry of the Chancellor, facts which make for prompt decisions. The arguments which might be adduced against a Southern Slav unitary State have been noticed from time to time above and need only be summarized here. They rest on the different degrees of cultural development attained by the different divisions of the race, the difference of historical development and of historical tradition which has distinguished the Serbs on the one side from the Croats and Slovenes on the other, the danger of the enthusiasm for unity cooling when the race is delivered from alien domination, and the difficulties which will attend the amalgamation and co-operation of political parties which have been formed in consequence of different needs and for the pursuit of different sets of objects in the past. On the other hand, the answers to these arguments have also been brought forward in discussing the various problems that affect the future of the race. We have had the testimony of various spokesmen of the race to the desire for unity, and the opinion that the feeling is permanent and deliberate, and the result of definitely conceived judgments borne in upon all sections as the great

and lasting lesson of the past. In any case, change will be inevitable as the result of the war in the composition and outlook of the various political parties, and complete fusion would afford the opportunity, and carry the necessity, of fresh political groupings to meet the new conditions, and such changes casting the parties adrift from their old moorings would be in fact a boon and enable the politicians to approach the future freed from the trammels of the past. It has been observed above that the religious division no longer operates as it has done, Orthodox and Catholic priests have enlisted under the same national banner and have suffered in the same cause as good Southern Slavs. In short, as a unitary government is the strongest and in itself the most desirable, so it appears to be the goal at which the Southern Slavs are consciously aiming. The race is certainly less divided than was the Italian at the time of the *risorgimento*, and in the latter case we know that federal schemes had to give way to the desire for complete fusion in spite of the great distinction which still exists between north and south.

The title of the new State and the style of its sovereign are matters for the Southern Slavs to decide for themselves. The term Jugoslavia (Southern Slavia) has come into common use of late, yet it is perhaps permissible to hope that no newfangled term will supersede old terms which have an historical past behind them. Only superficial people will lightly deride old historic terms, formulæ, and styles, for they carry with them the flavour of past glory as of past suffering, form part of the complex texture of race and government, and have a real even though often unperceived influence in moulding the thoughts, the reverence, and the sense of historic continuity of the citizens. It has been suggested that perhaps a personal style may be assumed by the King—King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. No foreigner can dogmatize, but the present writer confesses to a great dislike—not very reasonable—to this style. Possibly it may be the result of that sorry episode when the King of France was succeeded by a

King of the French in a reign of appalling commonplace, while the Tsar of the Bulgars has not made the style more grateful. I confess to the hope that the renewal of ancient glories may see a revival of the title of Tsar, and that we may see the old King Peter end his days as Tsar of Serbia, King of Croatia and Slovenia. No inferiority would be imputed to Croatia in such a style. It is true that in practice the title Tsar or King of Serbia would be colloquially used, but that would be the case also if the personal style were adopted. No one speaks of the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; to the world at large he is the King of England, nor is any grievance felt save perhaps among the Scotissimi of London! The Scotch probably think of him as King of Scots, and in the same way good Croats could think of their ruler as King of Croatia. Jugoslovenski (Southern Slav) would serve as the adjectival qualification of the functions of the Southern Slav Monarchy. Trivial matters, perhaps these—to those who do not understand that sentiment, Bismarck's *imponderabilia*, is a very hard fact and closely to be reckoned with.

CHAPTER IX

SOME PROBLEMS OF THE NEW STATE

IN whatever form the unity of the Southern Slavs be accomplished, the new State will have to face many urgent problems not only in the political sphere but in the economic and social. The first question is that connected with the German element. Allusion has been made already to the position of the Germans in the territories which may be taken into the new State and to the possibility of taking comprehensive measures to guard against the dangers which their presence might bring. There is, of course, no question as to the German and Magyar functionaries employed in various capacities in the administration of Bosnia central and local, and in the Banat, or of the same elements which have been foisted upon the kingdom of Croatia. They will, of course, disappear and return to their own countries. The Austro-Hungarian government has also since the occupation of Bosnia introduced various "strategic" colonies of Germans and Magyars (also some Poles), who have been planted in order to break up the Slav solidarity of the country, and similar colonies are to be found in Syrmia. There can be no valid objection to the expulsion of these colonists. As they have been planted, so can they be transplanted. They have been introduced into a land not their own as an alien garrison, as a disuniting element in the country in which they have been planted, and as a guard against Serbia, and they cannot now complain, having lent themselves to these purposes, if under the

changed conditions they are now sent home again; the retransplanting should be less painful than the original planting when they left their own home and their own kindred, and in any case Serbia cannot be expected to tolerate the presence of a foreign garrison introduced as such and coming with knowledge of its function.

The general question of the German elements, apart from the two categories just mentioned, who will be found in greater Serbia is more difficult and complex. No question of expulsion would have arisen after the wars of the past waged as honourable war used to be waged, but the facts of the present war must have an effect of the greatest importance in the after-settlement. Most illuminating has been the attitude of the American Germans. That American Germans should possess a lively sympathy with their country of origin is natural and to be expected, but what was not to be expected has been their attitude towards the country of their allegiance. They have emigrated of their own free will, they have been cordially received, they have received the rights of citizenship and all the rights and privileges of the native-born American, they have, many of them, acquired great fortunes in their adopted country, they have exercised a great influence on its politics and its industries, and yet in spite of all they have not merely evinced a sympathy with Germany which was natural but have also evinced a plain and outspoken hostility to the United States which not only argues the grossest ingratitude but has constituted a grave danger external and internal to their country. In order to achieve their aims they have stuck at nothing. Factories have been destroyed by bomb or incendiarism with great loss of life, attempts have been made to blow up bridges and railways, destruction of shipping by means of infernal machines has been attempted frequently, though happily with great lack of success; murder and arson and dynamite outrages all alike have been resorted to, and resorted to not only against the enemies of their original country, or the original country of their parents, but

against their own fellow-citizens, resorted to not to prevent hostile acts against their race-home, but to prevent their fellow-citizens, the citizens of their State of allegiance, from engaging in a trade recognized by international law as a legitimate trade to be carried on by neutrals. The non-German world cannot afford to allow matters to stand there, the peril of the German alien and equally of the naturalized German alien has been conclusively shown, and that peril must be taken account of by every State where an appreciable German element is to be found, since this element has exhibited an acrid and cunning capacity for hostility which might have the direst consequences. Just as German disregard of the rules of honourable warfare have put the Germans in a pale apart from honourable foes, so has the conduct of the "hyphenated-German" placed him in a category apart from other alien denizens naturalized or non-naturalized. In Belgium, further, it has been seen how the German denizen has been a spy and an advance agent acting in the interests of the military policy of his government.

These facts will have to be taken into consideration by the Southern Slav government in the reorganization of its territory after the war. The Germans who have shown such callous brutality cannot complain if such consideration should result in a considerable measure of expulsion against members of their race from Yugoslav territory; if the Serbs should regard with disquiet, for example, the large German element in the town and district of Pančevo almost over against Belgrade. The whole problem in its present acute form is a new one, and has been created by the action of the Germans themselves. It will be remembered that it was in view of this question that, in dealing with Southern Slav claims in southern Hungary, I suggested that they should be put forward with the strictest moderation in a territorial sense, and in a former chapter I traced a frontier line which comes considerably short of extreme demands for this very reason. The principle laid down was that the line should

be drawn to coincide with the limits of a solid block of Southern Slav population with no more than small islands of alien race embraced in it, and that it should not be so drawn as to include a solid block of alien territory even though it contained considerable Serbo-Croat islands. The suggestion was made with a view to the possibilities of transmigration after the war, and with especial reference to the German element, and thus the line drawn excluded all Baranja from greater Serbia, by far the greater part of the Bačka, and a large area to the east of Veliki Bečkerek, inhabited by a mixed population chiefly of Germans and Magyars. Any forced system of transmigration savours of barbarian times (but we live in barbarous times) and excites a natural distaste, nor must the effects on the Serbo-Croat population left in Hungary be overlooked. Yet such a measure applied under safeguards and with liberty to transfer movable property of all descriptions would add but little to the miseries of our time, and by giving ethnographical frontiers would afford solid advantages for the future. At any rate the question of the Germans will have to be faced by the Southern Slav government, and it may be that a transference of the German element may commend itself to it, leaving the Magyars to act in turn as they please.

It must be distinctly understood that reference has been made exclusively to the German element, and for the reasons already recited, and not to the Magyar or Roumanian elements of the Banat. As to the former, while it is true that they are strongly anti-Serb and have committed in Serbia the most horrible atrocities, yet it must be remembered that politically they have been exploited even in their own country by the Magyar-Jewish oligarchy, so that the mass of the Magyars, themselves for the most part peasants, cannot be held responsible for all the misdeeds of the politicians. In the Hungarian plain, even in the Southern Slav portion of it, they may be said to be in their own home. It is to be hoped that after the war there will be a new

Hungary reduced to a genuinely national State, in which the Magyar peasantry will come politically to their own. Such a Hungary should eventually become a friend of the Southern Slav monarchy, belonging, like itself, in part to the Danubian system, and no action should be taken by the Southern Slavs of a nature calculated to hinder such a consummation. The Magyars then, apart from the functionaries, exploiters, and strategic colonies in Bosnia and Syrmia, should be left in peace, in enjoyment of their properties and with full rights of citizenship. There is nothing to suggest that such Magyars would constitute the peculiar danger attendant on the presence of a large German element. Reciprocity of treatment for all Serbs left in Hungary must be a *sine qua non*, and full liberty of action assured.

What has been said of the Magyars applies with even greater force to the Roumanians. The latter have always got on well with the Serbs, they seem to be mutually sympathetic, the interests of their countries are identical. A solid Serbo-Roumanian alliance would go a long way towards ensuring peace in the Near East when each of the States has become one of a new order of secondary Powers of considerable strength and resources. While Serbia, Old and New, will include some 200,000 Roumanians, Roumania will include close upon 100,000 Serbs, and there is every reason for mutual toleration. The two States should facilitate any voluntary cross-migration that might manifest itself, but their efforts should be strictly limited to the supervision of such a voluntary tendency, and no compulsion of any sort, direct or indirect, should be used. Roumanians and Serbs alike must receive full rights.

Special measures of an economic nature will be called for in Bosnia. Its resources have largely been placed at the disposal of ruthless exploiters of Hungarian nationality but of Jewish race, to the detriment of the real interests of the population. It cannot be expected that these men will be left in possession of franchises granted

in despite of the protests of the inhabitants themselves, and of many members of the Austrian Reichsrath. The concession of a central land bank, for example, was granted on scandalous terms to Budapest capitalists, and was the subject of acrimonious debate in the Austrian Parliament, even non-Slavs expressing their condemnation of the transaction which was subsequently, I believe, somewhat modified. Here in place of an indemnity the Serb government can claim the right to cancel concessions without payment. Commercial, timber, land, and mining concessions, so far as the concessionaires are Austro-Hungarian subjects, should be resumed and worked by the State. The forest wealth of the Yugoslav kingdom will be an important national asset, there is a forestry department in Serbia, but it needs extension and working on modern methods, and so reorganized it will be able to take over the working of the State forests of Bosnia, now leased out to exploiters. The forest resources of Croatia are also very considerable, the oak forests of Slavonia being especially famous. In view of the dearth of timber and its rising price throughout the world, the State should organize this source of national wealth in the most thorough and comprehensive manner, and above all keep it in its own hands. The alien exploiters of Bosnia can very well follow the functionaries to their own land, and the country be developed for the benefit of its own people and its own national government.

One long-standing question that will be settled by the terms of peace will be that of the Oriental Railways which, so far as Serbia is concerned, is a matter of the main Salonica railway from the former Serb frontier at Ristovac to the Serbo-Greek boundary. At the time of the Balkan wars this length of line was taken over and worked by the Serb government as part of the State railway system. As soon as events foreshadowed a victory for the Balkan States, the Austrian government induced certain banks to buy up shares in this line, originally one of Baron Hirsch's lines, although the operation entailed enhanced prices for

the stock. A proportion of the shares was held in Paris. The object was to place the Austrian government in a position to refuse its consent, acting through the owning banks, to the buying out of the company by the Serb government. As soon as the latter got wind of the proposed operation, and before it had been effected, it declared that it would refuse to recognize the legality of any transfer of shares in the railway subsequent to the outbreak of the war. When peace was declared Serbia made offers for the purchase of the railway from the company, but the offers were refused. In turn the Austrian government, acting nominally for its nationals, demanded the return of the line, which Serbia refused. From then to the outbreak of the Great War negotiations were entered into from time to time without result, and the position remained that the Serb government remained in possession of the line, which it refused to return but was willing to purchase, while the Austrian holders refused to sell and demanded its surrender. The line will now, of course, become the property of Serbia, and it is likely that she will refuse to compensate the Austrian shareholders at all. For this course she will have two grounds; in the first place, that the purchase of shares by the Austrian banks was a political manœuvre inspired by the Austrian government and not a *bonâ-fide* investment, and that consequently the banks must look for compensation to the government whose agents they were; and in the second place, it may contend that the real owner of these shares is the Austrian government, and that they are therefore lawful prize of war, while even if they were genuine property of the banks holding them the value of them will be some offset to the claim for damage done in Serbia by the Austrian army, for which there is no likelihood of compensation by way of indemnity. Shareholders other than Austrian or German will doubtless be bought out at an agreed price.

There will be also the opportunity of denouncing the *convention-à-quatre* by which Austrian goods obtained

preferential rates over the Oriental Railway and over the original State railway of Serbia, namely the lines Belgrade-Niš-Pirot, and Niš-Ristovac to the former Bulgarian and Turkish frontiers. It will be to Serbia's interest to grant a generous railway tariff to Hungarian trade passing through Salonica in the interests of its own railway system, so as to attract through traffic and earn the freight charges; but she will probably prefer to make any such arrangement a part of the future commercial treaty with Hungary rather than to place her railways again under a perpetual servitude in the matter of such rates. In any case she will probably refuse anything in the way of internal preferential rates, the granting of which would be equally unfair to the Serb trader and to other foreigners doing business in Serbia. Our own exporters, for example—and after the war our trade with Serbia should grow enormously—would be prejudiced by any renewal of the old convention, which, it is to be thought, Serbia will certainly refuse.¹

A difficult question will arise as to whether any of the Austrian debt should be taken over with the annexed territories. Of late years in such cases it has been usual to lay it down that a portion of the debt should be taken over. It has to be remembered, however, that such a provision is not, as sometimes asserted, a matter of international law. When Germany took Alsace-Lorraine from France she did not take over any of the French public debt with the provinces, on the contrary she took £200,000,000 in addition. After the Russo-Turkish war Russia exacted an indemnity from Turkey (not yet paid off) as well as territory in Asia. It is true that the newly emancipated Balkan States were to take over a portion of the Ottoman Debt, a flagrant instance of one law for the strong and another for the weak, but as a fact the provision was never carried into effect. Even more pertinent to the question is the fact

¹ The *convention-à-quatre* applied only to the lines specified above in Serbia. Before the war Austria made an endeavour to extend its application to all Serb lines present or prospective, but Serbia refused.

that Austria-Hungary, which was not a belligerent, assumed no portion of the debt when she occupied Bosnia. It is true that in 1908 she paid over a sum to Turkey in respect of government property in Bosnia when the annexation was carried out, but this was obviously an after-thought and designed to smooth the way to Turkish acquiescence. No such provision was announced at the time of the annexation proclamation, and if Austria had considered even this payment obligatory, the natural time for it would have been when the provinces were occupied and when she entered upon a free usufruct of its government which she enjoyed without payment for thirty years. In any case this was a purchase of government property not an assumption of debt. The idea that such an obligation exists, or should exist, to assume a portion of the debt in respect of annexed territory is due to the great influence of international finance and to the fact that holders of national debts are to be found in all countries. At the present time, for example, France is deeply interested in the financial future of Turkey, and in the financial arrangements to be entered into in respect of what was once Turkey. The classic example of the results of such interests is of course our own occupation of Egypt for the benefit of the Egyptian bondholders.

It cannot be argued that by international law Serbia or the Southern Slav Kingdom should assume any part of the Austrian or Hungarian debts, or of the common debt of the Dual Monarchy, especially as the former will perforce have to forgo any war indemnity. Moreover, the financial situation of the Yugoslav kingdom will be in any case extremely difficult. In addition to her previous debt Serbia has incurred fresh obligations in the Balkan wars, and to an enormously greater extent in the present war, which will make a vast addition to the dead-weight of the national debt. She has also lost an enormous amount of wealth owing to the course taken by the war. The kingdom is purely agricultural, and its sources of wealth consist precisely in those things of which she has been so largely

deprived. The Mačva, the richest agricultural district of the country, has been utterly laid waste by the Austrians in their invasions, and since the occupation of the whole of the national territory the population has been bled white. The pastoral industry is perhaps even more important to Serbia than tillage—the Serb pig has not had to pay any rent, but he has largely paid the taxes. It is known that the Austro-Germans have carried out a systematic requisition of stock throughout the country, and pigs, cattle, and sheep in thousands have been sent into Germany and Austria. Leipzig alone was stated by the Germans to have received 20,000 pigs last Christmas season, and it must be years before the head of stock in the country reaches its former amount. These ravages have extended to Macedonia despite its alleged Bulgarian character. The Bulgars have also carried away, on their own admission, a great quantity of agricultural machinery. For a long time, therefore, the Serb peasantry will be steeped in dire poverty, and the financial resources of the State will be correspondingly diminished. Serbia is entitled, therefore, to refuse to take over any part of the Austro-Hungarian debts or of the Bosnian debt (the province has its own budget and liabilities), since she will be unable to obtain any compensation for these losses. So far, indeed, will she be from receiving compensation that she will be obliged to incur fresh liabilities in order to set the population on its feet again; in other words, the Serb State will have to compensate its subjects in part for the havoc wrought by the Austrians. All these liabilities, the debts, the compensations, the means of restoring the economic life of the people, will be a burden to be shared by the whole Southern Slav State, for the present Serb kingdom could not stand the strain, and in a sense a great deal of these burdens may be regarded as having been incurred in the common cause. If, in addition, the State were to take over any Austrian debt it would be plunged into a morass of financial trouble just at the moment when it would need all its resources to effect an economic recovery.

It may be said, on the other hand, that to impose upon the reduced States of Austria and Hungary the full burden of their existing debts and their new war debt would involve them in something like national bankruptcy. But as they are largely responsible for the war, and as, at the very least, it was their action that gave occasion for it, and as it was hailed by them with rejoicing as giving them at last an opportunity of dealing finally with the Southern Slavs, there is no injustice involved in their suffering the penalty of their misdeeds. They willingly took up arms in an unjust cause and must abide the result; to saddle the Southern Slavs with a portion of their war debt, for that is what it would come to, would be to make the latter pay part of the cost incurred by the enemy in the wanton attack upon themselves. The Emperor Francis Joseph and his advisers stated at the commencement of hostilities against Serbia that they had counted the possible cost of their action, and Austria and Hungary applauded, and if now the cost is considerably more than they bargained for that is their affair; they are reaping what they have sown. The question hinges partly upon the amount of the pre-war debt of the Dual Monarchy that was held in the countries of the Entente, which means practically in France, for the amount held by the other Allies must be small. It should be possible in the terms of peace to put the foreign pre-war debt of the Monarchy in a privileged position, leaving the Austrian and Hungarian governments free to do as they will with the debt held by their subjects or Germans. If they repudiate the latter or reduce the rate of interest it will be a matter between them and their friends.

Without a doubt both here and elsewhere when peace comes to be made we shall have to guard most carefully against the influence of *la haute finance*, the finance which knows no country, and is inspired solely by regard for its own interests. It was largely international finance which bolstered up the Ottoman Empire in the past, and more and more it has become a custom for such finance to act

for its own gain and then to call upon the national governments, or whichever government can be brought in ostensibly for the protection of its nationals, to support its claims. The peace that is to be made must be made in the largest interest of the Allies, great and small, and not to secure the profits of those who recognize their country chiefly when they have need of its services. At any rate the Southern Slavs should not be crippled at the outset by a load of debt not incurred by them but by their enemies, incurred not for their benefit but for the express purpose of dealing them a final blow.

A comparatively minor matter to be dealt with in the terms of peace will be the return of the manuscripts, books, antiquities, etc. which have been looted from Serbia, and at the same time the Austro-Hungarian museums should have to give up all manuscripts, antiquities, and objects of art which have their origin in the Southern Slav provinces. Many antiquities, for example, including coins of the early Serb Kings and Tsars have been removed from Bosnia; it has been stated indeed that, especially, early Serb coins have been taken to Vienna lest their presence in Sarajevo should convey too pointed an historical lesson to the Bosnian Serbs. The destruction of historical memorials carried out by the enemy undoubtedly was not the result of mere wantonness. It was conceived with the subtle idea of destroying the material facts and influences which go to feed historical and national consciousness and self-realization.

The local conditions in the different Southern Slav provinces differ in many important respects. In the present kingdom of Serbia there is practically no land problem save that of guarding against an excessive parceling out of the small peasant properties, and that unfortunately will have been largely solved by the grievous loss of population during the war. Already the Austrian papers are talking of the measures of colonization in Serbia proposed in view of that decrease. In Bosnia there is an urgent land problem akin to the Irish, and

soluble only by the same means. While some of the peasants own their holdings as in free Serbia, it is estimated that there are 112,000 families, comprising 650,000 persons, who farm their lands from the *Agas*, or land-owners, estimated at 10,000 families and 40,000 persons; these agas, or begs, are mostly Moslems, and in great part represent the old Bosnian nobility who turned renegade. These Moslems or "Turks" are, of course, Serb by race. The rent principle is almost universally the *métayer* system. The *métayer* peasants naturally desire to own their land like their freeholding neighbours, but the Austrian law has made mutual consent a necessary condition of sale, and the process of enfranchizing the land has been correspondingly retarded. Acting upon the principle *divide et impera*, the Austrians have fostered the privileges of the begs in order to divide the population into hostile sections. The remedy can only be an act for compulsory sale even at the risk of arousing a certain amount of discontent among the begs. Among the majority of the Moslems, Serb sympathies are by no means wanting,¹ for after all the early history of the Serb race is largely a history of their own families, a fact of which many are quite conscious, as Sir Arthur Evans discovered in his travels forty years ago, and told in his *Illyrian Letters*. When to this is added the fatalism of the genuine Moslem, we may expect the greater number to acquiesce without any great trouble, and in any case a certain amount of transient fanaticism manifested probably by the more ignorant Moslems will be better than the dragging out of a long and embittered agrarian dispute. The sooner the nettle is grasped the better for all concerned. In Croatia and the Banat side by side with peasant properties are large landed estates belonging to the great magnates, some of native stock, but the majority Magyar or Magyarized, as well as to the Church. As regards the properties of the Magyar

¹ The Moslem Serbs of Bosnia residing in Switzerland have proclaimed their wholehearted adherence to the Southern Slav cause.

nobles there is little to be said against confiscation. It must be remembered that the Magyar aristocracy has been reactionary in the extreme, and that it has always been its policy to keep under "the nationalities" of Hungary and to Magyarize them as much as possible. It has been the tyranny, misgovernment, and chauvinism of the Magyar nobles which have been largely responsible, not only for the chronic unrest in Hungary and its borderlands, but also for the war itself. Their policy has made it impossible in the past for any tolerable *modus vivendi* to be entered into with the subject peoples, and they were among the foremost in insisting upon a settlement with Serbia which should take the form eventually of the disappearance of the kingdom, or at least in its reduction to the position of a helpless vassal. They may now be feeling the pinch of the war, but it was the Magyars who at the beginning were most anxious for the chastisement of Serbia and most enthusiastic in the cause of war. The evidence of Professor Reiss is conclusive as to the methods of the Imperial army in Serbia, and Hungarian officers and soldiers were foremost in the atrocities committed on the population and in the utter devastation of the richest district of the kingdom. They have since looted and carried away property, and have been considering projects of colonization. The financial situation of Austria-Hungary does not offer much prospect of an indemnity, indeed if the Monarchy be decomposed into its elements the exaction of an indemnity would become practically impossible. In place of indemnity, therefore, the Serbs should claim the right to undertake various necessary measures of reform and reconstruction without having to indemnify the Austrians or Magyars concerned, the latter being left to the solicitude of their own governments. One such measure should be the parcelling out of the estates belonging to the Hungarian nobles in Croatia and the Banat among the peasants without indemnity. These men showed no consideration when they murdered and ravaged and laid waste the

property of the Serb peasants, and the loss of their own properties will be a just punishment in kind. As a matter also of public policy, it is necessary to make it plain that conduct such as has distinguished our foes in the present war will entail retribution, not merely national but, personal to those who have been the authors of the violation of the old honourable codes of warfare.

With these varying agricultural problems a unitary government, endowed with a greater total ability, experience, and independence than local legislatures and administrations, will be better able to deal than the latter more at the mercy of local conditions and influences.

Not so immediate as the land question, but hardly less important, will be the problem of the form to be taken by the future industrial conditions of the Southern Slav Kingdom. It possesses large mineral resources in Danubian Serbia and Bosnia, while Macedonia, hitherto outside the sphere of mineral production, is also stated to be rich. The best coal in the Balkans comes from Serbia, which is rich also in copper and lead, while iron and some gold and silver are also found as well as other minerals. It is asserted that it should be a potential oil-field also. By law all minerals belong to the State, which simplifies some matters greatly, and if full insistence is laid upon the consequences of this ownership the benefit to the State should be very great. The manufacturing interests are but very slightly developed, and the Serb happily does not take very kindly to the process of ceasing to be his own man in order to become somebody else's hand. The great importance and interest of the industrial development of the country is twofold: in the first place there arises the question of foreign capital and the dangers of pacific penetration, and in the second the extremely interesting point as to the exact form to be taken by the industrial edifice. These two questions are distinct and must be considered separately.

There is no need here to attempt anything approaching to a full discussion of the manner and method of the

process of pacific penetration, or to do more than indicate a few general propositions. It has been said that "the nation, proposing to absorb a district and make a colony out of it, loans money to the ruler and to as many of his subjects as possible; obtains a security for the money advanced, if it can, a part of the public revenue; builds railways in exchange for large grants of land, and, in general, develops the country. Then, when the available resources have been pretty completely hypothecated, the nation claims that its interests in the territory are so considerable that it must be conceded a share in the direction of administration and policy, in order to assure the safety of its investment."¹ "To be sure, the financial operations known as peaceful penetration are not exactly what we have been accustomed to consider methods of violent conquest; but by such means large numbers of the inhabitants of the smaller countries have just as certainly lost their land and the products of their labour as if an army had destroyed them."² The American Professor's remarks in their literal application deal rather with the methods which have been applied to decadent Oriental States, such as Egypt and Morocco, than with the processes applicable to such a State as the Southern Slav Kingdom will be, but they describe accurately the means employed in their most open form. It is not, however, such States alone which have been subjected to the process of pacific penetration with baneful effects upon the economic, and even the political, independence of the countries concerned. It is not necessary for a State to sink as low as Egypt or Morocco, two classical instances of different forms of a similar pressure, the one by means of *la haute finance* and governmental necessities, and the other by means of politico-commercial exploitation, to find itself seriously curtailed in the exercise of its sovereignty.³

¹ R. G. Usher, *Pan-Germanism*, p. 121.

² *Ibid.* p. 246.

³ I am not calling in question the action of England and France in the two countries mentioned, but I instance them as examples of the consequences of financial pressure and pacific penetration. That the occupations were legitimate rather emphasizes the danger in question.

Before the war Antwerp had become largely a German port, and its German population acted entirely in the interests of Germany in the political sphere besides acting as spies for the General Staff. In Italy we have an even more noteworthy example of the dangers of this sort of penetration. A great part of the trade has been in German hands and has been transacted with Germany, and the latter above all has made full use of the weapon placed at her disposal by the development of the modern banking system. The great Banca Commerciale, with its numerous branches, was practically in German hands; it maintained the closest relations with German producers and merchants, it was in a position to finance German exports to Italy, and, by discounting the debts due by the Italian buyer to the German seller, to provide the former with the long credit which he needed and the latter with ready cash. Such functions are of course merely in the ordinary way of the business of a bank of commerce, but when such a bank is extremely rich and able to crush possible rivals, and when it is in the hands of foreigners, it places in the hands of the latter a powerful lien on a country's trade. In England itself the same results have been at work. When war broke out Baron von Schröder was naturalized on the ground that it was necessary for the credit of the City of London.¹ Commercial companies of every description were found to be German even when nominally British. German firms controlled a great part of the trade in metals, large German interests affected in some cases even the sentiments of a great town, and the country became conscious of the startling extent to which its commercial and manufacturing freedom was mortgaged to its enemy. In Australia special legislation has been necessary to free

¹ As a matter of fact the plea was absurd. Had the Baron's office been taken over by a representative of the Treasury, the financial houses were quite capable of supplying the necessary personnel for carrying on the business. All that was necessary was to act at once before the books could be tampered with.

the metal trade. If such a state of things had come to pass in England, the centre (with Paris) of international finance, and the home of intensive manufacturing and commercial activity, it is easy to see the plight to which might be reduced a smaller country with great undeveloped natural resources but with a practically non-existent financial and industrial organization and a lack of fluid capital.

This points to the extreme unwisdom of any forced industrial development in the greater Serbia of the future, and the absolute necessity of framing betimes such banking, industrial, commercial, and company legislation as shall leave the Southern Slavs masters in their own house. It will be incumbent upon the government to see that its people shall not be exploited for the benefit of foreigners, that its population shall not sink to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for foreign capitalists and financial interests, and that the profits arising from the exploitation of the country's resources shall be for the benefit of its own subjects, not merely the profits of wages but the net profits of capital also to the extent that may be practicable. Above all will it be necessary to guard against the possibility of such a lien upon the country's development being held either by those who are opposed in heart to the nation's independence or by those who are nationals of a State which makes financial, industrial, and commercial interests a normal lever of political pressure. It is not unusual for English merchants to complain that they receive insufficient support from the English government, that their interests are not pushed and not efficiently safeguarded when menaced. I doubt whether on the contrary these things have not been, and in the future may be still more, to the benefit of English trade. It has been the recognition that an English trader is not a politician thinly disguised, that an English bank is a financial institution and not a government weapon, which has in many cases caused the foreigner to have dealings with

the Englishman, whom he does not suspect of entertaining deep political designs, rather than with the trader behind whom is very visible the form of an active and aggressive government.

It will be for the permanent benefit of the Southern Slavs if there is not too great a desire on the part of the government to encourage foreign capital to work the natural resources of their country, but rather a resolve to work them with national funds. State ownership is already familiar to them; the railways are State railways, the minerals belong by law to the State, by far the greater part of the forest area of Serbia belongs either to the State or to the communes, the latter working under State supervision, there is a tobacco *régie*, and salt, petroleum, cigarette papers, and matches are all State monopolies, and other resources should be worked as far as possible in the same way. A great source of power in the future will be hydro-electric, derived from the waterfalls and swift rivers of the mountain regions which comprise so large an area of the land, and it would be wise before vested interests are created to declare a State monopoly of hydro-electric power. The Serbs, as has been seen, take kindly to co-operation, and this mode of exploitation should be fostered to the uttermost and protected from unfair and "wrecking" competition. It may be said that under such circumstances progress may be slower. This raises the question, which cannot be argued here, as to what is the real content of national progress. There are those who, when a fair countryside is defiled with smoke, when the peasantry are replaced by townsmen, when villages give place to gaunt factories belching their fumes into the air, when large areas of land become covered with acre upon acre of mean and ugly streets composed of brick boxes with slate lids, when wealth is accumulated frequently by absentee shareholders of industrial companies ("a company has no soul"), and when the early night, and the late night of Saturday, rings with shouts of vacant laughter, and the whistling of the latest

music-hall inanity, are eloquent of the "progress" and "development" achieved. There are others who look upon these things as a degradation, who say that the vitality of the city population is maintained by the influx of country blood, and deny that these things constitute "progress" still less "civilization". Towns were not always, however, a blot upon the landscape, associated with ugly speculative building, or consecrated to the multiplication by machinery of things sometimes unnecessary and often ugly. Old towns like old houses (not *because* they are old) add to the beauty of the countryside, and what modern industrialism needs is a method of reconciling utility with beauty, of restoring as far as we can pride of workmanship, of giving the workman a living and proud interest in his work, in short of restoring civilization to the home to which as the name implies it properly belongs. Extremes meet, and many a true-blue Tory is attracted by the underlying ideas of the Socialists Ruskin and William Morris. In strict bearing upon the subject immediately under discussion it can be said that slower progress on national lines is infinitely to be preferred in the interests of any people to quick progress and swift development at the cost of foreign exploitation; nations like individuals suffer if they try too hard to get rich quick. If there were a large amount of native capital available the whole case would be altered, but the point is that such capital is non-existent, and the choice for Jugoslavia will be between handing over its resources to foreign capitalists or proceeding by the utilization of national capital, a process which will be slower but will bring with it the securing to the nation at large a greater portion of the profits derived from the country and full national mastery over the national wealth. The war has shown the grave perils to real independence which are the effect of foreign exploitation, the facts have never before emerged so clearly, and nations must shape their course in accordance with the knowledge now acquired.

Foreign capital is of course necessary, but it may be

borrowed by the government and by it used for the commercial and industrial development of the country, and if the Southern Slav becomes a hand he will at any rate be a hand working for his national State. It will be said that this is State socialism pure and simple; but circumstances alter cases. Our own colonial administrations working in undeveloped countries work on the lines indicated. They endeavour to prevent the exploitation of the native inhabitants, prevent the wasteful exploitation of natural resources, use government capital freely, and assure to the State the enjoyment of natural, and some artificial, monopolies. In such countries the government undertakes a great deal of work and supervision that in developed States can be left to private initiative. The Sudan has been largely, indeed almost entirely, built up by government expenditures and government supervision, and the same course is pursued in other undeveloped areas, and from the Western point of view the Southern Slav Kingdom will be an undeveloped country. Even in England itself the war has seen many changes in this respect and some of them will probably be permanent; it is unlikely that when the war is over we shall slide back into the old groove; we have seen the growth of "controlled" industries, and some of the knowledge acquired will probably be utilized when peace returns. It is agreed that certain "key" industries should be maintained, and if such industries cannot be started with private capital they will probably be started with national capital; if again they can only be maintained under the protection of a high tariff, it is likely that in return for this protection, and the profits thereby secured, the community, acting through the State, will insist on a certain amount of control. In any case industrial conditions in England are in a flux, and we shall have to beware of the tyranny of catch phrases, and of prejudice in the strict meaning of the term; still more is such caution necessary for undeveloped communities.¹

¹ Apart from the outstanding instances of Australia and New Zealand, I believe that in so individualistic a country as Canada State activity is

Concretely the new State will have to guard against, preferably prohibit, foreign ownership of land¹; it will maintain its State railways and forests; it will have to pass comprehensive legislation in restraint of certain activities of foreign banking corporations and foreign companies. In many cases no more will be necessary than the maintenance of the existing legislation of Serbia such as its homestead law, and the regulations noticed (in Chapter III) on the subject of bills of exchange on agricultural produce, etc. The present activities of the Land Bank must be extended to the whole kingdom, land mortgages, rural or urban, prohibited except with the State bank, and the co-operative institutions fostered and strengthened. Foreign banks must be prevented from acquiring a hold over the essential productivities of the nation, and their activities must be subject to a control which will enable the government to arrest any operation injurious to the national interests. Restrictions will also be necessary upon the holding of shares in companies by certain foreign elements. The working out of these projects in detail may show that control may be better in this or that matter than prohibition, and moreover there ought to be a distinction between the capital and the projects of allies and those of enemies; what should be forbidden to a German bank with politics in the background could well be conceded to an English bank engaged in its legitimate business, subject always to national control over the national heritage. It is here

employed in the western fruit-growing areas in the direction of grading and packing fruit. Co-operation in Ireland is another example of the same general trend of ideas.

¹ I cannot endorse Dr. Savić's suggestion of Englishmen starting farms in Serbia. It seems to me an example of that sentimentalism which is capable of becoming a weakness in the Serb character. Such ownership could not be confined to Englishmen, and the result might be the buying up of large areas of land by foreign capitalists from an impoverished peasantry. That is a real danger to be guarded against, and for a considerable time foreign ownership of land should be prohibited. Such prohibition is equally necessary in the case of urban land in view of prospective developments.

that the absence of governmental pressure to which I have alluded should stand us in good stead. Some mines are worked by the State, some are leased. If the latter system be employed in the future it should be remembered that as the State is the real vendor or lessor the capital of the company should not be watered with a dead weight of vendor's shares. It should be practicable to insist upon all such companies being capitalized upon a purely working capital basis, apart from a small promoter's profit to be paid in ordinary shares in return for his enterprise. Under such a system royalties could be replaced by a provision securing all profits to the company up to a certain percentage upon the capital, all further profits to be shared between the company and the State. This, it seems to me, would be an excellent way of uniting the exploiting interest of the foreign capital employed and the interests of the State acting for the community, and of guarding alike the interests of the genuine investor and the proprietary interest of the national government.

Such regulations would doubtless raise opposition in some financial circles, but it will bear repetition that slower development on national lines will be better than quicker development under the exploitation of the foreign company promoter. Moreover, in the case of the mining industry such legislation should, when it becomes known, encourage the genuine investor whose interest, it will have been seen, will not only be guarded by the State but will be identical with that of the latter, since both would be adversely affected by watered capital and unscrupulous promotion, and the current of genuine investment capital would therefore be attracted. The government should not be deterred in these matters by the objection of a certain class of foreign capitalist, or by the charge of being retrograde and reactionary, or by the taunt of slow progress as compared with other States whose quick advance has been paid for by the mortgaging of their resources.

In all cases provision should be made for the resumption

by the State, should it be desired, of its original proprietary rights by the compulsory repurchase on equitable terms of the shares of the concern in question.

One of the sources of interest in the Balkan States is the fact that from the industrial and commercial point of view they are practically *tabula rasa* on which may be written a new page in the history of industrial development. From some points of view modern Western industrialism may be said to be morally bankrupt, and we are conscious of a growing distaste for many of its manifestations, a distaste which is shared by people of various habits of mind. There has been, for example, the marked growth of appreciation of hand-work as applied to many articles until recently given over, since the full development of machinery, to factory production. "Machine carving" of wood is now a term of reproach; hand-made furniture is sought by those who can afford it, hand-woven fabrics from thick tweeds to finest linen are in demand, the architect specifies hand-made brick and tile when his client's purse will allow it, hand-wrought ironwork, jewellery, silver-ware, book-binding are all increasingly appreciated. One of the most formative of our architects, Mr. Baillie Scott, whose work is to be found in Russia and Poland, even in America, as well as in England, has not only practised a return to older and simpler methods of planning but uses hand-work whenever possible. Mr. C. F. A. Voysey, whose architectural style is quite different, is at one with Mr. Scott in the methods which he advocates, while an architect who is not one of the so-called craftsmen architects like the two just mentioned, Mr. Detmar Blow, owes some of the qualities of his work to the knowledge of material gained by working on it with his own hands. The whole "arts and crafts" movement and the colony of craftsmen at Chipping Campden, where Mr. C. R. Ashbee practises architecture on the lines spoken of, is eloquent of this change.

It is not merely from an æsthetic point of view that dissatisfaction is felt. Industrial unrest despite increase

of wages and better conditions is endemic, and it is noteworthy that it is shown most acutely in trades where wages are highest. In part this may be put down to growth of the appetite and the desire for more, but in part it would seem to be indicative of an unrest which is really spiritual—men are discontented they barely know with what even though the concrete form which the discontent takes is a demand for an increased wage. Many of the leaders, however, have become more articulate, and it is seen that men are increasingly dissatisfied with being somebody else's hands, they want to be their own masters. The rise of syndicalism (I speak of syndicalism as properly understood—the man who puts grit into a machine and calls it syndicalism is a mixture of knave and fool who does not know what he is talking about) is a direct product of this feeling, and in some of its aspects—extremes meet again—recalls a harking back to the guild system of the Middle Ages. State socialism and syndicalism are commonly held incompatible, but I think that a blend of the two would be preferable to either and not more difficult in operation. We have in England a wage-earning proletariat divorced from proprietorship of land or other means of production such as no other country possesses, and that represents a state of society which is full of danger to the community besides yielding some of the objectionable results already alluded to. The substitution of limited liability companies for personal ownership and the growth of combines further divorce the more wealthy classes of the nation from the wage-earner, and society tends to become sharply stratified with a lack of cohesion between the different strata. Even the rise of individuals usually means that they pass from one stratum to another rather than that they form a bond between the two.

The organization of industry has passed during the past century through three main stages. The first was the era of comparatively small concerns, as business is measured nowadays, in the hands of private owners, it was

the age of the private *entrepreneur*. The second saw the growth of the limited liability company. The latter was the more elastic as it allowed of various combinations of capital; some companies were private concerns converted into limited companies with but little addition of outside capital, others were in the main in the hands of a small number of capitalists with some smaller shareholders, while others again were owned by a large number of shareholders whose individual holdings were small in comparison with the aggregate capital engaged in the business. Then ensued a period of industrial consolidation: rival firms amalgamated, smaller firms were bought out when they were not crushed out, interests were pooled, and industry thus came under the sway, speaking quite generally, of a smaller number of very large firms, side by side with which, or rather over against which, stood the similar combinations of artisans in their trade unions. The policy of *laissez faire*, as it is generally but somewhat erroneously called,¹ has been gradually abandoned; workmen were protected, the labour of women and children forbidden or restricted, regulations imposed in matters of ventilation and sanitation generally, and the principle of each for himself and the devil take the hindmost has given place gradually to an increasing appreciation of the essential solidarity of society. The growth of the larger limited companies was fostered not only by the desire to eliminate competition, but by the many economies inherent in a system where operations could be undertaken on a very large scale, the same economies which had accelerated the decline of the small private firms. Late years have seen this process of consolidation carried yet further. Apart from pooling agreements and trade understandings between firms formally independent, we have seen the growth of the trust, combine, or *kartel*, which in its extreme form includes

¹ To speak accurately the general system is *laissez aller* "go as you please," divided into *laissez faire*, freedom of manufacture, and *laissez passer*, free trade.

all, or practically all, the firms engaged in a particular line of business, and in less extreme instances a very large proportion of such firms. The great home of the trust is America, with its Standard Oil Trust, Beef Trust, Steel Trust, etc., but the German *kartels* are extremely strong, and it has been very largely the organization of these *kartels*, their close co-operation with each other, and the support given to them by the German banks, which has accounted for the growth of German trade. The objections raised to these trusts are familiar and need not be restated; on the other hand, it is undeniably true that they stand in the due line of industrial development and follow in logical sequence from what has gone before, that they can effect great economies, and therefore if they will can reduce prices in many cases, that they can give stability to manufacture, and in short represent the scientific use of the resources of modern capital, machinery, labour, and banking. The problem is how to reconcile their existence with the rights of labour, and of the general consumer, with liberty of trade, and even in extreme cases with the full enjoyment by the nation at large of its sovereignty over the national territory and the activities of the community. Some socialists have been not altogether adverse to this growth; Mr. Bernard Shaw has remarked that the Trust magnates are preparing the way for State socialism far more effectively than any socialist propaganda, because eventually the community, if it must have a sort of collectivism, will prefer to see it in the hands of the State to seeing it in the hands of a small number of irresponsible capitalists. There is also the *via media* of State control, an idea with which, as remarked, we are becoming more familiar.

With the great trusts we have arrived at a point of development where there is a possible reconciliation between ideas in appearance diverse and even contradictory. On the one hand, the trust stands for the almost untrammelled power of the great financier, on the other hand, with a modified internal organization, it could be made

to approximate closely to the syndicate or guild; on the one hand it stands for a tremendous force even against the State, on the other by control, not to speak of expropriation, it would lend itself to the State supervision of industry (also a medieval idea); on the one hand it has come to stand as a symbol of the negation of popular rights, on the other it could be turned into a combination or co-operation of producers. A combination or correlation of trusts under the close control of the State and in alliance with a banking system working with it would be a near equivalent to a combination of guilds under State control, or in other words to a syndicalist system with a controlling element representing State socialism or collectivism. It is not a question whether we like these developments or not, for modern Western industrialism has come to stay, and the point is to make the best of it, and on the whole a large measure of State control is preferable to the dominance of the trust lord.

This brings me to the point of contact with my general subject. It is earnestly to be hoped that the Southern Slav statesmen will not be led by a misplaced modesty, by fear of being branded as behind the times, or by the idea that they can best prove their modernity and their realism by exactly aping the contemporary West, into a policy which should allow the growth in greater Serbia of precisely the same industrial civilization with which we are blessed or cursed. The West has a great deal to learn as well as to teach, and moreover it is one of the large justifications of the existence of small States that they can act as political and social laboratories in which can be observed the working of scale models of innovation and experiment. In a large country and a highly developed the road is blocked by a complexity of legitimate vested interests, and also by the widespread harm that would result from a false move. There is not the slightest reason why the new Serbia should laboriously undergo all the phases of Western industrial development when she can instead take stock of the position and start where we have

left off, or rather, learning from our experience, determine upon an industrial polity which shall seek to avoid manifested evils and take due account of the obvious trend of growth. Precisely because industrially Serbia will be *tabula rasa* it will be open to her to predetermine by legislation the form which shall be taken by her own industry, to set up a framework to which, already erected, the nascent industry must needs adapt itself. What, in my opinion, the framework should be has been already indicated. Since modern industrialism ends in trusts and *kartels*, and the process seems inevitable, let that be the starting-point. The rights of the workers must be guarded not merely by "factory legislation" but in the constitution of the trust by representation upon the directing board. But a trust, or a syndicate, can become as a whole an exploiting agent against the general community, so must enter the third element of State control by means of a representative or representatives with a power of veto over prices to be charged and so forth. All engaged in a given production should be included in the trust, there can be no question of crushing outside firms or of refusing admittance—all engaged in the industry *ipso facto* must become members. The way will be opened to co-operative productive societies, for such societies will no longer have to fear underselling, since there will be one selling price fixed for all with penalties for infringement; they will no longer have to fear unfair competition in the buying market, for the economy of co-operative buying in gross for the whole trust will apply to them equally with others; they will no longer have to fear the war of exhaustion waged by a firm with large liquid capital to sink against the co-operative producers with only their labour and the need of immediate returns. Thus the national *zadrugas* of the new type will find their place and scope in this modern industrial framework, they will not be overborne by capitalist production, and the instinct of the Serb for co-operation and for being his own master will be given full play, and his co-operative

inheritance from the former family *zadruga* (see Chapter III) will become to him a tower of strength. A place will be able to be found for handicraft as in the carpet *zadruga*, in which are already united those who make the hand-woven and natural-dyed Pirot carpets. This is obviously not the place to attempt to go into details, but sufficient has been said to indicate the main idea, which, let it be repeated, is but a development of the stage of industrial organization which has already been reached. We shall have in the West to adopt some form of State control almost inevitably before long, why then should not the Southern Slavs make that their starting-point since the road is already marked out, since no vested interests stand in the way, and there is no necessity deliberately to ignore the trend of modern industrial thought in order to allow to grow up a system which we ourselves are preparing to modify in spite of difficulties present with us, with all our past, but absent from the simple social organization of the Serbs?

In this way perhaps the new Serbia may be able to find a point of reconciliation between capitalism and labour, between syndicalism and socialism, between individualism and collectivism, between the old order and the new. These things lie in the future, but their roots are in the present, it is while the ground is clear that the seed can be sown. Such an attempt would be no small glory to the Serbs in the history of mankind, and if successful would confer a lasting benefit on others and on themselves an abiding-place in the history of civilization. Capital of the non-predatory type, too, would probably prefer to embark on industry thus stabilized rather than to meet untrammelled competition.

For many years, however, it is to be hoped that no effort will be made artificially to stimulate industry. The ultimate strength of a nation is derived from agriculture, and for a long time the soil of greater Serbia with its agriculture, its forests, and its pastoral industry will suffice to maintain not merely the present population but

one very much larger. Nations pay dearly enough for industrialism in the loss of many things that make life sane and sweet, in the decay of a sturdy peasantry, in the loss of a simpler and more healthy mode of life, of simpler and healthy pleasures, and of a really gentle code of manners. To transform the Serb peasant into a copy of the western artizan would be a poor work, and if the Serb retains his present dislike for manufacture and town life, the evil would be still worse either in the form of a *corruptio optimi pessima* or in the introduction of an alien-owned and worked industry superimposed upon those elements which have preserved the heritage of the Serb through darkest depression to our own day. "A peasant State", so let it remain as long as may be.

The situation of Serbia's capital has for some years constituted a serious weakness for the State, and in the present war has proved most unfortunate. No other Power has its capital standing actually on the very frontier, and that frontier the one which marches with the most dangerous and formidable foe, in such a position that it can be bombarded from enemy territory immediately war is declared. Serbia had to commence the war with an act which in other States connotes a dangerous military position—the evacuation of her capital and the transference of the organs of government to a temporary seat of administration. Even the position of Paris in the north-east of France, though it is so much further removed from the frontier, has frequently been an embarrassment to France, and the situation of Belgrade regarded as a capital is infinitely worse, though its fine natural position at the junction of the Save and Danube and at the entry of the Morava valley will always make it one of the most important, if not eventually the most important town of the Balkans, Constantinople excepted. When the Turk was more to be feared than the Austrian, and so much of Serbia's moral and intellectual strength was derived from the Vojvodina, the choice of Belgrade was natural, but with the decline of the Turk and the growth of Austrian

ambition Belgrade has become more and more unsuitable for the seat of government. While the capital of a country always tends to grow in population there is no necessity for the choice of the largest town for the capital: the Hague as a city is overshadowed both by Amsterdam and Rotterdam, Rome was not the largest city in Italy when it became the capital of the unified kingdom, Edinburgh is smaller and commercially and industrially much less important than Glasgow, as is the case also with Dublin and Belfast. In former days the choice was restricted owing to the lack of railway communication, but with the growth of the railway system the area of choice is considerably widened and includes towns whose historical associations and more central position entitle them to serious consideration as a future seat of government.

The position will of course be considerably modified if at the end of the war Serbia obtain the opposite shores of the Save and Danube, Syrmia and the southern Banat, and the acquisition of the latter is urged for this very reason as well as on the ground of nationality. With both banks of the river in possession of the Serbs the latter would be able to fortify the approaches to Belgrade, but even so the situation of the latter would be far from ideal in spite also of the direct railway communication with Agram. Even if some portion of southern Hungary in the Banat be obtained the area thus acquired would be comparatively small in extent and the frontier with Hungary would be not more than some sixty miles distant, and the Roumanian frontier—a less important matter—would be still nearer. Moreover, the intervening territory offers no obstacle to military operations as hitherto conceived, the country being a dead level, a continuation of the great Hungarian plain without any marked range of hills. There would be, in fact, no natural obstacle to the advance of an army in this direction, even the principal river, the Theiss, flowing southward to its junction with the Danube. A further point for consideration is that in consequence of the Austrian bombardment the principal

government buildings will have to be rebuilt. The new Skupština House still remained a project at the commencement of the war, and will in any case be a completely new building. The extension, moreover, of the kingdom will call for increased accommodation for the administration, and fresh building on this score will in any case be inevitable. It will not, consequently, be a case of abandoning adequate public buildings in good repair, but in any case of building or rebuilding the majority and of adding to the remainder; it is merely a question whether the inevitable expense is to be incurred in the existing capital or in some other town to be selected. After recent experience, and in view of the fact that the new frontier will in any case not be far distant with no natural obstacles in between, it would seem desirable that Belgrade should be abandoned. It has to be remembered that no great historical traditions are connected with Belgrade as capital, though the town is of extreme antiquity as a site dating at least to the days of the Roman Empire and probably before that. It is significant that in the Middle Ages it was frequently in dispute with Hungary. Even since the emancipation of Serbia Belgrade has not always been the capital, which under Miloš, owing perhaps to the presence of a Turkish garrison at the citadel was fixed at Kragujevac, though the Prince often stayed in Belgrade, while under Prince Michael it was for a time at Kruševac. The latter would be in many ways a better position. It has old historical associations as the capital of the last Tsar Lazar, whose church and the ruins of his castle remain, and of the Despots, his successors, until the advance of the Turks drove them to Smederevo (Semen-dria); it occupies a more central position than Belgrade, Kragujevac, or Niš, and now stands on the railway, which latter though now of narrow gauge will eventually be widened to the normal gauge and extended to meet the existing Bosnian line at Mokragora, just east of Višegrad. When this connection is made Kruševac will be on the direct line between Niš and Sarajevo, and it may also

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be on the Danube-Adriatic line if one of the proposed traces, Kladovo-Niš-Sarajevo-Spljet or Dubrovnik be adopted. It is a small town, but as has been said that is not necessarily an objection, and the very fact of its smallness will enable a new capital to be laid out, an opportunity for town planning which in the future might have the happiest results now that architects have turned so much of their attention to this branch of their art. Indeed the result might eventually from a modest beginning give a fine and distinctive seat of government to the Southern Slav Kingdom. Belgrade could still remain an occasional place of residence as Niš has frequently been since 1878, and in any event as the northern gate into Danubian Serbia it should be strongly fortified, a project for which possession of both banks of the rivers and of the islands in mid-stream would give great facilities. It is a commanding position of which full advantage should be taken, but a frontier fortress, however strong its position, is emphatically not the place for a capital, and such sentiment as may attach to it, itself of quite recent growth, should yield to the still greater national sentiment attached to Kruševac which has been called for the Serbs a "sacred city": no government should be placed in the position of having to evacuate its capital as the first operation of war. It is true that troubles from the north may be less insistent in the future, but Hungary will for some time at least be a jealous neighbour, and in any case the objection to fixing the seat of government in a frontier town remains.

Both orthographies, the Cyrillic and the Croatian, will be put on the same footing, and it has been announced that both will be taught in the schools. Some years ago it was proposed by Croatian patriots to introduce the Cyrillic alphabet into Croatia itself both as a manifestation of Southern Slav solidarity and because of its phonetic quality, but it is unlikely that such a proposal will be made now beyond what is contained in the design to teach all children both orthographies. The central administrative documents will

doubtless continue to be written in the Cyrillic script in order to avoid confusion as the central administration of the enlarged kingdom will be an extension of the present government offices. Any remains of the old jealousy on this score should be assuaged, and the matter regarded as being quite divorced, as naturally it is, from any question of religion or tribal difference, and the field left clear to the eventual predominance of whichever script forms the best vehicle of the common language. On the one hand the Croatian orthography is in line with the script of the western European languages though differentiated by diacritic marks which give it in practice several additional letters, on the other the Cyrillic is allied to the Russian alphabet and can claim the advantages of sentiment and of its phonetic character.

Religion is no longer the dividing force it once was and the difficulties on this score will be less than would formerly have been the case. On sentimental grounds one may hope for the revival of the Serb Patriarchate, nominally perhaps at Peć as England's Primate is of Canterbury, though usually residing in London. The Jesuits in Bosnia have been a strongly anti-national force, but the Society is adaptable and will find it to its own interest to modify its Habsburg loyalty. It is not so strong anywhere in popular favour as to risk taking up an attitude hostile to a united Southern Slavdom when the fact is accomplished, "but", it was remarked to me, "we shall not allow it to proselytize".

[NOTE.—Only since this volume has been in the press have I read the full record of the fiendish cruelties and obscene bestialities committed in Serbia by the Imperial troops, chiefly Magyar, as related by Dr. Reiss: I do not see how Magyars and Serbs will be able to live in amicable juxtaposition, and this modifies the expression of opinion on pages 272, 273. The proposed boundaries having been drawn on a very moderate basis, I think that the proposal made on page 187 (note) might be adopted, i.e. to attribute to Serbia the south-western Bačka and apply to the enclosed Magyar "islets" a policy of cross-migration. In any case the latter policy might be adopted apart from the rectification of frontier mentioned.]

CHAPTER X

THE EUROPEAN IMPORTANCE OF THE SOUTHERN SLAVS

It would seem to be extremely difficult for Englishmen to realize even yet the extent of our interest in the nature of the Southern Slav settlement, and the manner in which a faulty solution will react unfavourably both on the general European position in general and upon our own affairs. While Serbia was standing alone in the path of Austria there was admiration for her gallantry, but there was little understanding that it was our business that was being settled on the Danube. It is true that a writer in the *Times* described her as keeping watch on the Danube and holding the gate to the East, and again, "It is in truth for the supremacy over Great Britain that the fight is being fought out when shells fall upon Serbian regiments", while the Relief Committee reminded the nation that she was guarding the flank of, and making possible our operations in Gallipoli, but I do not think that it will be denied that these words made no impression upon, and conveyed but little of their real meaning to, the generality of the public, ever slow to seize upon a new idea especially in the domain of foreign politics.¹ Nor can it be altogether wondered at when even our political and military leaders failed to grasp the essentials of the problem. Not only was there a reaction from the

¹ "Unfortunately the English mind has no grasp of ideas, and no sense of proportion. Indeed, the Englishman has no mind at all, he has only an hereditary obstinacy".—Creighton.

view that Serbia was the cause of the war to the idea that her affair was the merest occasion (in one sense the Austro-Serb dispute was a mere occasion for the open manifestation of Austro-German aims, but on the other hand one of those aims was Near Eastern predominance), but the intimate bearing of Serb resistance on both our general military position in the East and also on the pursuit of an essential German aim seemed to be ignored. Our rulers, accustomed to look upon the Balkan States from the heights of Olympus and unwilling to mingle in the affairs of Balkan men, did not rise to the full conception of the issues at stake. Now at length we do realize how the whole current of our war in the East (not merely "Serbia's War", as one newspaper's headline constantly ran) has been changed, and we understand how different would be the aspect of affairs if an Allied army stood in front of an intact Serbia on the Danube, but still people do not see the importance of the future settlement. "The Southern Slav question is caviare to the general", remarked a friend of mine the other day. It remains therefore to conclude this volume by a short *résumé* of the extent and manner in which our particular interests are engaged.

The prime importance of the Southern Slavs from a general European point of view lies in the enormous strategical importance of the territory which they occupy, an importance which has not lessened but increased because of the progress of modern politico-commercial development, with its eastward trend and growing connection with the opening up of the areas of hither Asia. The Southern Slavs lie in the way of a German advance eastward, and it was for that reason that the attack on Serbia formed an integral part of Germany's plan of expansion, for it must be remembered that the domination of the Near East is for Germany one of the essential objects for which the war is being waged, and should she at the close of hostilities be in a position to maintain her hold upon the Near East, she would be enabled to derive from that position fresh resources both for her commer-

cial and economic development and for the building up of her military power.¹ Eight years ago the writer remarked in an unpublished study of the Balkan situation, "Austria has strengthened her position in Bosnia, and the next move, if the conditions allow, and if the Entente Powers do not take the only means of precaution—the strengthening of their naval and military resources—will be made against King Peter's realm". Serbia lies on the land route between East and West, and all the main lines of communication from western Europe to Asia Minor, and through Asia Minor to Persia and India, pass through Serb territory. These routes form also the lines of invasion, and whosoever from central Europe would exercise dominion over Asia Minor must sooner or later possess himself of Serbia, just as any southern Asiatic conqueror who desires a European realm must also conquer Serbia. These facts are well marked in the history of the land from ancient days. Under the Roman Empire Moesia Superior was an important province united to Italy by the road which, passing along the Save valley, went through Siscia (Sisak) and thence by Emona (Ljubljana) to Gradisca, Venice, and Milan. It thus formed part of the overland connection between east and west, as well as a barrier against incursions from the Pannonian plain. Naissus (Niš) and Singidunum (Belgrade) were important in those days as now, and when East and West came into conflict the territory now occupied by the Southern Slavs was a frequent scene of conflict. Invasion of Upper Moesia cut off the Eastern Empire from the Western, and resulted in mutual isolation save by sea so long as the invaders remained unsubdued.

Goth and Hun in early times, as the Mongol in the Middle Ages, struck from the north at this nerve centre

¹ Since these words were written the truth of the idea expressed has come more generally, but not generally enough, to be recognized very largely owing to M. Chéradame's book, *The German Plot Unmasked*. A German Near East would mean a German domination of Europe, and if we would prevent a resumption of the plans a strong Jugoslavia is essential.

of the later Empire. When the Ottoman turned his attention to the acquisition of a central European dominion, after he had secured his hold upon Asia Minor, which he conquered from the Seljuk from Thrace, which was the real seat of his power after the conquest of Adrianople, Serbia had to bear the first brunt of the attack. For some time after Kosovo the struggle lacked its fiercest intensity, but when Anatolia was secured and Constantinople had fallen to Mahommed the Conqueror, the days of Serbia were numbered. Six years from the latter event saw the end of Serb independence, followed after another four years by that of Bosnia. Europe then failed to appreciate the danger till it was too late, and the later Serb monarchs had frequently to defend themselves against Hungarian attacks. Hungary paid the penalty for this short-sightedness when, the Serb barrier overthrown, she had to lead the crusade against the Turks, and became herself the prey of the Asiatic invaders. With the decay of Turkish power the tide of conquest turned, as has been seen in a previous chapter, and the Habsburgs began their *Drag nach Osten*. Again it was upon the Serb lands that the waves of invasion broke as the Imperialists drove the Turks back along the roads by which they had advanced. Whether then the course of empire in south-eastern Europe were running westward or eastward, it was always the conquest of the Serb territory that was a necessary preliminary to advance in the enemy's country, always for the West she held the gate of the East, as for the East she held the gate of the West. Had the Southern Slavs been united and strong, the whole current of European history would have been changed; they would have formed a strong buffer State, a barrier regulating and confining the flow of invasion. Too weak to hold back the Turks, they have been too weak to hold back the Habsburgs, and until they are united and have acquired the strength that union will give there will always be chronic unrest in these regions, and one of the most important tasks in diplomacy will be to give them that unity which will enable them to stabilize the ebb and flow

of conflicting ambitions in the Balkan Peninsula: a weak people in an important strategical position will always invite attack from ambitious neighbours and be a source of unending disturbance. The different history of Roumania, a country so much more open to attack geographically, and its comparative autonomy under Turkish rule have been the consequence of its geographical position, and illustrate by contrast the different strategical position of Serbia. Lying in a backwater, away from the great inter-continental routes, Roumania could be left to a certain extent to her own devices; she led nowhere save into the vast expanses of Russia, and the would-be conquerors of central Europe passed through Serbia.

A few geographical details will serve to illustrate shortly the general strategical position of the Southern Slav lands and to act as a commentary upon historical tendencies past and present. The north-western Balkans form the real point of junction between the Balkan Peninsula and central and western Europe. Below Belgrade the Danube is both wide and deep, till it is confined by the mountain masses, its passage through which forms the Iron Gates, below which the river besides being broad is fringed on the north by marshy country. Thus from Belgrade to the Black Sea there is at present only one bridge across the river, that at Černavoda, and even at Belgrade the bridge is not over the Danube but over the Save, the Danube itself being bridged higher up at Petrovaradin. The whole area turns its back upon Italy as Italy does upon the Balkans, the mountain system having its spine close to the shores of the Adriatic, so that the course of the rivers westward is for the most part short, the country thus draining chiefly to the north-east and thence by the Danube into the Black Sea. The north-western portion of the area inhabited by the race thrusts itself forward into the Alpine knot where the Julian, Carnic, and Noric Alps meet, Kranjska (Carniola) being in main the head valley of the Save. From this region the Croatian coast is bordered by the desolate Karst, forming part of the head system of the Dinaric Alps, whose main

longitudinal ridge separates Dalmatia from Bosnia and which throws off spurs throughout the greater part of Bosnia, Montenegro, and the western portion of Danubian Serbia. Croatia and Slavonia, apart from this mountainous region in the west, forms a long Mesopotamia, running eastward between the Drave and the Save with its eastern end formed by the Danube between the points of junction with it of these two rivers. Large portions of this Mesopotamian area are flat, and it is nowhere really mountainous. Bosnia is decidedly mountainous apart from the low-lying region, the Posavina, along the Save. It has easy communication with Dalmatia along the Narenta, the most considerable stream flowing westward; elsewhere for political reasons the passes, such as the Aržano leading to the headwaters of the Cetina, have not been properly exploited. The Hercegovina, like north-western Bosnia which borders the Karst, is a difficult limestone region affording scanty tilth, scored by fissures, and undermined by subterranean watercourses. The central area, though difficult and mountainous, is richer in soil and forest growth. Communications are everywhere difficult by the narrow mountain defiles, the more so as the mountains form tangled knots instead of running in well-defined continuous ranges. Montenegro is a wilderness of mountains, while the sanjak of Novipazar is traversed by mountains whose trend, almost due south, imposes increased difficulties in the way of south-easterly communication.

Old Serbia^{*} is in some ways the key to the Balkan Peninsula. It represents an elevated plain surrounded by high mountain ranges offering but few points of ingress and egress. On the north-west it is closed in by the sanjak system, the Albanian Alps, etc., and here stands the town of Novipazar, itself in a mountainous basin opening to the Ibar. This river opens a way into Danubian Serbia uniting with the western Morava at Kraljevo. It was by this route that the British hospital units retreated from northern Serbia during the Austro-

^{*} Region of Prizren, Priština, etc.

German invasion. From Raška, where the Ibar flows from the plateau of Old Serbia, the north-eastern boundary of the latter is formed by the Kopaonik mountains, ranging to 7,000 feet in height with a practical pass at Prepolac, by which retreated the Serb forces from the Timok valley and Niš, and by which runs one of the traces of the Danube-Adriatic railway. On the south-east lie the Šar Planina and the Crna Gora (Karadagh), the former rising in Ljubitrn to a height of 10,000 feet. Over the Šar is a difficult mountain track to Prizren. Between it and the Karadagh, 3,000 to 4,000 feet high, is the pass of Kačanik, down which flows one of the headwaters of the Vardar past Skoplje. This is also the route of the Mitrovica-Skoplje railway. It was in this direction that the retreating Serbs massed in Old Serbia endeavoured to break through in order to join hands with the French on the lower Vardar, and on the failure of this attempt it was the holding of the northern end of the pass which enabled the bulk of the army to make good its escape by the remaining route, that to the south-west by which Old Serbia connects with Porto Medua, which runs a little to the south of the united Drin, bifurcating from which is the route along the valley of the Black Drin to Debar and Ochrida. The remainder of Old Serbia is closed in by the mountains lining the western edge of the White Drin valley, through which is a difficult route through Peć to Berane, taken by many of the refugees, a few following the head stream of the Ibar which runs to the *north* of the Albanian Alps.

Danubian Serbia approximates in general to Bosnia in its physical features, a tangle of mountains enclosing river valleys, well wooded and offering many difficulties to internal communication. To this there is one outstanding exception in the valley of the Morava, which has been in all ages the great road of communication between central and south-eastern Europe. The river itself reaches the Danube at Smederevo (Semendria), but the railway diverges to Belgrade. The main valley reaches into the

heart of the country to the neighbourhood of Kruševac, not far from which town the eastern and western Moravas unite. The eastern valley leads up to Niš, whence two routes separate. The one passes up the Nissava valley to Pirot, and thence the trunk line goes to Sofia, Philippopolis, and Constantinople, the other runs up the eastern Morava valley, past Vranja to Kumanovo and Skoplje, and thence to Salonica down the Vardar valley, the water-parting between the two streams in the neighbourhood of Kumanovo being low and easy. By way of the western Morava runs the route to Užice and thence to Višegrad and Sarajevo, while at Kraljevo, as has been seen, it is joined by the Ibar; there is thus a certain correspondence between the two head-streams of the Morava. The Oriental Railway runs from Belgrade *viâ* Niš and Sofia to Constantinople, while from Niš runs the Salonica line *viâ* Skoplje.

So much is the line of traffic in the western Balkans dictated by the physical configuration of the country, that at first glance but little difference can be perceived between a modern railway map, showing proposed extensions, and a road map of the later Roman Empire. The Oriental lines follow the track of the old Roman roads; the lines leading to Zagreb and Ljubljana correspond also; the southerly and northerly traces of the Danube-Adriatic line follow also roughly the Roman roads from the modern Alessio through Prizren and the Prepolac pass to Niš, and *viâ* Užice to Sarajevo and the Narenta valley; the sanjak line as proposed also represents an old road, and even the proposed Serbo-Roumanian Danube bridge which is projected is not far from Trajan's bridge. The point is of importance as testifying to the fact that the physical features of the country dictate now as in early days the necessary trace for the great lines of communication—the strategic conditions are permanent.

From the foregoing summary some idea will have been obtained of the general geographical importance of the Southern Slav lands. The Morava valley at each end

receives a confluence of trade routes of the greatest importance, and destined to be more used and of greater value in the future than in the immediate past. The first of these routes is that of the existing Orient express, which from western Europe leads through Vienna and Budapest to Belgrade. This particular stream of traffic may be regarded as having several head-streams—Paris, Antwerp, Ostend, Rotterdam, Hamburg, and Berlin—meaning by that that traffic from these various centres emerges ultimately on Belgrade through Budapest. For some years there has been talk of a new international route from the West which would materially shorten the distance between Paris and Constantinople. This route, known as the Po and Save valley line, would make use of the Simplon tunnel and pass by way of Milan, Venice, Trieste, Ljubljana, and Zagreb to Belgrade. The utilization of this route has hitherto been blocked by Magyar jealousy, but the conclusion of the war on favourable terms would see this obstacle removed. Eventually it could be shortened still further by the construction of more direct lengths of line from Belgrade to Mitrovica on the Save, and from the latter to Slavonian Brod, which would cut off the loops made by the existing track. This international line, which would serve to tap new sources of through traffic, joins the existing Oriental route, as has been seen, at Belgrade. Other trans-continental routes converge at the same point, for the shortest line from Warsaw to Constantinople and Salonica runs through Budapest to Belgrade, as does also the most direct line from Riga through Vilna and Lemberg, though in the latter case connections between Burgas and Varna and thence with the Roumanian system *viâ* Dobrić might eventually provide a shorter line.

All these convergent routes pass together up the Morava valley as far as Niš, where they meet a similar convergence of routes from Asia Minor and the Levant, which may be regarded as a branching out of the routes already mentioned. From Niš the Oriental line runs through Sofia to Constantinople, and along this passes all traffic which

has been gathered in at Belgrade, from west, north-west, and north, which is making for that city. Important as this route is it will be of infinitely greater importance in the near future. With the completion of the Bagdad railway to the Persian Gulf will be established a new overland route to India. Nor is that all. There will inevitably be before long with the decay of old prejudices on the point a southern Persian line which, linking up at one extremity with the Bagdad line, will find its eastern terminus by way of the existing Indian system at Bombay. This will be a genuinely overland route to the East, broken only by the short Channel crossing from Dover and the still shorter crossing over the Bosphorus from Constantinople, and if train-ferry services were established over those breaks it would be possible to travel in the same railway carriage from London to Bombay. Such a line would not compete with the sea route for goods traffic, save perhaps for a small number of articles of little bulk and high value, but it would attract those passengers for whom a sea voyage has no attractions, and still more those whose object it is to reach their destination as soon as possible. Its effect on English trade development would be largely by its action on the personal element, since the English importer or exporter would be able to make a comparatively quick passage to India to study local conditions on the spot or to meet his Indian correspondents. From Niš diverges another through route of immediate importance up the head valley of the eastern Morava and down the Vardar to Salonica. The importance of the latter will in some respects yield to that of the Piræus, for with the completion of the Greek lines to form a junction with the Salonica line, now just completed, the Piræus may become the southern terminus of the present overland route instead of Brindisi, the voyage from the former to Alexandria being some three hundred miles shorter than that from the latter. Salonica also is a focus for Levantine traffic in and out. Hence Niš, "the Clapham

Junction of the Balkans," and Belgrade are of greater importance than Sofia or Skoplje, for while the former bestride both the Vienna-Constantinople line and the Vienna-Salonica, Sofia bestrides only the Constantinople line, and Skoplje only the Salonica route.

It will be seen, therefore, that the Morava valley controls all the main arteries of traffic in the Balkans. All land traffic to the East from the western seaports from Marseilles to Rotterdam, as from Milan, Paris, Brussels, and Amsterdam, and all the traffic from the northern ports from Hamburg to Riga, as from Berlin, Vienna, Prague, and Warsaw, enter the valley at Belgrade, while from Niš diverge the land routes to Constantinople and eventually to India, as well as the southern lines of traffic to Salonica and the Piræus and thence by sea to Alexandria and the Suez Canal. If, as a result of the war, Asia Minor comes under civilized government and its vast natural resources are developed, it will become one of the richest regions of the world. What it was in ancient days, as Mesopotamia also, is known to every student, and its interior is studded with the ruins of what used to be great and prosperous cities. If in some respects its natural fertility has been decreased by deforestation and consequent denudation, yet its potential agricultural and pastoral wealth is immense. With the construction of roads and railways its mineral resources will be developed, its copper and coal as well as its marble quarries. A great commerce will spring up and the land routes to it will correspondingly increase in importance. It was with a sure insight that the Germans marked it down for their own, and so marking it cast their eyes also on the means of access, the lands of the Southern Slav who holds the gate to the East. Thus is apparent the rôle of the race as the great obstacle in the *Drang nach Osten*. The Germans so long as they cherish ambitions in hither Asia are bound to seek to crush the Southern Slavs, and conversely all those whose interest it is that German penetration in the Near East

should be prevented are bound by motives of self-interest, apart altogether from the doctrine of nationality or from any feelings of sentiment, to see to it that the Southern Slav barrier should be made as strong as possible. We English in particular have tremendous interests—naval, political, and commercial—in these regions, and consequently as a matter of purely self-regarding policy must give our closest heed to the settlement of the western Balkans. For years we have been disquieted by the hold of the Germans over the Bagdad railway, it has been a question that has aroused fiercest criticism of the conduct of our foreign policy; we have felt the menace of the approach to our Indian frontier of an aggressive military Power, and felt it so acutely that it furnished the incentive to the accommodation of our long-standing disputes with Russia, it gave us an insight into our true interests and the harmfulness of a suspicion which had crystallized with one political party into a maxim of policy; we saw the menace to our naval interests in the establishment of the second naval Power on the flank of our sea route to the East in close proximity to Egypt and the Suez Canal, and so in Persia the era of rivalry with Russia was closed by an accord. These interests must form an abiding preoccupation of English statesmen, and it is therefore incumbent upon them to strengthen our position by a means which will make no call upon us, and raise up no fresh rival, by establishing upon a firm basis a State which can never be a danger to ourselves.

It is not only the trans-continental traffic east and west which passes through Serbia. At the time of the annexation of Bosnia a great deal was heard of the proposed Danube-Adriatic line whose original trace was *viâ* Niš, the Prepolac pass, and Prizren to Porto Medua. The object of this line was both to provide Serbia with an outlet to the sea and to form a junction with the Roumanian system. After the war it will be one of the first tasks of the government to build this line. The trace, however, will be altered in accordance with the altered territorial arrange-

ments on the eastern Adriatic. If Spljet (Spalato) be left in Serb hands, and in such a way that its harbour is not commanded by foreign guns, then the line starting from the Danube at Kladova will run *viâ* Niš, the western Morava valley to Užice, Sarajevo, Bugojno, and the Aržano pass to Spljet. On this route connection will have to be made between Užice and Mokragora, and beyond Bugojno with Sinj, moreover the sections Niš-Užice and Mokragora-Bugojno are narrow gauge (2 feet 6 inches). An alternative trace which has not much to recommend it and would require a lot of new work is along the Danube to Belgrade and thence to Sarajevo. Should the position at Spljet be such as is foreshadowed by the secret treaty with Italy, then the Serbs will be well advised to abandon Spljet as a terminus in spite of its position and advantages, and to fix it at a port where they would be masters in their own house. By establishing Gruž (Gravosa), the port of Dubrovnik, as the terminus the latter part of the line from Sarajevo would be formed by the existing narrow-gauge line to the port mentioned: it would have to be made of normal gauge and a tunnel pierced through the Bielašnica range where now rack and pinion are utilized. Less will probably be heard of the proposed southerly trace, since the Serbs will naturally prefer to develop their own harbours rather than any Albanian port. A possible trace, however, would be from Kraljevo up the Ibar valley to Berane and thence by Kolašin to Antivari (a poor port) or Budva, which potentially is a good one. A lot of new work would be required here, and the line would be costly to construct, and in all probability the Danube-Adriatic railway will find its terminus at Gruž or Spljet. This line, however, is much more than a Danube-Adriatic railway. The project is to carry it over the Danube by a railway bridge and so to form a junction with the Roumanian system. It will thus become a transverse continental line, connecting the Adriatic with Bucharest, and through Bucharest with Odessa, Kiev, and Moscow. It will thus become an important avenue of through traffic with Roumania and

Russia, an avenue, it will be noticed, that crosses the great east and west routes at Niš at the southern end of the Morava "funnel", so that Niš will become the greatest rail and road centre in the Balkans. This line, also, emphasizes the important strategic position of Serbia and the Morava valley as the focus of trans-Balkan trade routes.

Enough has, perhaps, been said to bring out the European importance of the Southern Slav lands and therefore of a full and proper settlement of the Southern Slav question. The Southern Slavs occupy one of the most important strategic areas on the continent, all movements of conquest from nearer Asia into Europe or *vice versa* have perforce made their way through this land, and it is a European interest that the Southern Slav monarchy should be strong enough successfully to sustain the rôle thrust upon it. It has not been a matter of ambition or of national restlessness that has made this people loom so large in recent diplomatic history. Apart from the circumstance of the parcelling out of the nationality among several governments, it has been the territorial distribution of the race that has thrust it willy nilly into the vortex of vast diplomatic combinations and immense ambitions. It cannot escape its destiny in the future any more than in the past, the happiness that belongs to a nation that has no history has never been Serbia's nor ever will be; if she does not make history herself others will make it for her; either she will be a strong barrier to lawless ambition or she will be again, as in the past, the roadway of conflicting nations of irreconcilable ambitions. If then anything like a permanent settlement is desired in the Near East, if in our own selfish interests—apart from all other considerations—we desire to put a term to the Germanic *Drang nach Osten*, then our course is clearly marked out, we must effect the union of the Southern Slav race and strengthen it by every legitimate means in our power. A strong Southern Slav kingdom will be a stabilizing element both in the narrow Balkan problem

and in that much graver question of the future relationship between East and West, of the future interactions of central Europe and hither Asia. The European function of the greater Serbia of the future is to act as a sort of spring buffer between East and West so that political shocks having their origin in either quarter can be taken up and absorbed. That is clearly marked in the whole history of Serbia, in the history of Tsar Dušan, when for a time it seemed as if she might be able to take up and absorb the Turkish impact, as in the history of King Peter when the impact comes from the opposite direction. Not hitherto has this buffer been strong enough to stand up to its work, and it must be the task of the Allies in the general European settlement so to re-establish it that in future it will be able to perform its appointed work. A weak buffer State such as diplomatists love is useless, it can never do its work, it is always inviting attack, and is thus the cause of ceaseless jealousy and of constant trouble. This spring buffer of fundamental importance in the general European mechanism must be made as strong as possible. It would indeed be well for Europe if the Southern Slavs were more numerous and stronger than they are, yet I think that in union they will be, with proper support, strong enough for the purpose. As we have seen, a united Southern Slavdom would be even now a nation of some twelve millions, and as the area they inhabit amounts to some 90,000 square miles there is room for a much larger population. With a population of three hundred to the square mile at some future date the land would not be overcrowded in view of all its resources, and thus eventually we should have a nation numbering between twenty-five and thirty millions, which should be strong enough to hold the gate and to prevent it from being forced.

If this desirable consummation is to be attained we must approach the settlement with a clear eye, not only to the innate justice of the Southern Slav cause, but also to our own national interests, which in this matter are also the general interests of Europe. We must endeavour

even at the eleventh hour to bring to a wiser frame of mind those who, blind to their real advantage, would seek out of causeless jealousy to bring about a maimed and partial settlement which, so far from furthering European interests, would work them perhaps irretrievable harm, which might drive the Southern Slavs into a fatal course, which so far from bringing peace to south-eastern Europe would bring a sword and be the precursor of future wars, which instead of stabilizing the Balkan position would result in chronic unrest, and would fail to provide the bulwark we need. That bulwark can only surely be built up if all the Southern Slavs are united under the white double eagle of the Nemanjić. It is to our interest, to Europe's interest, equally to the interest of the threefold Southern Slav stock that not Serbs alone, but Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes should now at long last after five centuries of martyrdom gallantly borne enjoy the fruition of the aspiration expressed in S. Sava's proverb cherished all these long years, and enshrined in the four C's (in the Cyrillic alphabet), which find a place in the national arms of Serbia, "*Samo Sloga Srbina Spasava*"—Union alone is Serb salvation.



NOTE ON THE MAP

THIS map is included, by kind permission of the Yugoslav Committee, for the purpose of giving a general idea of the ethnographic features of the Southern Slav lands. Unfortunately the Rumanian element in North-Eastern Serbia is not indicated, nor the Albanian element in "Old Serbia." It would have been well, also, to differentiate the "Macedo-Slovenes." Apart, however, from these omissions, the map is substantially accurate. It has been included in lieu of a map specially prepared for this volume by the author which it was found impracticable to reproduce.

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